ESSAYS

MOSTLY FROM THE *DUBLIN REVIEW*,

By W. G. WARD, D.Ph.

ESSAYS

ON THE CHURCH'S DOCTRINAL AUTHORITY.

BY

WILLIAM GEORGE WARD, D.Ph.

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TO THE

Right Rev. Herbert Lord Bishop of Salford.

MY DEAR BISHOP OF SALFORD,

I FEEL it a great gratification, that you have permitted me to connect publicly your name with my own on the present occasion. From the time when our friendship commenced with our united work at S. Edmund's in 1855–1858, you have been associated (I may say) with every event of my life, public and private. Your incessant activity of labour has never prevented you from giving me patient attention and carefully-considered advice, under my various perplexities and troubles. And I hope I may add without impropriety, that I have found my knowledge of *yourself* a greater blessing, than even your acts of unwearied kindness. I account your friendship as amongst the highest privileges I possess.

You have throughout heartily encouraged my efforts in the "Dublin Review"; and indeed, during the later years of my Editorship, you consented to act as one of its Censors. I cannot doubt therefore that you will approve the general drift of these Essays. I hope you may also think, that the selection from my articles has been not injudiciously made; and that what little I have added is in sufficient harmony with the rest.

Begging your blessing,
I am ever,
My dear BISHOP OF SALFORD,
Your affectionate friend,
W. G. WARD.

PREFACE.

There is a closer connection than might be thought at first sight, between the various Essays which I here submit to the judgment of English Catholics. On the surface it would appear, that the first four and last three are exclusively concerned with Catholic domestic controversies; and that the intermediate ones are exclusively directed against externs. This is by no means entirely so, as I will presently explain. But I will begin with referring to the fundamental domestic controversy treated in the volume.

I have mentioned in my Preliminary Essay, what were the circumstances which compelled me to dwell so earnestly, in the "Dublin Review," on the Church's Infallibility in her ordinary and unintermittent magisterium. It is really no caricature of what used to be implied by certain writers, to say that, on their view, it is the business of a cultured and leisured Catholic to construct for himself his own religious system.

He must base that system indeed partially on the Church's Definitions of Faith; i.e. on those Definitions, of which the contravention is actual heresy: but in no other way need he submit to her authority. Of course as regards the enormous majority of Catholics — those who are not fitted for theoretical speculation — to profess such a Rule of Faith would be self-evident foolery. But the "Home and Foreign Review" virtually maintained, that the highly-cultivated intellect should seek religious truth by a method essentially different from that accessible to the ordinary believer. Indeed the Editor (see p. 49 of this volume) described "the instructed minority" as the Church's divinely-appointed teachers; whose lead the Pope, the Episcopate, the ignorant herd, are slowly and laboriously to follow in each other's company. This amazing position I had to meet with the most emphatic of negatives; and no other part of my controversial duty was so indispensable.

Now the one Catholic Doctrine available for such a purpose was this: that the whole magisterium of the Ecclesia Docens is simply infallible; and that an entirely unreserved submission to that magisterium is a duty,

no less incumbent on the ablest and most thoughtful philosopher, than on the most ignorant peasant. On this Doctrine therefore I earnestly and repeatedly insisted. In various parts of this volume I have attempted to exhibit my own idea, how large is the ground covered by that infallible magisterium; and how extensive therefore is the intellectual captivity imposed by God on every loyal Catholic. As regards the particular question, whether intellectual captivity or intellectual independence be the true intellectual liberty,—I would submit what I have said in pp. 320–326. And on the general subject I have just named, I would refer to pp. 11, 12; 71; 117; 178, 9; 181–4; 310; 325; 361; 528–530; and especially to pp. 185–204. Before all other things, I would solicit the reader's attention to what I have put forth on this theme; and I would specially entreat competent theologians to correct any error or exaggeration, into which I may have fallen thereon. I submit that the good Catholic's mental attitude — however highly instructed he may be; nay in one sense the more, in *proportion* as he may be more highly instructed (see p. 72);—is predominantly one of intellectual captivity: of continuous searching to discover

the Church's true mind: of resolve to pursue his own speculations, in entire harmony with, and submission to, that mind.* Observe what even Dr. Döllinger says, as quoted in p. 325, note. And consider again what emphatic stress is laid by all approved Catholic authorities, on the "sentire cum Ecclesiâ."

A second theme on which I have laid stress, is the large extent of the Church's *definitional* Infallibility. See especially the Tenth Essay, with its two Appendices. The fundamental assumption of my argument in this Essay is, that the Church, if infallible at all, must necessarily *possess* whatever Infallibility she *claims*. As to this assumption, see what I have said in p. 322.

To my mind, the great interest and importance of this *second* question is its intimate connection with the *former*. If the Church's infallible Definitions are as numerous as I believe them to be,—from this alone it would follow, that the loyal Catholic's mental attitude is predominantly one of intellectual captivity.

* I am speaking of course concerning those questions alone—but surely they are beyond comparison the most important of all—which are connected with man's moral and spiritual interests, whether individual, social, or political.

And on the other hand, if a Catholic recognises how large is that infallible unwritten magisterium to which his intellectual submission is due,—he will not be startled at the large number of infallible Definitions, which (as I maintain) are obligatory on his absolute interior assent. I may here also add a remark, for which no natural place has occurred in the volume. Those who have been in the habit of deferring profoundly to the Church's whole magisterium, and labouring to ascertain her true mind,—will very rarely indeed (I think) experience any kind of even superficial difficulty, in accepting this or that minor Definition, which may issue from the infallible See.* Such Definition will be found almost invariably to do no more, than express distinctly what has throughout been ascertainably involved in the Church's practical teaching.

At the same time I by no means intend to imply, that every Catholic, who is in spirit full of loyalty to the Church's teaching office, will as a matter of course accept this or that theory, concerning the extent of her definitional Infalli-

* As to the broad distinction, in the way of practical effect, between a Definition *of faith* and a *minor* infallible Definition,—I would solicit special attention to what I have said in pp. 502, 3.

bility. In p. 27, note, I draw attention to M. de Haulleville's testimony, that Montalembert e.g. was in intention unreservedly submissive to the Church's voice. But I think even a stronger supposition may be made. I think that the very extent and thoroughness of some given person's loyalty to the Church might make him less ready than he would be otherwise, to see the injurious effect produced on more ordinary minds by some inadequate doctrine on the Church's definitional Infallibility. I might fully admit this, as I do; and yet I might think that the effect of such inadequate doctrine on the *mass* of those who accept it, is very unfortunate.

At last however I need not say, that the question directly to be considered, as to any given theory, is not whether it be expedient but whether it be true. And this therefore is the question, which I more prominently submit to competent judges. But I think indeed it will be admitted by persons of every school that, if what I have urged on the subject is even substantially and approximately true, it is of extreme practical importance. Take one instance. A large amount of familiar intercourse between Catholics and non-Catholics is an

absolute necessity of our time. It can be no matter then of inferior moment, whether I am correct in what I have said pp. 70–81. It can be no unimportant matter whether it be absolutely necessary for any Catholic, who desires to retain his grasp of Catholic Dogma and live what may be called a Catholic life,—that he labour actively to surround himself with a Catholic atmosphere, and to place himself in constant contact with Catholic influences. Another even stronger instance concerns Catholic higher education. In my humble judgment—I speak however with great deference — the diffusion among English Catholic youths of higher and deeper intellectual culture than they now possess, may be a signal blessing; but it also may be a signal calamity. It will (I think) be one or the other, accordingly as secure provision may or may not be made, that those who receive such culture shall be fully imbued with the Church's true and genuine spirit. See pp. 99, 100 of this volume. On a future occasion I shall be able (I hope) to exhibit my reasons for grave apprehension on the subject; most of which indeed I have already, from time to time, set forth in the "Dublin Review." The decision of ecclesias-

tical authority indeed has been strongly pronounced. Nor can I abandon the hope that a time may speedily come, when the true Catholic spirit, with which youths are now imbued by the healthy discipline of Ushaw and Stonyhurst, shall receive its fuller and more mature development in some more advanced Institution, no less entirely removed than they are from the intrusion of non-Catholic principles.

And there is an especial reason—of which I speak in p. 564—why it is more important at this epoch than it might have been in other times to exhibit clearly the amount of intellectual captivity which the Church imposes on a loyal Catholic. I refer to the singularly rapid growth of what I have called "individualism" outside her pale.

I now pass to the historical argument for the truth of Catholicity, as contained in some of the following Essays. When Dr. Pusey's Eirenicon appeared, the "Month" said that one of its great results should be "the calm and positive statement of Catholic Doctrine on the part of trained and practised theologians, whose works might take their place among the permanent treasures of our literature." Accordingly F. Harper issued, as soon as might

be, one most valuable volume; and afterwards a second. Certainly I am no "trained and practised theologian." Yet it seemed in harmony with the then general feeling of English Catholics, that the "Dublin Review" should not content itself with a mere exposure of Dr. Pusey's more prominent fallacies; but should utilize the occasion, by setting forth affirmatively the Church's historical basis. It might appear indeed presumptuous, that one so little versed as I am in patristic knowledge should attempt such a task; and I refer apologetically to this disqualification, in p. 124. Nevertheless I thought there was a service of some importance, which I could render in the matter. I am not acquainted with a single Anglican (still less ordinary Protestant) controversialist, who has shown so much as a faint apprehension of the Catholic historical argument *as a whole*. On the other hand Catholic controversialists—who invariably imply this argument—have not in general (I think) sufficiently displayed its full force. They have been more occupied in encountering their opponents on this or that individual historical fact, than in making clear the reasonable *bearing* of historical facts in the aggregate. In order to explain what I here

mean—I would refer to what I have said in p. 352; in pp. 415–418; and in pp. 420–428. Much of course has been written on both sides, since my articles originally appeared. But I cannot find, either that the Catholic additions supersede, or that the new anti-Catholic arguments tend to invalidate, the reasoning of my Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Essays. For instance I have looked cursorily at a series of anti-Roman articles in the "Church Quarterly," which have been for some time proceeding. They are written (so far as I have observed) in a perfectly Christian and temperate tone. But I have been quite surprised to observe how manifestly irrelevant their whole reasoning is seen to be, when once the true lie of the argument is understood.

I should add that the Essays I have named —the Fifth, Eighth and Ninth—are by no means merely directed against the Anglican as "ad hominem." They will hold their own, I trust, against every section of non-Roman Christians. They assume no other premiss (see p. 309), than that Christianity comes from God; and that the facts, recorded in the New Testament, are on the whole substantially true.

The Essays on "Corporate Union" and

"The Council of Florence" were written with less help than the others from Catholic writers. Doubtless therefore they may be especially conspicuous for mistakes; and in particular I may have made historical bungles in the second of the two. But I do think I have abundantly shown, how hopeless is any attempt to adduce the facts of that Council, as giving any kind of countenance to the Anglican dreams about Corporate Union.

I said at starting, that there is much greater connection than appears on the surface, between *all* the different contents of the volume. In fact—of those passages to which I just now drew attention, as bearing on the Church's Infallibility in her whole practical magisterium, —the great majority are taken from the very Essays, which handle the Anglican controversy. The reason of this fact is worth observing. Just as some Catholics have seemed to fancy, that the Church teaches infallibly no other truths except those which she has defined;—so a certain not very dissimilar error has prevailed among Anglicans. Cardinal Newman (see p. 112 of this volume) represented Anglicans as expressly maintaining a doctrine, which certainly their arguments always seem

to imply. They hold, he said, that the Faith "has ever existed in the Church whole and entire;" "*recognized* as such," "*ascertainable* as such," apart from any dependence on the Church's testimony; "entirely objective and detached" from the Church, the Church "being in the background."* It was an essential portion therefore of the anti-Anglican argument, to show how opposed are historical facts to this fancy sketch. In other words, it was absolutely necessary to exhibit the large extent and infallible authority of the Church's unwritten and unformulized Doctrinal magisterium, as that magisterium was exercised from the very first. See for instance pp. 113–119. I fail to see how those Catholics, who confine the Church's Infallibility to her Definitions, can consistently give any satisfactory historical proof of her divinely given authority.

So much on the reasonings set forth in this volume. As regards its general contents—I must not omit a tribute of respect and affection to the memory of my late venerable friend, Canon Oakeley. In pp. 13, 14,—and again in

* This passage occurs in the review of Palmer's Treatise on the Church. Cardinal Newman has republished that article in his "Essays Critical and Historical," vol. i.

pp. 210–213,—will be found extracts from a pamphlet of his; extracts which every one (I think) will account eminently characteristic of his profoundly Catholic spirit, not to speak of his uniformly clear and most graceful style. Since those pages were printed off, he has been removed from among us; and he has left behind him (I venture to say) but few who exceed him in humility, simplicity, unselfishness, unworldliness. I have a right to speak, because he honoured me with his friendship to the last; and in our Anglican days we were especially intimate. Though he was much my senior—together we pursued that course of inquiry, which led us to accept (the then) Mr. Newman as our one master in religious Doctrine; and together we pursued that course of inquiry which led us to the further conclusion, that Mr. Newman's teaching had its legitimate issue in the Communion of Rome. Mr. Oakeley looked through—sheet by sheet—my Anglican work, "The Ideal of a Christian Church, &c." before it was published; and when it was condemned, he identified himself both with the book and the condemnation. From the first he was just what his friends remember him to have been at the last: so full

of public spirit and so devoted to public objects, that the remembrance of self seemed literally to have no place in his thought. May he rest in peace!

Before concluding, I must perform a very acceptable task. I mention in p. 33 how great was the comfort and encouragement afforded me in the earlier days of my Editorship, by the approval and the counsels of Cardinal Wiseman and his Successor. At a later period I received a still more consolatory testimony, as proceeding from a still higher authority; nor can I be content without placing that testimony on the most permanent record I can. In 1870, Pius IX. honoured me with the following Letter:—

"PIUS P.P. IX.

"Beloved Son, health and Apostolic Bene-
"diction.

"We congratulate thee, beloved son, that
"having been called into the light of God's
"sons, thou labourest to diffuse the same light
"over the minds of others; and that, having
"been received into the bosom of Holy Mother
"Church, thou studiest to exhibit and illustrate
"her holiness, and to assert the divine autho-

" rity of her supreme Pastor, to vindicate his
" Prerogatives, to defend all his Rights. In this
" we see the nobleness of a mind which, having
" been drawn forcibly to the truth by mature
" examination, burns for it with more inflamed
" love, in proportion as it has gained it with
" greater labour; and occupies itself with ex-
" tending further the received blessing with
" more intense effort, in proportion as (taught
" by its own experience) it accounts the con-
" dition of those in error more miserable. The
" unwearied labour with which, for many years
" past, thou hast applied all the gifts of ability,
" knowledge, erudition, eloquence, given thee
" by the Lord, to supporting the cause of our
" most holy religion and of this Apostolic See,
" plainly shows the faith inherent in thy mind
" and the charity diffused in thy heart, whereby
" thou art pressed to redeem the past time,
" and to atone for any controversy formerly
" perhaps undertaken in behalf of error, by
" alacrity and strenuousness in defending truth.
" But since a sure reward is prepared for him who
" sows justice, and those who train many there-
" to shall shine like stars for ever and ever,—
" while we rejoice that thou thus wreathest for
" thyself a garland,—we exhort thee at the same

"time that thou pursue thy design, and con-
"tinue to fight valiantly the Lord's battles; in
"order that thou mayest ever lead forward
"more into the way of truth, and mayest ob-
"tain for thyself a more splendid weight of
"eternal glory. We wish thee, therefore, the
"necessary strength for this, and supplicate
"copious helps of divine grace and all blessings;
"and as the foretaste of these and as a pledge
"of our paternal good-will, we very lovingly
"impart to thee the Apostolic Benediction.

"Given at Rome, at Saint Peter's, on the
"4th day of July, in the year 1870, being the
"twenty-fifth of our Pontificate.

"PIUS P.P. IX."*

* "PIUS P.P. IX.

"DILECTE FILI, Salutem et Apostolicam Benedictionem.—
"Gratulamur tibi, dilecte fili, quod in filiorum Dei lucem vocatus,
"idem lumen aliorum mentibus offundere certes; et, in gremium
"sanctæ Matris Ecclesiæ receptus, sanctitatem ejus ostendere et
"illustrare studeas, supremique ejusdem Pastoris divinam asserere
"auctoritatem, vindicare prærogativas, jura omnia tueri. Nobili-
"tatem in hoc videmus animi, qui, ad veritatem maturo compulsus
"examine, eo incensiore ignis flagrat amore, quo majore conten-
"tione illam est adeptus; et eo impensiore nisu beneficium acceptum
"latis porrigere satagit, quo miseriorem, propriâ doctus experientiâ,
"censet errantium conditionem. Indefessus autem labor, quo
"pluribus ab hinc annis dona omnia ingenii, scientiæ, eruditionis,
"eloquentiæ, tibi a Domino largita, confers ad religionis nostræ

Last year our present Holy Father expressed his most welcome approval in a different shape. The Cardinal Archbishop's letter, announcing the fact, ran as follows:—

"Archbishop's House,
"Westminster,
"*Nov.* 7, 1879.

"MY DEAR DR. WARD,

"Our Holy Father Leo XIII., by a "letter from the Cardinal Secretary of State,

---

"Sanctissimæ et hujus Apostolicæ Sedis causam propugnandam, "fidem perspicue præfert inditam menti tuæ et charitatem in tuo "corde diffusam; quibus urgeris ad redimendum præteritum "tempus, et certamen imprudenter alias pro errore fortasse com-"missum rependendum, per alacrem ac strenuam veritatis defen-"sionem. Quoniam vero merces fidelis paratur seminanti justitiam, "et qui ad eam erudiunt multos fulgebunt quasi stellæ in perpetuas "æternitates, dum te tuum ita sertum texere gaudemus, te simul "hortamur, ut instes proposito tuo, et impigre præliari pergas "prælia Domini, quo et plures semper ad viam veritatis adducas, "et splendidius tibi compares æternæ gloriæ pondus. Necessarias "idcirco ad hoc vires tibi ominamur, copiosaque adprecamur "gratiæ cœlestis auxilia et fausta omnia; eorumque auspicem et "paternæ nostræ benevolentiæ pignus Apostolicam Benedictionem "tibi peramanter impertimus.

"Datum Romæ, apud Sanctum Petrum, die 4 Julii, anno 1870, "Pontificatûs Nostri anno vicesimo quinto.

"PIUS P.P. IX.

"*Dilecto Filio* GEORGIO WARD."

" commands me to inform you, that His Holiness
" has been pleased to confer upon you the
" *Commenda* of the Order of St. Gregory; and
" at the same time to make known the motives
" which have prompted the Holy Father to
" bestow on you this distinguished mark of
" confidence.

" His Holiness is fully aware of the fidelity
" and labour with which, in the last seventeen
" or eighteen years, you have devoted yourself
" and your means to the conduct of the 'Dublin
" Review,' and to your other writings for the
" vindication of the Doctrinal Authority of the
" Holy See and of its civil rights. The Holy
" Father knows also how forward and able a
" defender you have been of Christian and
" Catholic Philosophy, against the manifold ab-
" errations of modern metaphysics; and against
" the theories which, in rejecting metaphysics
" altogether, deny the evidence of reason and
" of sense, together with the freedom of the
" will, thereby undermining all morality.

" It was with this information before him,
" that the Holy Father desired the Cardinal
" Secretary to write as follows:—That 'this
" ' distinction is conferred on you in testimony
" ' of the high esteem in which His Holiness

" ' holds the services rendered by you to the
" ' Church and to Science, especially in Philo-
" ' sophy, by the publication of your works;
" ' and of the great satisfaction with which
" ' the Holy Father sees a Catholic layman
" ' employing the lights and talents which
" ' Divine Providence has bestowed upon him,
" ' for the defence of the rights of the Roman
" ' Pontiff which have been violated, and for
" ' the diffusion of the doctrines against which
" ' the self-called philosophers of our times
" ' direct their attacks.'

" Believe me, my dear Dr. Ward,
" Your affectionate Servant
" in Jesus Christ,

" HENRY EDWARD CARDINAL MANNING,
" Archbishop of Westminster."

The volume, now submitted to the public, has received (I trust) fully sufficient theological supervision. The articles, of which it is mostly composed, were of course submitted to the three Censors of the "Dublin Review"; nor have I introduced into them any substantial change whatever, though I

have made various verbal corrections and various omissions. The Latin pamphlet, herein translated, was carefully supervised by a distinguished Roman theologian. Lastly, the whole as it stands has been examined by a most competent theological censor, approved for that purpose by the Cardinal Archbishop. I need hardly add, that I submit every part most unreservedly to the Voice of the Holy See. But I am also earnest in submitting it to the judgment of theologians. Certainly I have taken the best pains I could, to arrive throughout at true conclusions; but this has by no means been my sole end. One principal hope of mine has been, that theologians may be induced to bestow more careful and sustained attention than (I think) they have commonly done, on the line of theological country over which I have been here in part obliged to travel.

St. Joseph's Day, 1880.

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PRELIMINARY ESSAY.

[December 1879.]

I MUST beg my readers' indulgence, for beginning this volume with some personal explanations. And I am the less unwilling to ask of them this favour, because no one (I think) will say that I have been unduly addicted to obtruding my individuality on public attention. But grave exception has been taken against several of the following Essays, by various excellent Catholics whom I deeply respect; nay by persons, whose approval would be to me among the highest of earthly gratifications. The republication then of writings which have been so censured, seems the suitable occasion for me to speak directly in their defence; and I cannot do so without some reference to my personal history. If, after weighing what I have to say, these excellent persons still disapprove the general substance and tone of what I have written, they have (I need not say) the fullest right to do so. But—apart from all private considerations—I think it of some importance even as regards general Catholic interests, that I avail myself of the opportunity now presented, and exhibit my case from my own point of view.

I.

I would ask my readers then in the first place to remember the state of things which existed in Catholic England, when I was entrusted with the office of editing the "Dublin Review." At that time it is hardly too much to say, that the one organized intellectual agency at work among English Catholics was wielded by the "Home and Foreign Review." How great had been the influence of that periodical, and its predecessor the "Rambler," I had (and have) no means of certainly knowing. But I believed it to be (and now believe it to have been) very considerable indeed; if we take into account (as is reasonable) not those only who followed these periodicals into their more extreme conclusions, but those also who accepted in a vague and general way the cardinal principles therein defended. At all events—whether the influence of which I am speaking were less or greater—as regards the *character* of that influence, I had no doubt whatever. Certainly the conductors of the two periodicals were thoroughly sincere and well-intentioned. But I have the firmest conviction, that they were labouring to introduce what was in fact deadly poison, into the course of English Catholic thought.*

* I am far from meaning—I need hardly say—that any given Catholic, who may have happened to write this or that article in one or other of the two periodicals, is on that account reasonably included in this indictment. It so happens indeed that in July 1866 (p. 94) I cited with warm praise an article from the "Home

Cardinal Wiseman, towards the end of his life, expressed a deliberate and solemn judgment on this matter. These were his words, addressed to the clergy of his diocese on August 5, 1862. His Eminence was immediately referring to some comments made by the "Home and Foreign Review," on what had recently occurred in Rome.

"But this [added his Eminence] can hardly excite surprise in us, who know the antecedents of that journal under another name; the absence for years of all reverence in its treatment of persons and things deemed sacred; its grazing over the very edge of the most perilous abysses of error; and its habitual preference of un-Catholic to Catholic instincts tendencies and motives. In uttering these sad thoughts,—and entreating you to warn your people, especially the young, against such dangerous leadership,—believe me, I am only obeying a higher direction than my own impulses, and acting under much more solemn sanctions. Nor shall I stand alone in this unhappily necessary correction."

This passage expresses an emphatic and severe judgment on the Cardinal's own part; and the Bishop of Birmingham speedily followed, with words of even graver import and more stringent censure. But a further fact is intimated in the Cardinal's pronouncement. His Eminence was not, it seems, merely expressing his own judgment; but obeying an injunction,

and Foreign," on Irish University Education. But I believe as a matter of fact, that the great majority of contributors to the "Rambler" and "Home and Foreign" were substantially at one with the Editor's principles.

which had been laid by the Holy Father on him and his episcopal brethren, to warn their flocks against "the dangerous leadership" of these writers. I may further add that (as I have already implied) my own personal judgment—so far as I could trust it—went the whole length of Cardinal Wiseman's strictures, and even further.

Something might also here be said, on the singularly critical period at which these pernicious utterances began to be heard. Catholic intellect in England was beginning to bestir itself, after the paralysis with which the penal laws had visited it. The question of higher education was dawning on the minds of many; and a deep sense was springing up, of the grievous intellectual defects under which Catholic education laboured. The "Rambler" and "Home and Foreign Review" took advantage of this nascent feeling, by posing as the champions of educational progress. They assumed, as a kind of self-evident truth, that no other intellectual wares but their own could be acceptable to a really-cultivated mind; and that anyone, who expressed detestation of their fundamental tenets, showed himself thereby indifferent to the grave importance of raising Catholic intellectual cultivation to its due level. I hope to speak at greater length on this subject in a future volume: here it will suffice to have indicated its bearing on my present theme.

Within a month of Cardinal Wiseman's address, I accepted (with extreme reluctance and misgiving) the most honourable but most responsible

office of editing the "Dublin Review"; and I brought out my first number in the following July. I should have grossly betrayed my trust, had I not used my best efforts towards neutralising the poison, which threatened to infect the first springs of English Catholic thought. I had already read with some care the more important productions published by the chief "Home and Foreign" contributors; and what I had found was this. The more I read, the more I disliked what I read, and the more anti-Catholic seemed the doctrines which were implied at every turn. What the doctrines were which had animated the two periodicals, is cognizable by most unimpeachable testimony. For the Editor, in an article which he published (April, 1864) in bringing the "Home and Foreign" to a termination, put forth a deliberate manifesto of the principles on which he had conducted his periodical. In my next Essay I enumerate several of these principles: here I will only refer to two in particular. I refer particularly to these: because on one hand they are so fruitful of deplorable results and ramifications; and because on the other hand I incline to believe, that no inconsiderable number of English Catholics—including some of the most able and thoughtful in the number—were at that time more or less imbued with such notions.

The first of these concerns the Church's authority in philosophy. The Editor considers that the Ecclesia Docens—and therefore the Holy See—has no power of obliging interior assent on matters primarily philo-

sophical.* On this question I speak so frequently in subsequent Essays, that one remark will here suffice. It is among the most elementary doctrines of Catholicity, that the Ecclesia Docens is laden with the duty—and has received all the gifts necessary for performing the duty—of preserving the Deposit of Faith free from error and corruption. But in these days, unsound thinkers do not in general care enough about theology proper, to be guilty of *theological* aberrations. It is a false *philosophy*, whereby they commonly injure purity of theological doctrine. To allege therefore that the Ecclesia Docens possesses no infallibility within the sphere primarily philosophical —to allege that she has no power of condemning infallibly those philosophical errors, which are perilous to the Faith—is to deny that she has received the gift of infallibly preserving the purity of that Faith. And to allege that she has received no gift of infallibly preserving the Faith in its full purity, is to repudiate (as I just now said) an elementary doctrine of Catholicity.

* The Editor holds this, as the conclusion of such a syllogism as the following. "The Ecclesia Docens possesses no infallibility whatever: but there can be no obligation of interior assent except to an infallible authority; ergo &c." My impression would be, that very few Englishmen indeed who called themselves Catholics accepted the first-named of these two premisses. But my strong impression would also be, that the two periodicals exercised very considerable influence, in indoctrinating English Catholics with the *conclusion* which I mention in the text.

I should explain that, according to the Editor, the Church's Infallibility resides—not in Pope or Pope and Bishops--but in the body of the faithful. See my next Essay.

But a still more serious and vital error was advocated by the Editor, in the article to which I refer. He confined the Church's Infallibility to her actually "*defined* dogmas." Now even if he used the words "Church" and "defined"—as he was very far from doing—in the sense in which an ordinary Catholic understands them,*—even so it is impossible adequately to describe the root-and-branch destructiveness, or again the wild absurdity, of such a notion as this. One hardly knows where to begin, when one comments on it. In Honorius's time then, Monothelism was an open question; for Duothelism had most certainly not been defined. The Sixth Council committed the gravest injustice in anathematizing those Monothelite Patriarchs who died before the Definition, because they had in no way contravened the Church's infallible teaching. Nay every heresiarch who has ever afflicted the Church, is whitewashed by this marvellous theory. It is quite proverbial that doctrines are not

* Here, as in the former case, the tenet, with which (as I believe) the two periodicals indoctrinated many English Catholics, was indefinitely short of that held by the Editor himself. When he expressed the proposition mentioned in the text,—by the word "Church" he did not understand the Ecclesia Docens, but the general body of the faithful. He denied (as I just now observed) that the Ecclesia Docens is infallible, even in what she might define ever so expressly and peremptorily. Here however—as in the other instance I have given,—I believe that very few Englishmen indeed who called themselves Catholics followed him to this extreme position. At the same time, as I also believe, the number was very considerable of those who imbibed from his two periodicals the disastrous tenet mentioned in the text, that the Church is not infallible except in her Definitions.

commonly defined, until they have been denied. Take then any name you please: Arius; Nestorius; Pelagius; Eutyches. If the heresy connected with his name existed before his time, he was no heresi*arch*. If it did *not* exist before his time, the doctrine which he denied had previously formed no part of the Church's infallible teaching; and (before his condemnation) he was not only no heresiarch, but not even a heretic. When the Apostles died—if we are to accept this truly amazing notion—there was absolutely no dogma whatever, which the Church infallibly taught: not the Blessed Trinity; not the Incarnation; not the Inspiration of Scripture: for of all these verities the Definition belongs to a later period. One cannot wonder that such a notion was very promptly condemned by the Holy See.* Yet even to this day some excellently intentioned Catholics occasionally use language, which it is difficult to understand otherwise than as implying this monstrously anti-Catholic notion, that the Church's Infallibility is confined to her Definitions.

The more I thought on the matter, the clearer it seemed to me, that the theological source of the errors against which Cardinal Wiseman—by direction of

* Thus the Munich Brief. "Etiamsi ageretur de illâ subjectione quæ fidei Divinæ actu est præstanda, limitanda tamen non esset ad ea quæ expressis . . . . Decretis definita sunt; sed ad ea quoque extendenda, quæ ordinario totius Ecclesiæ per orbem dispersæ magisterio, tanquam divinitus revelata, traduntur."

The Vatican Council: "Fide Divinâ et Catholicâ ea omnia credenda sunt, quæ in verbo Dei scripto vel tradito continentur, et ab Ecclesiâ, sive solemni judicio sive ordinario et universali magisterio, tanquam divinitus revelata credenda proponuntur."

the Holy See—had so earnestly warned English Catholics, was to be found in a most inadequate and therefore false doctrine, on the extent of Infallibility. I say the "theological" source. Of course there was a "moral" source too; and I had an opinion of my own on that subject also. The advocates of these errors exhibited (I think) in their writings a certain general view of life; a habit of putting in the background man's true end; of preposterously over-estimating intellectual excellence, in regard to its supposed dignity and nobleness; of measuring morality by a different standard from the Christian; which would (according to my view of things) connaturally issue in a quite indefinite amount of doctrinal unsoundness. I briefly treat this subject, in the fourth Essay of my present volume. Here however I am referring, not to the "moral" but to the "theological" source of those errors, which appeared to me so gravely pernicious. And I think that their theological source—the fundamental theological mistake from which they flowed — was a complete misconception of the Church's teaching on her own Infallibility. On this point then, I was more sensitively anxious than on any other. I watched sedulously that nothing should be said in the "Dublin Review," which could imply any kind of tolerance for the view taken by these writers. And I seized every opportunity I could, for inculcating what I apprehend to be true doctrine on the subject. I well know that this reiteration was wearisome to many readers; and possibly enough I should have been more successful in achieving my desired end, if I had

pursued it in some less clamorous way. I am here only explaining, why I thought this end of such inestimable importance. And on this point I am still quite clear that I was entirely right.

Now it happened quite providentially, that F. Perrone—whose work was at that time the almost universal text-book throughout the Church—speaks of this particular theme with a clearness, which makes misapprehension impossible. On several occasions therefore, I drew prominent attention to his teaching. These are the words with which that theologian commences his exposition of the Church's Infallibility.

The Church, when she discharges her function of teaching, performs a threefold office: the office (1) of "witness"; (2) of "judge"; (3) of "magistra."* She performs the office of "witness," in professing those verities of the Faith which she has received from Christ; that of "judge," in deciding those controversies which affect the Faith or are related thereto; that of "magistra," in that her daily ministry wherein by verbal and by practical inculcation (vivâ voce et praxi) she instructs the faithful in all those things which conduce to their training in pure doctrine and morality, and leads them as it were by the hand along the path of eternal salvation. That Christ has endowed His Church with Infallibility for the performance of these several offices—[is the truth which] Catholics maintain and all non-Catholics deny. (De Locis, nn. 347–8.)

It was this office of "magistra," to which I thought

* I do not find myself able to give an English equivalent for this word "magistra."

that especial attention ought to be drawn; because it was this, which the writers with whom I was in conflict more persistently and deliberately ignored than any other. On one occasion I paraphrased F. Perrone's words, to this general effect: "Catholics throughout the world," I said, "are instructed in certain *doctrines;* are exhorted to certain *practices;* are encouraged and trained in certain *tempers and dispositions.* The Church's office in providing for this is no other than her 'magisterium;' whereby, as F. Perrone expresses it, 'she leads them by the hand as it were along the path of eternal salvation.' Now firstly, when we say that her magisterium is *trustworthy,* —we mean, (1) that the *doctrines* so taught are true; (2) that the *practices* so inculcated are really serviceable for sanctification and salvation; (3) that *the tempers and dispositions* so encouraged are really acceptable to Almighty God. F. Perrone however pronounces, not merely that her magisterium is trustworthy, but that it is infallible; or, in other words, that its trustworthiness is guaranteed by God's infallible promise." For the truth of this proposition—that the Church is by divine promise infallible in her whole magisterium—I argue in more than one part of the following Essays.

To this great prerogative of the Church is attached of course a correlative duty, whether on the part of theologians or of individual Catholics. As regards the former, I thus expressed myself. "A theologian," I said, "who is fully penetrated with this truth, ever gazes (throughout his investigations) on the Church's aspect and countenance. He is eagerly desirous that

her spirit may be infused into his whole body of thought; that he may understand her Definitions, according to her true mind; and that he may duly grasp those other doctrines, which she magisterially teaches without express definition. Every fresh conclusion at which he arrives he distrusts, until he has carefully considered how far it harmonizes with her practical conduct and maxims. And even though each individual conclusion so harmonizes, he is still dissatisfied, unless his whole assemblage of conclusions, his whole corpus of doctrine, be according to her mind, in the respective emphasis and proportion of its various parts." He seeks her whole mind, I may here add, not in her explicit Definitions alone, but in her sanctioned ascetical and theological treatises; in her catechisms; in the maxims of her seminaries and schools; in her daily habits of action. Even when pursuing secular science on its own ground, a good Catholic will remember what has been infallibly taught in the Munich Brief. He will never lose sight of Revealed Truth; nor of those living tribunals of the Church, by which its bearing on secular science is authoritatively determined.

As time went on, I cited statements from Catholic writers in corroboration of this fundamental doctrine. I cited Dr. Molloy, of Maynooth, for instance. That distinguished theologian—in dealing with Dr. Pusey's censure of Catholic devotion to our Blessed Lady—emphatically disclaimed any such theory (however tempting to a controversialist) as that the Church's Infallibility is confined to her Definitions.

"It is quite true," he says, "that a Catholic is bound to believe many things, which are not defined by any General Council. The Pastors of the Church seldom meet together in General Council. But they are at all times infallible in their teaching; for the Spirit of God ever abides in the midst of them, and teaches them all truth. . . . Moreover Catholics maintain that —not only are the Pastors of the Church at all times preserved from error in what they teach—but the Universal Church itself is likewise preserved from error in what it believes. It follows therefore, that whatever is universally taught or believed throughout the Church, bears upon it the stamp of Infallibility. Again, there is no doubt that the doctrine, which is taught and believed in the Church on any particular subject, may be partly gathered from the writings of her theologians, from the language of her liturgy, and from the devotions in common use among the faithful."—("Dr. Pusey's Eirenicon," pp. 16–17.)

Similarly, Mr. Rhodes in the same controversy: "It is impossible," he says, "for her sanctioned and universal system of popular teaching and devotion to be at variance with her formal and defined doctrine. It is the self-same spirit, which animates her Councils and *pervades at all times her every-day life and action.*"

To the same effect I will cite parts of a magnificent passage, written by my venerable friend Canon Oakeley.

"God the Holy Ghost is the Creator of the Church, and it is in Him that the Church lives and moves and has its being. The Church, when viewed at any period of her history, presents the appearance of a world teeming with spiritual animation. Here is the theologian working out the problems of his science from its elementary axioms; there is the Saint follow-

ing out a train of thought on the Incarnation, and resting with holy rapture on inferences, strictly within the terms of faith, yet hidden from minds less purified from earthly stain . . . . while, in addition to the fruits which are continually added to the Church's store of untechnical and traditionary knowledge, she is always gathering in fresh illustration of the same kind from the attestation of miracles, the illustrations of saintly example, the growth and influence of popular devotions, the comparison of experiences, the collision with error, and many other such outward manifestations of a pervading and vigorous life. It is thus that the Church weaves around her a network of associations, out of materials within herself, which is at once the evidence of her activity and the protection of her weakness. This is what men call her 'popular system:' the assemblage of secondary and influential doctrines, constantly accruing from her energetic action, and gathering round her steps in multiplied profusion.

"Dr. Pusey and others, who look at us from without, always seem to argue as if the 'popular system' of the Roman Church were . . . the product of human infirmity or perversity. . . . This is a view of the case against which we from within most strenuously protest, as tantamount to a denial of a Divine Presence constantly within the Church, by which she is *secured from error* e.g. . . . in all *which relates to the spiritual government of her members,* so far as it comes within the sphere of her responsibility" (Canon Oakeley's "Letter to Archbishop Manning," pp. 14, 15).

But I would especially beg my reader's attention to the singularly impressive words, with which the Bishop of Birmingham expressed his censure of the "Home and Foreign Review" on this particular head :—

"Many things [says the Bishop] go to form the integral belief of the Church, that were never formally defined; for there is an unwritten as there is a written Rule of Faith, *a statute and a common law of believing.* The decrees of Faith but incorporate and fix the common belief in formal terms, as circumstances call for dogmatic declarations. . . . The Church's Decisions live in the hearts of the faithful, and express not more but less than her entire belief. . . . There yet remain, unfixed by decrees, both doctrines of Faith, and moral laws, and fundamental principles of the Church's constitution and discipline, without which the Church would not be what Christ made her. Under whatever pretext of science or of criticism, and under whatever plea of their not being defined, to attempt to strip religion of these doctrines, or of that inner theology which is inseparable from faith, or from fixed principles such as faith presupposes, or even from the theology generally taught and preached; or to separate religion from that sacred history, on which her evidence, or her doctrine, or her edification reposes; would be to incur the charge and the sin of inculcating, as the case may happen to be, heresy, or what approximates to heresy, or is rash, or scandalous, or offensive to pious ears." ("On Certain Methods, of the 'Rambler' and 'Home and Foreign Review," pp. 55, 56).

Reverting now to F. Perrone's account of the Church's Infallibility—one logical remark may be made on it. In strictness of expression, her office as "witness" is largely included in her office as "magistra." When she "instructs the faithful in all those things which conduce to their training in pure doctrine and morality,"—a large part of that instruction is given by her, in her capacity as "witness" of those verities

which were revealed by God. Thus—as we have already seen — the Munich Brief and the Vatican Council speak of divine faith being due to those dogmata, which, "by her ordinary *magisterium*, she proposes as divinely revealed." And a similar remark may be made—though not perhaps to the same extent—in regard to her office as "judge." A more precisely logical division therefore may be made, by a somewhat different terminology. We may speak of the Church's "definitional" Infallibility, as extending over all which she infallibly teaches by way of actual Definition; and her "magisterial" Infallibility, as extending over all which she infallibly teaches in some different way.* Her "definitional" Infallibility is but one portion—nay, for several centuries was comparatively a very small portion—of her "integral" Infallibility. Now I was (and am) firmly convinced indeed, that those writers, who represented the spirit of the "Rambler" or "Home and Foreign," were most unsound (to speak within bounds) as regards the Church's definitional Infallibility. On this I have briefly spoken in a preceding note; and something more will be said in the following Essay. The charge however which I here bring against them is, that they entirely repudiated her distinct Infallibility as

* I do not forget the Vatican pronouncement, "de Romani Pontificis infallibili *magisterio*": where the last word very prominently includes Definitions. Still I find my use of the word very convenient; and no confusion can arise, if I here explain in what sense I shall consistently employ it. I take it that the correct theological phrase, for what I call the Church's "magisterium," would be her "magisterium *ordinarium*."

"magistra." It was (I think) this fact especially, which invested their writings with so repulsive a character of disloyalty and unsoundness. Anyone who reads the citations I make in my next Essay, will see the kind of thing which I mean.

And this will be the most suitable opportunity for saying a few words on one adverse criticism, which has been brought against me perhaps more frequently and urgently than any other. I mean, the vehemence with which (so my critics allege) I have assailed my "brethren in the Faith." I admit most readily, that I have often spoken with much fierceness against those whom I have called "unsound and disloyal Catholics." But who were the persons in my mind, when I so spoke? There was a certain knot (as I have said) of able and most influential writers, against whose "leadership" the Holy Father had exhorted the English Episcopate to warn the faithful. In speaking with all the severity I could on the general line of thought pursued by these persons, I was but following the guidance of supreme ecclesiastical authority. On the other hand, to my mind it was (and is) perfectly clear, that their doctrine and general line of thought was intensely anti-Catholic. Moreover (as I was in the habit of urging) in one most important respect far more grievous peril was to be apprehended from their influence, than could possibly be threatened by externs; because the very fact of their professing Catholicity disarmed suspicion, and gave their notions Catholic currency. They were (to use the common expression) traitors within the camp. I cannot feel any kind of regret—on the

contrary I feel great gratitude to Almighty God—when I remember the fact, that I never uttered one word concerning them, which would suffer the reader to forget how vehement was my aversion to their writings. At last, nothing which I said could go much beyond Cardinal Wiseman's public and official pronouncement, that they "grazed over the very edge of the most perilous abysses of error," and "habitually preferred anti-Catholic to Catholic instincts, tendencies, and motives." Nor did I think that the abandonment of the "Home and Foreign" could give me any justification, in suspending what have been called my "invectives." Far otherwise. I strongly thought (and think) that—through the past influence of the two periodicals—there widely existed at that time what may most truly be called a certain spirit of disloyalty to the Church. I think that this spirit existed to a larger or smaller extent, in many an English Catholic, who would have quite sincerely disclaimed entire sympathy with the more extreme position assumed by those periodicals. I certainly felt that I did my duty, by calling a spade a spade, and by calling disloyalty to the Church disloyalty to the Church. But I earnestly trust, and honestly think, that my language never approached to any kind of invective, which could rightly be called "personal."*

Nevertheless on reflection I quite admit that I ought sometimes to have explained more clearly, *who* those were against whom I intended to speak. It was (I fear) by no

* If there was one single instance—in the year 1865—which constitutes an exception to this general statement, I unreservedly express repentance for the language I used.

means unnatural, that the reader should sometimes think I was directing my invective against persons, who were in fact most loyal of intention towards the Church. There were various persons, against whom I had really nothing to say, except that I did not think them sufficiently clearsighted in discerning the disastrous tendency of certain tenets. I greatly regret that I occasionally used language, which might naturally be thought (though such was far from my intention) to comment on such persons with harshness and severity.

II.

I have spoken hitherto of those English Catholics, who had been more or less imbued with the evil spirit of the two periodicals censured by Cardinal Wiseman. But there were other opponents also, whom I had to encounter when I entered upon my Editorship. As happens perhaps not unfrequently in Ecclesiastical History, a dead-set was made from several quarters at once, against one and the same verity: on this occasion, against orthodox doctrine concerning the extent of Infallibility. At the time I name, the movement in favour of what some persons called "corporate reunion" was in full swing. And two years later this movement received additional strength and prominence, through the publication of Dr. Pusey's "Eirenicon." I felt far greater personal respect for some who were connected with this movement, than I could ever profess for the Conductors of the "Home and Foreign."* As a general rule, the Unionists

* As I am here writing more or less *personally*, I may be allowed

exhibited (I think) a far less secularizing and (what I may call) free-thinking* spirit, than did those other writers. As a set-off, the latter were doubtless greatly superior to the former in power of mind, knowledge, and intellectual accomplishments. But these matters, whatever may be thought upon them, are alien to my immediate purpose. What I wish here to point out is, that both parties agreed in one significant particular. There was not so much as the faintest primâ facie plausibility for the doctrines of either, except by means of their simply and consistently ignoring the claim of magisterial infallibility, made in her own behalf by the Church in communion with Rome. It was absurd enough indeed—as I argue in a subsequent Essay—when Dr. Pusey implied an opinion, that he could accept the actual Definitions which had been put forth by the Roman Catholic Church. But suppos-

a personal digression, in honour of my late admirable friend Mr. Phillipps de Lisle. In various ways he had given me great assistance, during my struggles towards the Church. But some little time after I became a Catholic, we found ourselves in such great mutual difference—and our feelings were so strong on the points of difference—that we had comparatively little intercourse. I feel it a great pleasure to look back on the fact that, during the last year of his life, he spent a month or two in my immediate neighbourhood, and we resumed our former habits of intimacy. No one, who had the privilege of Mr. de Lisle's acquaintance, could fail of being extremely struck by his singular simplicity, humility and tenderness of piety. May he rest in peace!

* By this term—a "free-thinking spirit"—I mean to express the spirit, which prompts persons to contemplate things primarily temporal, without due deference and subservience to the voice of Revelation and to the unseen world.

ing (per impossibilissimum) that he had been able to do so, he would not have been one step nearer to his desired end. The theme on which he dwelt far more than on any other, and which we may take therefore as a sample of his general method, was the Roman Catholic* devotion to our Blessed Lady. Now (not to speak of other means by which the Church has inculcated her practical lessons on this devotion) there are various prayers to Mary Most Holy, which the Church has so emphatically sanctioned, that she has attached most precious indulgences to their habitual practice. If the Roman Catholic Church is infallible as "magistra," nothing can be more certain, than that the doctrines implied in these prayers are infallibly true. See my "Essays on Devotional and Scriptural Subjects," pp. 8-10. Nevertheless Dr. Pusey entreated the Roman Catholics of England—as though it were the simplest and most obvious thing in the world for them to do—that they should shun such doctrines, with the devotions founded on them, as being idolatrous in tendency; and that they should defend themselves on the pretext, that the doctrines in question had not been made matters of express definition. I am convinced he had no unkind or disrespectful feeling towards the Roman Catholic Church in this; though he expressed himself no doubt with exquisite infelicity. I really believe he had not so much as heard of

* In arguing with Dr. Pusey, I was of course always obliged to add the prefix "Roman": because he does not admit that those only are in truth "Catholics," who are in communion with the Holy See.

the doctrine, that she is infallible in her ordinary magisterium, no less than in her Definitions.

The Eirenicon occasioned a considerable number of my articles in the "Dublin Review." Three appeared in my preceding volume; being those which concerned this very theme, Catholic devotion and doctrine concerning the Mother of God. The rest (with one exception) are among those here presented once more to the public. In writing these, I was desirous inclusively of exhibiting, as clearly as I could, the extraordinary and quite incredible confusion of thought, which is Dr. Pusey's controversial characteristic. The Eirenicon however is now so entirely forgotten, that there is no need of reprinting this portion of what I published, except so far as it may be mixed up with other matters. At the same time I retain, in their integrity, the arguments adduced by me against the Anglican position; which appear to me, on a fresh perusal, quite as cogent as I thought them at the time. I think that what I have written exhibits, not very inadequately, the absolute historical certainty of the Roman Catholic religion. But there was another class of arguments, which I also still retain, and which seem to me no whit less momentous than the former. For I took occasion by the Eirenicon, to draw out what seems to me the entirely irrefragable historical proof, that the Church's Infallibility lies primarily, not in her Definitions but in her magisterium; that her definitional Infallibility is a result from, and (as it were) an offshoot of, her Infallibility as magistra. In truth, throughout my controversy with Dr. Pusey—while

of course I wished to show as clearly as I possibly could the gross fallaciousness of his anti-Catholic reasoning,—I was even more anxious to avoid all compromise of Catholic truth. I thought it of vital moment duly to guard against that danger, which so urgently besets controversialists, of watering down the Church's doctrine, in order to make their own task easier. Doubtless it would have been a great evil, if even one person had been repelled by Dr. Pusey's sophistries from submitting to the Church. But (in my humble judgment) it would have been quite an indefinitely greater evil, if (what I have always called) "minimizing" doctrines and principles had effected any considerable or lasting lodgment among English Catholics. And as this is a question on which largely depends the verdict to be given on my past Editorship, I will here devote a paragraph to its consideration; though it will be treated of at length in other parts of this volume.

By the phrase, "minimizing tenets,"—I always intended to designate those tenets, which tend towards the proposition, that the Church is infallible only in what are most strictly called "definitions *of faith;*" that she is not infallible in her ordinary magisterium, nor again in branding any given dictum with some censure other than the special censure "heretical." I will not here argue at all against *the truth* of minimism, because there is quite sufficient argument of that kind in the following Essays. But several Catholics have been in the habit of altogether waiving this particular inquiry. They have said that—

whether minimism be true or false—at all events (by the confession of all) no one who holds it thereby actually ceases to be a Catholic; and that therefore it should not be publicly and earnestly denounced by any son of the Church as anti-Catholic, but on the contrary treated as an open question. On the other hand, what I myself felt throughout, and expressed in various shapes, was this. An internecine conflict is at hand, between the army of Dogma, and the united hosts of indifferentism, heresy, atheism: a conflict which will ultimately also (I am persuaded) turn out to be a conflict, between Catholic Theism on one side and atheism of this or that kind on the other. Looking at things practically—the one solid and inexpugnable fortress of truth is the Catholic Church, built on the Rock of Peter. But we cannot submit to the Church's authority by halves. We cannot accept what we please, and reject what we please. By rebelling against one part of her doctrine, we rebel against her doctrinal authority itself. But by rebelling against her doctrinal authority, we lay open our one position of security, and become an easy prey to our enemies. The Church's power as witness of the Truth cannot be duly brought into practical action, except so far as the Truth which she teaches is set forth in its full and genuine proportions. Its power, I say, cannot be brought into due action, if we choose merely to exhibit what after all are but fragments of her teaching; and very far less, if those fragments be united with other tenets which she actually condemns, whether that condemnation be definitional or merely

magisterial. Such is the lesson which I had learned from my old friend F. Faber; and with which I have always sympathized most entirely. If I were not to edit the "Dublin Review" on this principle,—such was my habitual conviction—I could not in conscience edit it at all.*

On the other hand, I earnestly protest that I was deeply impressed by a sense of the opposite danger also; that I felt how grave would be my responsibility, if any word in the "Review" were to interpose any unnecessary obstacle between even one soul and its true home. If my readers will look at the concluding paragraphs of the Sixth Essay contained in this volume—they will see how strongly this feeling is expressed, and with what bearing on practice and conduct. If they further urge that I undertook a most difficult task in attempting such a navigation between Scylla and Charybdis,—I will only reply that

* The Rev. Father Hutton, in his admirable work on "The Anglican Ministry," has a somewhat similar remark. "If it be true," he says (p. 5), "that only faith founded on the Rock of Peter will be able to stand against those assaults of infidelity which the coming age will see, it follows that an argument which at first may seem only calculated to cause needless division . . . . may nevertheless in the end be conducive to the truest unity, and tend to the establishment of faith on a sure basis." The excellent author indeed uses this argument, with a slightly different drift from my own. He uses it to defend himself against those who say, that Catholics ought to "sink those differences" which separate them from non-Catholic Christians, "and unite, on the ground of our common Christianity, to meet the common foe." But the very same argument is obviously applicable to the purpose, for which I adduce it in the text.

no one in the world could feel this more keenly than I did. It was prominent among the various motives which (as I shall presently explain) were continually prompting me to resign a work, which I felt above my strength. At the same time (as I make clear in the Essay to which I have just referred) I had no doubt whatever, on the *principle* which ought to determine the conduct of a Catholic writer in this matter. My drawback lay in my intellectual deficiencies; and consisted of my difficulty in satisfactorily applying that principle to practice.

III.

So much on Dr. Pusey and the Unionists. It was simply impossible to treat from a Catholic point of view the questions they raised, without discussing the Church's extent of Infallibility. But there was a third influence, which in some sense, I think, acted even more powerfully than the other two that I have mentioned, in disposing English Catholics at that time to minimize. I refer to the very great respect which was so justly felt for the school of M. de Montalembert, and the earnest gratitude with which their labours in the Church's behalf were so deservedly regarded. It has been said of me, that I was wanting in due respect for that excellent man and his friends: but I consider this a severe imputation, and deny the fact entirely. What I have however consistently said is, that in regard to his characteristic tenets as a "*Liberal* Catholic," he was in a state of direct (though most unintentional) rebellion

against the Church's infallible teaching.* I do not see how this fact can possibly be denied. In a future

* I may be allowed to quote the following passage of mine, for more than one reason. It appeared in January 1868, pp. 129, 130.

"The French 'Liberal Catholics' as a rule are most pious and exemplary men; enthusiastic defenders of the Pope and his civil princedom; and men who have in time past done invaluable service to the Church. On the other hand they cling to their prejudice concerning the 'modern liberties' with a certain strange fanaticism, and allow that prejudice to colour their whole view of facts both past and present. Possibly enough, He who reads the heart may see that in some of these men a greater or less degree of venial sin or imperfection has been the cause of their not rightly discerning the Church's guidance, or not truly interpreting her voice. But as to their ignorance being *gravely* culpable, we may consider this presumably incredible in men who so zealously and piously frequent the Sacraments.

"How does the Church act towards them? Firstly she repeats her doctrine on the subject again and again: hardly a year passes without some fresh condemnation of 'liberalismus hodiernus.' She takes for granted the truth of her own doctrine in all her official acts; and bases on it the whole civil constitution of the Roman States. She earnestly encourages Catholics to write in its defence . . . . All that can be said on the other side is, that she does not take any step which would compel ['Liberal Catholics'] peremptorily and at once to choose, between consciously rebelling against the Church on the one hand, and abandoning some of their most cherished views on the other. Those views—we again repeat—being regarded by no one as directly heretical;" but only as censurable and unsound.

In January 1876 I reprinted from the "Month" a letter written by M. de Haulleville, full of sympathy for M. de Montalembert; and explaining what were those peculiarities of character, which rendered it possible that one, so docile in intention to the Church, should have nevertheless in one particular so persistently contravened her teaching. In reprinting this letter, I avowed my reason to be, that Montalembert's "fair name is so dear to every Catholic."

volume I hope to enter in detail on this question: here I will but explain very briefly what I mean. Every Catholic is of course at perfect liberty to hold—I suppose pretty nearly every Catholic does hold—that what are called the "modern liberties" are (under one shape or other) a necessity under present circumstances; that the Church suffers less evil under their existence, than she would under any other arrangement now by possibility practicable; nay that (as society is now unhappily constituted) they are even due in justice. But what Montalembert maintained was, that their establishment constituted a true social progress. Indeed he maintained more than this; for he maintained that the earlier state of things was wrong in *principle*. I may refer on this head to a few words of mine in January 1876, pp. 204, 5. And as regards the extreme importance, even at this day, of true doctrine being held on the subject, I would submit to my readers' judgment what I said in January 1868, pp. 54–58. Now no one, I suppose, denies that Montalembert's tenet was such as I have described; and it seems to me equally manifest, that the Church has infallibly condemned this tenet. I hope to make this quite clear in my future volume. Meanwhile for the present it will suffice, if I recall to my readers' remembrance Pius IX.'s express declaration. That Pontiff of glorious memory, with direct reference to Montalembert, pronounced that the Liberal Catholics failed in duly receiving those lessons which had been inculcated from "this Chair of Truth"; that they failed to understand, how widely the Church's doc-

trinal authority extends; that they inflicted detriment on the Church's interests, by destroying that "unity of mind and spirit," which ought to exist among Catholics; that they caused the Church to mourn, by occasioning "division of opinions" and "severing of hearts."* Considering how widely Montalembert's influence extended among English Catholics—and in particular how much attention was drawn to his deplorable speech at the Malines Congress—I still think as strongly as ever, that I should have gravely betrayed my trust, had I been silent on the matter. I think it was my bounden duty to do what little I could, that English Catholics might sympathize with the Holy See and the Church in this grave conflict.†

IV.

I have said then (I think) more than enough, to explain what I have once or twice mentioned in

* I translated this Letter at length in April 1865, pp. 479, 480. It was addressed, by the Pope's command, to M. de Beaulieu, congratulating him on his reply to M. de Montalembert's speech at the Malines Congress.

† "The Month" of August 1869 thus expresses itself, in an entirely accordant sense. The italics are mine:—"Liberal Catholicism is the result of the partial temporary and unconscious adoption, within the pale of the Church, of principles and maxims which are in reality not Catholic, though their opposition to Catholicism is concealed from the eyes of those who are influenced by them. At certain times, and under certain conditions of society, these principles are more mischievous than at others; and in our time the bad principles with which the form of opinion of which we speak is more or less distantly connected, *have acquired a fatal prominence and threaten to be terribly influential.* They are days therefore in which it is of the highest importance that *opinions of this kind should be unmasked and their tendencies pointed out*" (p. 114).

print; viz., the anxiety and despondency under which I laboured in executing my task, and my constant temptation to give it up in despair. In one point of view indeed I was extremely reluctant even to entertain the idea of resigning it; because I was full of zeal for the great truths (as I consider them) which I was maintaining, and could not bear the thought that they should be less prominently brought forward. Yet on the other hand there seemed strong reasons for resigning the Editorship into the hands of some one, who might take a different view of his duties, or else might be free from the difficulties which oppressed myself. In the first place I was a layman. No doubt I was greatly protected by the circumstance, that every thing I wrote was censorized by three distinguished theologians, whom the Archbishop nominated; and that their province extended over the sphere of ecclesiastical expediency, no less than of doctrinal orthodoxy. Still I was a mere layman, called to a work very prominently theological. Then again, in some sense I had to work out a good deal of my theology for myself. Those doctrines on the extent of Infallibility, which I felt it so indispensable a duty to press, are (I am quite confident) substantially implied in the whole language and teaching of theologians from first to last. Still there had not been as yet (so far as I happened to know) any methodical treatment of the theme.* No doubt controversies

* At the time I mention, the last volume of Dr. Murray's treatise on "the Church" had not appeared.

concerning Infallibility had been very prominent among Catholics; but these controversies were concerned with the "subject," not the "object," of that prerogative. Theologians had very keenly and prolixly discussed the question, whether Infallibility resides in the Pope alone or in some other seat. But they had put forth comparatively few express and reasoned statements on the no less momentous question, how far Infallibility itself extends. Take for instance that fundamental and altogether undeniable doctrine, upon which I have been saying so much: the Church's magisterial Infallibility. It is most easy to apprehend this as a general truth, and to recognise its entire certainty. But again and again it is a question of great anxiety and delicacy, whether this or that particular doctrine—and if so, under what shape—is *included* in her ordinary magisterium. On this matter—extreme as is evidently its practical importance—I was not acquainted with theologians, who had treated the theme of set purpose, methodically, scientifically; nor did I find learned men who could *refer* me to such theologians. Even as regards the Church's definitional Infallibility, something of the same kind may be said: but on this I will not here insist.

No one can be surprised, that I felt all this a strong reason for shrinking from the responsibility with which I was laden. But other motives also prompted me to retirement from my office. I had an extremely strong impression, on my controversial inferiority to my opponents of the "Home and Foreign Review." I was indubitably their inferior to quite an indefinite extent

in literary accomplishments, in general knowledge, in acquaintance with politics and secular history. Even with ecclesiastical history, my acquaintance was mainly second-hand. And meanwhile notoriously my style was dull and heavy to an unusual degree.* On reflection, I now think that I greatly overrated the ability of those opponents; very able men though they undoubtedly were. Still more, I underestimated the intrinsic force possessed by a merely logical exposition of truth, when one is addressing a Catholic audience. Nevertheless at the time I was greatly cowed by the brilliancy and acquirements of those whom I had especially to confront. Moreover, my position was a very invidious one. A Catholic writer has far greater hope of attaining the approval of his co-religionists if he makes it his main work to defend and glorify their then existing position,—than if he dwell prominently on what he may consider the doctrinal shortcomings more or less prevalent amongst them. And certainly as a matter of fact (if I may speak colloquially) I received, in the earlier part of my Editorship, very many more kicks than halfpence. Both publicly and privately I was visited with a great mass of adverse criticism; while, if there was any considerable number of Catholics who approved the line I took, I had not the good fortune of knowing their existence.

* I do not mean that my style is unsuited for purely scientific discussion, whether theological or philosophical. But where poetry or rhetoric is called for, I am alas! nowhere. Yet even for the due exhibition of speculative truth, poetry and rhetoric are quite indispensable.

The heaviest trial of all was, that persons, whom I profoundly respected, censured my course precisely on the ground of its being injurious to souls. Now there is certainly no limit to self-ignorance: but I am myself hardly aware of any motive which ever prompted me to write a single line, except my desire of forwarding God's cause in the world. It may well be imagined therefore, how I winced under this particular criticism. After the best attention indeed I could give it,—it was quite clear to me (1) that (cæteris paribus) God's interests are best promoted by a writer, in proportion as he shall be more docile to the injunctions and intimations of the Holy See; and (2) that such docility would necessarily lead him to dwell on those very doctrines which were so much disliked. At the same time, I could not rid my *imagination* of the dread, that at last I might be injuring the very cause which I passionately desired to serve; and this dread at times made me very unhappy indeed.

Yet on the other hand I should be grossly ungrateful if I ignored the number of kind friends, who were ever ready with words of advice when I was perplexed, and with words of sympathy when I was disheartened. In particular there was one immense consolation and encouragement, the value and sustaining force of which I cannot exaggerate. I refer to the fact, that my labours as a whole were cordially approved by my two ecclesiastical superiors, Cardinal Wiseman and his Successor. From first to last indeed I have found Cardinal Manning's counsel and exhortations simply invaluable; both as assisting me to steer the right course, and as giving me spirit to pursue that course. And at the

period I am now speaking of, had it not been for his unflinching support, I should most assuredly not have had the pluck to continue at my post.

V.

As time went on however, circumstances changed a good deal in my favour. The "Home and Foreign" indeed came to an end as early as July 1864; and I was of course greatly rejoiced, that one enemy of the Church at least had been brought to silence. But there was no reason whatever to suppose, that the contributors would not continue to write as individuals. Moreover, I thought (and think) that various unsound theological principles were vigorous among this or that knot of Catholics, a legacy of the "Review's" disastrous influence. In fact the Contributors coalesced a second and even a third time. The "North British" came into their hands in 1869–70, so as to give them an opportunity of writing corporately on the Council; and at an earlier period they had started a weekly journal, called the "Chronicle." My impression however is, that the Definition of 1870 (among the other inexpressible blessings which have followed in its train) has brought to an end the possibility, that these writers can further exercise, to any important extent, their baneful influence over English Catholic thought.

I incline to think, that the first notable improvement of my place in the general estimation of English Catholics did not commence, until three years had elapsed

from the cessation of the "Home and Foreign." In 1867 a question of great importance was raised by an adverse critic, bearing on the Church's *definitional* Infallibility. For the question was raised, *what* in particular are those pronouncements, which legitimately take rank as the Church's infallible Definitions. I had treated this matter in various articles; and had republished the relevant portion of those articles, in a volume on "the authority of doctrinal decisions which are not Definitions of faith." On this volume my critic founded his assault. Three pamphlets passed on each side, without either party convincing the other. The controversy ended by my writing a Latin pamphlet —"de Infallibilitatis extensione"—of which I insert a translation in the present volume.

The controversy was far less trying to me, than some of those with which I had been earlier engaged. It was far less trying, because of my unfeigned and very great respect for my opponent; and because of my keen sense that (intensely though I disliked his explicit statements of doctrine) his general spirit was most widely removed from that which so shocked me in the "Rambler" or "Home and Foreign." Apart however from all question about my own feelings, my strong impression is (as I have already said) that the result of this controversy considerably improved my position. Even those many Catholics who still differed from my conclusions, came in numerous instances (I fancy) to hold, that I had been too indiscriminately assailed; that my notions were not merely self-willed and wanton exaggerations; that they were at

all events (what lawyers call) *arguable;* that they admitted of at least plausible theological defence. Then there was the further fact, that I was able with profound sincerity to speak of my new opponent in terms of respect, which I could not have applied to the more able of my earlier opponents without profound *in*sincerity. Thus it began (I think) to be much more generally admitted, that I was not a merely hot-headed, narrow-minded partisan, unable to see any good in any one who might differ from my own notions. However mistaken I might still be accounted on questions both of doctrine and of ecclesiastical prudence,—I believe that from this period there was much greater disposition among English Catholics to consider, what *amount* at least of truth there might be in the views which I put forward.

VI.

But a far greater step was won for me by the Vatican Council and its results. In the first place I need hardly say, that the Definition of Pontifical Infallibility sanctioned in one fundamental particular the line which had been taken by the "Dublin Review," from its very commencement; and not least prominently, during the period of my own Editorship. For myself, long before 1870, I had accounted the Dogma to be so certainly a revealed verity, as to claim legitimately (even before its Definition) the assent of divine faith. I had for many years followed those theologians, of whom Cardinal

Manning may be taken as a representative instance, who regarded the Dogma of Pontifical ex-cathedrâ Infallibility as "credendum fide Divinâ;" although of course—so long as Gallicans were expressly tolerated within the Church—it could not be accounted "de fide Catholicâ." I had consistently so written in the "Dublin Review;" and the Definition therefore of the Dogma gave me a certain not inconsiderable lift in the estimation of English Catholics.

But what I have particularly in my mind, is something different from this. Those excellent men, who had deprecated the Definition as inopportune, had used language strikingly similar to that, which had been held by so many English Catholics in regard to the "Dublin Review." Inopportunists denounced those who urgently petitioned for the Definition, as wantonly creating division among Catholics; as gratuitously increasing the difficulties of a Catholic controversialist; as dull to the lessons of history; as acting most tyrannically towards tender-minded and simple souls. Now these were the very charges, which for six or seven years had been urged with great severity of language against the line which had been taken in the "Dublin Review."* Moreover every one could see with half an eye, that they were no whit less plausible against the advocates of a definition, than they were against the writers of the

* One Unionistic critic said on one occasion, that I had uttered "a prolonged howl of impotent bigotry." I think this is pretty well, from one whose especial purpose was the promotion of "Christian unity."

"Dublin Review." I venture to think it by no means the least among those innumerable blessings which have been conferred on the Church by the Vatican Council, that objections of this kind have been deliberately weighed and set at naught. Not only they were set at naught by a large majority of the Episcopate; not only they were set at naught by the Holy Father; but (which is immeasurably more significant) they were set at naught by the Holy Ghost. Two principles had been contending for mastery within the Church: on one side that of promoting "peace through the Truth"; * on the other that of compromising truth for the sake of peace. I by no means wish to imply, that in no possible case should any portion of truth be waived or veiled for the sake of peace. Many passages in the following Essays will show, how very far I am from maintaining this. Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, the charges brought by my opponents against me had always been, that I was not duly zealous for peace; while my rejoinder had been, that they were not duly zealous for truth. Similarly in 1870 the charge brought by inopportunists against those whom I may call "definitionists" was, that the latter were not duly zealous for peace; and the retort was, that the former were not duly zealous for truth. Now it was the principle *opposed* to inopportunism—the principle that peace should be promoted through inculcation of the Truth—which on that

* This was the title given by F. Harper, S.J., to his admirable treatises against Dr. Pusey. It refers of course to Dr. Pusey's own title, "an *Eirenicon*."

particular occasion received such signal divine sanction.* Such a fact could not but tend largely to allay the distrust which had been felt towards me, by so many for whom I had never ceased to feel unfeigned respect.

VII.

The Council, taken in connection with some of its attendant circumstances, was the death-blow (I think) of that organized party in England, which had been represented successively by the "Rambler," the "Home and Foreign," and the "North British." I by no means intend to say that there are not still in England a larger or smaller number of Catholics, who are more or less imbued with the evil principles of those periodicals. But I do not fancy that any of these are persons, who combine great intellectual activity with great intellectual power; nor again that there is among them any concert or unity of action. As regards again those schemes of corporate union against which I had continually to contend in the earlier period,—they have received "a heavy blow and great discouragement" through the Definition of Pontifical Infallibility; nor do I think it at all likely that they will again trouble the Church. Lastly, if we look across the Channel, we see that no great peril is now to be dreaded in Catholic England from Catholic France, against integrity of Catholic doctrine. Various circumstances have combined to effect this result. There

* See the truly admirable letter, addressed by M. Albert Dechamps to F. Gratry. I published a translation of this letter in our number for October 1875.

is the death of Montalembert, and of others belonging to his school. Then the course of political circumstances plainly shows, that the one formidable antagonist to French Catholicity is atheism in one or other shape; and Montalembert himself never thought that the civil toleration of atheistic propagandism (however inevitable) could be otherwise than a deplorable social degradation. And further, attention has of late been much more prominently drawn than had been the case at an earlier period, to the express and emphatic censure with which the tenets of Liberal Catholicism have been infallibly branded by the Holy See. At all events—whatever the causes—the fact as regards Catholic France is undeniably what I have stated. Since the year 1870 therefore, I have written much less constantly and urgently than before, on the extent of the Church's doctrinal authority. Circumstances of the moment have sometimes rendered it in some sense necessary to do so; but when there was no special pressure of circumstances, I have commonly let the theme alone.

Accordingly—whenever I have had the chance—I have turned my attention to a series, which I am still continuing in the "Dublin Review" under its new Editorship, against the agnostics and other antitheists of the day. In this I have been carrying into effect a design which I had long entertained. When I commenced my Editorship indeed, antitheism was an immeasurably less prominent and frequent phenomenon in England than it is now. Yet so far back as 1868 I spoke of it as a "trite remark," that an

"internecine conflict is at hand between the army of Dogma, and the united hosts of indifferentism and atheism." I added also, that "looking at the matter practically, the one solid and inexpugnable fortress for the army of Dogma is the rock of Peter." I have always felt that Catholics cannot successfully do the work assigned to them by Divine Providence, of defending religious and moral truth against the argumentative assaults of those who reject it,—unless they thoroughly apprehend the Church's Infallibility in those most grave philosophical questions, which she may judge to have a real (however indirect) connection with Dogma.* But I have always felt no less strongly, that it is the duty of competently-endowed Catholics to attack the infidel party in close and detailed conflict, on its own chosen ground, the ground of Reason. In the earlier part of my editorial career, I was largely occupied in insisting on the *former* of these truths. In the subsequent period, I did my best towards carrying the *latter* of them into practical execution. The Essays of this volume, however, belong to the earlier period.

VIII.

I just now said, that I do not think there exists at this moment among English Catholics any such organ-

* I here refer, not only to those numerous cases in which she teaches with Infallibility strictly so-called—but to those also (such as the doctrinal decisions of a Roman Congregation) in which she rightfully claims firm interior assent to ecclesiastical pronouncements, which are not strictly infallible.

ized intellectual agitation as there was some sixteen years ago, in favour of anti-Catholic doctrine. Yet they must always be exposed to considerable danger of unconsciously imbibing such doctrine, while they are circumstanced as at present. Such danger, I say, must always exist, so long as—instead of their living (as in olden time) under the Church's magisterial shelter—there exists that unreserved intercourse between them and non-Catholics, which is an unhappy necessity of the time; and so long as they indulge the habit of freely and unsuspiciously familiarizing themselves with non-Catholic literature, periodical or other. As "The Month" once happily expressed the matter, the "surges" are sometimes "considerable, which rock the vessels riding in security within the shelter of a land-locked harbour,"—i.e., the Catholic Church—"while a violent storm rages without, fraught with danger to the rash or unfortunate mariners, who are exposed to its full fury on the open sea." And very far more especially, more calamitously, will this be the case, in regard to those vessels, which do not avail themselves of the full shelter afforded by the innermost part of the harbour, but approach the extreme limits dividing it from the ocean itself. I think that, under the circumstances of modern society, it must always be important for Catholics to be familiar with much of the ground covered by the following Essays; and this is one of my various reasons for republishing them. No doubt I must have incidentally made many serious mistakes in them, both as regards theory, and (still more) the

practical application of theory; though my conviction is certainly strong, that the general principles which I have maintained are quite indubitably sound and Catholic. On all this however, I unreservedly submit my own judgment to that of more learned and competent theologians. Even if there were far more of error in what I have written than I believe there to have been,—still I hope I may say without presumption, that I am confident I have done a really important service, were it only by pressing these questions on the attention of my co-religionists.

I must again express an apology to the reader, for troubling him with so much reference to my own personal history. I can promise him however, that nothing of the kind will be found in the Essays which here follow, and which I once more submit to the judgment of Catholics.

ROME AND THE MUNICH CONGRESS.

Brief addressed by the Holy Father to the Archbishop of Munich, dated Dec. 21st, 1863.

The Home and Foreign Review. No. 8. April, 1864. Article 12, "Conflicts with Rome" signed "John Dalberg Acton."

[July 1864.]

THE Holy Father's Letter to the Archbishop of Munich deserves certainly to be ranked among the most important ecclesiastical events of our day. We will mention some of the many reasons, which lead us to this opinion.

Firstly, the great majority of the questions started at this time, which regard Theology, are primarily of a philosophical or otherwise secular character. This circumstance has been urged in so many different quarters, as to have become quite a trite dictum among us. And it follows of course, that a clear and distinct view of the Church's authority within the sphere of secular truths, is absolutely indispensable to any Catholic, who would take part in the controversies of the day. Now this is the theme, more prominently than any other, treated in the present Brief.

Secondly, certain principles, which the Pope has now expressly and formally enunciated, are of the greatest moment in a strictly theological point of view. We refer to his declaration on the deference due to Decrees

emanating from Roman Congregations; on the existence of dogmata which are strictly to be believed by Divine and Catholic faith, over and above those which have been expressly defined; and on other similar matters.

Thirdly, the whole history of the Munich Congress, and its relation with Dr. Döllinger, is full of deep and painful interest; and since the publication of the Brief, every good Catholic must read that history in its true light. Dr. Döllinger incontestably possesses enormous erudition, great critical power, and not inconsiderable general ability; one-sided though he be, and deficient both in depth and width of intellect. Moreover, his influence in Catholic Germany is extremely great. In what direction he will henceforth use that influence, is among the many anxious questions of our time.

Fourthly, the Papal Brief has brought the "Home and Foreign Review" to a sudden close; and as this fact more specially concerns the Catholic body of these islands, we will dwell on it at somewhat greater length. This periodical, during its brief career, has exhibited a vast amount of learning and of mental activity, but it has been animated throughout by profoundly anti-Catholic principles. Soon after its first number was issued, the English Bishops, acting under a sanction still higher than their own, warned the faithful against its tendencies. And its Editor has now frankly admitted (p. 688), that it "would surrender the whole reason of its existence," if it "ceased to uphold" principles, which "the Holy See" in this very Brief has formally

"rejected." So long as its publication was continued, there were obvious reasons which indisposed us from entering into direct conflict with its various utterances, unless some very special reason had rendered such conflict absolutely necessary. And now indeed, that its publication has ceased, there might appear to be reasons fully as strong, though of an altogether different kind, which should no less dissuade us from such a course: because men might say that its self-imposed silence secures us from the possibility of a reply. The fact however is quite otherwise. Sir J. Acton has now appended his name as responsible Editor; and we shall be criticising therefore, not an extinct periodical, but a living person: a person, we will add, who is extremely well able to defend himself, so far as the strength of his cause may permit. At the same time we should be sorry not to express emphatically our sense of the manliness and straightforwardness he has displayed, in this frank acceptance of responsibility.

We had hitherto thought that even those Catholics who place at the lowest point the authority of such Pontifical documents, at least admitted the obligation of a "respectful silence" as to their contents. If Sir J. Acton had acted even on this lowest view—if, without professing any change of opinion, he had simply said that in deference to the Papal pronouncement he terminated his periodical—we should by no means have been too curious in inquiring, whether he really yielded as much deference to that pronouncement as its character demanded. On the contrary, we should have gladly hailed his submission, as a graceful

and suitable homage to the Church's authority. But his estimate of duty has been most different. His valedictory article consists of one sustained and energetic attack on the principles enunciated by the Holy Father. "All that is being done for ecclesiastical learning by the Priesthood of the Continent, bears testimony," he says, "to the *truths* which are now called in question:" i.e., to the errors condemned in the Papal Brief. "And every work of real science written by a Catholic adds to their force" (p. 689). Of those who treat Theology as the Holy Father prescribes, he tells us (p. 690) that "their methods are obsolete, and their labours vain." The Pope pronounces in so many words, that Catholic philosophers are under the obligation of submitting themselves to the doctrinal decrees of the Pontifical Congregations. But Sir J. Acton replies, that it is a "monstrous error" if we "attribute to the Congregation of the Index a share in the infallibility of the Church" (p. 679). This expression indeed, taken by itself, admits of a tolerable sense; but the Editor himself precludes our understanding it in such sense. He says that the German theologians, with whom throughout he expresses unreserved sympathy, "attach no more value to the unreasoned decrees of" the Index, "than to the undefended 'ipse dixit' of *a theologian of secondary rank*" (p. 678). Further, as to "the method of Rome" in "adjusting the relations between science and authority," (p. 673)—a method which he considers signally exemplified in the maxims of this Brief—he criticises it as follows:—

"The true limits of legitimate authority are one thing, and the area which authority may *find it expedient to attempt to occupy* is another. *The interests of the Church are not necessarilg identical with those of the ecclesiastical government.* A government does not desire its power to be strictly defined; but *the subjects require the line to be drawn with increasing precision.* Authority may be protected by its subjects *being kept in ignorance of its faults,* and by their holding it *in superstitious admiration.* . . . . These arts are simply those *of all human governments* which possess legislative power, *fear attack, deny responsibility, and therefore shrink from scrutiny*" (p. 674).

Consistently with this view of the case, he is of opinion that historical inquiry "has gradually *laid bare the whole policy and process of ecclesiastical authority,* and has removed that *veil of mystery* wherewith, *like all other authorities,* it tries to surround the present" (p. 673). And he considers that "the twilight of opinion enables it to assume" "the halo of infallibility" (p. 674).

Finally, with a simplicity which in a less serious matter would be exquisitely droll, he assigns as one of his reasons for discontinuing the "Review," his unwillingness to impair "the authority and dignity of the Holy See" (p. 686). As though any private individual could well do more (pro viribus suis) to impair such authority and dignity, than by saying that the principles which that See maintains are "fundamentally erroneous and inexpressibly mischievous; that the Pope has been hitherto enabled by the twilight of opinion to assume a halo of infallibility; that he *finds*

it expedient to cling to a position exceeding the true limits of legitimate authority; that he fears attack, denies responsibility, and therefore shrinks from scrutiny." Such are the final utterances of the "Home and Foreign Review." Certainly it has died like a wasp, which leaves its sting in the wound it has inflicted.

But we have not yet done any kind of justice to the Editor's whole view of the Pope's position in the Church. We would therefore beg our readers, carefully to ponder the following portentous paragraph: in reprinting which, however, the italics are ours:—

"What is the Holy See in its relation to the masses of Catholics, and where does its strength lie? It is the organ, the mouth the head of the Church. *Its strength consists in its agreement with the general conviction of the faithful.* When it expresses the common knowledge and sense of the age, or of a large majority of Catholics, its position is impregnable. The force it derives from this general support makes direct opposition hopeless, and therefore disedifying, tending only to division, and promoting reaction rather than reform. The influence by which it is to be moved must be directed first on that which gives it strength, and *must pervade the members in order that it may reach the head.* While the general sentiment of Catholics is unaltered, the course of the Holy See remains unaltered too. As soon as that sentiment is modified, Rome sympathizes with the change. The ecclesiastical government, based upon the public opinion of the Church and acting through it, *cannot separate itself from the mass of the faithful, and keep pace with the progress of the instructed minority.* It follows slowly and warily, and sometimes begins by

resisting and denouncing what in the end it thoroughly adopts. Hence a direct controversy with Rome holds out the prospect of great evils, and at best a barren and unprofitable victory. The victory that is fruitful springs from that gradual change in the knowledge, the ideas, and the convictions of the Catholic body; which in due time overcomes the natural reluctance to forsake a beaten path, and by insensible degrees *constrains the mouthpiece of tradition to conform itself to the new atmosphere with which it is surrounded.* The slow, silent, indirect action of public opinion bears the Holy See along, without any demoralizing conflict or dishonourable capitulation. This action *it belongs essentially to the graver scientific literature to direct*" (p. 686).

Now what are those principles of the Holy See, which Sir J. Acton thus wishes to revolutionize? Avowedly those declared in the Munich Brief. But all the more fundamental of these are strictly theological, if there are any such in the world. What doctrines are strictly of faith? What is the dogmatic authority of Roman Congregations? What is the dogmatic authority of the "sensus fidelium"? What is the value of Scholastic Theology, and the weight due to that encouragement which the Church has ever given it? What is the Church's doctrinal authority within the sphere of philosophy? Such are the chief questions to which the Brief gives an answer. And when the Council of Florence decreed that "the Roman Pontiff is the Teacher of all Christians," no one doubts that it was precisely to such questions as these that primary reference was made. But Sir J. Acton considers it an universal

and inevitable fact, that so far from teaching the "instructed minority" on such matters, the Holy Father cannot even "keep pace with their progress." The "instructed minority," it seems, are not included in the number of those sheep and lambs whom Peter is to feed, or of those brethren whom by his unfailing faith he is to strengthen. It is not he who teaches them, but they who teach him. They make indeed all equitable allowance for his position; they quite see that he cannot be expected to reach their height of divine knowledge, unable as he is to "separate himself from the mass of the faithful." Still the fact remains. Catholics have hitherto supposed that, in matters of religious doctrine, it is the Pope and Bishops who teach the faithful. But the instructed minority possess their esoteric gospel; and according to that gospel, "the graver scientific literature" teaches the faithful, while they, by a slow and laborious process, enlighten the Pope. Peter is ever the hindmost of all Catholics, in arriving at true views of theological science and theological truth.

These things are miserable enough; but still worse remains behind. We must complain indeed seriously, of the vagueness which characterizes many of Sir John's propositions on the most vital and critical points; but there are some sentences which plainly deny altogether the existence of *any* infallible Ecclesia Docens. It is not that he is Gallican, and refuses to admit the Pope's Infallibility except in connection with the body of Bishops. He recognizes it as little when the Pope acts with them, as when he acts without them. It is a

"vulgar mistake," says our author (p. 681), "to confound religious truth *with the voice of ecclesiastical authority.*" "*The whole Church*" is not "infected with the liability to err, *from which her rulers are not exempt*" (p. 682). And an earlier passage explains his meaning at greater length. "In the civil affairs of mankind . . . . *particular authorities* may fall into error . . . . but the political conscience of *the whole people* cannot be irrecoverably lost. The Church possesses *the same privilege*, but in a much higher degree . . . . Whatever authority therefore *expresses* that knowledge of which *she* is the keeper must be obeyed. But *there is no institution* from which this knowledge can be obtained with immediate certainty. A Council is not à priori Ecumenical; the Holy See is not separately infallible. The one has to *await a sanction;* the other has repeatedly erred. Every decree, therefore, requires *a preliminary examination*" (p. 679.) According to this statement, it is the collective faithful only who are infallible, and there is no infallible Ecclesia Docens at all.* We are bound to express our humble opinion, which we submit altogether to the judgment of theologians, that he who should really deny Infallibility to the collective body of Catholic Bishops, when professing to teach, in union with their Head, the Catholic Faith as such,—could not be an unsound or a disloyal Catholic, because he would be no Catholic at all.

We do not understand the Holy Father, when

* [I here omit a sentence, which expressed a doubt whether the Editor could really mean this. There cannot now be the least question that he meant it.]

issuing the Munich Brief, to have had in contemplation so extreme a tenet as this. In order however to understand what errors he did intend to condemn,* we must begin with a few prefatory remarks on the relation between religion and secular science.

Theological science, we need hardly say, is generated by the exercise of Reason on principles known by Revelation; secular science, in its various branches, by the exercise of Reason on principles known by Reason itself, or by Experience. Religion however and secular science are constantly crossing each other, and very many are the truths which belong equally to both. This happens in more than one way. Firstly, the doctrinal Deposit committed to the Church's keeping has the closest relation with Philosophy; it possesses no one constituent, which may not be assailed on strictly philosophical grounds. A large portion indeed of Catholic dogma is in its own nature within the sphere of Reason; though of course it is a very different question, how far unassisted Reason would have advanced in its exploration. The Church's whole moral doctrine, for example, is so circumstanced, and

* [I have omitted two portions of the original article. In the former I argued, that firm interior assent may be due to ecclesiastical pronouncements which are not strictly infallible. This question is, I think, more effectively discussed in an article on "Galileo and the Pontifical Congregations," which I hope to republish in my next volume; and I will not therefore here enter on it. The other omitted portion of the article was directed to show, that the Munich Brief was issued ex cathedrâ. This portion of my argument is sufficiently exhibited in a subsequent Essay of the present volume.]

her whole exposition of God's Attributes. But doctrine the most purely supernatural may easily come into conflict with (erroneous) philosophy. Thus, the Church's teaching on Grace may be indefinitely corrupted and falsified by unsound Psychology; nay, even such mysteries as the Trinity, the Incarnation, Transubstantiation, may be opposed by a chain of philosophical reasoning, purporting to show that they are intrinsically impossible. Here then is one way, in which Religion and secular science may easily be brought into conflict. Another way is, by means of the various facts, which are either inseparably mixed up with the very foundations of Christianity, or else are stated in that Inspired Volume which the Church authenticates. For both these classes of facts may easily be in apparent collision with the conclusions, whether of historical or of physical science. Already therefore we discern one very large field of secular science, over which the Church's Infallibility must extend, if she have really the power of infallibly guarding the Deposit of Faith. She must have the power of infallibly pronouncing propositions to be false, if they tend by legitimate consequence to a denial of any religious doctrine which she teaches. But secular science contains a vast number of such propositions; and on all these therefore, the Church has power to pronounce an infallible judgment.*

* [I maintain most confidently even more than is said in the text. I maintain most confidently, that the Church has power of infallibly condemning any philosophical tenets which she may account *perilous* to the Faith, even though they do not lead to its denial by necessary consequence. See my subsequent Essay on the extent of Infallibility.]

We may here notice, by the way, a transparently fallacious argument, which has occasionally been used by certain Catholic writers. These persons sometimes speak, as though nothing were further from their wish than to meddle with Theology itself. Their aim, it seems, is merely to introduce some more satisfactory harmony between religion and secular science, than has hitherto prevailed. And they complain that the Church should look with a jealous eye on what (as they think) appertains so very indirectly to her province. A transparent fallacy indeed! Their allegation assumes, as a matter of fact, that certain propositions, generally accounted as true conclusions of theological science, are in conflict with certain other propositions, which are generally accounted as true conclusions of this or that secular science. If this fact be granted them, it follows that two different methods are imaginable, of removing such apparent conflict between the sciences. The first is, by showing that the former propositions are not true conclusions of theological science. And the second is, by showing that the latter are not true conclusions of secular science. If these writers adopt the latter method, there is no pretence for saying that the Church has ever shown the slightest disposition to interfere with them in any way whatever. But if they adopt the former, they are simply treading on theological ground; and they are as absolutely under the Church's jurisdiction, as though they were writing formal treatises on the Trinity or the Incarnation.

We are now in a position to appreciate the value and bearing of those chief maxims, which the Munich Brief

condemns. They may be reduced, we think, to two heads. Firstly "The Ecclesia Docens is not infallible, except as regards her express Definitions; and where the Church is not infallible, the declaration of her authorities has no more legitimate force, than is due to the actual arguments which they adduce." On this view, a theologian has simply to take for his principles the Definitions (as contained e.g. in Denzinger's small volume) which have been put forth in various ages by Popes and Councils; and to manipulate them according to his own views of history and logic, with no further deference or submission to the living Church. His private judgment, thus exercised, may lead him to the opinion, that S. Augustine, whom the Church has ever reverenced as the great doctor of Grace, is the virtual founder of a condemned heresy against that very doctrine. Or his private judgment may lead him to the opinion, that the Scholastic Theology is radically unsound, though the Church has not merely cherished it throughout with her warmest favour, but has almost identified herself with it, by incorporating its characteristic thoughts and expressions into her very Definitions of faith.* If such are the conclusions in which an inquirer is landed by his private judgment, he will not be deterred by any reverence for the Church's authority, from holding and even publishing them. In one word, whereas the one fundamental principle of genuine Theology is unreserved and eager sub-

* [This sentence refers to certain theories, which had been advocated in the "Rambler" or "Home and Foreign Review."]

mission to the Church's magisterium,—a total refusal of such submission is the one principle pervading this most unsound and poisonous counterfeit. It is, in its whole spirit and bearing, a simple substitution of the Protestant "private judgment," for the Catholic "authority."

So much for theological science in its strictest sense. As to those large portions of secular science which come into contact with Theology, writers of this school do not conceal the fact, that they handle them almost entirely in the same way as Protestants; that they handle them with hardly any greater reference to the Church's voice, than if she did not exist. And this is the second maxim to which we above referred. But the Munich Brief teaches, that secular science cannot be safely cultivated, unless its votaries "revere above all things (as is fitting) that infallible and uncreated light of the Divine Intellect, which marvellously shines forth in the Christian Revelation. For although,"—proceeds Pius IX.—"those natural sciences depend on their own proper principles as known by Reason," nevertheless the "Catholics who cultivate them must have Divine Revelation before their eyes as a guiding star, under whose light they may be on their guard against quicksands and errors."

Great is the consolation of remembering, that the shallow, proud, and most pernicious errors here condemned are now for ever banished from Catholic Theology. But we must not forget that, though these particular errors are put to silence, the spirit which has prompted them still lives in the midst of us. We

are far indeed from meaning to imply, that this age of the Church is worse than others. Every age in its turn is replete with calamities; and if we look at ecclesiastical records, we shall see that each successive Pope has regarded his own period as most heavily afflicted.* Whether the evil and irreligiousness of our own time exceed that of others, is a truly unprofitable inquiry; for all times are predominantly evil and irreligious. But what is the particular *kind* of evil and irreligiousness now rampant, is surely of all inquiries the most practical. To us it seems that, among all the Church's heavy afflictions, none is now more grievous, than the tendency, not in practice only (as at all times) but even in theory, to separate the general current of thought and action from the influence of religion and of religious teachers. It is of course among Protestants, that this tendency is far more extensively and formidably exhibited; and the great body of Catholics in these islands seem as yet on the whole (thank God!) faithful to their traditions. But living as we do in habits of constantly increasing familiarity and intimacy

* We think that Pius IX. has hardly issued a single document, which does not contain some reference to the fearful evils by which the Church is now so heavily bowed down. So in the Munich Brief he refers, at starting, to the exceeding bitterness of the time (asperrimis hisce temporibus); and afterwards he speaks of the false opinions which have appeared in Catholic Germany, as adding to the anguish which so many causes contribute to produce. "Hæc sanè omnia . . . . nostrum solicitabant et angebant animum tot aliis pressum angustiis."

[Our present Holy Father expresses himself in precisely a similar way.]

with Protestants, it is absurd to doubt that we are in danger of serious harm from the infection of their evil principles; and among those lay Catholics who specially profess intellectual culture, the symptoms appear to us truly alarming. Illustrations abound. Sometimes it is implied, that clerics and laymen legitimately differ from each other in their estimate of human life and conduct; nay, it has been called an encroachment on the sacerdotal office, that a layman should address his fellow-Catholics (as at Malines) on the worthlessness of this world's goods.* Sometimes it is implied that the moral and religious training of clerics and laymen should differ, not in matters of detail, but in its fundamental principles. But this view, intellectually speaking, is below contempt, unless either it be denied that clerics and laymen have one common nature, or else it be assumed (which *is* really the assumption) that the moral excellence of one class should be measured by a different standard, from the moral excellence of the other.† Or again, in the various discussions about mixed education, it is often taken for granted, that religious instruction and training is but one part out of many; instead of being the one foundation, on which all must be built under pain of the whole edifice being unsound and rotten. But why dwell on individual questions? Look at the highest spheres of non-ecclesiastical action and speculation respectively, the

* [This refers to a then recent comment in one of the English Catholic journals.]

† [This also refers to a then recent controversial fact; though I do not now exactly remember what the fact was.]

sphere of Politics and the sphere of Philosophy. Both these regions are in open and flagrant rebellion against God and the Church. It is held unconsciously by many, and actually expressed by some, that the politician as such has no concern with man's supernatural end; and that the philosopher as such has no concern with revealed doctrine.* The Holy See of late has been especially energetic against both these malignant errors. Gregory XVI., in his well-known Encyclical "Mirari vos," declares authoritatively (in the words of a canonized predecessor), that "the power and authority" of princes is "conferred on them, not only for the world's government, but, *most of all*, for the Church's protection." And the present Pope has repeatedly and most earnestly inculcated the obligation incumbent on philosophers and philosophy, of rendering to the Church due submission.† It is with very deep truth then, that an able writer in the "Civilta" places in close juxtaposition two orations, delivered almost contemporaneously to Catholic audiences, the

* It may perhaps be better here to explain. No one pretends, that either political action or philosophical speculation is directly under the Church's authority. But both are indirectly under it. The politician, in his political capacity, is bound to defer to the Church so far as his measures affect the welfare of souls; and the philosopher, in his philosophical capacity, is bound to defer to the Church so far as his speculations affect revealed doctrine. Moreover (as we most earnestly maintain) it is for the Church herself to decide, what political measures in particular affect the welfare of souls; and what philosophical speculations in particular affect revealed doctrine.

† [I need hardly remind my readers of Leo XIII.'s language in the "Æterni Patris."]

one by M. de Montalembert at Malines, the other by Dr. Döllinger at Munich. Both these orations tend to disparage—we need not here determine precisely to how grievous an extent—the Church's legitimate authority, whether in Politics or in Philosophy.

For ourselves however, we regard the philosophical movement with immeasurably greater alarm and consternation than the political. No one indeed can condemn and repudiate more unreservedly than we do, M. de Montalembert's whole principle on "the liberty of worships." But in the first place, a man's view of such matters is almost or altogether apart from his interior life; and even a saintly person, under invincible misapprehension, may hold such opinions. But further, the evil work of de-Catholicizing civil society has been now so completely wrought out in far the largest portion of Europe, that the question at issue rather concerns our theoretical estimate of the past, than our practical provision for the present. It may be said indeed (and truly) that the French Orator's principles imply the civil tolerance of such errors, as the religious sense of Europe would still repudiate; of sects, e.g., which might be started on the basis of polygamy or of atheism. But M. de Montalembert is far more given to action than to speculation; and his Catholic instincts would assuredly save him in practice from any such blunder. Indeed, remarkably enough, in his Malines orations he excepts from his proposed liberality all sects, which should deny God's Existence or run counter to natural morality. In other words, he excepts all but those, which are tolerated already in far the greatest

part of Europe, and with whose external liberty in such regions no Catholic dreams of interfering.

But the other case is widely different. The pursuit of secular science on the principle of disregard to ecclesiastical decisions, eats like a canker into the whole substance of a man's religion. We have seen that the number of philosophical tenets is very large indeed, which lead by legitimate consequence to denial of this or that Cátholic verity. What safeguard then can be imagined against an inquirer embracing some of these tenets, if he makes it his very principle to disregard those ecclesiastical declarations which condemn them? Here then we have to suppose a man engaged in active philosophical speculation, who still believes in Catholicity, but who holds also certain philosophical tenets, which in their result are antagonistic thereto. He has, of course, started on a road which has no end except apostasy. At what pace he advances along that road, will depend on the degree in which he unites intellectual keenness with spiritual obtuseness. But every day will bring him nearer to his unhappy goal, unless God give him grace to retrace his steps and renounce his fundamental principle. He naturally tries every attainable method, to relieve himself from the burden of two contradictory convictions; and so gradually sinks from bad to worse. First, he refuses to believe any Catholic doctrine, which is not strictly defined as de Fide Catholicâ. Next, as to the defined doctrines themselves, he more and more chooses to confine his acceptance of them to the lowest sense which their

words will grammatically bear, instead of studying the Church's full intention. Then a current of thought finds outward vent, which has long been silently proceeding; and he both thinks and speaks of the Church's Rulers with compassionate contempt. He regards them much as he might regard Balaam's ass. They are made the organs of a divine utterance, he thinks, at certain very wide intervals; but are otherwise below the ordinary level of humanity, in their apprehension of God's works and ways. It is difficult to know how long this state of mind can last. But one would think the time could not be far distant, when he will find himself in a direct opposition to the Church's teaching, which no sophistry can gloss over; and be confronted with the awful alternative, of total retractation or undisguised apostasy.

It may be said perhaps, that deplorable as such an exhibition may be, at least but very few are exposed to these awful perils; and that in this respect political liberalism is far more disastrous than philosophical. But, on the contrary, "the instructed minority" exercise an enormous influence on man's destiny; a degree of influence which is not exaggerated, we verily believe, by the said "instructed minority" themselves, or by Sir J. Acton as their mouthpiece. It is not the effect produced by them on their contemporaries, which is so formidable; but the effect produced in forming the convictions and maxims of the rising generation. And no doubt it is a sense of this, which animates Catholic authorities in the movement now proceeding in so many different parts of Christendom

—nowhere more than in Rome itself—for elevating ecclesiastical education in its intellectual aspect. It is this, we are convinced, next to directly spiritual means, in which the true remedy is to be found for evils, whose fearfulness and imminence it is difficult to exaggerate. It will be a very great boon also if (as the "Civiltà" article induces us to hope) these controversies may lead to a renewed cultivation of the Scholastic Theology. We are confident that neither Scriptural, nor patristic, nor historical studies, necessary as they are, can produce their due result, unless built on the scientific mastery of dogma. Now, as the "Civiltà" writer most truly remarks, the Scholastic cannot be called the *best* scientific Theology taught in the Church, simply because she neither teaches nor has ever taught any other. But we are wandering to a theme which would require an article for itself.*

The mention however of the "Civiltà" leads us to one final consideration, deeper than any which has preceded. "We have learned," says the writer in question very opportunely, "not from the Scholastics but from the Catechism, that the end for which man was placed in the world is to save his soul; and not to construct linguistic science, historical criticism, and biblical exegesis." The certain and unfailing result of intellectual rebellion is practically to forget,—some go the length of explicitly denying,—this foundation of all. And such a fact not only throws men into direct antagonism with the Church's spirit, but takes

* [The prospect now under this head is far brighter, than it was even in 1864.]

from them all power of appreciating (even if they wished it) her maxims and demeanour. It is said (we know not how truly) of Mr. Telford, the eminent engineer, that in his view rivers were created for the one purpose of feeding canals. According to him then, each individual river is more excellent of its kind, more perfect, more admirable, in proportion as it is better adapted to fulfil this the great end of its existence. If such were really his whim, it would follow as a matter of course, that whatever judgment he formed on the relative excellence of rivers, was simply untrustworthy and ridiculous. In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred it would be absurdly wrong; and if in the hundredth it happened to be approximately right, this circumstance would be due purely to accident. In like manner, if any one goes astray on the first principles of human conduct—if he is at sea as to the very end for which man was created—every judgment which he forms will be absolutely worthless, whether on human action itself or on the efforts put forth by the Church for directing it. When an uneducated rustic can form a just criticism on the poetical beauty of "Hamlet" or "Faust," then (and not till then) will it be worth while to hear our poor blinded intellectualist, expressing his judgment on the maxims and policy of the Holy See. Such men have already pronounced on the Church the very highest eulogium which it is in their power to pronounce, when they have expressed a severe censure on her rules and principles, and a kind of compassionate contempt for her divinely appointed Pastors.

THE CHURCH'S MAGISTERIUM.*

A Letter on the Association for the Promotion of the Unity of Christendom. By Right Rev. Bishop ULLATHORNE. London: Richardson.

[July 1865.]

WE have on previous occasions given reasons for our opinion, that those Catholics who are bitten with the Unionistic spirit,† will be always found to have most mistaken notions, whether on the nature of the Church's magisterium, or on the duty of deference thereto. We propose on the present occasion to mention two errors (as we account them) on this subject, which have been maintained by such Catholics: errors however which have no other mutual connection, than as being particular instances of our general proposition.

* [This Essay is rearranged from a very much longer article, on "Rome, Unionism, and Indifferentism." The first paragraph is newly written, for the purpose of holding together the Essay in its present shape. I feel that the result is very patchy; but there are one or two things said in the original article, of which I wish to preserve the memory. The chief part of this Essay indeed appeared in my "Doctrinal Decisions"; but it has far closer connection with the general drift of this volume than of that.]

† By this term we mean to express that spirit, which leads men to look favourably on those projects of corporate union which have been put forward by certain Anglicans.

I.

Firstly then, these Catholics love to speak of the great evils which have accrued to the Church, from the separation of England e.g. and to so large an extent of Germany, from the Roman See. As to the great majority of Unionists—those who are non-Catholic—they may most consistently say this; for they believe that the Church has been actually divided. If the Church could be divided at all, it would be impossible (no doubt) to exaggerate the calamitousness of such an event. But the question which we wish to consider concerns Catholics. How far and in what sense can Catholics truly say, that the Church has suffered injury, through the lamentable defection which has taken place from her body?

Firstly, of course, the loss of so many souls, which would have been saved within visible Unity, but which will not in fact be saved externally to that Unity, is a grievous injury to the Church's interests: for her highest interest is the salvation of souls.

Then, further, an active intellectual process has been exercised within the Church from the first, on the Deposit of Faith. Great thinkers have busied themselves in every age, whether with analyzing some individual doctrine; or harmonizing various doctrines in their mutual relation; or carrying them forward to their legitimate conclusions, theological and philosophical; or penetrating the depths of Scripture; or exploring the treasures of Tradition. All this has been done

under the vigilant supervision of the Holy See; which has carefully guarded the purity of this doctrinal development, and provided against the danger of unsound opinions taking root within the Church. Now the intellectual labour of which we have spoken has conferred inestimable services; and at no period has it been more needed, than in the three last centuries. It has no doubt therefore inflicted very serious injury on the Church, that men of genius and learning, who (had they been Catholics) might have taken a prominent part in the work, have wasted or worse than wasted their power, by devoting it to the service of a non-Catholic religion. Germans e.g. (whatever their intellectual faults) are perhaps exceeded by none in critical acumen, and again in philosophical profundity. The Church then has sustained a severe detriment, from so many Germans being Protestants; in that she has lost the benefit of such important services as they might have rendered her.

The Church then, we say, has been negatively a great sufferer by the Protestant apostasy. But—so we must mantain—no good Catholic can consistently admit, that she has positively suffered thereby. It is necessary to insist on this; because we are inclined to fear that, through confusion of thought, much unsound speculation has found access to the mind of certain Catholics. It has been implied in fact—unless we misunderstand the meaning of various expressions which have been used—that she has actually suffered *in the purity of her teaching*, through the defection of Protestant England and Germany. It has been implied

that Rome's authoritative lessons (apart of course from actual Definitions) are less simply orthodox in tendency, than they would have been had all Europe remained Catholic. Such a notion simply inverts the Church's whole constitution. God teaches the Holy See, and the Holy See teaches the Church; it is Peter whose faith fails not, and who in his turn confirms his brethren: whereas, according to the above notion, he would not be simply the Church's Teacher, but in part her disciple. Rome, let it never be forgotten, is commissioned to teach England and Germany, not England or Germany to teach Rome. So far as any Englishmen or Germans are at variance with what is authoritatively inculcated in Rome, they are quite certainly in error. Rome no doubt may often wish to correct her impressions of *fact* by special communication e.g. with England; but she cannot, without abandoning her essential claims, seek correction from any source on matters of doctrine or of principle.

II.

The second error, to which we referred at starting, consists in practically forgetting the doctrine, so clearly exhibited by F. Perrone, that the Church is strictly *infallible* in her magisterium.* Let our readers consider at their leisure—though indeed it requires very prolonged consideration to exhaust the subject—

* [See the Preliminary Essay in this volume.]

how much is implied in this pregnant statement, that the Church is infallible in her magisterium. Take the obvious illustration of a parent; and suppose it were revealed to me, that my mother's guidance is infallible in every particular of moral and religious training. That I should accept with unquestioning assent the very least detail of her explicit instruction, is but a small part of my submission to her authority. I should be ever studying her whole demeanour in my regard—her acts no less than her words—in order that I may more fully apprehend her implied principles of conduct, and gather those lessons of profound wisdom which she is privileged to dispense. Perhaps indeed at the present time no more important contribution could be made to scientific Theology, than a full exposition of the Church's infallible magisterium; so that this great doctrine might be cleared of possible misconception, and vindicated against plausible objection.

This Infallibility of the Church's magisterium is not only declared by theologians, but also testified by the "sensus fidelium." He who holds that the Church is infallible only in her Definitions, studies divine truth by a method which we must maintain to be characteristically Protestant. He takes for his principles these Definitions (as contained e.g. in Denzinger's small volume) and manipulates them according to his own private views of history and logic, with no further deference or submission to the living Church. Now such an extravagance as this is by absolute necessity confined to highly-educated intellects. The ordinary

believer has no more power of proceeding by such a method, than by the more openly Protestant maxim of private judgment on Scripture. A few unsound Catholics, we repeat, may be led astray by intellectual phantoms, or blinded by intellectual pride; but the great mass have imbibed one and one only method of acquiring Catholic truth. The Church, as they have been taught, in her full practical exhibition, is their one infallible guide. They well know that, if they would learn their religion, they must open their heart unreservedly to the Church's full influence; study for their guidance those manuals and spiritual books, which she places in their hand; listen with docility to the instruction of her ministers; practise those duties which she prescribes, in the very form in which she prescribes them; labour in one word that that great body of truth may sink silently and deeply into their heart, which her whole system of practice and discipline inculcates and implies.* Now it is the common doctrine of theologians, that wherever the body of the faithful has unanimously imbibed one impression of fundamental doctrine, a strong presumption arises of such impression being the true one.† But even otherwise—is

* "As the blood flows from the heart to the body through the veins; as the vital sap insinuates itself into the whole tree, into each bough, and leaf, and fibre; as water descends through a thousand channels from the mountain-top to the plain; so is Christ's pure and life-giving doctrine diffused, *flowing into the whole body through a thousand organs from the Ecclesia Docens.*"—Murray, de Ecclesiâ, disp. XI., n. 15.

† E. g., "In quæstione fidei communis fidelis populi sensus haud levem facit fidem."—Charmes, quoted with assent by Perrone.

there anyone who would openly say, that there is a "royal road" to religious truth? that the highly-cultivated intellect is to seek it by a method essentially different, from that accessible to the ordinary believer? that far less deference is due to the Church's practical guidance from the former, than from the latter? An affirmative answer to this question is involved in the opinion which we are combating; but such an answer is so obviously and monstrously anti-Catholic, that no one will venture expressly to give it. The legitimate benefit to be derived from intellectual cultivation is not (we need hardly say) that men should be less loyal and submissive to the Church. On the contrary the legitimate result of that cultivation is, that their docility to her, while remaining formally the same, may become materially far greater. That it may become greater, we say, from the far more extensive knowledge opened to them, of her true mind, of her implied teaching, of her multifarious Traditions.

III.

The full bearing of this doctrine, concerning the Infallibility of the Church's magisterium, will be made further manifest by one very important consideration. The essential difference of belief between Catholics and non-Catholics does not mainly consist in the circumstance, that certain doctrines may be exhibited on paper, which Catholics hold and non-Catholics reject. There is a certain *interior spirit* which characterizes good

Catholics, to which those outside the Church are generally altogether strangers. We will proceed briefly to suggest what we mean by this, and will then deduce from it certain obvious conclusions. Let us first then recapitulate certain doctrines, which are professed by all Catholics,—which non-Catholics commonly do *not* profess—and which tend to produce a very conspicuous effect on the interior character.*

(1.) Catholics practically hold, no less than speculatively believe, that He who died on the cross is the Eternal God. Putting aside the Tractarians, we believe the number of Protestants to be extremely small, who practically hold this doctrine; though the great majority of them consider themselves to believe it. And we shall see the reason of this, when we consider the principal means whereby the Catholic Church secures its true presentation to the mind of her children. We do not here speak on books of meditation, nor again of scientific theology; because these, though instruments of signal efficacy, are available of course only for the educated classes. Nor again do we speak of the Catechism; which is amply sufficient for engendering speculative belief in the great doctrine, but not always for ensuring its full practical apprehension. The means whereby the great body of Catholics is duly trained in this respect, seem to us mainly two;—devotion to the Blessed Sacrament, and

* It can hardly be necessary to warn our Catholic readers, that in the following discussion the word "character" has its ordinary and popular meaning; totally distinct from that theological sense, in which it is said that certain Sacraments impart a "character."

to Our Lady. And since Protestants have abandoned both, it is no matter of surprise that the treasure has escaped from their grasp. The belief that, by a stupendous miracle, the Redeemer is personally present in every Tabernacle, impresses the mind with a sense of His indefinite greatness; while the divine worship, internal and external, which Catholics offer to the Blessed Sacrament day after day, preserves in their mind the fresh and vivid impression of His Divine Personality. Then as regards devotion to our Blessed Lady. The practice, so peculiar to Catholics and at the same time so universal among them, of uniting themselves with Mary in the contemplation of Jesus, unspeakably elevates their conception of His Divine Majesty. Yet we cannot wonder that Protestants reprobate devotion to our Lady altogether; for commonly their own practical conception of Christ rises hardly (if at all) above the Catholic's conception of Christ's purest creature.

(2.) Firm belief in the Real Presence, and the habit of frequent communion (as is known by all who try the experiment) produce in the mind a profound and incommunicable effect of their own.

(3.) Devotion to our Lady is the peculiar heritage of Catholics. The immense majority of Protestants regard it with reprobation and horror; those more lenient, with indulgence and excuse: but Catholics cherish it as among their dearest possessions and their highest privileges. We will here appeal to those Catholics, who have once been Protestants. We will suppose them to have accepted on faith that fully-

developed devotion to our Blessed Lady, which is *there* encouraged, whither all sound believers look for light and guidance—viz., in Rome. And we will further suppose that they have practised assiduously the devotion thus learnt. Let us even put the case that these men have been Tractarians; and therefore that, even in their pre-Catholic days, they have really embraced and practically apprehended the doctrine of our Lord's Divine Personality. These however, no less than others, find that their devotion to Mary, while unspeakably intensifying their awe and reverence, has, at the same time, given a quality of tenderness, confidingness, intimacy, to their love of Him, which has been an absolutely new experience. They find indeed generally, that it has imparted a familiarity with the invisible world, a realization of supernatural truth, an unworldliness of thought and affection, a practical belief in the efficacy of prayer, a power of self-control, to which otherwise they would have been strangers.

(4.) All Catholics recognise the Evangelical Counsels; and consider that those who follow them pursue a higher and more heavenly method of life than any others. Consider this especially, as it regards celibacy and purity.

(5.) Observe again the Saints of the Church. How singularly like to each other! how singularly unlike to all besides! It is commonly recognised as part of Catholic doctrine, that the Church is actually infallible when she proposes these holy beings one by one to the love and reverence of the faithful. Moreover, the practice is earnestly inculcated on every Catholic of

studying carefully their acts and lives, as the one highest and truest exhibition of Christianity; as presenting the one type of character most acceptable to God; the type of character, by approximating to which and in no other way, can men become better Christians.

(6.) Whether in perusing these lives, or in studying works of ascetic theology, all Catholics are taught that the one true way of rising in true holiness is to unite diffidence in self with confidence in God. They are taught, in other words, to labour energetically towards fulfilment of His Will, in the spirit of simple reliance on His strength as enabling them to do so. One school of Protestants denies this doctrine, by affirming that all our efforts for consistent obedience are vain, and indeed anti-Christian; and that our best acts are in God's sight but as filthy rags. The opposite school, ignoring or denying original sin, holds that we can really advance to our true end, by works done in our natural strength, and in the spirit of self-reliance.

(7.) It is an essential truth of Catholicity, that the one end for which man was created is the love and service of God; that men are more admirable, more excellent, more perfect as men,—not at all in proportion as they are more intellectual, or more gifted with practical power, or more nobly descended;—but exclusively as they are more morally and spiritually advanced. On no point is there more real difference than on this, between the respective morality of Catholics and Protestants.

(8.) All Catholics are required to go annually to confession; and are earnestly exhorted, both to go

much oftener, and also to practise regularly and systematically a rigid examination of conscience. Moreover, in the Confessional they submit themselves to the priest, both as their judge and their physician; while he is obliged to adjust his counsels and decisions by a whole system of moral and ascetical theology, which he is authoritatively taught in his ecclesiastical education.

(9.) Catholics hold, that even the smallest sin is a greater evil than any other in the world *except* sin; that for each smallest sin future suffering (in purgatory) is justly due; that efficacious repentance for venial sin is far from easy; that men cannot in this life obtain (whether by indulgences or otherwise) remission of the punishment for any one such sin, *without* efficaciously repenting it. We are not denying that after death the penalty may be shortened, or even removed altogether, by the prayers of survivors or by the indulgences which these may gain. But still the doctrine which we have mentioned stands out in startling contrast with Protestant misbelief. Even the everlasting punishment of mortal sins is fast disappearing out of the Protestant's creed; and a Catholic's sensitiveness to small offences was always unintelligible to the Protestant world. Matt. v. 17—19 may be thought to have been specially pronounced by anticipation, against those frightful heresies introduced by Luther, which have pervaded Protestantism in all its phases like a besetting plague.

(10.) Catholics have also a very real and influential belief, in the constant battle to be waged by those

who would obtain salvation, against the attacks of those evil spirits, who are so crafty and sagacious, and at the same time such malignant enemies to God and man. Such a belief has now hardly any practical existence with most Protestants.

(11.) An English Catholic has a far closer corporate connection with a French or Italian Catholic, than with an English Protestant. He owes more unreserved attachment to the Church than to the State; and holds moreover, as of divine faith, that the Pope is by God's immediate appointment the Church's Supreme Ruler. Consequently his one reasonable attitude of mind towards the Holy Father is a more ardent and (as it were) chivalrous loyalty, than was due e.g. to the Stuarts even on the highest theory of divine right.

We need not continue our enumeration further; and we will now draw a few inferences from what we have said:—

I. A very little consideration will show, that a habit of pondering on those truths and diligently practising those usages which we have now mentioned, must necessarily engender a most peculiar and pronounced interior character—one widely different from any other.

II. Further, God revealed Catholic doctrine for the very end that men should contemplate and dwell on it. Since, therefore the duly pondering on Catholic doctrine leads to a certain most definite interior character, this character must be singularly pleasing to God. It cannot be saying too much, to affirm that the production of this character is one principal end

for which God revealed Catholic Dogma. May we not even hold that it is *the* principal end?

III. Again, as this character would infallibly be produced by the contemplation of Catholic Dogma, so the converse also holds. Those who possess this character, will understand far better than any other the true force and bearing of such Dogma; and on various matters of thought will instinctively cleave to sound opinions, while they shun those which are unsound.

IV. Indeed, this interior character may be considered as substantially identical with what are called "Catholic instincts." Those who possess such instincts, have a most special gift (supposing them to possess adequate knowledge of *facts*) for seeing on each occasion what is God's preference, and how they can best please Him. Such instincts are among a Catholic's most precious possessions.

V. Here occurs a vital question. Great multitudes have really not the opportunity or the gift of duly and fruitfully contemplating Catholic doctrines one by one. Have these men no means of acquiring this assemblage of Catholic instincts? On the contrary, God has specially provided for their need, by enjoining that duty on which we are insisting: viz., docility to the Church's magisterium. By unreservedly surrendering themselves to the Church's influence in the kind of way we above set forth, all may imbibe the true Catholic spirit. All may imbibe that spirit, which places them in real sympathy with the Church's mind; gives them the instinctive habit of obedience to ecclesiastical authority; and constitutes them the Church's trustworthy defenders.

VI. Since the season of childhood and youth is immeasurably the most impressible of all, it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of preserving the purity of a Catholic atmosphere throughout the whole of education. Far better for Catholic youths to be in constant contact with men sick of the plague, than with men aliens to the Church.

VII. Even intellectually speaking, no result can well be more deplorable than that which tends to ensue from mixed education. There is no surer mark of an uneducated and uncultivated mind, than that a man's practical judgment, on facts as they occur, shall be at variance with the theoretical principles which he speculatively accepts. Suppose e.g. a politician, who is busy in forwarding measures, condemned by that theory on political economy which he professes to accept. What would happen? We should all cry out against his shallowness, and lament that he had received no better intellectual training. Now, this is the natural result of mixed education. The unhappy Catholic who (whether from his own fault or that of others) is so disadvantageously circumstanced, tends to become the very embodiment of inconsistency. Catholic in his speculative convictions, non-Catholic in his practical judgments; holding one doctrine as an universal truth, and a doctrine precisely contradictory on almost every particular which that universal truth comprises.

VIII. Further, we can thus discern (see prop. lxxix. of the Syllabus) the deplorable nature of that calamity which overspread Europe, when unhappy circumstances

necessitated in so many countries the civil toleration of religious error. The Catholic atmosphere, instead of pervading the nation, is withdrawn, as it were, within the more purely ecclesiastical sphere. A wide and ever-increasing gulf opens, between the clergy on one hand, and the great body of the laity on the other. Religious indifferentism eats like a cancer into the very vitals of society; a disease perhaps, by the very reason of its impalpableness and subtlety, more perilous than almost any other by which the body politic can be affected.*

Lastly (as has been more than once implied) unreserved and undue fraternization and familiar intercourse with misbelievers, tends to destroy, not indeed all speculative belief, but at least all practical apprehension, of those great truths which Christ came to teach us.

The circumstances of modern society, and the calamity of the "modern liberties," place (no doubt) indefinite difficulties in a Catholic's way. But it is (we think) by approximating as far as he can to the practical realization of such principles as we have ventured to submit, that he will most effectively learn from the Church those divine lessons, with which she is commissioned to imbue his mind.

* [Since this was written things have so far changed, that disbelief in all religion is at least *as* prominent a phenomenon in the non-Catholic world, as religious indifferentism.]

LIBERALISM RELIGIOUS AND ECCLESIASTICAL.

La Chiesa e lo Stato. Del P. MATTEO LIBERATORE. Napoli: Giannini. 1871.

[January 1872.]

WE think that important service is done, under existing circumstances, by dwelling emphatically on such doctrines, as those which F. Liberatore has set forth in the volume we have named. We have more than one reason for so thinking; but we shall confine our remarks to that, which weighs with us far more than all others put together. We refer to the partial development of those anti-christian views which are denoted by the name "liberalism,"—not only in their proper home, the mind of materialists and pantheists—but among children of the Catholic Church; nay, to a limited extent, among some persons, who otherwise deserve our sincere respect and admiration.

I.

Indeed Catholic liberalism* is to be found in stages

* The writers of the "Civiltà Cattolica" sometimes say, that a "Catholic liberal" is a contradiction in terms. We quite concur with this statement, in the sense in which they evidently intend it. But they would not of course deny, that many persons, more or less imbued with liberalism, submit their intellect (so far as inten-

indefinitely varying from each other; and there are those, more or less tinged with its spirit, who would be unaffectedly shocked by its more extreme manifestations. The *tendency* however of a Catholic liberal is to such opinions as these. He regards the Church's Infallibility as strictly confined to her testification of revealed dogmata; and her authority in governing as strictly confined, to what bears immediately on individual and personal religion. In other words he denies to her all jurisdiction, whether of teaching or ruling, in matters primarily temporal; however indubitable and momentous may be their indirect relation with Revealed Truth or with individual orthodoxy and piety. Further he tends to consider that Catholics have no very great advantage over externs, either as regards the help given them by their religion towards leading a good life and reaching Heaven, or as regards the particular type of goodness which they respectively recognize. And even if we went no further, we have landed the extreme Catholic liberal in a somewhat startling conclusion. For since he considers the Church's province as strictly confined to the immediate sphere of individual piety and faith—and since *within* that sphere (according to him) she confers no very important benefit on her children—he must rank the benignancy of her influence at a very low point indeed. But in consistency he cannot stop here. He holds that hardly any social calamity has

tion goes) to the Church's actual *Definitions of faith*, and also frequent her sacraments.

ever existed so grievous, as what he calls "persecution"; i.e. the laws enacted and enforced, for repression of heresy, during the ages of faith. Now it is undeniable, that for the existence of such laws the Church is mainly responsible. Our extreme liberal then must infer, that whereas the Church's benignant influence has always been small, her malignant influence (wherever she is able to have her way) has been simply appalling. And so soon as he has distinctly arrived at this conclusion,—one would think it must be a mere question of circumstances, how many weeks or months longer he will remain in her communion.

We have been commenting exclusively, on what may be called the liberal's "objective" process of thought; the objective connection of one opinion with another. The number is always very small, of those who carry forward a premiss to its legitimate outcome; and we are far from implying that the present case is an exception to the rule. Yet it need hardly be pointed out, that any principle, which leads in consistency to a detestable conclusion, must itself be an evil principle; inflicting very serious injury, not only on those who embrace it, but potentially *through* them also on the Church. Nor again can it be doubtful, that as time proceeds—in the course of generations—evil principles are always found issuing in their legitimate results. It is worth our while therefore for various reasons to inquire, whether those respective tenets, which in their combination constitute liberalism, are so many unconnected evil weeds, rising up spon-

taneously in various parts of corrupt human nature;—or whether they spring from one common root. Our strong impression is, that the latter is the true account of them; that they are intimately connected with each other, as having one common origin. That common origin—as we estimate the matter—is a denial, more or less explicit, of that vital Catholic doctrine, which is stated by our English Catechism as the first and most rudimental of all; and which is laid down by S. Ignatius, as the "Foundation" of his whole spiritual structure.

"Why did God make you?" asks the Catechism; and the prescribed answer is, "To know Him, serve Him, and love Him in this world, and to be happy with Him for ever in the next." In like manner the "Spiritual Exercises" of S. Ignatius: "Principle and Foundation," that is, of the whole Exercises: "Man has been created, that he may praise the Lord his God, and show Him reverence, and serve Him, and by means of this save his soul." Again. "We should not wish on our part for health rather than for sickness, wealth rather than poverty, honour rather than ignominy, and so on accordingly in all other things; desiring and choosing those things alone, which are more expedient to us for the end for which we were created." Now it is almost a truism to say, that man arrives more nearly at his *personal perfection*,—is more worthy of admiration and respect,—in proportion as he achieves more successfully the end for which he was created. It follows therefore from the above statement, that man arrives more nearly at his

personal perfection—not at all in proportion as he possesses greater bodily health and strength, or higher intellectual endowments and cultivation,—but exclusively in proportion as he is more prompt and disposed to love and serve God.* "Our per-

* In illustration of our statement in the text, the following passages may be cited, from Dr. Ward's "Essays on the Relation of Intellectual Power to Man's True Perfection," with one or two slight changes of expression :—

"Every thing is more perfect, in proportion as it more nearly reaches its proper end ; or to put the same thing in other words, in proportion as it more completely accomplishes its proper work, its ἔργον as Aristotle would say. A locomotive engine is more perfect, in proportion as it more combines strength, speed, and safety : the art of medicine is more perfect, in proportion as it enables the student more successfully to cure disease. Now to apply this. Our body is more perfect, in proportion as we more combine health, strength, speed, and the rest. Our poetical faculty is more perfect, in proportion as we possess a keener power of appreciating poetical beauty. Our practical faculty is more perfect, in proportion as we possess genius and fertility of resource, for devising and carrying out plans of practical action. Our philosophical faculty is more perfect, in proportion as we have a greater power (to use F. Newman's words) of grasping a large multitude of objects in their mutual and true relations. But we, as *persons*, as *men*, are more perfect,—have more nearly achieved our proper end, have more completely accomplished our proper work,—exclusively in proportion as we are more morally and spiritually perfect. This surely is a most definite and intelligible statement. And what I maintain is, that no different statement can be made on the subject, consistently with Catholic doctrine." (p. 49.)

"That view of human perfection, which seems to me implied by Catholic doctrine and practice, is comprised in the three following propositions. (1.) Just as various men are called to other modes of life, to be poets, or lawyers, or merchants, or clockmakers, or professional singers,—so some of us are called to the occupation of

fection," says Suarez, "consists in union with God; but charity it is which unites us to God." And all other theologians without exception similarly express themselves.* This being laid down, our first thesis

intellectual activity in one or other branch of knowledge: in theology, or philosophy, or history, or physical and mathematical science, as the case may be. (2.) Just as all other men act more perfectly and become more perfect, in proportion as they make their external work an instrument of interior perfection; so those of us who have *this* vocation act more perfectly and become more perfect, in proportion as we make our *intellectual* exercises an instrument of interior perfection. (3.) One man is more perfect than another, in precise proportion as he is more spiritually perfect. No one ever thought of saying that A tends to be more perfect than B, because he sings better, or makes better clocks; nor yet because he has more muscular power, or has worked more assiduously at its development: so neither does A tend to be more perfect than B, because he has greater *intellectual* power, or because he has worked more assiduously at its development. True indeed, A may sing, or make clocks, or practise gymnastics, from some supernatural motive and with a pure intention; in which case these exercises do so far increase his real perfection: and in like manner (neither more nor less) *intellectual* exercises, if practised from some supernatural motive and with a pure intention, increase his true perfection. But this is not because he possesses musical, or clock-making, or muscular, or intellectual, power; nor yet precisely because he exercises that power: but exclusively, because he makes such exercise his instrument for advance in piety." (pp. 42–3.)

* The soul, says F. Newman, which "has faith in the word of God" "understands that wealth and notoriety and influence and high place are not the first of blessings and the real standard of good; but that saintliness and all its attendants . . . . are the high and precious things, the things to be looked up to, the things to be reverently spoken of." ("To Mixed Congregations.")

Dr. Ward sets forth the unanimous testimony of theologians to

may be thus stated. The implicit rejection or the forgetfulness of this doctrine, we say, leads directly (among other evils) to three profoundly anti-christian habits of thought: viz. (1) idolatry of intellect, (2) idolatry of temporal greatness, and (3) indifferentism. The complex of these three habits may fairly be called "religious liberalism." And our second thesis is, that "religious liberalism" leads irresistibly to that further "liberalism," which may be called "ecclesiastical." By the term "ecclesiastical liberalism" we mean then to express a denial of the doctrine, that the Church possesses a true authority of teaching and ruling, within that portion of secular science and politics, which affects directly or indirectly the religious welfare, whether of the individual or of society.

II.

We will begin with what (for want of a better name) we will call "temporalism"; the idolatry of temporal greatness. F. Newman has expressed the doctrine of S. Ignatius's "Foundation" under this particular aspect, in words of characteristic energy, which have (thanks partly to Mr. Kingsley and Mr. Lecky) obtained a world-wide renown. The Church, he says,

"Holds that it were better for sun and moon to drop

the doctrine expressed above, in an Appendix to the Essays already cited. (pp. 80–94.)

from heaven, for the earth to fail, and for all the many millions who are upon it to die of starvation and in extremest agony, as far as temporal affliction goes, than that one soul, I will not say should be lost, but should commit one single venial sin." ("Anglican Difficulties.")

Such indubitably, as F. Newman says, is the doctrine of her, who has been commissioned by God infallibly to teach mankind. Nor need we say how utterly distasteful and contemptible is such teaching, in the eye of that anti-Catholic world which surrounds us. For to that world, interior piety, purity of intention, love of God, are as nothing, when they conflict or seem to conflict with national wealth, power, and aggrandisement. If we would convince ourselves of this, let us look at its employment of that ill-used word "patriotism." We will suppose such a case as the following. Some Englishman so dearly loves his country, that he feels most keenly her national sins. He well knows indeed the national sins of France, of Germany, of Italy. Still they do not grieve him as do English sins, though he may think them equally heinous, because he does not love France, Germany, or Italy, as he loves England. He fancies that he sees one special root of these sins in England's *temporal greatness*. We are not endorsing such an opinion, any more than we are assailing it; but it is a very intelligible one. The Englishman then, whom we are supposing, is led by his keen love of his country to desire her temporal humiliation. He expresses accordingly his wish, that she may be

unsuccessful in some war which she is waging; that she may descend to a secondary place among nations. All this, we say, arises from his love of his country: for if he loved her not, it would be a matter of comparative indifference* to him, how much she multiplied her sins. Yet the very charge brought against him would be, that he is "unpatriotic." By "patriotism" then, in the world's parlance, is not meant "love of our country's highest interest," but "love of her temporal greatness." Nay it precisely means a *preference* for her temporal greatness over her spiritual good. For our Englishman will be dubbed "unpatriotic" on no other ground, than that conversely he prefers her spiritual good to her temporal greatness.†

* By "comparative" indifference we mean, that he would not grieve more for *England's* offences against God, than for *other* nations' offences against God.

† Some years ago we quoted the "Pall Mall Gazette's" emphatic enforcement of this foul idolatry. "The lasting *glory and greatness*," says the writer, "of the English nation and the British Empire is about the *highest object* at which English politicians can aim. Cases may be imagined in which the general *interests* and sympathies of Europe would be in favour of the enemies of England; but it would not be the less true in that case that an Englishman, who *took that view*, and *acted on it*, would be *an infamous traitor*." We observed on this passage (Jan. 1869, p. 92, note) that "it is worth while to see what an English newspaper, universally accounted respectable, has ventured to state. The highest aim of a politician then, it seems, is not at all his country's moral and religious welfare; the diminution of crime, the increase of contented industry, increased purity of morality: nor even is it the advancement of her temporal welfare; the increase of innocent enjoyment, the diminution of squalid poverty, the accessibleness

It will be seen then, that we are as far as possible from blaming an Englishman for loving his country: we should as soon blame a mother for loving her son. But suppose some mother's love takes a worldly direction; suppose she is far more anxious for her son's taking an influential position in life—for his being popular and clever and highly esteemed and wealthy—than for his growing in piety and the love of God. Two judgments, on that supposition, may be confidently passed. In the first place the existence of such sympathies is a dark blot in her interior character, and must deplorably injure her spiritual growth. In the second place they will almost inevitably issue in *acts*, which are cruelly injurious to her son's welfare. The application is obvious.*

Such is the plague of "temporalism," which so widely infects non-Catholic Europe. It is an absurd and extravagant compliment, to speak of this evil spirit as consisting in a preference for a nation's temporal good over its spiritual. On the contrary, those imbued with such a spirit are usually as indifferent to the former as to the latter. "It would be obvious for me," says F. Newman, "to retort upon the cold and selfish system" promoted by worldly politicians; "to show you how the many are sacrificed

of medical aid for illness and of legal redress for injuries. All these should be entirely subordinate, it seems, to that paramount one, of its 'lasting glory and greatness.'"

* "Spirituale emolumentum . . . . ejus est pretii, ut quæcunque hujus mundi gloria et faustitas in comparatione illius plané in nihilum esset computanda." (Pius IX. "Nôstis et nobiscum.")

to the few, the poor to the wealthy; how an oligarchical monopoly of enjoyment is established far and wide, and the claims of want and pain and sorrow and affliction and misery are practically forgotten." It is not the *people's* temporal *enjoyment*, but the *country's* temporal *greatness*, which these liberalistic fanatics so highly appreciate.

In illustration of our remark, we may appeal to some very carefully balanced statements made by F. O'Reilly, S.J., in the November number of the "Month," on the state of the Roman people when under the dominion of the Holy Father. He speaks of that state in the present tense. "They are in general well off" he says "as regards the necessaries of life. They are sufficiently clad and provided with dwelling accommodation. There is but little distress, and I may say no misery; certainly much less want than is to be found in many countries, which *are set up as models of prosperity*. The taxation is very moderate. There are abundant means of education for the different grades of society; nay more, the children of poor parents have opportunities of high education, without expense and at the same time without discredit, *such as certainly are not to be found in these countries*, nor probably in many others. There is every facility for literary pursuits, which flourish there extensively. The fine arts too are largely cultivated and with great success. Commercial and industrial enterprise is also encouraged and is progressing" (p. 402). "The Roman people are happy, leading a peaceful life, with almost universal sufficient means

of support, and widely-spread comfort and no oppression" (p. 405). Now we may fairly take the English Protestant newspapers, as exemplifying this spirit of "temporalism" against which we inveigh.* And we appeal to all readers of those newspapers, whether what we are going to say does not truly describe the course they have taken. The statements made by F. O'Reilly are taken from a very well-known work (Mr. Maguire's), which has been long before the public and is in everybody's hands. No attempt whatever has been made to disprove the alleged facts, nor indeed has any interest been shown about them. The Romans have been considered by every newspaper contributor to be under an intolerable grievance —not because their secular well-being has been less than that of other men—but because they have no national *greatness*, whereon to feed their pride and vain glory; because a Roman cannot *boast* of being a Roman, as an Englishman loves to boast that he is an Englishman.†

* "Contemplate the objects of" the English "people's praise; survey their standards; ponder their ideas and judgments; and tell me whether it is not most evident, from their very notion of the desirable and the excellent, that greatness and goodness and sanctity and sublimity and truth are *unknown to them*." (F. Newman "To Mixed Congregations.")

† "Sanctissima Christi religio . . . . avertit quidem Italos ab infelicis illius gloriæ splendore quam illorum majores in perpetuo bellorum tumultu . . . . posuerant, sed unà simul Italos ipsos, Catholicæ veritatis luce collustratos, ad sectandam justitiam et misericordiam, atque adeo ad præclara etiam pietatis in Deum et *beneficentiæ erga homines* æmulanda opera excitavit." (Pius IX. "Nôstis et nobiscum.")

F. Newman ("Scope and Nature of University Education,")

Now in modern times, and especially in Protestant countries, there is (as every one knows) a large amount of cordial and even of intimate intercourse between the Church's children and externs; and Catholics are constantly brought into contact with non-Catholic literature. If then the Protestant world is profoundly imbued with the disease we have described—with this idolatry of temporal greatness,—it is absolutely inevitable that Catholics shall have caught the infection,

does not hesitate to lay down, as a "most precise view of a Christian's duty" declared harmoniously by Scripture and the Fathers, "to labour indeed for a competency for himself and his," but on the other hand "to be jealous of wealth whether personal or national." This greatly illustrates what we have said in the text.

It has always however appeared to us, that in this most impressive passage—though not speaking at all too severely against the particular writer whom he criticises—he has nevertheless not quite done justice to the importance of Political Economy; which science is his immediate subject. We think he has failed in doing this science justice, from not sufficiently bearing in mind, that its scope is the *distribution*, no less than the *production*, of wealth. Let us suppose that the civil ruler, from sympathy with the true and momentous principle enunciated by F. Newman, aimed at adapting his legislation to the diminution at once of extreme wealth and of extreme poverty. He could not surely effect his purpose, except by help of political economy.

We would also ask (with diffidence) a further question. Would there really be any danger to be dreaded from increase of national wealth, if that wealth were distributed very far more equally than now it is? As things now are, the poorest class in a country like England are deplorably destitute. Is there really any *opposite* danger? Is there any danger, lest the poorest class of any country should ever—through any possible increase and distribution of national wealth—be so well off as to injure their spiritual interests?

except so far as they may possess some special safeguard. Now we do not for a moment deny, that intellectual heedlessness and dulness (however otherwise undesirable) may operate to no small extent as such a safeguard. There is many a Catholic, who without reflection utters a number of worldly and anti-Catholic sentiments, which he has caught up indeed from Protestant society, but which he has in no respect mastered and made his own. His language is the echo of the world around him, not the true utterance of his inmost thoughts. Nor would we deny that there may be even active-minded and intelligent Catholics, who do but give a passive otiose assent to such phrases, without lodging deeply in their heart the correspondent ideas. But on the whole and in the long run it is impossible to doubt, that deep draughts of the poison will be imbibed by children of the Church—the deeper perhaps in proportion as the process is unconscious—unless they are guarded by some special corrective and antidote. Nor do we see what special corrective and antidote can even be alleged to exist, except the imbuing their mind energetically in one shape or other with the doctrine of S. Ignatius's "Foundation." In other words, a large proportion of those active-minded and intelligent Catholics, who mix unreservedly with Protestants and who do not take special pains in the direction we have indicated, will inevitably be possessed in greater or less degree by that anti-Catholic and anti-Christian temper, on which we have been enlarging.

How largely this temper must deform and disfigure

their interior—how unhappily it must cripple and dwarf spiritual growth—has been sufficiently implied, in the illustration we drew from a worldly-minded *mother*. How utterly and (one may say) even grotesquely such a temper will place them out of harmony with the Church's mind and spirit, we cannot better express than in F. Newman's most forcible words. "The Church," he says ("Anglican Difficulties,") "would rather save the soul of one single wild bandit of Calabria or whining beggar of Palermo, than draw a hundred lines of railroad through the length of Italy, or carry out a sanitary reform in its fullest details in every city of Sicily, except so far as these great national works tend to some spiritual good beyond them. Such is the Church, O ye men of the world, and now you know her. Such she is, such she will be; and though she aims at your good, it is in her own way,—and if you oppose her, she defies you. She has her mission, and do it she will; whether she be in rags, or in fine linen; whether with awkward or with refined carriage; whether by means of uncultivated intellects, or with the grace of accomplishments." The loyal Catholic politician or public writer makes it his chief endeavour, to work unreservedly in sympathy and harmony with this mind of the Church. But such action is folly and feebleness in the eye of the world; and in the eye also of any Catholic, so far as he may have permitted himself to learn from the world its characteristic lessons. He and the Church are at cross purposes, on matters of social action. And were it only in self-defence, he is driven to contend against

her claims to influence society, and to intervene with authority in matters primarily temporal.

There is a different exhibition of the evil spirit which we have called "temporalism," in that hatred of restraint and subordination, which in these days is often accounted even a virtue. We have abstained from dwelling on this,—not because it is less antichristian than the pseudo-patriotism against which we have inveighed,—but in some sense for the opposite reason. It is in truth so *manifestly* antichristian, that no Catholic can need to be put on his guard against it.

III.

On "intellectualism," the second constituent of "religious liberalism," it is not necessary to enlarge. We can refer to another publication, for a fuller exposition of what we would say. We would refer then to Dr. Ward's two Essays, on "The Relation of Intellectual Power to Man's True Perfection"; from which we have given extracts in an earlier note. By its own nature, this evil spirit is far less widely extensive than the other of which we have spoken; because comparatively few can *appreciate* intellectual excellence. Yet externally to the Church it almost makes up by its intensity, for the partialness of its extension. Consider e.g. this amazing burst of Lord Brougham's. "It is no mean reward of our labour" in scientific studies, says this inveterate man of the world, "to become acquainted

with the prodigious genius of those who have *almost exalted the nature of man above its destined sphere;* and who hold a station apart, rising *over all the great teachers of mankind*"—God Incarnate and His Apostles of course inclusively,—"and spoken of *reverently,* as if *Newton and Laplace were not the names of mortal men.*" No worshipper of stocks and stones ever perpetrated a much more degrading idolatry than this. And the judgment of a consistent Catholic on such insane rant will be understood from the fact, that Lord Brougham considers Newton and Laplace to be "almost exalted above the destined sphere" of humanity, precisely because of their possessing certain qualities, which are possessed in an immeasurably greater degree by Satan and his angels. It is hard on Newton to be so spoken of; for in many ways that eminent astronomer was worthy of sincere respect. But on the various moral excellences which he seems to have possessed—his humility, simplicity, public virtue—Lord Brougham has not a word to say. It is in consequence of his having approached so much more nearly than most other men towards intellectual equality with the evil spirits, that Lord Brougham speaks of him just as the Catholic might speak of S. Ignatius or S. Francis of Assisi.*

* Even Mr. Stuart Mill on this head will read a good Catholic lesson to intellectualists. "The ultimate end," he says, "from which" intellectual "studies take *their chief value,*" is "that of making" men "more effective combatants in the great fight which never ceases to rage between Good and Evil." (Inaugural Address at St. Andrew's, p. 97.)

A remark may be made in this case, precisely similar to that which we made in the former. Catholics—in proportion as they are able really to appreciate intellectual excellence—will inevitably become steeped in intellectualism, except so far as they are protected through the influence of that doctrine, which is S. Ignatius's "Foundation." And the Catholic intellectualist is in some sense a more dangerous enemy to the Church than an extern can possibly be; from the very fact, that (since he *is* a Catholic) the Church's children are less on their guard against his counsels. As one out of a thousand instances, take a question which is at this moment of singularly urgent importance: that of higher Catholic education. No one indeed can be more earnestly desirous than is a loyal Catholic, that those among the leisured classes who have the Faith, should also possess the highest and completest attainable intellectual education. The intellect is an engine of tremendous power; and Catholics therefore can never hold their own, unless their intellectual training be fully equal to that of their opponents. Great indeed is the evil, so far as in any given place the Church may possess no children, who can defend her cause with fully adequate intellectual power. But then there is another evil possible, and greater still; viz. that her nominal sons may *assail* her cause with fully adequate intellectual power. There is no one thing which she has more to dread, than the disloyalty to her true spirit of men possessing highly trained intellects, who are in some sense Catholics, and who do not take public rank

therefore as her avowed enemies. Such is the very result, to which the Catholic intellectualist really, however unintentionally, directs his efforts. He labours earnestly, that Catholics shall receive full intellectual training. So far well. But then he is (to say the least) altogether inactive and indifferent as to the still more important end, that they shall be educated in clear intellectual appreciation of her various principles, and in deep harmony with her mind and spirit. But if Catholic students are not carefully educated in *this* direction, they will move, spontaneously and by the very force of Protestant example, in the extremely opposite one; and at this moment we are inclined to think, that there is no rock ahead more dangerous than this. If we had really to choose between two undesirable alternatives,—it is indefinitely a less evil, that the Catholic gentry of England should be ever so inferior to their Protestant fellow-countrymen in mental power and cultivation,—than that they should lose one particle of that reverence for ecclesiastical authority, which is now their noble characteristic.

And at last this instance is but one, among a whole family of illustrations which might be given. In every single question e.g. which concerns education of any class in the community,—the difference of practical view will be fundamental, between those who hold one and the other doctrine. The difference, we say, will be fundamental, between those on one hand, who hold that intellectual culture in itself ipso facto elevates man towards his true perfection;—and those

on the other hand who hold (in accordance with the Church's spirit) that such culture is but a powerful instrument, which *may* indeed be a momentous influence for good, but which needs special concomitant moral training to prevent it from being a grave calamity.

We have spoken on the *public* evils which would ensue, so far as this idolatry of intellect should exist among Catholics. It cannot be necessary to enlarge, on the deadly blight with which such a spirit withers the interior growth of all whom it infects in its more extreme shape; and on the grievous spiritual detriment which every Catholic suffers, in proportion as he submits to its influence.

IV.

We next proceed to "indifferentism"; the third ingredient of "religious liberalism," which we mentioned at the outset. There is no evil principle of our time, against which the Holy See has more frequently and urgently protested, than this. On a former occasion we considered it with special reference to the Syllabus and other Pontifical Definitions; and in a still earlier number we exhibited to the best of our power its unreasonableness and irreligiousness.* We assume, from those earlier disquisitions, that it includes two distinct elements, to mention no others.

* [I have not yet republished these articles.]

Firstly, an indifferentist tends to think, that the performance of external duties constitutes the whole of morality; that a man is truly good, so only he abstains from robbery, lying, injustice, outrage,—and performs various acts of public spirit, generosity, forbearingness, compassion. But the good Catholic lays extreme stress on the *motive* for which such acts are done. He inquires whether they are done on one hand for worldly purposes, for the sake of self-complacency and human praise, at best from natural temperament;—or on the other hand as acts of submission and obedience, done with a pure intention of conforming to God's good pleasure. There are certain personages, held up by the Church to her children's reverent gaze, as exhibiting the true type of sanctity, carried to a heroic extent: we refer of course to canonized Saints. This type of sanctity is identical from its earliest rudiments; it is based throughout on purity of intention, mortification, repentance, and prayer; it is fed by the fulness of Catholic doctrine, as that doctrine is livingly and energetically impressed on the mind by the Church's whole atmosphere and spirit. The good Catholic lays extreme stress on this special type of character. But the indifferentist tends to think, that there is no such very pronounced difference, between Catholic goodness on one hand, and the goodness of pious Protestants, unitarians, and deists on the other.* The good Catholic holds that so far

* See F. Newman's whole sermon on "Saintliness the Standard of Christian Principle."

as any man, even without fault of his own, is unimbued with Catholic doctrine—and much more so far as he has embraced any doctrine inconsistent therewith—he suffers a serious calamity. But the indifferentist thinks that he is hardly any loser at all; for that there is no very appreciable ethical difference, between a pious Catholic and a pious Protestant. We wish indeed we could be more certain than we are—though the supposition is very dreadful—that there are not some professing Catholics, who *do* recognize a gulf as separating the saintly spirit on one side from non-Catholic piety on the other: and who in their heart of hearts *sympathize* with the latter as against the former.

Now it is so plain as hardly to need expression, that this particular exhibition of indifferentism results inevitably, from an implicit rejection or forgetfulness of S. Ignatius's "Foundation." The beauty and unity of the Saint's character consist precisely, in his making the Creator's love and service his one end; and in his caring no otherwise for creatures, than as the latter may *conduce* to that end. He is ever gazing with the eye of faith on things not seen; and for that reason prizes beyond words those great and glorious Objects, which the Church places before his spiritual vision. It is in a soul so disposed, that the seed of Catholic doctrine produces due flower and fruit. On the other hand, just so far as men forget the "Foundation," they are out of sympathy with the Saints, and fail to appreciate the value of Dogma.

The indifferentist then, as we have seen, thinks that

men suffer no considerable loss, when without their own fault they are ignorant of Catholic doctrine. But now secondly he further thinks, that such ignorance is *very seldom* men's own fault; or in other words he gives extraordinary extension to the plea of invincible ignorance. We admitted in a former article that the cases seem comparatively rare (so far as we can conjecture) in which the English Protestant's ignorance of Catholicity is *proximately* vincible; in which he has means of knowing for certain, at once and now, his obligation of submitting to the Church. But however this may be, we strongly think that in a large number of instances his ignorance is remotely, even if not proximately, vincible. We strongly think, that very many Protestants would soon be brought towards a vision of the truth, if they would be diligent in such pious exercises as are most fully within their proximate power. We refer to regular habits of self-examination; prayer for forgiveness; prayer for increased light; prayer for purity of intention; meditation on those religious truths which they already know. And obviously every Theist may at once be certain, that such exercises are his only way for securely growing in God's favour and in the full knowledge of His truth. In what sense the non-Catholic who neglects such exercises, and who in consequence of such neglect fails to ascertain the divine authority of Catholicity—in what sense such a person is permitted the plea of invincible ignorance, we need not here inquire. Even if he *had* that plea, it is quite incredible that he can have that kind of belief in the doctrines which he does

hold, as can with any show of plausibility be accounted divine faith. Yet it is a rudimentary doctrine of the Church, that *without* some act of divine faith, no individual adult can possibly be saved. An indifferentist denies or ignores all these considerations. He is wonderfully generous of what is not his own; and he will pronounce ex cathedrâ as a matter of course, that a whole crowd of Protestants, unitarians, deists (perhaps even pantheists),* whom he may happen to know, are on the high road to heaven, clothed with the mantle of invincible ignorance. Nor need we pause to point out at any length, how entirely this hallucination originates in the neglect or denial of S. Ignatius's "Foundation"; and in that disregard for the exercises of practical piety, which inevitably *results* from such neglect or denial.

The violent opposition of indifferentism to the Church's most fundamental maxims, is even more obvious than that of temporalism or intellectualism. The Church abhors heresy as among the deadliest of evils, and prizes religious truth as the one foundation of every highest blessing. Accordingly good Catholics have in every age esteemed the Catholic Faith to be so priceless a treasure, that its possession is cheaply purchased by any amount of labour and self-sacrifice. To the good Catholic, the Faith is as everything; to the indifferentist, it is as nothing.

* It may perhaps be worth while to remind our readers of the Catholic doctrine, that no adult can possibly be saved, who does not at least exercise explicit faith in "Deus Unus et Remunerator." —See Denzinger, n. 1039.

V.

We have now enumerated those three antichristian habits of thought, which seems to us the chief constituents of what is usually meant by "religious liberalism"; viz. temporalism, intellectualism, indifferentism. And we have shown that all three originate in neglect of S. Ignatius's "Foundation." These, it is obvious, will inevitably issue in that further "liberalism," which we have called "ecclesiastical." Those who are essentially out of sympathy with the Church's spirit, will grudge any extension of her power either in teaching or governing. Those who account her social maxims narrow-minded and pernicious, will not admit her divinely given authority in the temporal order. Those who are steeped in this or that modern error which she has denounced, will be slow in recognizing the *infallibility* of such denunciations. Here however we must loudly and earnestly make an explanation, to avoid being guilty of extreme injustice. There are various Catholics,—denying the Church's Infallibility in matters not primarily dogmatic, and her power in matters not primarily spiritual—who are by no means deeply tinged, and some of them not tinged at all, with *religious* liberalism. This was doubtless a far commoner case some fifty years ago, than it can be now; because the Holy See had then spoken much less emphatically on the subject than she has of late. Still such instances are certainly to be found even now. We by no means say then, that all who will not ascribe such

power to the Church are religious liberals; but we do say conversely, that all religious liberals concur in the non-ascription of such power to the Church. Take e.g. the vast majority of those Catholics, who at this moment deny the ex cathedrâ character of the "Quantâ curâ" or the "Mirari vos"; and who, not content even with this, confidently account those doctrines *false*, which are therein declared. Surely it is a plain matter of common observation and common sense, that they are not led to this opinion by theological considerations—concerning the tests of an ex cathedrâ Act, or the testimony of Tradition on the extent of Infallibility—but by their dislike of those verities, which the said utterances set forth and inculcate. Nor do we designate by the name of "ecclesiastical *liberalism*" any one's error concerning the Church's extent of authority, except so far as in his particular case such error results, from the liberalism which we have called "religious."

In these remarks, we have been dealing partly with a question of words, but far more prominently with a question of things. We have maintained the two following propositions: (1) The failure of duly pondering on man's true end leads to those evil tempers of mind (to mention no others) which we have called respectively temporalism, intellectualism, indifferentism. (2) These three evil tempers of mind—so far as any Catholic may be infected with them—will dispose him to the tenet, that the Church has no authority within the sphere primarily temporal. We have called the complex of the three evil tempers

by the name "religious liberalism"; and we have called the resulting tenet by the name "ecclesiastical liberalism." Those who may consider our terminology unusual or otherwise undesirable, may none the less (if they account our reasoning cogent) accept our two propositions. For our own part, we think that those propositions are of very considerable practical importance.*

* The concluding paragraph is here newly added. The original article contained a second portion, treating matters, the discussion of which I had better (I think) postpone, until I arrive at my subsequent Essay on "Catholic Controversies."

HISTORICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE CHURCH'S CLAIMS.

The Church of England a Portion of Christ's Catholic Church. By Rev. E. B. Pusey, D.D. London : Parker.

[January 1866.]

OUR purpose in the present article is (1) to exhibit in general outline the historical argument available for the truth of Catholicity; and (2) to show how simply unmeaning and self-contradictory is the Anglican theory, as exhibited by Dr. Pusey.

I.

There is one advantage in having to contend against the last-named writer, rather than against one of the rationalistic school. The ground common to him and ourselves, on which the argument may proceed, is very far wider and more definite than in the other case; and, consequently, there is far more hope of exhibiting an intelligible issue. In fact, our present opponent will be at one with us on the following most pregnant and momentous propositions :—

1. The possession of true doctrine is among the greatest blessings which any man can enjoy.

2. The only sure way to enjoy this blessing, is faithfully to accept the Rule of Faith which Christ has appointed.

3. Those who depart by a hair's breadth from that Rule, incur imminent peril of serious error.

4. Those who depart from it altogether and substitute some other, have great reason to fear that they may accept many grave errors as Christian truth, and reject much Christian truth as being grave error.

5. Those therefore, who publicly and systematically advocate a Rule of Faith totally different from that which God has appointed,—however praiseworthy their intentions may be,—are really labouring to inflict an unspeakable calamity on their fellow-Christians.

This last and no less (we grieve to say) is the charge which we must prefer against Dr. Pusey. We allege, that he has adopted a Rule of Faith totally different from the Rule appointed by Christ, and that he "teaches men so." Consequently we allege, that his influence tends to inflict a serious calamity on those who may come within its sphere. Our argument can contain nothing, which has not been said again and again by Roman Catholics; for Dr. Pusey has not added one single novelty to the whole controversy. We can only exhibit in our own way the general argument, on which Roman Catholics insist.

They all agree of course in holding most firmly, that the one Rule of Faith appointed by Christ is the Voice of the Living Church.* According to this

* Our argument concerns the "Regula Proxima," not the "Regula Remota." See "Murray, De Ecclesiâ," vol. ii., p. 448.

principle, every Christian who desires to accept the Faith taught by his Redeemer in its absolute purity, has one simple means given him of effecting his object. That means is, that he listen like a little child to the Church's authoritative instruction, as delivered to him through her authorized organs and instruments.

But as this principle is universal among Roman Catholics, so also it is peculiar to them. It is embraced by no other religionists whomsoever. We need not, in our present controversy, consider the frightfully large and increasing class of open rationalists. Apart from these however, two principal theories, contradictory of the Roman, are presented to our notice by persons who believe in the truth of Christianity. Many hold that the Divine Rule of Faith is private judgment, exercised on the text of Scripture. But as Dr. Pusey is at one with us in peremptorily rejecting this theory (see pp. 37-39), we have no need here either to explain it more fully, or to enter on its refutation. Others consider the whole Faith to have been given from the first, independently of the Church no less than of Scripture; in such sense, that learned and intelligent men may obtain a more accurate and precise knowledge of it by studying ecclesiastical history, than by submitting humbly and unreservedly to the Church's guidance. This, we need hardly say, was F. Newman's view, when an Anglican; and he has expressed it in the following passage with characteristic vigour and clearness. We italicize some clauses.

"The received notion in the English schools seems to be, that the Faith which the Apostles delivered has ever existed in the Church whole and entire: *ever recognised as the Faith, ascertainable as such,* and separable (to speak generally) from the mass of opinions which with it have obtained among Christians. It is considered *definite in its outline,* though its details admit of more or less perfection: and in consequence it is the property of each individual, so that he may battle for it in his day whoever attacks it: nay, *as not receiving it simply from the Church,* but through other sources besides, historical and scriptural, —he may defend it, if needs be, *against the Church, should the Church depart from it:* the Faith being the foundation of the Church as well as of the individual, and *the individual being bound to obey the Church only so far as the Church holds to it.* This is the doctrine of fundamentals, and its peculiarity lies in this; that it supposes the truth to be *entirely objective and detached,* not lying hid in the bosom of the Church, *clinging to her and as it were lost in her embrace,* but as being sole and unapproachable as on the Cross, or at the Resurrection, with the Church close by, but in the back ground." ("British Critic" for Oct., 1838, p. 367.)

This tenet in its general shape must be held by Dr. Pusey, as by every Tractarian. He must necessarily, we say, hold this tenet; because, on his view, the very thing which the Reformers did, and which he praises them for doing, was, to defend "purity of faith" against the existing Church, by appeals to Christian Antiquity. "Against the existing Church:" this is the point to be observed. No men deal more habitually and earnestly with the study

of Christian Antiquity, than do Roman Catholics. When a new heresy arises,—even before the Church has spoken,—it is often refuted by that Tradition, which now lives in the Church, and which may be traced to Apostolic times. Nay, as regards Dogma established and defined,—Roman Catholics love to follow in their mind its historical progress through every age. But what all Roman Catholics maintain, and what all other religionists deny, is, that the living Church, on all those matters to which her teaching extends, is the one ultimate and unimpeachable voucher of genuine Apostolical Tradition.

The whole question between Roman Catholics and Dr. Pusey, has for its basis this one issue, the Divine Rule of Faith. To what arbitration will Dr. Pusey refer that issue? He will reply, no doubt, "to Scripture and Antiquity." For ourselves, we desire nothing better; and we will at once open our pleadings by a reference to the New Testament.

Before the Christian epoch (apart from Judaism), there was no authoritative standard of religion or morality. If any wished to live on higher than worldly motives, no assemblage of doctrines and principles offered itself for their acceptance, purporting to be *the* one truth. No distinct authoritative voice was heard; but only the clamorous vociferations, whether of the people at large, or of rival philosophers. One man accordingly made mere popular opinion his standard of right; another this or that sect; another looked doubtfully about from one to the other; the great majority, even of those who might have con-

ceived momentary aspirations for what was higher and nobler, would be driven back to the mire of merely selfish objects and interests, by the apparent impossibility of obtaining any certain knowledge of moral and spiritual truth. To the great mass it would never even occur, to seek for aught higher and truer than what they found ready at hand. Any combined action of the comparatively higher and nobler spirits on their mind, was rendered impossible, by the incurable divergencies of opinion among the former, and their mutual contests. Nay, as regarded the moral advancement of the better class itself, let it be remembered that no external testimony was borne to that one moral system, which is the correlative to human nature in its entireness, and which alone is able to elicit its highest and choicest qualities. The absence therefore of all testimony to this system, and the consequent parcelling out of moral truth into mere scraps and fragments, overthrew all possibility (speaking generally) of elevated and consistent virtue.*

This was that deep and festering evil, incurable except by interposition from above, which the Gospel professed to remedy. It enforced distinctly and emphatically the one true ethical code. It did still more. It disclosed high spiritual truths concerning God and His dealings with man, of the most transporting and

[* In what manner Divine Providence dealt with the individuals one by one who lived under these unhappy circumstances—is a question which I merely state, to show that I do not forget it. Its consideration would lead us over ground entirely different in kind from that covered by the present article.]

elevating character; truths which (as one may say) swallowed up morality into religion; stamped an eternal value on every little action of every day; and, moreover (where duly received), gave to the whole religious and moral character that harmony and proportion, for which man had before possessed the materials, but not the power; the external mould, but not the quickening, animating spirit. It abolished, so far as knowledge of truth is concerned, all essential distinction, between the stronger and the weaker minds; between those who have leisure and faculties for speculative inquiry, and those who are immersed in the tumult of worldly affairs. One fixed code of doctrine was securely offered to the busy; while the speculative had no further privilege, than that of analysing, systematising, and carrying forward to its results, this one code. The weaker minds were enabled to accept and know this; the stronger were obliged to bow down before it. It thus evoked a degree of moral and spiritual energy, so incommensurably greater than any which before existed, as to open quite a new idea as to the capacities of human nature. Nor was this the whole or the chief of its results. It further enabled that energy to act directly, and without drawback, for the benefit of mankind, by furnishing a common ground for union and sympathy. In saying all which, we must not of course be supposed to forget (what however is not to our immediate purpose) the special gifts of grace which the Church imparts.

Now it is perhaps conceivable that the truths, so offered, might have been imparted by some Rule of

Faith other than the Roman. It is perhaps conceivable, that Sacred Writings should have been given into the hands of each convert, in order that he might construct his own religion from their perusal; or that some sacred form of words should be given to each, as precisely containing the essentials and fundamentals of true doctrine. It is perhaps conceivable; but the fact plainly and indubitably was otherwise. We say it is *perhaps* conceivable; for to our mind the possibility of success on any other method, regard being had to the laws of human nature, is more than doubtful. The first Christians had, in a vast number of instances, been converts from nothing less than heathenism, and that at a time when it wore one of its most corrupt and degrading forms. From which dense and stifling darkness, with eyes clouded and enfeebled, they were brought directly within the influence of the purest light which ever visited this world. Then consider, still more emphatically, how vast an extent of ground is covered by the Christian Revelation. It includes at one side mysteries, wholly alien to all experience or past conception; mysteries of the most startling (and one may say) bewildering character; and exposed also to an indefinite number of heretical corruptions, in proportion to the inexhaustible variety of aspects presented by them to the human mind. It includes, at the other side, a most definite moral code, which must bring it into more or less of conflict with every human sect of philosophy, past, present, and future. Surely, all this being duly pondered, we may well doubt whether it was even possible (except by palpable

miracle) that these supernatural objects and principles *could* be even rightly apprehended by the first Christians; far less could obtain any real hold on them; and far less still, could become the leading principle of their lives; unless some immeasurably more potent means had been employed, than such merely mechanical contrivances as those above mentioned. It was by incorporating Christians then into a *living Society*, that this great object was effected; by bringing them and retaining them in direct contact with those, who had learned the Truth by special inspiration.

We all know the subtle but most efficacious influences, communicated through the various waves (as it were) of some organized society. We know in how inexplicable and yet intense a degree, feelings and prepossessions, which are acted on as first principles and which are ordinarily unassailable by argument, are implanted by the various associations, habits, usages—in one word, by the general *tone* of such a body. We know what a mysterious sympathy spreads through the mass, and conveys into the very heart of each individual a share in the characteristic life and character of the whole. And we know again the marvellous power possessed by any person endued with extraordinary wisdom and genius, of spreading round himself, as it were, an atmosphere of his own; an atmosphere which gives to his direct lessons and admonitions a quite incomparably fuller meaning and deeper force, than they would otherwise possess. Both these powerful moral engines were united in the constitution of the Apostolic Church.

Nor is it at all out of compass to suppose (we mean, it is no more than might well follow under the circumstances), that by the help of such unspeakably efficacious instruments, the Apostles might have fully succeeded, before their death, in deeply imbuing their disciples with the Christian ideas; in enforcing on the mind of the Church as a whole, and of each individual in different degrees, all the lessons which Christ desired them to impart. Thus the Church as a whole might have received that one true impression of the great Objects of Faith,—the Sacred Trinity, and our Adorable Saviour,—which the whole series of Ecclesiastical Definitions concerning those Objects most inadequately indeed represents, yet indicates and shadows forth. She might have obtained that deep perception of the Christian's hidden life, and the dealings of God with the soul, which the various Definitions on Original Sin, Justification, Grace, Merit, and the like, have partially put into doctrinal shape, and which ascetical writers have so copiously exhibited; but which is far indeed as yet, from being intellectually exhausted. She might have acquired that accurate knowledge of true ethical principles, which admits of being applied to successive complications of circumstances; and which has in small part been (as we maintain) authoritatively and infallibly so applied, in the various Decisions of the Church on moral questions. She might have learned the high dignity of a Christian Saint; and might have received that apprehension of Mary's supereminent prerogatives and spotless purity, which has no legitimate analysis short of the doctrine of her

Immaculate Conception.* Nay, the Apostles might have deeply indoctrinated the Church's mind, not only with these great essentials, but with an indefinite number of practical habits, principles, and rules, which were handed down (as it were) unconsciously and in the mass to the next generation; which have become the traditionary maxims of the Church; and have been the means of leading her safely in many a conjuncture, and guiding her aright in many a perplexity. And all this of course over and above their direct and explicit teaching, on which we need not here enlarge.

It is this which Roman Catholics in general believe the Apostles to have done, and which fully harmonizes at least with the Sacred Records. What the Scripture expressly states however, most abundantly suffices for our argument. We ask then, what is the broad Scriptural fact, as regards the Rule of Faith in Apostolic times?

Christians, contemporary with the Apostles, were formed into one visible and organized Society, under the governance of those who were divinely inspired to teach them. The authoritative teaching again was not confined to new and supernatural matter. On the contrary it was to the full as distinct and emphatic, in declaring explicitly to their understanding, and pressing urgently on their conscience, the principles of Natural

* [Nay, as I should add, short of the doctrine, that she did not sin in Adam; that she was exempt from the debitum proximum of contracting original sin. See my "Essays on Devotional and Scriptural Subjects" pp. 159–164.]

Religion and Morality. A Jew or Gentile, who desired salvation, was obliged to submit himself at once both to the instruction and to the government of the Divine missionaries. He might have been attracted to them by some one doctrine, or some one appointed usage. But in joining them, he laid himself under the obligation of humbly accepting he knew not what unknown body of other doctrines and usages; some (it may be) at first indefinitely repulsive and distasteful. The spread of the Gospel again, was the propagation of this Apostolic Empire; the two proceeded pari passu together, or rather were one and the same thing, not separable except by intellectual analysis. As a flock look to the shepherd for guidance, or children to a parent, and never in their very dreams separate the idea of humbly learning from that of willingly obeying,—so was it with the first Christians. With them, to be within the Church, was salvation; to be without it, eternal ruin. And to be within the Church, implied in its very nature the being obedient to her laws and governance, and the being gradual recipients of her doctrine. As a good parent lays down those laws which best enable his children to understand his teaching, so the Apostles' principles of government were in deepest harmony with their doctrinal lessons. The most powerful and original minds again were required to bow humbly before the very same doctrines, which were the strength and support of the weakest and most ordinary among the brethren. In a word, the one Rule of Faith in Apostolic times was the Church's magisterium. Any individual Christian who at any

particular time might come into contact with an Apostle, would of course accept with joyful and most unreserved submission the instruction given him by that Apostle. But take the general body of the faithful in the general course of their lives. They dreamed not of any other method for imbibing religious truth, except *listening humbly to the Church's voice, as she taught through her various organs and representatives.*

We forbear from adducing Scriptural evidence in detail for our statement, because we are confident that Dr. Pusey will agree with the whole of it. His position must be (see p. 85), that at the Apostles' death all this was changed, and a new order of things introduced. In reply to which supposition, we argue as follows.

II.

The Apostles, Dr. Pusey will admit, had no end more nearly at heart, than the future preservation of Christian Dogma in its fulness and purity. It is further evident, that there could be no security for such preservation, no safeguard against that doctrinal corruption which they regarded as among the gravest of calamities, unless Christians were trained to hold firmly the Divine Rule of Faith. Now Dr. Pusey thinks that, at their death, the Divine Rule of Faith and the Church's constitution were to be fundamentally changed. Had this been really God's appointment,

the Apostles must of course have been inspired accordingly. Had they been so inspired, it is most certain that, in their keen zeal for doctrinal purity, they would have inculcated this truth with earnestness and perseverance. No imaginable calamity would to them have seemed greater, than that a false Rule of Faith should in time future delude the Church. No topic then would have occupied a more prominent and more emphatic place in their teaching, than the Rule of Faith which was to be called into existence at their own death. They would have guarded with most jealous care against the danger, otherwise so inevitably imminent, of their disciples supposing that the existing Rule was to remain unchanged, and thereby falling into unfathomed abysses of doctrinal corruption. On such a supposition, S. John—throughout those many years during which he survived the other Apostles—would have been universally recognized as the Church's last infallible teacher; and his death would have been the most startling epoch in Christian history, since the great day of Pentecost had passed. We do not see how Dr. Pusey or anyone else can doubt, that this is temperately and fairly argued. It is hardly necessary to add, how violently inconsistent are the actual facts with any such hypothesis. S. John's death, instead of being the most critical event in history, passes almost sub silentio. The supreme teaching of inspired men was succeeded by that of uninspired, in a natural and easy succession. No trace, even the most distant, can be found of any new Rule of Faith. The Church of the Second Century

occupied, as of right, the very same position with the Church of the First. This argument alone must surely be considered as nothing less than conclusive.

We have said that no trace can be found in the later centuries, of any new Rule of Faith. We are of course well aware, that there is a long list of patristic passages, which have been quoted as proving that Scripture, independently of Tradition, is the Rule of Faith. But as Dr. Pusey agrees with us that the Protestant world has grossly misinterpreted these passages, they do not here concern us.* Dr. Pusey holds, as we hold, that not Scripture only but Tradition also, was employed by God as a means of handing onward the Faith. And what we are here saying is, that one and the same principle was held, throughout the whole of what Dr. Pusey himself accounts to have been the Catholic Church, as regards whether the sound doctrinal interpretation of Scripture or the true sense of Tradition. During those early centuries on which Dr. Pusey rests his case,—all those whom he considers Catholics, without exception, have consistently regarded the judgment of the living Church, as the one final and irreversible standard of appeal on either of these two subjects. No hint of any other doctrine can be found in any one early Catholic writer. Reference was sometimes made by such writers to the local churches generally; sometimes to the Apostolical

* [I may refer however to Cardinal Newman's admirable comment on them, in the first volume of his "Via Media," pp. 328–330.]

churches in particular; and sometimes to the Holy See. But not one in their number dreamed of questioning the principle which we have just expressed.

Anyone may say this with perfect confidence, however little his own detailed knowledge of the Fathers, when arguing with men so learned as Dr. Pusey and his friends. Anyone, we repeat, may most safely say this; because we may be quite certain that if any opposite testimony had been discoverable, they would long since have produced it.* Let us look back at the very first volume of the Tracts; which was written at a time when all the contributors without exception were most confident of their ground, and when Rome indeed was denounced in language of incredible severity. This volume contains a series of papers called "Records of the Church;" constructed with the view of placing before Anglican readers such extracts from Antiquity, as were judged most suitable for promoting true Anglican doctrine. We confidently affirm, that there is not one syllable in these "Records" at variance with our statement; not one syllable which can even be alleged, as giving the slightest countenance to Dr. Pusey's Rule of Faith. And on the other hand there are several passages, which distinctly enunciate our own. We need hardly add that, in the extracts which follow, the italics are ours. We begin with S. Ignatius, Martyr:—

"Study to *be confirmed in the doctrine* of the Lord

* [This is intended of course as an apology, for one with so little patristic learning as myself, venturing to treat such a subject.]

and of the Apostles, ... *under your most excellent Bishop,* and your Presbytery and the Deacons."—No. 2, p. 4.

"Avoid division and *corrupt doctrines;* but *where your shepherd is,* thither follow ye as sheep. For there be many *wolves unworthy to be trusted,* . . . . but in *your Unity* [i.e., the Unity of the Church] *they shall have no place.*"—No. 10, p. 1.

Mr. Waterworth, in his most useful work on "The Faith of Catholics," adds another passage from S. Ignatius, which may be taken as illustrating this. It is from his epistle to the Trallians:—

"I exhort you, therefore, to abstain from the strange herb, *which is heresy.* . . . . From such men keep yourself guarded; and *guarded you will be,* if ye are not puffed up and separated from Jesus Christ our Lord, and *from the Bishop.*"

Returning to the Tractarian "Records of the Church," we find the following most significant extract from S. Irenæus; who, as the Editor reminds us, was the disciple of Polycarp, the friend of S. John.

"This is the message, and this the Faith, which the Church has received (as was said above); and which, though dispersed throughout the whole world, she *sedulously guards,* as though she dwelt but in one place; believes as uniformly as though she had but one soul and the same heart; and preaches, teaches, hands down to posterity, as harmoniously as though she had but one mouth. True it is, the world's languages are various, but the power of Tradition is one and the same. There is no difference of Faith or Tradition, whether in the churches of Germany, or in

Spain, or in Gaul, or in the East, or in Egypt, or in Africa, or in the more central parts of the world. But as the Sun, God's creature, is one and the same in all the world,—so also the preaching of the Truth shineth everywhere, and lighteth every one who will come to the knowledge of the Truth. Among the Rulers of the Church, *neither he who is powerful in word speaks other doctrine* (for no one can be above his Master), *nor does the weak in the word diminish the Tradition.* For, whereas the Faith is one and the same, neither he who has much to say concerning it hath anything over, nor he who speaketh little any lack."—*Tracts*, No. 14, p. 2.

This again we may serviceably supplement, by other passages of S. Irenæus, from Mr. Waterworth's volume.

"We *ought not to seek among others* for the Truth, which *it is easy to receive from the Church;* seeing that the Apostles *have brought together most fully into it,* as into a rich repository, all whatever is of truth.

"They [the Apostles] sought that they [the Bishops] whom they left as successors, *delivering unto them their own office as teachers and governors* (suum ipsorum locum magisterii tradentes) should be especially perfect, &c."

From the various similar passages given by Mr. Waterworth from other authors, for brevity's sake we will but extract one. It was written by S. Theophilus, in a work which Mr. Waterworth dates A.D. 182:—

"As in the sea there are inhabited and well-watered and fruitful islands with ports and harbours, *that they that are tempest-tossed may find shelter in them;* so in

the world, agitated and tossed by sins, God hath given holy churches in which, *as in harbours, are the doctrines of the Truth.*"

We will again refer to the Tractarian "Records" for our final specimen, the well-known words of Tertullian :—

"If the Lord Jesus Christ sent the Apostles to preach, it follows that no other preachers are to be received, but those whom Christ appointed: because 'no one knoweth the Father but the Son, and he to whom the Son hath revealed Him.' And it seems that the Son has revealed Him to no others than the Apostles, whom He sent to preach that doctrine, of course, which He revealed to them. But *what they preached, that is, what Christ revealed to them, I shall here also plead should be proved in no other way, than by means of those same Churches which the Apostles themselves founded,* by preaching to them, as well as by word of mouth, as afterwards by Epistles. If these things are so, it follows immediately that *all doctrine that agrees with those Apostolic Churches, the depositaries and sources of the Faith, is to be reckoned for truth: preserving, as they doubtless do, what they received from the Apostles, the Apostles from Christ, Christ from God. But that every other doctrine is to be presumed false, that savours of contradiction to the Truth of the Churches, and of the Apostles, and of Christ, and of God.*

"It only remains then to prove, whether this our doctrine, the Rule of which we have given above, is to be considered of Apostolic Tradition; and from this very fact, whether the rest come not of falsehood. *Now our very inter-communion with the Apostolical Churches, which is matter of fact, is an evidence that*

our doctrine does not differ from theirs. This is the witness of the Truth."

Such then was the patristic Rule of Faith from the first. No hint of any different doctrine have Dr. Pusey and his friends been able to discover. No hint have they discovered of any possibility (to repeat F. Newman's Anglican words) that "the Church may depart from the Faith;" or that the individual can, without grievous sin, "defend" what he considers to be "the Faith" against her.

One further inference may reasonably be drawn from such extracts as the foregoing, and from the large number of similar quotations which Catholic controversialists adduce.

If the Apostolic Deposit were separable even in idea from the living witness and practical teaching of the Church,—if it admitted of being fully communicated in a certain given number of propositions,—what possible meaning could we assign to such very strong expressions as we have cited? to such expressions as that "the Church *sedulously* guards it;" "holds it as having one soul and one heart;" that "tempest-tossed men find shelter in holy Churches, in which, *as in harbours,* are the doctrines of the Truth"? Let this given number of propositions be reduced to writing or to memory, the Church's office of *guarding* is at an end. Once admit on the other hand such principles as those above stated,—everything becomes intelligible and natural. The Church is put in trust with a treasure,—on the one hand,

unspeakably precious; yet on the other hand of so delicate, supernatural, spiritual a quality, that it readily and imperceptibly admits of corruption, unless "sedulously guarded;" that it cannot be rightly received, except by those who are imbued with the very principles which it inculcates or presupposes, and who are therefore "of one soul and one heart;" that it cannot be communicated in words, but must be learned in some far more intimate and far-reaching way, by means of fleeing into the Churches commissioned to teach it, as "tempest-tossed men flee into harbours."

We need hardly say, that in each successive period of ecclesiastical history the patristic evidence on the Rule of Faith becomes even clearer and more irrefragable. There is no need therefore of pursuing the "Records of the Church" into the second volume of the Tracts, except as regards one particular treatise, of which parts are therein contained. We refer to the famous "Commonitorium" of Vincentius Lirinensis. Anglicans have been fond of citing this treatise, as though it told in behalf of their argument; whereas in fact it is no less decisive against them, than are those other patristic passages already adduced. By citing it so perseveringly, they proclaim that there is no other ancient testimony which they regard as so favourable to their cause. And if it be found therefore really to be dead against them, their cause is indeed desperate. The Rev. Mr. Penny however, now of the Irish Catholic University, fully established this conclusion, in a work called "The Exercise of Faith Impossible, except in the Catholic

Church;"* and we will here give a brief analysis of his argument. The references throughout are to the Oxford translation of Vincent:—

Mr. Penny begins by drawing attention to Vincent's most express words (p. 132), that heresies are not "always, nor all, after this sort to be impugned, but only such as be *new and upstart;* to wit, *at their first springing up.*" And so, at starting, Vincent speaks of "finding out the fraud of heretics *daily springing up*" (p. 8). "Secondly," asks Mr. Penny, "what does Vincent mean by Antiquity? We shall see this the more easily, by bearing in mind what term he opposes to it. This term is 'novelty'; and he has clearly explained what he means by 'novelty,' limiting it to 'the first springing up of a heresy.' Antiquity therefore, in his acceptation, extends *up to the time when the novelty commences*—that is, when the new heresy starts up." This is quite evident to anyone who will read the treatise with even moderate candour and attention. Consider e.g. Vincent's choice of those Fathers, whose writings are to be our guide. He does not speak,

* Richardson, Derby, 1846. We cannot however at all accept the doctrine which gives its name to the treatise. Since no adult can possibly be saved without some act of faith,—to say that no one can elicit an act of faith who is external to the Visible Church, is to say that no such person can possibly be saved, however invincible may be his ignorance of the Truth.

[I quoted Mr. Penny, as being a writer whose words would of course have especial weight with Dr. Pusey. I did not forget, how carefully several Catholic theologians had treated Vincent's dictum. I may now especially refer to Card. Franzelin, in his treatise "de Traditione et Scripturâ."]

according to the language of Tractarians, about "going back to those who lived nearest to Apostolic times." Such a notion is not to be found in the whole treatise. "Consult the opinions," he says (p. 13), "of those Fathers only, who, living at *divers times* and sundry places, yet *continuing in the communion and Faith of one Catholic Church,* were approved masters and guides to be followed." "Those Fathers' opinions only are to be conferred together, who, with holiness, wisdom, and constancy, lived, taught, and continued, in *the Faith and communion of the Catholic Church*" (p. 133). He is speaking then all through of some *new* heresy, on which the Church has not yet spoken. He is giving tests, whereby contemporaries may at once discover its real nature. And he assumes as a first principle, that those who had lived "in the Faith and communion of the Catholic Church," were of course orthodox. He expresses the same thing still more distinctly, in the following comment on God's dealings with heretics (p. 93). "This is the reason why, when out of the safe port of the Catholic Faith, they are shaken, tossed, and almost killed with storms and troubles." This befalls them, in order that they should give up their "novelties," "and so retire, and *keep themselves within the most sure port of their calm and good mother,* . . . . and drink of the flowing rivers of lively and pure water." Words cannot express more clearly the Church's office, as divinely guaranteed guardian of the Faith. Again, he distinctly recognises the duty, not merely of handing down the Faith, but of analysing it and viewing it in its mutual rela-

tions. "That which men before believed *obscurely*, let them by thy exposition understand *more clearly*. Let posterity rejoice for coming to the understanding of that by thy means, which Antiquity, *without* that understanding, had in veneration" (p. 101). And the often-quoted passage on Development bears in the same direction; of which one or two short extracts will sufficiently remind our readers. "Fitting it is, that the understanding, knowledge, and wisdom . . . . of the Church in general should, by the advance of ages, *abundantly increase and go forward.*" . . . . "Christian doctrine . . . . with years must wax more sound, *with time become more ample*, yet remain incorrupt and entire." It is impossible surely for language to be further removed than this is, from giving any sanction to the characteristic habit of Dr. Pusey and his school. We refer to their habit of appealing against those doctrines which the later Church either explicitly or practically teaches, by a reference to the records of earlier times.

Indeed so obviously is this truth impressed on every page of the treatise, that the Editor of the "Tracts,"—although himself designating the "corruptions of the Roman Church" as "a most deplorable and astounding instance" of error,—yet admits that Vincent "never anticipated such an occurrence" as the "admission of error in" *any* branches of the Church. Vincent, he says, "considers the Church to possess within it that principle of health and vigour, which *expels heresies out of its system*, without its suffering more than a temporary disarrangement from them."

Lastly Dr. Pusey himself gives a testimony to the Roman doctrine, which is stronger from the very fact that it is so wholly undesigned. In a sermon on "The Rule of Faith," which he more than once quotes in his present volume, the following passage occurs. It will be seen that out of twenty-eight patristic phrases, which he cites as expressing "the body of Faith," no fewer than sixteen refer to the Church's office as its divinely guaranteed guardian. These we have put into italics—

"This body of Faith is spoken of by different names, from the very earliest times, as a recognized whole, alike by St. Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and his Apologist St. Pamphilus or Eusebius, as by St. Irenæus and Tertullian. It is called '*the Faith of the Church*'; '*the preaching of the Church*'; '*the Truth of the Churches*'; '*ecclesiastical teaching*'; '*ecclesiastical Faith*'; '*the first and ecclesiastical Tradition*'; 'the doctrines of the Truth'; '*Ecclesiastical and Apostolical Tradition*'; '*Apostolical and Ecclesiastical dogmas*'; '*Ecclesiastical Rule*'; 'the doctrine of the Apostles'; '*the Faith delivered by the Church, fenced by Holy Scripture*'; '*the Rule of the heavenly Church of Christ according to the succession from the Apostles*'; 'the celebrated and venerable Rule of Tradition'; '*the Tradition from the Apostles preserved in the Churches, through the succession of Presbyters*; the unvarying Rule of Faith received through Baptism'; 'the Tradition of the Apostles'; 'the Apostolic Faith transmitted to us through the Fathers'; 'that excellent Deposit of the Holy Fathers, who were nearest to Christ and the primitive Faith'; '*the word of the Church*'; 'the Faith of the Fathers'; 'the Apostolic Rule'; '*the doctrine heard in Holy Church*'; 'the safe

Rule'; '*the Rule of the Holy Church of God*'; 'the Tradition and Rule of Truth'; '*the Faith of the Catholic Church*'; 'the Rule of Truth' "*—(pp. 31, 32).

Undoubtedly then, if "Scripture and Antiquity" can render certain any doctrine in the world,—they render certain the doctrine, that the Living Church is the Christian's one divinely-appointed guide to Apostolic Truth; and that she is ever privileged by God faithfully to guard and teach that truth throughout the orbis terrarum. How singular are Dr. Pusey's speculations, when viewed under this light! Take one instance. Assuredly the author will agree with us, that there is no more vital and essential portion of the Deposit, than true doctrine on the Church's divinely-given constitution. Now the Roman Catholic Church teaches, that this divinely-given constitution prominently includes the Papal Supremacy; and she defined that Supremacy at the Council of Florence.† We will not here inquire, what Dr. Pusey considers the Apostolic teaching on this matter to have been. Suffice it, that he regards the Roman doctrine as totally at variance with that teaching, and as inexpressibly injurious to God's interests. It is his opinion therefore, that on a question momentous and pregnant with awful consequences, the Roman Catholic Church obliges her children, on pain of anathema, to anathematize that truth which the

* Published by Parker in 1851, pp. 31, 32.

† [I need hardly remind my readers, that this was written before the Vatican Council.]

Apostles taught. Further, as he most truly observes, "Since the Faith is one whole, then whosoever parteth with or altereth *any portion* of the one Faith, in fact *changes the whole.*" (P. 54.) The Roman Catholic Church, consequently, having (in his view), "parted with or altered one portion of the one Faith"—namely, Christ's doctrine on the Church's constitution—has in effect "changed the whole." This, and no less, being his virtual charge against her,—he considers her nevertheless to be an integral portion of that Divine Society, which has received from God a promise of securely guarding Apostolic Truth. Surely the force of unreason can no further go.

III.

The doctrine which we have now investigated on the "Rule of Faith," includes, as part of itself, a correlative doctrine; that of the Church's Infallibility. This is most manifest from the course of our previous remarks; and one only explanation need be added. The Church Catholic, by divine promise, sedulously and incorruptly guards the Faith, both in her explicit and in her practical teaching. This is the Christian principle, as it came down from the Apostolic period, and was accounted de fide from the first. When time advanced, and respite from persecution gave leisure for thought, one healthy and legitimate result of this circumstance was, that the Christian mind began far more actively to *reflect* on the various doctrines which

it had embraced. As this process continued, there was a constantly increasing evidence, that the Church could not succeed in preserving incorrupt the Faith committed to her charge, unless she herself employed much intellectual analysis; both in defining her doctrine, and in formulizing the heresies which she condemned. Later on there came a further experience. A number of secondary questions arose. Propositions were advocated which, though not in themselves heretical, were yet so intimately connected with heresy that, unless effectually expelled from the Church, they would certainly introduce it. The Church's gift therefore of preserving the faith incorrupt, was seen to include the prerogative, that she is infallible, not merely in condemning certain tenets as heretical, but in branding others with some minor theological censure. All this, we say, is but an exhibition under new circumstances of the one ancient divine gift.

IV.

From the two preceding correlative doctrines, may at once be inferred the Church's Unity; by which word we mean to express, that she is subjected by God's Law to one supreme government. We are not here maintaining that such government is monarchical, though of course we so believe; but merely that the Church was established by God as one indivisible Society under one central rule. Great Britain and Ireland are unquestionably under one central rule;

though that rule is not monarchical, for the supreme government is with Queen, Lords, and Commons. And on a similar principle, we are not necessarily maintaining that the Church is monarchically governed, when we maintain that she is united under one supreme authority. We should have called the characteristic of which we here speak, by the name of "organic" Unity, had not Dr. Pusey used this word in a totally different sense. See p. 46. Under circumstances, we may be allowed to coin an expression, and designate this attribute as "hierarchical Unity."

We have said that this doctrine,—the Church's hierarchical Unity—follows from the two doctrines already established. If any one indeed chooses to imagine, that the Apostolic Church, instead of being one hierarchical Society, consisted of twelve such societies, each governed by an Apostle—so strange a supposition would not, however, involve any detriment to her Unity of Faith. So much we must certainly admit; because the Apostles, being severally inspired, would teach one and the same doctrine to their respective obediences. But so soon as the Apostles were removed,—had the Church not been constituted by God as one hierarchical Society, one of two results must have followed. Either the supreme government of each separate society must have received that gift of Infallibity, which Roman Catholics ascribe to their Ecclesia Docens; or else Unity of Faith must have been speedily at an end. But no one of any school whatever has even imagined the former alternative.

It follows therefore, that if Unity of Faith were secured at all, and if no visible, palpable miracle were to be perpetually worked,—there was but one means by which the desired result could possibly be obtained. It was necessary that God (1) should place the whole Church under one supreme government, and (2) invest that government with Infallibility.

But there is no need of our deducing the doctrine of Unity from any other; for its independent evidence, both in Scripture and Antiquity, is overwhelming. First, for the Apostolic Church. Nothing can be more plain from the New Testament—and we are sure Dr. Pusey will not think of denying it—than that she was one hierarchical Society, governed by the Apostles. We are not here maintaining that she was governed by S. Peter. In so far as regards our present argument, Dr. Pusey may suppose, if he will, that the Apostles were specially overruled in each particular case to issue harmonious commands, just as they were inspired to teach harmonious doctrine. We are here but saying, that the Apostolic Church was not composed of twelve (or more) hierarchical societies,—united indeed with each other in strictest amity,—but yet distinct societies. No: the Apostolic Church, as one whole, was placed under the government of the Apostles, as of one governing body. We will not pause to argue so plain a fact, because we are sure that Dr. Pusey holds it as strongly as we do.*

* [" We may doubt whether Bishops are of obligation; whether there is an Apostolic Succession; whether S. Stephen and his

Protestants in general, as we understand them, think that the Apostolic Empire ended with the Apostles' life. But Dr. Pusey is forward in maintaining, that the Church Catholic of every age is lineally descended from the Apostolic. Now, the Apostolic Church was by Divine appointment one hierarchical Society: hence the Church Catholic of every age is by Divine appointment one hierarchical Society. Our old argument here returns. Had it been part of God's Revelation that, after the Apostles' death, the Church was no longer required by His Law to be such a Society—that Christians were no longer under an obligation of submitting to one and the same central authority—there is no truth which the Apostles would have been more careful to teach, and which every Christian would have been more certain to learn. S. John, throughout those many years during which he survived the other Apostles, would have been universally regarded as the one sovereign of the still united Church; and at his death there would have been a solemn inauguration of the new constitution. No supposition of course can be in more violent antagonism with the most obvious facts; and the Roman conclusion is thus demonstrated as true.

associates were the first deacons; whether the Sacraments are seven or two. But of one thing we cannot doubt; viz. that all Christians were in that first age bound together in one body; with an actual intercommunion and mutual relations between them; with ranks and offices and with a centralized authority; that this organized association was 'the body of Christ,' and that in it, considered as One, dwelt 'the One Spirit.'" Cardinal Newman's "Essays Critical and Historical," vol. ii. p. 96.]

So far indeed from its being the case that the Divine command of hierarchical Unity was understood to cease with the Apostles,—it was not till after their death that an appellation was assumed which pre-eminently implied it. The word "Catholic" is stated by the Anglican Bull to have been in universal use from the time of S. Polycarp;* and the "One Holy Catholic Apostolic Church" was proclaimed by that Council of Constantinople, which Dr. Pusey admits to have been infallible. The word "Church," "Ecclesia," would surely be an extraordinary word, to express the federal coalition of independent hierarchical societies; "*one*" Ecclesia still more extraordinary; one "*Catholic*" Ecclesia the most extraordinary of all.†

Then Dr. Pusey will of course hold, that the various appellations, given to the Church in Scripture, apply to her as existing in every age. But several of them on their very statement are seen to imply hierarchical Unity. "The Church was to remain, from the Lord's first coming to His second, a kingdom, a fold, a family, a household, an army. What is that which makes a kingdom one? the derivation of all jurisdiction from its sovereign. Or an army one? the concentration of all authority in its general. Or a household one? but the rule of its master. Two sovereigns, two generals

* "Judicium Ecclesiæ Catholicæ," c. 6, s. 14.

† [See the admirable note on this word "Catholic," in Mr. Allies's "Per crucem ad lucem," vol. i. p. 377. Its "full idea," so concludes Mr. Allies, is "as expressing organic unity in universality."]

with supreme power, two masters . . . destroy altogether the idea of those respective unities."*

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to understand clearly what is Dr. Pusey's own tenet on ecclesiastical Unity. Most Anglican controversialists of the present day shrink sensitively from drawing out any theory of their own. But our author is honourably distinguished from them in this particular, and expresses his view in a sufficiently intelligible shape. For convenience' sake, we number the various "means and conditions of unity" which he lays down; and we italicise a few clauses.

"Thus, then, we have from Holy Scripture, as means and conditions of the Unity of the Church, [1] One All-Perfect Author, the 'One God and Father of all;' [2] one end to which all tends, the 'one hope of our calling;' [3] 'One Head,' the Head of the Church, our 'One Lord;' [4] 'One Spirit,' giving life to every living member; [5] the same Sacraments, 'One Baptism,' and 'One Bread,' by which we are all ingrafted into or maintained in the One Body of our One Head; [6] one Apostolic descent of the Bishops and Pastors of the flock, coming down from One; [7] 'One' common 'Faith,' that which was given once for all, with the anathema that we hold no doctrine at variance with it, although an Angel from Heaven were to preach it. Of these we are receivers only.

"*These if any wilfully reject, they reject Christ.* They sever themselves not only from the Body of Christ, but directly from the Head, loosing the Band which binds them unto Him. *These while Christian bodies retain,* they are, so long, like the river which 'went

* Allies's "See of S. Peter."

out of Eden to water the garden ; and from thence it was parted and became into four heads. . . . .

. . . "Unknown in face, in place separate, different in language, *opposed, alas! in some things to one another,* still before the Throne of God, *they are one Holy Catholic Apostolic Church* (pp. 56, 57)."

Our author then regards every society of Christians as an integral portion of the Catholic Church, which is governed by a validly consecrated Bishop whom Dr. Pusey would regard as orthodox ;* which ministers validly the Sacraments of Baptism and the Eucharist ; and which professes in words and formulæ the Church's ancient Creeds.† It is manifest therefore, that as he does not consider *hierarchical* unity, so neither does he regard *visible* unity in any sense, as appertaining by God's Command to the Catholic Church. It is most desirable, he thinks, for her well-being, but by

* We understand him to mean, that no one who rejects any portion of the Faith (as he understands that term) can be a Catholic, or, consequently, a Catholic Bishop.

† We thus express his last condition, because even Dr. Pusey cannot imagine that all members of the Establishment really *embrace* the verities which those Creeds *declare.* However, if he does really mean to include among the conditions of Catholicity that a society shall enforce *on all her members* belief in the ancient Creeds, our argument against him does but become stronger ; because no one will dream of saying that the Church of England enforces this.

[Shortly after Dr. Pusey published the "Eirenicon," he wrote to an Anglican journal, vigorously denouncing the doctrinal corruptions freely tolerated within the Establishment. Some of the tenets therein freely professed, he says, are worse than Mahometan. I published the whole letter in our number for April 1867, p. 523 ; where my readers may see it.]

no means essential to her existence. Now, if there is one doctrine more than another in which there is not even a *primâ facie appearance* of discord in patristic teaching, it is the doctrine that visible unity *is* an essential attribute of the Church; nay, and is one most special means whereby she is discerned. If any of our readers is otherwise than keenly alive to this circumstance, let him look through the collection of passages cited by Dr. Murray in his admirable treatise (vol. i., 477–505); or those collected by Mr. Waterworth."* To select any extracts in particular, would be to weaken the force of our argument. We will but cite S. Cyprian's well-known words, as a sample of the Fathers' unanimous testimony.

"Part a ray of the sun from its orb, this division of light the Unity allows not; break a branch from the tree, *once broken, it can bud no more;* cut the stream from its source, *the remnant dries up.* Thus the Church, flooded with the light of the Lord, &c. . . . . Does any one believe *that this Unity can be rent asunder in the Church? He who holds not this Unity, holds not the Law of God.* . . . . Christ's people *cannot be rent.* . . . . There is one God and one Christ, and *the Church is one,* and *the Faith one,* and *the people one,* joined into *the solid unity of one body* by the glue of concord. *Unity cannot be sundered,* nor *the one body be separated by the dissolution of its structure.*"†

* [After this was published, Mr. Allies brought out his masterly treatise on "Dr. Pusey and the Ancient Church"; of which I append my original notice to the present Essay. His citations on the particular point mentioned in the text are (I suppose) about the most complete which have ever been brought together.]

† We have adopted Mr. Waterworth's translation.

Dr. Pusey enlarges in most glowing language (p. 287) on the Church's purity and spotlessness in the time of S. Augustine; though we firmly believe that, had he then lived and been born of heretical stock, he would have experienced the same obstacles to conversion, which now retain him in (what we of course consider) heresy and schism. But let us ask him, what was held by S. Augustine and by his Catholic contemporaries, on the Church's visible Unity? Cardinal Wiseman, in his well-known Essay on the Donatists, supplies an answer. Nor does it in the least concern our present purpose, whether the Donatists did or did not deny Catholicity to others; for our concern is merely with the doctrine laid down by S. Augustine and the rest, as the one undoubted Apostolic truth. We wish our author would read carefully the Cardinal's whole treatise, which he seems never to have seen; but the following words of S. Augustine will serve as a specimen:—

"That you should be found separated from the communion of the entire world (which is a *wickedness* most grievous, *manifest*, and common to you all), if I wished to show its aggravation, time would fail me before words."

"It seems indeed to be a fixed notion with" S. Augustine—admitted F. Newman when arguing for Anglicanism,—"that the Universal Church is that which is diffused through all countries; and that 'diffused,' an expressive word, *includes the idea of active communion.*"* Nor will anyone think of deny-

* "British Critic," for January, 1840, p. 65.

ing, that in this S. Augustine simply repeats the universal Catholic conviction of his time.

Again, Dr. Pusey speaks with very high approval of Mr. Allies' great Anglican work. He considers that gentleman to have written it, "not as a partisan, but as the fruit of investigations as to whose issue he was indifferent" (p. 237, note 2). What then was "the fruit" of Mr. Allies's "investigations," pursued under circumstances so favourable to the discovery of truth? "*No other idea,*" he says, "about the Church *prevailed up to S. Gregory's time,*" than that she was "one organic whole; a body with one Head and many members."* And by the term "one organic whole," he means precisely what we have called "hierarchically one;" as is evident from the circumstance, that he regards this "essential law" of the Church as maintained by Roman Catholics, but as having been "broken" by Anglicans.†

And there is one fact to be finally mentioned, which renders the force of these overwhelming testimonies peculiarly conclusive and irrefragable. While patristic authorities on the Roman side are so vast and so multifarious,—not so much as one single isolated statement can be found, in any hole or corner of Christian Antiquity, issuing from any one writer accounted Catholic and orthodox, which gives so much as a superficial or colourable sanction to Dr. Pusey's theory. We refer of course to his theory, that every society

* "Church of England cleared from the charge of Schism." Second edition, pp. 500, 501.

† P. 502.

remains a portion of the Catholic Church,—so long as it is governed by an "orthodox" Bishop and retains the other notes which he mentions,—though remaining external in communion to the rest of Christendom. And we make our statement with perfect confidence; for if any one such passage could possibly have been found, so learned a theologian as Dr. Pusey would long since have produced it.

Our readers will be curious to know, how a writer, so deeply versed in Christian Antiquity, meets this mass of patristic testimony; and we are deeply grieved at the answer which we must give to the inquiry. He does not attempt to face it, but ignores it throughout the volume. From the beginning of his book to the end, there is not one sentence which would lead a reader to imagine that any such testimony exists. Yet he speaks throughout in a tone of undoubting confidence, on the harmony of his own doctrinal views with the patristic, which, under the circumstances, is truly unaccountable and deplorable.

V.

We have seen then, how violently opposed is our author's tenet on ecclesiastical Unity to the uniform and most undeniable teaching, both of Scripture and of Antiquity. Its wild untenableness will be further made apparent, if we consider its intrinsic character, and the practical consequences to which it would legitimately lead. And here some apology seems really

required, for the extraordinary unreality of the discussion which is to follow. Our obvious defence however is, that the fault lies, not with ourselves, but with the incredible extravagance of our opponent's theory.

1. It is not an inference from it, but merely a statement of it in other words, that no "orthodox" Bishop, who teaches his flock "orthodox" doctrine, and provides for their valid reception of Baptism and the Eucharist, can by possibility be in a state of schism; even though he separates absolutely from the whole remaining Christian body. Such a procedure may evince a very unchristian spirit, but in no respect makes him cease from being a Catholic.

2. It is of course schismatical and mortally sinful, for any Christian to separate himself from the Catholic Bishop who is lawfully placed in authority over him. In the case therefore above supposed, all individual members of the flock are, without exception, under a strict obligation of remaining under the Bishop's government. Apply this. If there is any "Bishop" whom Dr. Pusey would regard as undeniably "orthodox," it is Dr. Hamilton; and he is now, by hypothesis, legitimate Bishop over the "diocese" of Salisbury.* At any future time therefore, Dr. Hamilton, rightly or wrongly—from dislike of Privy Council judgments or from some other cause—may quit the Establishment, and set up on his own account. All the members of

* [This most excellent and lovable man, Bishop Hamilton of Salisbury, died a very few years after the present article was written.]

his "diocese," without exception, will then be obliged to leave the Establishment with him, under pain of mortal sin. Every Englishman thenceforward, who worships in the ancient churches of that "diocese," commits mortal sin. All are under a strict obligation of resorting to the chapels, in which Dr. Hamilton's nominees officiate.

3. Nay, since Dr. Pusey defends (p. 66) what was done by the Anglican Reformers, a further inference follows. As regards any doctrinal matter on which the "undivided Church" has not spoken, Dr. Hamilton may draw out thirty-nine or any other number of "articles;" expressing such tenets as he judges to be in accordance with Scripture and Antiquity. He may refuse to "ordain" any except those who will subscribe these articles; and all the flock are required to attend the ministration of these clergymen, and of none others.

4. There have been "Bishops" of the Establishment, whom even Dr. Pusey will admit to have been heretical. Our own conviction is, that very few of these "Bishops" have been on a level even with his own standard of orthodoxy; that very few of them have ever really accepted the teaching of the early Councils. But even Dr. Pusey will admit e.g. that Dr. Whately, of Dublin, advocated Sabellian tenets; Dr. Hoadley, of London, Arian; and Dr. Hampden, of Hereford, some still deeper form of misbelief. We will not speak here of modern cases; we will refer to Dr. Hoadley, of London. He was an Arian. Was

he also a Catholic? Is there to be a new kind of epicene, the heretical Catholic? But if he was not a Catholic at all, he was not a Catholic Bishop. It follows therefore, that during his whole tenancy of his "See," the Establishment members of his "diocese" were external to the Catholic Church.

5. They were therefore under the obligation of leaving their present communion, in order that they might be united to that Church which Christ founded. Moreover, there was a Bishop, whom even Dr. Pusey accounts orthodox, and who at that very time claimed spiritual jurisdiction over them, as due to him by the Law of God: viz., the then Vicar Apostolic of the London district. All these members of the Establishment therefore, if they had but known it, were at that time under an obligation of becoming Roman Catholics.

6. But our author will of course admit, that to communicate with an heretical Bishop whose opinions are known, is to forfeit the Catholic name. Hence, all the Establishment "Bishops" contemporary with Dr. Hoadley forfeited the Catholic name; and all members of the Establishment were under the obligation of becoming Roman Catholics.

7. And since the whole Establishment at that time fell from the Church, it is difficult to see how it was ever rehabilitated. The Vicars Apostolic became the legitimate Bishops of all Englishmen; nor have they ever, from that day to this (in our author's own view), either fallen from orthodoxy; or failed so to teach their

flock; or omitted to provide for the ministration of Baptism and the Eucharist.*

So much on the Establishment. Let us next see the application of the author's theory to our own communion. Two points will here suffice.

1. Dr. Pusey claims to have discovered with perfect certainty, by historical investigation, that the doctrine of a Supremacy over all other Bishops divinely given to the Pope, is contrary to Apostolic teaching. He does not claim for himself exceptional perspicacity and illumination; but holds that every candid inquirer must come to the same conclusion. Well: a candid Roman Catholic, we will suppose, does inquire, and does come to the same conclusion. What is he to do? He cannot continue to believe with Divine faith what he recognizes as contrary to God's teaching; and yet if

* [My readers will remember a somewhat similar reductio ad absurdum of the Anglican theory,—published long after this article of mine,—in Cardinal Newman's "Essays Critical and Historical," vol. ii. I will here give two brief extracts from this magnificent argument, to remind my readers of its general bearing, and in the hope that they will again study the whole.

"This theory is as impracticable . . . . as it is unknown to Scripture . . . . Regarded in its probable results and actual tendencies, it is a sure and easy way of not effecting those very ends, which ecclesiastical arrangements are intended to subserve" (p. 96).

According to the Anglican theory, "each Bishop has the power of the keys; each can bind and loose; each can excommunicate all his brethren. Each can proclaim and defend a heresy. What then can keep them in the unity of the Faith, but to suppose each of them alike infallible? Yet must a theory, which protests against one Infallibility, fall back upon a thousand?" (p. 98).

he does *not* believe this doctrine, he is excluded from the Church. Such then is the upshot of this laborious trifling. "God has founded a Church, and requires all men to enter her communion. Yet He permits her to fall into such a state throughout what is by far her largest portion, that no men can believe what He has taught, without being excluded from that Church with which He commands them to be united."

2. Then what can be a more heinous offence against the Church's constitution, than exciting men to rebellion against their legitimate and Catholic Bishop? Yet, according to Dr. Pusey, in the "diocese," say, of Salisbury, this is done in various degrees by every Roman Catholic, from the Bishops downwards. Nor is this all. The Pope and the whole Roman Catholic Episcopate assiduously teach, that such conduct is not merely admirable, but (on due occasions) of obligation. Such is the mutual relation of those two societies, which the author holds to be sister societies, and true portions of the One Catholic Church.

Lastly it is very safe to say, that the theory laid down by Dr. Pusey on Ecclesiastical Unity, is not at this day held by fifty persons throughout all Christendom. We doubt if it be held by five. The author, on his own showing, differs from the "Easterns" no less than from the "Westerns." "If all Christians," says a Photian Bishop, quoted by Dr. Pusey (p. 63), "were agreed on this chief point how the Church was to be governed, *whether by aristocratic rule as we think, or monarchical as the Latins think,* there would be very little trouble in agreeing about the rest" (p. 63). The

Church's *hierarchical Unity* then is as fully held by the "Easterns," as by Roman Catholics themselves; both alike have "apostatised" from that "Divine Truth" on Ecclesiastical Unity, which Dr. Pusey has at last in this Nineteenth Century rediscovered. The Church has simply failed in her office of guarding the Deposit. She has totally forgotten the very constitution given to her by God. That constitution would have remained absolutely unheard of in these later days, had it not been disinterred by the historical exploration of a few zealous Anglicans.

VI.

To pursue further this phantom theory, is like running a worn-out joke to death. That Dr. Pusey could find none to allege more plausible, more colourably reconcileable with Scripture and Antiquity, is a virtual confession of defeat. We will say no more therefore on this most curious tenet, but look at the broad and general aspect of facts. And to judge from this broad and general aspect, never surely was there a more wonderful delusion, than that which possesses Dr. Pusey. Never was there a more wonderful delusion, than the idea that the Roman and Anglican Communions are joint portions of that Church, throughout which "the Holy Ghost maintains the tradition of the great body of the Faith infallibly fixed" (p. 93).

As to the Roman Church (as we have already pointed out), she requires all her children, as a condition of

communion, to hold firmly, as divinely revealed, a certain fundamental doctrine concerning the Church's constitution. But this doctrine is regarded by Dr. Pusey as directly contradictory to Apostolic teaching, and, therefore (by necessary consequence) as heretical. Again, Dr. Pusey holds it to have been taught by the Apostles as part of the Deposit, that every human person born since the Fall has been under the dominion of original sin. But the Holy Father has fulminated an anathema, against everyone who should hold this in the case of our Blessed Lady; the Roman Catholic Episcopate has united in that anathema; nor would any Roman Catholic priest dream of giving Absolution, to one who follows what Dr. Pusey considers the Apostles' teaching on the subject. Lastly, our author thinks that the Roman Church refers her children for salvation to Mary, and not to Jesus.* And yet he says that God the Holy Ghost "*maintains in the Church everywhere* the tradition of the great body of the Faith infallibly fixed." What *can* he mean?

Unspeakably more amazing is his statement, that within *the Church of England* "the great body of the Faith is infallibly fixed;" that she is "a continual unchanging teacher of the truth which Christ revealed" (p. 10).† It would really be paying too great

* "The practical answer to the Roman Catholic seems to be, 'Go to Mary and you will be saved.' . . . . In our own belief it is, 'Go to Jesus and you will be saved'" (p. 182).

† ["The great body of the Faith infallibly fixed," in a communion, which tolerates errors worse than Mahometan ! ! !]

a compliment to an allegation so extravagantly false, if we examined it in detail. We pass it over therefore, in regretful and wondering silence.

VII.

The doctrine, which we have been hitherto endeavouring to vindicate and illustrate, may be thus exhibited. Those truths, which Christ taught, were committed by Him to the keeping of one organized Society. This Society was wrought into visible union, by the precept of obedience to one supreme central authority. And she was gifted with Infallibility both in her explicit and her practical teaching, for the purpose of preserving these truths till the end of time. Lastly, we must complete our argument by maintaining two further propositions. We maintain that this doctrine on the Church's organization gives a security different, not in degree but in kind, from any other, for these two results: (1) that individuals shall elicit real acts of faith; and (2) that the Ecclesiastical Society shall be really imbued with Unity of pure doctrine.

What is Divine faith? Humble submission of intellect to God's Revelation. Now a Roman Catholic is *forced*, if we may so express ourselves, into this attitude of mind. He is required to believe a vast body of Truth,—much of it quite unknown to him in its explicit shape,—on no other ground, than because the Church teaches it as revealed by God. Intellectual submission to an external authority is the very atmo-

sphere which he breathes. An Anglican, on the contrary, is met at the very threshold by rival schools, differing from each other on even the rudiments of Natural Religion,* and touting as it were for his patronage. He is compelled by force, instead of learning as a disciple, to decide as a judge. The Photian *theory* leads to a similar result, though in practice there is probably much alleviation of the evil. In theory, the Photian accepts various doctrines, because he has satisfied himself by historical inquiry, that his own Communion was right in its quarrel with the Roman. But in practice, we may hope that the great doctrinal unity, which prevails within his Communion, may often induce him really to accept those many truths which he has been taught, as coming to him with Divine Authority; and as claiming his humble and submissive belief on that ground alone.

Next, as to Unity of doctrine. In the case of rude and uncultivated minds,—or again of men who do not apply their cultivated minds to religion at all,—such Unity may be sometimes produced by the mere force of inertia; by the merely passive reception of hereditary beliefs. But wherever there is both activity of thought and an application of such thought to the moral and spiritual order,—no mode can be imagined (not openly miraculous) for securing doctrinal Union, except a common belief in some authority, as endowed

* This statement applies more especially to the fundamental difference which exists, between what is called the "Evangelical" school and its opponents, on the due position of holy obedience in a Christian's life.

with the gift of infallibly deciding on each question as it arises. Among Anglicans, both activity of thought very largely exists, and also the application of such thought to the moral and spiritual order. Among them therefore, there is no kind of doctrinal Unity. The Eastern Schismatics, on the contrary, have great doctrinal Unity, because they have so little religious thought. It is the Roman Catholic principle alone which can combine, in the case of religious thought, the two inestimable blessings of Unity and activity.

VIII.

And now at last to sum up. The Apostolic Church was constituted by Christ, as one corporate and hierarchical Society: claiming to teach with infallible authority the truths committed by Him to her charge; and inculcating them on all her members, through her various living organs and representatives. Moreover, the Apostles' death was not, by God's appointment, to make any change whatever in her organization. On the contrary Christ and His Apostles had expressly declared, that she was to remain on earth until His second coming; and the post-Apostolic Fathers unanimously testified the same truth. Correlatively with this broad fact on the one hand, there stands forth in history a broad fact on the other hand. From that time to the present, there has always been one, and (speaking generally) there has never been more than one, Society, precisely answering to the description

which we have given.* This Society therefore, in every age, has been the One Catholic Apostolic Church. There have been rare and exceptional periods, we admit,—specially the period of that Schism which terminated at the Council of Constance—when there were two rival claimants of Apostolic privilege. But the fact that at rare intervals there have been rival claims, does not tend ever so remotely to cause doubt in ordinary times, when there is no such rivalry. The Apostolic Church, such as we have described it, was to last till the end of the world. In the time of S. Irenæus, there was one, and one only, such Society. In the time of Constantine, there was one, and one only, such society. In the time of S. Gregory—in the Middle Ages—at the time of the Reformation—there was one, and one only, such Society. At the present moment, there is one, and one only, such Society. Hence she is the One Catholic Apostolic Church. And her teaching (whatever it may be) is infallibly true; simply because it *is* her teaching.

Dr. Pusey indeed adduces arguments to show, that a certain portion of this teaching is repugnant to

* It can hardly be necessary to point out that the "Greek Church," as it is called, does not even profess Infallibility. Ask any Russian why he believes any doctrine, will he say, "because the Church in communion with the See of Moscow cannot err"? or "the Church in communion with some Patriarch" he will name? or "some specified body of Bishops"? or "the majority of them"? No such thing is even alleged. He must give you as his own *opinion*, that his Church was right in her quarrel with Rome several centuries back; but he will not say that she had any divine *promise* of being right.

Apostolic doctrine. Now the Catholic controversialist is bound, of course, to consider those arguments. Only we beg our readers clearly to understand the real state of the case. Let us suppose, for argument's sake, that Dr. Pusey proved his thesis with evidence absolutely irresistible. What would be the legitimate inference? His thesis would not have the faintest *tendency* to show, that the Anglican Society is a portion of the Catholic Church. His thesis would show, on the contrary, that the Catholic Church has ceased to be. This, we say, is the one only conclusion which could legitimately be derived from Dr. Pusey's reasoning, if that reasoning were valid. Such reasoning would (on that hypothesis) evince, that the only Society on earth, which by possibility can be the Catholic Church, has authoritatively taught erroneous doctrine. But a Society, which authoritatively teaches erroneous doctrine, cannot possibly be the Catholic Church. And further, since Christ and His Apostles have emphatically declared that the Catholic Church will *never* on earth cease to be, Dr. Pusey's argument (if valid) would issue in the ultimate conclusion, that Christianity is not from God. This is the genuine conclusion, towards which he is so energetically labouring. And if he could but see the real bearing of his argument, he would be the first to rejoice, that it is so conspicuously—so incredibly—weak and ineffective. It is an easy task indeed to show, that there is absolutely no force in that train of reasoning, which our author has so sedulously urged against the divine origin of Christianity.

We assure him we feel quite as keen a grief as he can feel, that in these days, when the hosts of open rationalism and infidelity are so vast and so aggressive, those who would gladly do them battle are not all united in one close phalanx. Yet he cannot surely mean, what his words here and there seem to imply. He cannot surely mean, that, for such a reason as this, the authorities of our Church are called on to make doctrinal concessions. All Roman Catholics regard the doctrine of Papal Supremacy, and again of the Immaculate Conception, as having been no less simply and directly revealed by God, than those of the Trinity and the Incarnation. How then could any motives of expediency, were they ten thousand times stronger than even he can think them, justify the Church in compromising these Apostolic Truths? Would Dr. Pusey then himself cultivate ecclesiastical union with Arians, that he might the better repel Jowett and Colenso? Heathenism in the first three centuries was to the full as formidable an enemy to Catholicity, as rationalism can now be considered. Yet the presence of a common foe in no way deterred the Church from promptly anathematizing each successive heresy.

But in fact any such monstrous attempt at coalition and compromise would be as inexpedient as it would be flagitious. The one secret of intellectual strength is intellectual consistency. Roman Catholics, and they only, are able consistently to contend against the foe, because they only have consistently contended against the foe's fundamental maxims. It is the unhappiness of Dr. Pusey's stand-point, that he is compelled to join

issue with rationalism in detail rather than on principle; that he is precluded from assailing it at its origin and source; that he cannot impugn its first principles, without condemning that whole ecclesiastical position, which he is still so resolute to uphold and vindicate.

IX.

Dr. Pusey and the Ancient Church. By T. W. Allies, M.A. London: Longmans.*

[April 1866.]

The particular question, raised in this singularly powerful and conclusive treatise, is that which concerns the Church's constitution.

Dr. Pusey speaks of the Church having once been "undivided;" i.e. of having once possessed a certain Unity, which she has now lost. All Catholics maintain on the contrary, as an elementary truth—as a doctrine no less infallibly certain than that of the Trinity or the Incarnation—that the Church is *in*divisible. This is the doctrine which we put most prominently forward in our recent article against Dr. Pusey; and it is with this doctrine that a large portion of Mr. Allies' volume is occupied. This "is the belief," he says, "on which the Church has lived, since the day of Pentecost to the present moment.

* [Mr. Allies has now incorporated this admirable treatise in his larger work, "Per crucem ad lucem."]

This is the truth which, without exception, every Father held." Mr. Allies draws out an invaluable catena to the same effect, reaching from S. Ignatius Martyr to the great S. Leo. Dr. Pusey must be well aware of these passages; and yet how has he attempted to meet them? He has simply ignored their existence. Never surely, since Christianity began, was there a position so controversially contemptible as that of Anglicans. Dr. Pusey appeals to Christian Antiquity; whereas, if there is any doctrine in the world which Christian Antiquity testifies explicitly and most emphatically, it is this very doctrine which Dr. Pusey denies. As Mr. Allies points out, far more plausible objections may be raised against the patristic evidence for the Trinity or the Incarnation, than against the patristic evidence for the Church's indivisible Unity. To profess an appeal to Antiquity, and at the same time to deny the Church's Indivisibility, is a delusion or a mockery.

This doctrine, so unanimously and explicitly testified by all the Fathers, was expressed by S. Augustine with especial emphasis, on occasion of the Donatist schism. Mr. Allies' argument, let Dr. Pusey observe, does not turn on what *the Donatists* maintained, but on what *S. Augustine* maintained in his replies to them. Mr. Allies draws out the great Father's various statements. And he concludes with saying most justly, that "Dr. Pusey's doctrine is the most unpatristic which can be conceived, being the contradiction of that idea on which the Fathers lived."

Now the Church's indivisible Unity is secured by

the circumstance, that God has subjected her to one supreme central authority. We have next therefore to inquire, what *is* that supreme central authority? This is the true way of putting the Papal question; and as soon as it is so put, Dr. Pusey is out of court. He does not even allege the *existence* of any supreme central authority, other than the Papal. He denies that there is *any such authority at all* reigning by Divine Right. But in that denial, he opposes himself as absolutely to the unanimous testimony of the Fathers, as though he denied the Incarnation or Baptismal Regeneration. He may, no doubt, raise historical objections against the doctrine of Papal Supremacy. Only, if those objections were conclusive, it would follow (as we have already said) not that the Anglican Society is part of the Catholic Church, but that the Catholic Church has ceased to be. And further, since Christ and his Apostles have emphatically declared that she will never on earth cease to be, such an objection, if valid, would further prove that Christianity is not from God. In refuting then Dr. Pusey's historical objections against Papal Supremacy, Mr. Allies is really vindicating the Divine origin of Christianity against Dr. Pusey's assault.

Dr. Pusey's one palmary historical objection is the case of Apiarius; and, in connection with that case, the doctrine, whether of S. Augustine, or of the contemporaneous African Church. Nothing more complete can be imagined, than Mr. Allies's reply to this. As to S. Augustine's positive doctrine, Mr. Allies exhibits it in detail; and as to the particular case of

Apiarius, he discusses it most fully and frankly. We do trust that, as a matter of common justice, Dr. Pusey will either reply to Mr. Allies's argument, or else confess himself to have been completely in the wrong.

PROJECTS OF CORPORATE UNION.

The Reunion of Christendom. A Pastoral Letter to the Clergy. By HENRY EDWARD, Archbishop of Westminster. London: Longmans.

An Eirenicon. By E. B. PUSEY, D.D. Oxford: Parker.

The Leading Topics of Dr. Pusey's recent Work, Reviewed in a Letter addressed (by permission) to the Most Rev. H. E. Manning, D.D. By the Very Rev. FREDERICK OAKELEY, M.A. London: Longmans.

[April 1866.]

I.

IT has happened at this eventful controversial period, that it became the Archbishop's duty to promulgate Cardinal Patrizi's new response on the Union question. This has naturally issued in his addressing a Pastoral Letter to his clergy, on the general subject of Christian Reunion. A Bishop's pastoral address cannot, we imagine, under any circumstances, be a legitimate object of public criticism; but in the present instance adverse criticism would be impossible. The Archbishop has uttered, in his characteristically impressive, distinct, and weighty manner, certain great doctrines, which are at the root of every Catholic's belief; but which Unionists in general—Catholic alas! no less than Protestant—in some strange way manage to

ignore and pass over. This address is in fact an authoritative exposition of principles, absolutely certain, inappreciably momentous, yet constantly put out of sight. It will be our own guide throughout. We shall but aim at illustrating, in this [Essay] by theological argument, and in our [next Essay] by ecclesiastical history, those foundations of Catholic Truth, which have been authoritatively laid down for us by the most exalted member of our English Hierarchy.

Nor can we more appropriately commence, than by his Grace's language on the unspeakable importance of religious Unity; a truth which he, and those who most closely follow his guidance, have been most strangely suspected of undervaluing.* We italicize one clause.

"For my own part, if I may speak of myself, it is more than a quarter of a century since the thought and name of Unity so filled my whole mind, that it has been often turned to my reproach. In all these years it has been my heart's desire and prayer, not only to see the members of the Anglican body gathered into Catholic Unity, but the millions of Dissenters, that is, the whole English people, especially the multitude of its noble-hearted poor, united once more in the bond of peace and truth. We believe Union to be a very precious gift, *and only less precious than Truth.* There is nothing we would not do or suffer, by the grace of God, to effect or to promote the reunion of all or of any who are out of the fold, to the Unity of

* Here is a fact, incredible à priori, but true. The "Union Review" of last September (p. 499), asserts that that "union of Christians, for which Our Lord prayed," "is the subject of the 'Dublin's' *most bitter and continuous execration.*"

the Church. We heartily pray therefore, that He who has inspired and nurtured this desire of Union may mature and perfect it; that He will remove all that hinders its accomplishment, purifying the hearts of men from all attachment to their errors and their separations, and cleansing their intelligence to see the immutable Faith and sole Unity of the Catholic and Roman Church. On our part, all that can cherish and foster these yearnings shall be done. The vision of England Catholic once more; its true and energetic people once more elevated by faith to the higher instincts of the Catholic Church; our domestic schisms healed, our bitter controversies ended, and all our powers turned from mutual conflict, upon the subjugation of the sin and unbelief which, day and night, devour souls on every side: all this is as beautiful and fascinating as the image of the Heavenly Jerusalem, which the Apostle saw coming down from Heaven. There is only one thing more beautiful and more commanding, and that is the Heavenly Jerusalem itself, not in image, but in reality; the Holy Church throughout the world in all the perfect symmetry of Unity and Truth, indefectible and infallible, incorruptible and changeless, the mother of us all, the Kingdom of God on earth" (pp. 15, 16).

These expressions will find an echo in every Catholic heart. That there is to be a lifelong conflict between the principles of good and evil—this is an inevitable dispensation. But that those who love their God and their Saviour should dissipate their energies in contending against each other, rather than combine them in contending against the world,—this is a matter for keenest grief. And in these days particularly, when the whole mass of European Society is

animated by principles profoundly anti-Catholic, "the Reunion of Christendom" is the only adequate remedy (if indeed it be adequate) to cope with so fatal a disease.

But on what basis shall we labour to establish this Reunion? on a latitudinarian or a dogmatic? The popular specific at this day is of course the former. "Let all religionists continue to think as they do in other respects; but let them cease to think that these points of difference are important." Such at one time was Constantine's view, as it has been of many another secular potentate.* "Why should Catholics and Arians," he asked in effect "disturb the world by their contentions? Why should they not agree to differ? Why should not those who adore our Lord as the Creator, and those who reverence Him as the highest of creatures, remain contentedly united in the same Church?" One or two writers in the "Union Review" are undoubtedly imbued with this poison of indifferentism; but Dr. Pusey will regard it with as much aversion as we do. In our present discussion, we will speak of it no further.

Reunion then is to be sought on a dogmatic basis. Is it however, we ask, to include Roman Catholics or to exclude them? Of course, the former. But then this significant fact at once presents itself, that these cannot possibly accept any other dogmatic basis than their own. They consider that that basis was revealed directly by God; and that it has been preserved in

* See the passage in F. Newman's "Anglican Difficulties."

absolute purity, by that gift of Infallibility with which He has endowed the Church. Moreover, this dogmatic basis includes prominently, nay primarily, the doctrine, that the Roman Catholic Church is the one ark of salvation; that no one external to her can possibly be saved, unless he have the plea of invincible ignorance; that her teaching is, by Divine promise, infallibly true. As the Archbishop points out, this is no Ultramontane characteristic; it is the doctrine of Bossuet no less strongly than that of Bellarmine (pp. 30, 31). Indeed, no words can be imagined more emphatic and unmistakeable, than those testimonies of the former writer, which the Archbishop textually quotes. Of course, Roman Catholics may seek Union on some other dogmatic basis than this, by the simple and intelligible method of apostatizing from their religion. But no Christian can possibly be united with Roman Catholics who *remain* such, except by submitting humbly and unreservedly to the Roman Catholic Church. The fundamental, the inappreciable significance of this fact, induced us to make it the one main theme of our former article on Dr. Pusey. It was our one main purpose throughout that article, to argue against him, on grounds of Scripture and Antiquity, that the Church in communion with Rome constitutes exclusively that one heavenly Society, "extra quam nulla est salus."

Now if we may judge from appearances, we should say that those Anglicans who at this moment are speaking so much of Union, are divisible into two different classes. In the case of many, we really believe that

Unionism is a healthy and hopeful stage, in their journey from the bad extreme of contented isolation to the good extreme of humble submission.* With others however, the project of Union seems a pretext, for ignoring the consequences legitimately deducible from their Church's frightful corruptions; and for shutting their eyes to the peremptory obligation, of fleeing for safety to the Ark of God. But to whichever of these classes an individual may belong, nothing but good (we are convinced), can result, from pressing on his attention that fundamental dogma of Rome on which we have been insisting. We are very far from meaning to deny, that in many cases a considerable period will elapse, before inquirers attain to that solid conviction, which may be a sufficient ground for seeking admission into the Church. But if they from the first understand, that there is no middle position; that there is no possibility of union with Rome, except by recognizing her as their one infallible guide to heaven; —they will obtain a most precious security, against that spirit of self-will, of private judgment, of proud and fastidious criticism, which is so largely fostered by idle and foolish talk about "negotiations" and "terms of union." They will examine far more jealously the grounds of their objection to Roman

* So Canon Oakeley :—"There was not one of us earlier converts (unless indeed, it were our far-sighted friend John Henry Newman), who was not, to use a familiar phrase, 'bitten' with the theory of a 'corporate reunion'; or at least who did not foster the hope of something like a combined movement, before he decided upon taking an independent step."—(Pp. 46–47.)

teaching, and will be far more eager in their endeavour to understand the true nature of that teaching. They will dwell, far more earnestly than now they do, on the obvious fact, that in every period he who first submits to the Church as an adult, must at starting accept many things on faith. They will be far keener and more unreserved in their prayers for light and guidance, and for the all-important grace of humility.

So far as Dr. Pusey is personally concerned, all who read his "Eirenicon" with any care must see, that when he wrote it he had not in the slightest degree realized—we doubt if he had speculatively apprehended—the exclusive claims, so peremptorily made for herself by the Church of Rome. In proportion as he does so, he will see that his whole practical proposal is simply unmeaning. He has one extremely definite question to consider, and only one. Is the Roman Communion exclusively the One Holy Catholic Apostolic Church? Is his own Communion schismatical? Is he at this moment as truly external to the Visible Church, as any Methodist or Quaker in the land? *Until* he answers these questions in the affirmative, he cannot be received (if he wishes it) into the Roman Catholic Church. *So soon as* he answers them in the affirmative, he would be formally committing mortal sin and meriting hell, if he delayed for one moment (as we are most certain he would *not* delay) in resolving to make his unreserved submission.

If it were our sole desire to silence Dr. Pusey by a reductio ad absurdum, it could not be necessary to add another word. But God knows that this is neither

all nor any part of our desire. We wish simply to do whatever may lie in our power, in order that his noble aspirations after Unity may obtain their legitimate fulfilment. This however is certain, that he must move towards the Catholic Church, not she towards him. Our only method therefore for hastening his approach to Christian Unity, is to assist in removing from his mind those numerous misapprehensions, which so curiously hamper his every movement. This has already been in part done, and is still being done, by several Catholics. In future promised discussions we hope we may contribute our own humble efforts to that end; and our present paper will be addressed in the same direction. His speculations on corporate Union, and on the means by which it may be healthily accomplished, are vitiated throughout (as we consider) by three pervasive misconceptions. To clear up these, is the purpose of our article.

II.

Firstly, we cannot see how on his principles any permanent Union is attainable at all. God Himself has laid down the only true basis on which such a result can be achieved, by imposing the precept of submission to one central authority. But Dr. Pusey does not yet believe the existence of that precept; and he is precluded therefore from suggesting any other means of Unity, except the voluntary feder-

ation of independent "branches." But it is plain, that if these "branches" are free to come together, they are equally free to separate again. Let us suppose (per impossibile) Union effected on Dr. Pusey's terms. Well, in what age of the Church has there not been an abundance of religious differences and misunderstandings? And as soon as any one such arises, what motive can Dr. Pusey supply, for retaining the hostile parties in union with each other? The laboriously-created fabric of artificial unity would crumble at a breath, and be dissolved into its original elements. Unity can be found only in subjection to Rome; hearty and profound Unity, only in hearty and profound subjection.

III.

Dr. Pusey's second misconception requires a very far longer and more careful consideration; and leads us indeed to a discussion of the gravest practical moment. If there be one assumption more than another, which penetrates every corner of the "Eirenicon," —which absolutely challenges a Catholic's criticism,— it is his uniform denial of the Church's Infallibility in her ordinary magisterium. Of all his principles, there is none, to our mind, more profoundly anti-Catholic, than the distinction which he draws throughout between the Church's explicit and her practical teaching. Not only he does not consider the Roman Catholic Church as infallible in this latter respect; he evidently has not

the faintest suspicion, that she even *claims* such Infallibility. To abstain from commenting on this error, is to abstain from commenting on what is literally the chief feature of his book; and yet a full exposition of the contrary doctrine would require a volume. We must do it however the best justice, which our limits render possible.

Before entering on this discussion, we will briefly express our unfeigned amazement at Dr. Pusey's implied opinion, that he can, at least, accept Rome's actual Decrees. In one or two recent letters indeed, he seems more or less to have retracted that opinion. But it will be well at all events to show, by a few instances out of many which might be given, how greatly the fact is otherwise. We will begin with the Council of Trent, because Dr. Pusey has particularly referred to it. "I have long been convinced," he writes to the "Weekly Register," "that there is nothing in the Council of Trent, which could not be explained satisfactorily to us." Yet he comments in the "Eirenicon" (p. 94) on "the marriage-law of the Council of Trent, which *allows* what the whole Church, from the first until . . Alexander VI. . ., held to be *incest*." And certainly it is difficult to see, how he is otherwise than in direct conflict with the Council on this matter. He repeatedly refers in the Eirenicon to his evidence before the Parliamentary Commission, as expressing his present convictions. Now this evidence proceeds throughout (as we understand it) on the basis, that the Church has no power of dispensation, as regards those grades of consanguinity and affinity

which are mentioned in Leviticus. But this proposition was expressly anathematized at Trent: "If any one shall have said, that those grades only of consanguinity and affinity, which are expressed in Leviticus, can impede (impedire) a marriage from being contracted, and nullify (dirimere) it when contracted; and *that the Church cannot dispense in some of them*, or [again cannot] appoint that a larger number of grades impede and nullify;—let him be anathema." (Session 24, Canon 3).

Another Definition of Trent bears on a matter, far more universally and urgently practical. If there is one question more momentous than another to the mass of baptized Christians, it is on the means of obtaining remission for mortal sin. On this the Council speaks expressly: "If any one shall have denied that Sacramental Confession was instituted, and is necessary to salvation, *by the Law of God* . . . let him be anathema." (Session 14, Canon 6). And the sense of this Canon is authoritatively laid down, in the previous Instruction of the Council (cap. 5): "The Church hath ever understood that complete (integram) confession of sins *is necessary by God's Law to all who have fallen after Baptism.*" Does Dr. Pusey or does he not believe, that God has commanded Sacramental Confession, as obligatory on all those who have fallen after Baptism? If he does *not* believe it, he incurs the anathema of Trent. But if he does believe it, how can he consider his own communion to be a "branch" of the Church? Christ, it seems, gave the precept, and entrusted the Church with its

promulgation. To say that the Church of England has totally omitted to promulgate it;—that the great body of Anglicans have remained in total ignorance of it;—that the vast majority of them have inveighed against all belief in its existence, as being among the worst errors of "Popery:"—all this is to say little. The Prayer-Book itself, by the most manifest implication, actually denies it. "If there be any of you," the unlucky clergyman is obliged to say, "who by this means [self-examination, confession to God, reparation to man] *cannot quiet his own conscience therein,* but requireth further *comfort or counsel,* let him come to me, or to some other . . . minister *of God's word,* and open his grief; that *by the ministry of God's holy word* he may receive the benefit of absolution, together with ghostly counsel and advice, to *the quieting of his conscience, and avoiding all scruple and doubtfulness.*" Confession to a "minister," you see, is represented, not as required by the Divine Law, nay, nor even as in itself desirable. It is recommended simply as the lesser of two evils; as a useful soporific, to those who cannot otherwise "quiet their own conscience."

But the Tridentine Decrees are not the Church's only Definitions; though Dr. Pusey often speaks as if they were. That God has revealed Mary's Immaculate Conception, is held by every Catholic as no less certain, than that He has revealed the Trinity and Incarnation. According to Dr. Pusey, God has revealed the direct contradictory (see e.g. p. 181); viz., that every human person, born since the Fall, has been

once under the dominion of original sin. And Dr. Pusey, in consequence, regards the Definition of 1854 as "an insoluble difference between the modern Roman and the ancient Church" (p. 121). We have observed however with great pleasure, that in a recent letter to the "Guardian" he expresses himself with far less aversion to this Dogma, than he formerly did; and as he is still under some misconception as to its real meaning, there is hope that further explanation may remove still further difficulty.

Then there is the Decree of Florence, on which we are to speak [in the next Essay]. No one ever has attempted, or by possibility ever can attempt, to give this Decree any sense consistent with the supposition, that either the Greek or the Anglican Communion is included in the visible Church. Canon Oakeley points this out; and says that the fact escaped his own notice and that of his friends, when they professed, as Anglicans, to hold "all Roman doctrine."

There is no necessity for further multiplying these instances of contrariety. We will conclude therefore, for special reasons, with citing this proposition. "In these last ages, a general obscurity has been spread over truths of graver moment, appertaining to religion, and which are the bases of faith and of the moral doctrine of Jesus Christ." This proposition was expressed, by certain professing Catholics, as applicable to the Roman Catholic Church "in these last ages." Nor does it seem possible to deny, that both Dr. Pusey and all Anglican Unionists regard it as truly so applicable. As to Dr. Pusey himself, the

extracts we shall presently give from his "Eirenicon," will show abundantly that such is his opinion. Is there any "truth appertaining to religion" which can more truly be called "of graver moment," than our Lord's Atonement and Intercession? Yet it is one main end—judging from the volume itself, we should have said it is *the* one main end—of his "Eirenicon," to establish that this truth, during the last centuries, has been miserably obscured within the Roman Catholic Church, through the growth and wide prevalence of devotion to our Blessed Lady. Now what has Rome explicitly decreed, on the proposition above recited? She has denounced it as "heretical" (Bull, "Auctorem Fidei," of Pius VI.); and the whole Episcopate has accepted the sentence.* The grounds of that sentence are evident to every Roman Catholic. Such a proposition, whether coming from the Synod of Pistoia or from Dr. Pusey, directly denies the Church's prerogative, as being the faithful guardian of Divine Truth in every age. It denies, we say, her prerogative of infallibly preserving the Truth, in all its fulness and in all its purity.

IV.

This consideration then leads us naturally to the second proposed theme of our article: the Church's

* [Writing before the Definition of 1870, I was commonly careful to insert this kind of reference to the "Episcopate." My reason was, that (rightly or wrongly) I regarded minimism as a far worse error than Gallicanism; and was desirous of carrying Gallicans with me in my invectives against the former tenet.]

Infallibility in her ordinary magisterium, and Dr. Pusey's denial of that Infallibility. On this most important subject, we will first lay down those general principles which we consider true, and afterwards apply those principles to the particular case of Dr. Pusey.

Firstly then let us state, as accurately as we can, the doctrine we maintain. Roman Catholics, throughout the world, are instructed in certain *doctrines;* are exhorted to certain *practices;* are encouraged and trained in certain *tempers and dispositions.* The Church's office in providing for this is called her "magisterium;" being that function whereby, as Perrone expresses it, "she leads them, as it were, by the hand, along the path of eternal salvation." "*Catholics contend,*" he adds, "*all non-Catholics deny,* that Christ has endowed His Church with *Infallibility* in this respect" ("De Locis," n. 347–8). Now firstly, when we say that this magisterium is *trustworthy,*—we mean (1) that the *doctrines* so taught are really truths revealed by God, or legitimate inferences therefrom; (2) that the *practices* thus inculcated are really serviceable for sanctification and salvation; and (3) that the *tempers and dispositions* so encouraged are really acceptable to Almighty God. And, secondly, when we further say that this magisterium is not *trustworthy* only, but *infallible,*—we mean that its trustworthiness is guaranteed by God's infallible promise.

Here however certain explanations are necessary. When we say that the Church's magisterium is in-

fallible, we do not of course deny, that each several priest throughout Christendom falls probably into one mistake or another, on various minor matters connected with religion. For to deny this, would be almost to maintain that each several priest is infallible. Nor yet do we deny, that in one or other portion of the Church most serious doctrinal corruptions and heresies may arise; may infect Priests and even Bishops; and may give the supreme authority great trouble, before they are finally repressed. For to deny this, would be to deny facts, which are on the surface of ecclesiastical history from first to last. But all this being fully admitted and allowed for, it still remains true that, in every part of the Roman Catholic Church, there is a large mass of such practical guidance as we have described, given to the people by their Priests, with fullest knowledge and approval of the Church's supreme authority. This constitutes what Dr. Pusey (p. 106) happily calls "the Church's practical teaching;" and what theologians commonly designate as her ordinary magisterium. We must maintain as an elementary Catholic doctrine, that she cannot "*recede*" from it, as Dr. Pusey wishes (ibid.), because she claims for it Infallibility. Perrone speaks of this Infallibility, we have seen, as "held by Catholics and denied by all others." He does not speak of it as of one Catholic view among many, but as of the one Catholic view; nor does he so much as hint, that among Catholics any other can possibly exist. Dr. Pusey himself indeed points out the universal prevalence among them of this conviction.

"This argument [he says most truly] was used again and again by the Bishops [before the Definition of 1854]: "the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception must be true, because *the Church teaches it everywhere, and the Church cannot err*" . . . We have been often told * that it was enough for any one in the Roman Communion to believe the Canons of the Council of Trent. The Bishops of Spain and Portugal, especially, tell us of a vast practical system, *which the Bishops and Priests teach, and the people believe* as matter of faith.† And this system *being taught everywhere.*‡ . . . it, too, might be and must be assumed to be, of Divine tradition, § and might be declared to be matter of saving faith. Some of the Bishops observed that the doctrine of the Assumption . . . rested on the self-same authority. . . . There is the same practical teaching of the Assumption, as there was of the Immaculate Conception."—(Pp. 149, 150.)

How far such reasoning, before the Definition of 1854, amounted to an actual proof of the Immaculate Conception, we shall presently consider. But as regards this general argument drawn by the Bishops from the Church's practical teaching, we must maintain, against Dr. Pusey, that nothing can be more cogent and logical, or more strictly conformable with sound ecclesiastical principle. Father Newman, in his "Apologia," has this very significant remark: "I disavowed and condemned [Protestant] excesses

* Most unjustifiably.—Ed. D. R.

† Rather "matter of certain and sure doctrine."—Ed. D. R.

‡ "With full knowledge and approval of Pope and Bishops."—Ed. D. R.

§ "Or else a legitimate consequence therefrom."—Ed. D. R.

[when an Anglican] : *I wished to find a parallel disclaimer, on the part of Roman controversialists, of that popular system of beliefs and usages in their own Church which I called Popery.*" In other words, he wished to obtain an admission, that the Church is infallible indeed in her explicit Decrees, but not in her popular magisterium. "When that hope was [discovered by me to be] a dream, I saw that the controversy lay, between the book-theology of Anglicanism on the one side, and *the living system of what I called Roman corruption on the other.*" This was the practical conclusion of common sense.

Such then is the thesis which we are now to establish : "The Church is infallible in her ordinary magisterium, no less than in her explicit Decrees." And we would urge the following on Dr. Pusey's attention, as an irrefragable proof of its truth. How does a Roman Catholic prove the Church's Infallibility at all ? Fundamentally and primarily, of course, by proving the Infallibility of that Church, which the Apostles governed ; and by then proceeding to prove, that the same privilege still remains. This was our reasoning [in the preceding Essay] against Dr. Pusey's Apology for Anglicanism. In the Apostles' lifetime, we argued, the Church was one infallible Society. But their death caused no change in that particular ; therefore she is one infallible Society still. She inherits then, not some other Infallibility, but that Infallibility which was first granted. Now in what sense, in what respect, was the Apostles' Church infallible ? Most undeniably, most obviously, in this precise respect of her ordinary

magisterium. On the great Mysteries of Faith, there were no explicit Decrees at all during the Apostles' life; and some years of their government elapsed, before there was any Œcumenical Council whatever. Yet no one will deny, that the faith of Christians then rested on a secure basis. We drew out just now what we meant by the Church's Infallibility in her ordinary magisterium. Every syllable of that description applies, precisely and accurately, to the Apostolic period. Individual teachers were of course liable to error, because not one out of a thousand disciples received his full course of instruction from an inspired Apostle. In particular places again, fearful corruptions of doctrine might arise; for did not the great body of Galatian converts fall from the Faith? But throughout the Church there was a large mass of practical guidance, both in doctrine and in spirituality, given to the faithful, with full knowledge and approval of the Apostles. It was precisely the Infallibility of this guidance, which was the Infallibility of the then Church.

Such then is the proof which we allege for our thesis; and it is surely incontrovertible. That very course of argument, which evinces that the Church is infallible at all, evinces directly, not that she is infallible in her *Decrees*, but that she is infallible in her ordinary *magisterium*.

Or to put the same thing in a somewhat different light. The Church of the Apostles, it will be admitted by Dr. Pusey, was recognized by all true Christians as their infallible guide to Heaven. But all Roman

Catholics maintain, that the Roman Catholic Church of every age is lineal heir to that of the Apostles; and they maintain therefore, that she is her children's infallible guide to Heaven. Christians of the Nineteenth Century have the very same Rule of Faith with Christians of the first. Now what can be more preposterous than to say, that the Roman Catholic Church would be her children's infallible guide to Heaven—however free from error might be her explicit Decrees—if her *magisterium* were fallible? if the practical teaching, which she earnestly sanctions and diligently dispenses, could by possibility be false and anti-Christian? This is really the vital point at issue, between Roman Catholics and Dr. Pusey. As an excellent writer in the "Tablet" urges (Feb. 10), "so long as he clings to the notion that the Church is *a collection of formularies*, however sacred and venerable, he is as far off in principle from the Church as the veriest Protestant. If he could lay hold of this very simple but fundamental idea, that the Church is his teacher, and not he the teacher of the Church, his difficulties would have vanished."

We have said that the Church is infallible in her whole magisterium, and not only in her explicit Decrees. But indeed a very little consideration will show something more than this. It will show that her Infallibility *in the former* is the principal and predominating end, for which God has granted her Infallibility *in the latter*. We argue as follows, in behalf of this further conclusion. For what purpose has God granted to the Church Infallibility at all? Every Catholic will

answer, "in order that true Doctrine may be securely preserved, and false doctrine securely repelled." Now, from among the whole mass of Catholics, how many are there, who learn true Doctrine immediately from the Church's infallible Definitions? An almost infinitesimal proportion: none whosoever of the uneducated classes; and of the educated, none except theological students. So, on the other hand, there are very numerous heretics who, from sheer intellectual incapacity, might altogether fail to see any contrariety between their own tenets and the Church's explicit Decrees. What in fact repels them from her Communion, is the practical system of belief and worship, at which they feel an instinctive disgust. Both these great ends of Infallibility therefore are *immediately* secured by the Infallibility, not of her Decrees, but of her ordinary magisterium.

We are the very last indeed to be suspected of undervaluing the inappreciable importance, whether of Definitions,* or of other doctrinal Decisions. But we say that, as regards an ordinary Catholic, their importance consists, not in their direct, but their indirect influence. This indirect influence is immense. The whole sacerdotal body is trained, both to accept Definitions with the certainty of divine faith, and also (in greater or less degree) to master their full import and bearing. Then, as regards other doctrinal Decisions,—every sound theologian considers these Deci-

* For brevity's sake, we will use this word throughout, as expressing Definitions *of faith:* those which condemn the contradictory tenet, as actually *heretical.*

sions (when issuing from the Ecclesia Docens) as no less infallible than Definitions; and the very large majority of priests so believe. Here and there indeed a Catholic may be found, who holds (in direct opposition, as we maintain, to the Church's teaching) that these minor Decisions are not infallibly true. Yet even such an unsound Catholic as this admits in theory, that no public advocacy of the censured tenet is henceforward permissible. What follows from this? The contradictory truth is alone permitted to be taught, in text-books or by seminary professors; and the whole rising generation of priests imbibes it as certain and unquestioned. The powerful effect of all this, towards preserving in full purity the Church's practical teaching among Catholics in general, is too obvious to need another word.

V.

We consider ourselves now to have established two conclusions. We have shown (1) that the Church is infallible in her ordinary magisterium, no less than in her Decrees; and (2) that the latter Infallibility is principally useful for the sake of the former. It will have further appeared from our argument, that the Church exercises a twofold magisterium: according as she respectively addresses—on one side, the few who can really master her explicit Decrees;—on the other side, the vast majority, whose chief means of apprehending truth is very different. We may call the former her "theological,"

the latter her "popular" magisterium. Her theological magisterium consists primarily of course, but by no means exclusively, of her various Definitions and doctrinal Decisions: for which she demands that unreserved interior acceptance, which is due to an infallible authority. Then further, as Pius IX. teaches in his Munich Brief:—

"Even though the question concerned that subjection [of the intellect] which is to be yielded in an act of divine faith, yet that would have not to be confined to those things which have been hitherto defined by the express decrees of Œcumenical Councils or of Roman Pontiffs and this Apostolic See, but to be extended to *those things also which are delivered* [*to the faithful*] *as divinely revealed* by the ordinary magisterium of the whole Church dispersed throughout the world, and *are therefore accounted by Catholic theologians, with universal and consistent consent, to appertain to the Faith.* But since the question concerns that subjection by which all those Catholics are *bound in conscience,* who apply themselves to the speculative sciences, in order that by their writings they may confer new benefits on the Church,—therefore the men of the above-named Congress should recognize that it is not sufficient for learned [sapientibus] Catholics to receive and revere the beforementioned dogmata of the Church; but that it is also necessary [opus esse] for them to subject themselves, as well to *the doctrinal Decisions which are issued by the Pontifical Congregations,* as also to *those heads of doctrine which are accounted by the common and consistent consent of Catholics as theological truths,* and as conclusions so certain that opinions adverse to the same, though they cannot be called heretical, yet deserve some other theological censure."

Or suppose some question to have been actively ventilated by theologians; and the whole body of them to have arrived confidently at the conclusion, that certain propositions relating to it are theologically unsound. Suppose also the Holy Father and the whole Ecclesia Docens to be well acquainted with this fact; and to display no kind of disapprobation, but rather the contrary. A moral certainty, we think, would thence arise, that the Church teaches magisterially, and therefore infallibly, the unsoundness of those propositions. There are various ascetical truths again, on which the whole body of approved ascetic writers are unanimous, as on truths absolutely fundamental and indubitable; and these (we think) may be considered as taught infallibly by the Ecclesia Docens. Such are the principles on this subject, which to us would seem sound, and which we submit to the judgment of theologians. But there is no need of entering into detail and argument on this matter; because Dr. Pusey's objection refers exclusively, not to the Church's theological, but to her popular magisterium.

VI.

Our remaining remarks therefore will refer to the Church's *popular* magisterium. In regard to this magisterium, one point to be borne in mind throughout is this; that the great mass of Catholics do not apprehend religious truth through scientific statements,

but incomparably rather through means to them more practically influential. It follows therefore, that if on any given subject we would learn what doctrine the Church popularly teaches, the main thing which we have to consider, is the practical impression wrought on the popular mind, by those various spiritual appliances which she originates or sanctions. By not sufficiently attending to this undeniable truth, men may often think that the Church does not teach the full doctrine, which she really does teach; while on the other hand they may sometimes fancy that she teaches what she does not. As we are to speak on the Council of Florence in [the next Essay], we will take our illustration of this latter fact from the doctrine of Purgatory. Father Newman, in the immediate vicinity of that passage which we lately quoted, draws attention to "the pictures of souls in flames," which he "had seen in the streets of Naples." Another popular illustration of Purgatory is taken from the three children of God, praising their Creator in the midst of flames. And it cannot, we think, be fairly denied by any one, that the bodily torment inflicted by fire is placed before the whole Catholic flock, with full knowledge and approval of Pope and Bishops, as a representation of purgatorial suffering. We infer from this as the Church's infallible teaching, that the souls in Purgatory undergo a keen anguish, of which a true idea is imparted by the analogy just mentioned. But there is also a scholastic question; viz., whether God inflicts this anguish by means of actual fire such as our fire on earth, or by means of

some different agency. We are not here considering how far, on other grounds, the former alternative is more probable; but we should say that the question is external to the Church's popular magisterium. That image, under which the mass of Catholics have learned to apprehend purgatorial suffering, is not the action of fire on the *soul*, but on the *body*. And whether the analogous effect is produced on the *soul* by fire, or by some other agency, is a question which they do not precisely consider.*

We may take another illustration from the same doctrine. It was in former times debated among theologians, whether the souls in Purgatory are tormented by evil spirits. Now let us make the imaginary supposition, that those pictures of Purgatory, which are exhibited to the Christian flock with pas-

* On this doctrine of Purgatory, Dr. Pusey has really taken a very important step forward. "It is absolutely inconceivable," he says, (p. 191), "that when the soul shall first behold Jesus, and in His sight, with its powers quickened by Him, shall behold its past life as a whole; when, in His countenance, it shall behold all which it never saw before of His goodness; and in contrast with this, all its own ingratitude, baseness, rebellion, negligence, discontent, murmurings, not to speak of forgiven deadly sin;—it should not have intense pain: *pain so intense, that one should think that in this life soul and body would be severed by its intensity.*" This does not, of course, come up to the Catholic doctrine of Purgatory; but it is a most important move in that direction. The passage also seems to imply the Catholic doctrine of a particular judgment. [I would also draw attention to it, as exemplifying the piety of tone and thought, which Dr. Pusey invariably exhibits, and which so favourably distinguishes him from certain other controversialists.]

toral sanction, contained universally a representation of evil spirits inflicting torment. On such a hypothesis, we think that the Church would have practically ruled the question in the affirmative. On the other hand, since such a representation is (we believe) absolutely unheard of, this circumstance alone affords an extremely strong argument against a notion, which no Catholic of the present day (we suppose) is at all inclined to hold.

There is another question, very closely connected with that of the Church's popular magisterium; viz., the "sensus fidelium." Our discussion therefore would be incomplete, if we did not say a few words on the authority due to that "locus theologicus." Nor can we introduce the subject better, than by citing the Bishop of Birmingham's excellent work on the Immaculate Conception. We italicize a few clauses of the passages we quote.

"Nor should the universal conviction of pious Catholics be passed over as of small account in the general argument. For that pious belief, and the devotion which springs from it, *are the faithful reflection of the pastoral teaching.* The more devout the faithful grew, the more devoted they showed themselves towards this mystery. And *it is the devout who have the surest instinct in discerning the mysteries* of which the Holy Spirit breathes the grace through the Church, and who *with as sure a tact reject what is alien from her teaching.* . . .

"We cannot do better than listen to the words of the learned Petavius on this part of the subject; for besides their inherent weight, they have been adopted by the greatest writers in treating the subject. 'I

am inclined,' he says, 'towards the Immaculate Conception, most especially by that common sentiment which is entertained of it by all the faithful, who have this deeply rooted in the innermost recesses of their minds, and by all the signs and devotions in their power, bear witness that nothing was ever created by God more chaste, more pure, more innocent, more alien, in short, from every condition and stain of sin, than that Virgin. That she truly never did hold anything in common with hell and its ruler the Devil, and therefore not with any offence towards God or with damnation.' That very grave author, S. Paulinus of Nola, has given us this excellent admonition: 'That we should depend *upon the spoken sense of all the faithful, because the Spirit of God breathes on each believer.*' John Fisher, the Bishop of Rochester, in the book which he wrote for the King of England against Luther, taught how great is the weight of this universal suffrage of all Catholics, *even when not called forth or demanded by any precept, but spontaneously uttered*" (pp. 172–4).

This passage suggests, what we otherwise think certainly true; viz., that there are two different aspects, under which this sensus fidelium tells in favour of some doctrine. Firstly and chiefly, it tells as being "the faithful reflection of the pastoral teaching." So far as popular belief affords proof that some doctrine has been practically taught to the whole Church as indisputably Catholic,—to that extent it affords proof, that the doctrine is infallibly true. But a further hypothesis may be made. Let us suppose, that a certain body of Dogma is practically taught everywhere as indisputably Catholic. Then let us further suppose, that all those without exception

who most apply themselves to the contemplation of that Dogma, who are most pure in mind, most detached from worldly things, — that all these men are eager in pressing forward this Dogma to some farther consequence. An extremely strong probability hence arises, that this farther consequence is true. Yet, until the Ecclesia Docens shall have taught it as indisputably Catholic, such probability can never ascend to infallible certainty. Now, until the Immaculate Conception was actually defined, ecclesiastical authority strictly forbade all Catholics from stigmatizing the contradictory tenet with any censure. It appears to us therefore (though of course we speak diffidently and under correction) that until the memorable Dec. 8th, 1854, the doctrine of her Immaculate Conception could not be truly said to possess that infallible certainty, which now obtains e.g. on the doctrine of her Assumption.*

VII.

So much then on the Church's Infallibility in her popular magisterium, and on the legitimate weight of the sensus fidelium. We now approach a critical and anxious part of our inquiry. From what we have already said indeed, Dr. Pusey will falsely infer, that

* Lugo (de Fide, d. 20, n. 76) holds a denial of the Assumption to be beyond question theologically erroneous; but of course he could not at that time so speak concerning a denial of the Immaculate Conception.

we maintain as *de fide* every doctrine taught by the Church's popular magisterium. For he speaks throughout, as though "de fide" and "infallible" were convertible terms.* Such however, we need not remind our readers, is far from being the case. Those doctrines only are de fide, which are proposed by the Church as having been divinely revealed. But the Church, as we have so often said, is infallible, not as "testis" only, but as "judex" and "magistra:" not only as witness of those truths which are de fide; but also as guide to an indefinite number of further truths, indissolubly mixed up with the former. Now, in her popular magisterium, she aims at nothing else than directly training souls for Heaven. But for this purpose it more often suffices, to inculcate this or that doctrine as indisputably true; without entering into the question whether it be strictly of faith. It can by no means therefore be inferred, from her popularly teaching some doctrine, that she condemns its denial as precisely *heretical.*

Persons then may ask (and this is the anxious inquiry to which we above referred), what kind or degree of theological censure may rightly be ascribed to a rejection of the Church's practical teaching, on this or that particular which is not actually de fide.

* See e. g., p. 111 and p. 130. [Cardinal Franzelin and others make a distinction between "de fide immediatâ" and "de fide mediatâ" or "ecclesiasticâ." In the present Essay the expression "de fide" is always used in the *former* sense. I call those doctrines only "de fide," the contradictories of which a Catholic is required to regard as actually heretical.]

It is absolutely necessary to discuss this question, as will be presently seen. But it is a serious matter to speak about, and we submit our judgment most humbly to that of competent theologians. Our own suggestion would be as follows :—

By far the commonest case surely, where a Catholic is unhappily out of harmony with the Church on any particular included in such teaching, will be for him to deny that this particular *is* really a portion thereof. And there is of course great opening for this denial; from the very circumstance, that her ordinary magisterium is so far less precise and (as one may say) concrete than her Definitions. In such cases, there may often be room of course for great suspicion, that this denial arises from want of candour; or of keen desire for spiritual knowledge; or from some other moral defect: but it would be unmeaning to speak of such a denial, as being in itself theologically unsound at all.

But let us suppose him to admit that the Church practically teaches certain doctrines; and to say nevertheless that they have no infallible authority. "What *do* you think of them then?" we ask. "I think," he replies, "that they are unauthoritative inferences from Apostolic Dogma. Some may be true; others, I am fully certain, are not true: but no doctrines are *infallibly* true, except those which the Church actually teaches as an integral portion of the Deposit." If this be the full expression of his mind, he cannot be charged with actual *heresy*. The Church has not yet proposed, as actually *revealed by God*, the truth, that she

is infallible in drawing inferences from the Deposit. Yet we must submit, that such an opinion is theologically unsound and censurable; though of course the individual may well be invincibly ignorant of its unsoundness, and otherwise admissible to the Sacraments.

But a man may imaginably take a much more extreme ground. He may say that the doctrines, taught practically by the Church, inflict a most grave injury on souls, by obscuring those fundamental truths which God has committed to her keeping. Or he may go still further, and say that the former doctrines are absolutely inconsistent with the latter truths. In either case we do not see how such an opinion can deserve a lower censure, than that of *heretical*. For it directly contradicts the Dogma, so undeviatingly proposed by the Church as revealed by God, concerning her own office and prerogative; the Dogma namely, that she is infallibly protected in every age, as the witness and faithful guardian of the Deposit. According to the lesser error above named, she has ceased to be its faithful guardian; according to the graver, she has ceased even to be its true witness. And our readers will remember that even the lesser error of the two has been explicitly pronounced heretical by the Church.

Now on another matter, closely connected with what has gone before.

Dr. Pusey has laid much stress on the circumstance, that the Church's popular teaching often goes far beyond her explicit Decrees. As to Purgatory e.g. she teaches practically, as we have seen, that its

sufferings are analogously represented by the action of fire on a human body; whereas her strongest *Decree* merely states, that certain souls "are purified after death by purgatorial pains." (Conc. Flor.) Then, as to our Blessed Lady. Those who have derived their notion of the Catholic belief from ecclesiastical Decisions alone, would undoubtedly be perplexed and bewildered, when brought across the multifarious manifestations of Catholic devotion. How is this discrepancy to be explained? F. Newman, in the passage of his "Apologia" to which we have already twice referred, mentions that many Protestants ascribe it to a very discreditable cause; to the Church's being afraid of explicitly avowing what she implicitly inculcates. His language shows of course, how widely removed he is from any kind of sympathy with this reply; but (writing as he does historically and not controversially) he does not pause to refute it.* We believe ourselves, that the real account of this matter is as follows:—

The Church is bound by two different duties, which it is most difficult to bring into harmony. On the one hand, the Gospel verities are committed to her keeping; and she is under the obligation of steadfastly resisting every encroachment, which tends even distantly to corrupt or impair them. On the other hand, she is the one ark of salvation; and she must open her doors as widely as possible to all who desire

* [I need hardly remind my readers, that Cardinal Newman has now expressly treated this subject in the first volume of his "Via Media."]

Heaven. Here then is her difficulty. Every new doctrinal Decision, however necessary, yet erects a fresh barrier against the salvation of individuals;*

* Here is a striking passage on this subject, from Monseigneur Pie, Bishop of Poitiers :—" Here is interposed," says the Bishop, " an objection which has become familiar to the men of our time, even to good sort of men. If it is the Church's duty to guard the truth, it is also her duty to save souls. Now may not too great attention to one of these duties interfere with the fulfilment of the other? Is the moment well chosen for affirming more strongly and putting forth more precise statements, when the susceptibility of men's mind and the delicacy of their case require rather a tender treatment? Why not leave in their obscurity those practical or speculative questions, which the last generation never examined very attentively? In particular, at a time when human society is sick with the one widely-spread malady of naturalism, why so accurately set forth, develope, emphasize, the principles, laws, and whole economy of the supernatural order? Is not this to widen the gulf of existing separations?" *Such was the almost universal cry during the period of Arianism;* and the ambassadors of secular princes held similar language *during the deliberations of the Council of Trent.* "Why a new and unreasonable declaration, which wears the appearance of aggression? Why a stricter definition or more absolute symbol than in times past? Should not the Church, *in order to maintain her character of visibility and Catholicity*, have regard to *her numbers?* What will be the advantage of separating from the Church that multitude of vacillating minds, *which might be maintained in her communion by a less explicit formula?* Oftentimes those great Bishops, on whom weighed the care of sacred interests, found these protests on the lips even of friends and defenders of the good cause. Animated by the Spirit of God, which is a spirit *both of love and of strength*, those illustrious champions of the Church knew how to unite that consideration which is due to the weak, with that inflexibility which orthodoxy demands; and without pronouncing any Decrees of exclusion which would have overpassed the end desired, maintained nevertheless the special word of doctrine with

and she is always desirous therefore, to the utmost possible extent, of preserving dogmatic purity by some different means. Take, as one very principal instance, the various doctrines concerning our Blessed Lady, which she practically teaches. Almost all Catholics, who accept the infallible truth of these doctrines, will piously believe that Christ taught them to the Apostles. Yet if the Church formally declared this,—if she propounded them as so many distinct matters of faith,—much evil must arise. There is many a well-intentioned, but half-hearted, or puzzle-headed, or eccentric Catholic, who might shrink from accepting these propositions, when thus rigidly and (as it were) coldly put into scientific shape, and who might thus be seriously tempted to apostasy. Nevertheless such a man, if remaining a Catholic, might receive indefinite benefit from the Church's Sacraments and teaching; might probably save his soul; and would at all events educate as Catholics his children, to become perhaps far more loyal sons of the Church than himself. Still more importantly, there is many a non-Catholic, who, as things now are, will submit to the Church; will receive her sweet and gradual training; and under its influence, will learn to sympathize with every high devotion to the Mother of God; who might not have had the heart to make

indomitable tenacity; and defended it with so much authority, interpreted it with so much knowledge, that the doctrine assailed shone forth in irresistible lustre."

[See on the same subject M. Albert Dechamps's letter to F. Gratry, which I mention in my Preliminary Essay.]

so great a venture, had those various truths, which he has thus unconsciously imbibed, been presented to him at first in the nakedness of theological Decree. And moreover, after all, no such Decree could really have conveyed to his mind the true doctrine, in that fulness and precision with which faithful Catholics really hold it. Why then should the Church throw obstacles in the way of such persons? What fear is there, that they will impede the general reception of integral and pure and what we may call "maximistic" doctrine, concerning Holy Mary? That doctrine (thank God!) lives in the heart of the Catholic masses; and any individual is absolutely powerless (even if he wished it) to stem the popular tide.

VIII.

Such then are the principles which we are disposed to uphold, on the Church's popular magisterium; and we must next apply those principles to the Eirenicon. Now the general question of devotion to Mary is far too large to discuss here.* Yet, in order to appreciate Dr. Pusey's various propositions, it is very important that we briefly and generally explain, what are those doctrines concerning her, which we maintain to be authoritatively, and therefore infallibly, taught by the Church. They are, we think, such as these:—(1.) That her merits are incomparably greater than those

* [It occupied four Essays in my volume on "Devotional and Scriptural Subjects."]

of any other created person. (2.) That accordingly she occupies a place in Heaven, incomparably nearer to her Son than any other. (3.) That she is intimately acquainted with the thoughts, the character, the circumstances, of all who invoke her aid; and well knows what is really for their greatest good. (4.) That she has incomparably greater power than any other created person, towards promoting that good. (5.) That to unite ourselves with Mary in the contemplation of Jesus, as is done e.g. by those who duly recite the Rosary, is a singularly efficacious means, for vividly apprehending His Divine Personality and His various mysteries. (6.) That the unremitting and most loving thought of her has an efficacy, peculiarly its own, in promoting a tender and practical love of Him. (7.) That regular and repeated prayer to her cannot be omitted by a Catholic, without putting his salvation into grievous peril. Other propositions might be added to these. And the proof which we would allege, of such propositions being really contained in the Church's authoritative teaching, is this: —If any one of them were denied—the exhortations impressed on Catholics throughout Christendom, with full approbation of Pope and Bishops, would be baseless and indefensible; influential religious habits, whose growth is sedulously fostered by ecclesiastical authority, would be founded on a delusion; the Church would have in fact made a mistake, unspeakably serious, in that very matter,—the training of souls for Heaven,—which is the one ultimate end for which she was endowed with Infallibility.

Again, there are other propositions which, if not actually taught by the Church with infallible authority, are yet so universally held by devout servants of Mary, that no "cordatus Catholicus" will dream of doubting them. For instance, that God secured her assent as an indispensable preliminary to the Incarnation ("fiat mihi secundum verbum tuum") which otherwise would not have been accomplished; that while our Lord was on earth, she had a clear knowledge of, and keen sympathy with, all which He effected for our salvation; that she takes a most active part in dispensing the gift of perseverance; that extraordinary tenderness towards her is a special note of predestination. Lastly, there are other pious opinions, more or less in excess of what has been above stated, which have been advocated by this or that individual, with the Church's full permission. Of these, we would earnestly maintain that they contain nothing theologically unsound; yet, since the Church does not herself teach them, they may be of course to any extent mistaken. At the same time, from the manifest tendency of the Church to permit what appear at first sight extreme expressions on this matter,—she does seem authoritatively to teach, that *in themselves* they are not spiritually dangerous, though they might be so to particular individuals.

We think Dr. Pusey quite correct, in alleging these devotions as far the most striking exhibition of that difference, on which he so much insists, between the Church's explicit and her practical teaching. Whatever therefore we say on this, may be easily accommo-

dated to other instances. And that we may do justice to Dr. Pusey's argument, it is absolutely necessary to consider the various ways in which a candidate for admission into the Church may regard this practical teaching. We will put aside for a moment the question of *corporate* admission, and confine ourselves to the case of individuals. To this case we will (as best we can) apply the general principles above laid down. Nor of course do we forget, that the various states of mind which actually exist in different individuals, are incapable of being definitely separated into distinct classes; since they melt into each other gradually and imperceptibly. Yet we cannot make our meaning clear, unless we speak of the classes as altogether distinct. Moreover here again we most humbly submit all which we suggest to the judgment of competent theologians.

One candidate for reception will speak thus: "These constant prayers to Mary are quite external to my previous experience, and I shrink altogether from plunging into them headlong. Yet I see that the Church sanctions them; and I have no doubt therefore in my own mind that they are pleasing to God. By degrees I shall probably understand and practise them myself." To say the very least, there is nothing reprehensible in this. At the same time such a postulant as we have supposed, when he has once become a Catholic, will probably advance very far more speedily than he had thought possible, in sympathy even with the more extreme forms of devotion to our Blessed Lady.

Another not only dislikes these devotions, but blinds

himself to the fact that the Church sanctions and encourages them. He intends, on becoming a Catholic, to content himself with a comparatively sparing worship of Mary. However a priest might advise such a person, he could feel no difficulty of course in receiving him.

A third may actually recognize that the Church practically teaches these things; and may yet regard them as being unauthoritative, and in an indefinite degree mistaken, additions to the Deposit. Here we must of course speak with more reserve, and much may depend on circumstances of individual character or habit. But looking at the thing generally, it may be assumed that he is invincibly ignorant on the obligation of believing what the Church practically teaches; and it may be the dictate of charity, not to attempt the removal of such ignorance. On his reception, he will witness a totally new scene, and breathe a totally new atmosphere; the Sacraments of the Church will strengthen and enlighten him; a totally new form of teaching will be presented to him; and everything may be hoped for the result.

But now suppose a Protestant to hold, not merely that these doctrines are unauthoritative and partly mistaken, but that they are certainly false; and moreover, that they are inexpressibly mischievous, as obscuring those fundamental truths of religion, which it is the Church's office to exhibit in their clearest light. We have seen that such a view is expressly condemned by the Church as heretical; and even had it not been so condemned, its heretical nature is

abundantly manifest. No man could be received into the Church therefore, without renouncing it.

And still less, if he held that these doctrines are not only thus injurious, but that they are directly contradictory, to the Apostolic Deposit.

Now we wish we could see any room for possible doubt, that Dr. Pusey's views must be ranked in one or other of these two latter classes. He considers (p. 111) that the doctrines on Mary, practically taught by the Roman Catholic Church, "*come as near to idolatry* as can be supposed in a Church, of which it is said 'the idols he shall utterly abolish.'" Also (p. 113) "that the vast system," practically encouraged by Rome, "does practically occasion *many* uninstructed minds to stop short in the mediation of S. Mary;" i.e. to regard her, and not her Son, as mediator between God and man. Further (p. 143) that "where the natural language [of Anglicans] would be 'God will do this or that,' there it seems equally natural to Roman Catholics to say, 'Mary will do it;'" by which we understand him to mean, that the prevalent teaching about Mary causes ordinary Catholics to account her possessed of supreme and underived power. "It is difficult to see," he says elsewhere (p. 183), "how *direct heresy should not be suggested* by sentences such as these (and they are so common), 'If we fear to go directly to Jesus Christ . . . . let us boldly implore the aid of Mary our Mother.'" Such sentences are indeed most common, and most fully permitted by the Church; yet Dr. Pusey thinks that they suggest direct heresy.

He is speaking throughout, be it remembered, of a "practical system" (p. 210) "*taught by her priests,* put forth as certain truth and *as her teaching* in books *which have the sanction of her Bishops,* and by writers *who have been canonized:*" for which most assuredly therefore she "remains responsible." Of this system, he says (p. viii.) that it "interferes with the simple and exclusive reliance on Jesus;" also (p. 151), that "*the most startling fact* is its completeness. It *shocked* us to find," &c., &c. He would not have been "shocked," unless this system were seriously prejudicial to piety and spirituality. Indeed he thinks this whole mass of practical belief so disastrous, that a vast apostasy from the Faith may possibly result therefrom (p. 258). Lastly, on "a practical question affecting our whole eternity" (p. 182), he considers that Rome gives an answer both false and unspeakably pernicious.*

It is quite impossible, we think, for any one to read these passages—and still more to read them in their respective contexts—and to doubt that Dr. Pusey holds one of the two gravest errors above recited. We have already given reasons for our opinion, that either of these errors is a heresy; and we have quoted the Church's express Definition, in support of our opinion. We conclude, that however invincible may be Dr.

* "The one is a practical question *affecting our whole eternity:* 'What shall I do to be saved?' *The practical answer to the Roman Catholic* seems to me to be '*Go to Mary and you will be saved;*' in our dear Lord's own words, it is, 'Come unto Me'; in our belief it is, 'Go to Jesus, and you will be saved.'"

Pusey's ignorance, however admirable his intentions, however pious his life, he cannot be admitted (until he abandons such heresy) into the One Catholic Church.

As to his wish that the Roman authorities should give some assurance against such doctrines being taught to their English flock;—if called on to speak, they would of course give just the opposite assurance. They would frankly promise to take every available method of spreading a devotion, which is infallibly guaranteed as true in principle, and which is demonstrated by experience as so inestimably beneficial in practice.

After having read such passages as those above recited—passages which no one could imagine Dr. Pusey having put forth without extreme deliberation, and under a most painful sense of duty,—we were more astonished than we can well express, by the following words in his letter to the "Weekly Register." "I did not write," he says, "as a reformer, but on the defensive. *It is not for us to prescribe to Italians or Spaniards* what they shall hold, or how they shall express *their pious opinions.* All which we wish is to have it made certain, by authority, that we should not, in case of reunion, be obliged to hold them ourselves." Now we cannot comment on these extraordinary words, without expressing our sense of the truly kind and humble spirit which they seem to display. Indeed in this, as in so many other exhibitions of himself, Dr. Pusey presents the appearance of a kindly and humble man, possessed (as though through some

Satanic agency) by a most unkindly and proud theory. But surely the passage we have just quoted shows the strangest inaccuracy of thought. In Dr. Pusey's opinion, "Italians and Spaniards,"—nay Englishmen also of the Roman communion—accept heartily a devotion close upon idolatry; which raises a creature into the Creator's place; which suggests direct heresy; which speaks most falsely and perniciously, on a question affecting our whole eternity; which is so monstrous, that it may not improbably end in producing a widely-extended apostasy from the Faith. All this he thinks himself at liberty confidently to think, and loudly to express. Yet he will not venture to tell Italians and Spaniards, that they had better abandon this devotion. Where then is his Christian charity? Where his zeal for God's glory? Is it Englishmen only, whose salvation he desires? Otherwise, why should he not "prescribe to Italians and Spaniards" what he so energetically prescribes to his fellow-countrymen? If he believes one-tenth part of what he says on the Catholic devotion to Mary, in what possible spirit (as an honest man) could he enter the Roman Catholic Church, except in the spirit of "a reformer"?

It will further have been seen that, by some inexplicable oversight, those very devotions which he has denounced as verging on idolatry, are now leniently characterized as the "expression" of men's "pious opinions." Why then may not Englishmen also, if God draws them to it, "express their pious opinions" in a similar shape?

Presently he continues :—"Least of all did I think of imputing to any of the writers whom I quoted, that they took from our Lord any of the love which they gave to His Mother. I was intent only on describing the system—I had not the least thought of criticising holy men who held it." We do wish he would consider the force of his own words. In S. Alphonsus, in the Venerable Grignon de Montfort (whom he constantly quotes), and in a thousand other like-minded men—next to their personal love of God and of their Saviour—there was no more conspicuous characteristic of their whole interior life, than their enthusiastic devotion to Mary. Dr. Pusey, in his work, describes this devotion as totally unfounded and unspeakably mischievous; and then protests in his letter, that he has had "no thought of criticising these holy men." To say that they were victims to a mischievous and idolatrous superstition, he considers to have been no criticism at all.

He thinks moreover, that none of them took from our Lord that love which they gave to His Mother. But if so, their love of Mary must have been to them a vast blessing. To love tenderly, and contemplate unremittingly, a spotlessly holy creature, will be admitted by every pious man to be in itself a vast blessing. Protestants however commonly think that this blessing cannot be obtained, without paying for it too high a price; without taking from our Lord a large portion of that love which they gave to His Mother. Now Dr. Pusey considers this objection chimerical, at all events in the case of holy men; and

he must think therefore, that their love of Mary is an unmixed and vast blessing to them. In other words, he thinks that they derive an unmixed and vast blessing, from giving their assent to a most false and pernicious system of religious teaching.

It may seem ungracious to take advantage (as it were) of Dr. Pusey's amiable and gentle expressions. But surely he cannot be permitted, at once to hunt with the hounds and to run with the hare. Does he, or does he not, deliberately hold to those violent criticisms, which he has expressed in his volume? If he does not, he is bound expressly to retract them. If he does, we know how he and we mutually stand. We give him every credit for the best intentions; but we must wage against him an internecine conflict, in behalf of doctrines which are dearer to us than life.

The same thing holds with the other Unionists in his communion. They are confident that their own Society is part of the Visible Church; but they wish to promote unity and peace by a concordat with Rome. Unity and peace! Why their entry among us with their present dispositions (if it were possible, as, thank God, it is not) would be the signal for a bitter and violent contention, in comparison with which all other ecclesiastical quarrels of the day would fall into insignificance. The supreme authorities of the Roman Catholic Church teach a large scheme of doctrine as infallibly true; and they inculcate it practically on every one of her members, as a most prominent portion of his religious creed. A body of converts forsooth is to enter that Church, in an attitude of

violent rebellion against these authorities, and denouncing this very scheme of doctrine as pernicious and anti-Christian. "O, Liberty!" it has been said, "what tyranny is perpetrated in thy name!" And we may exclaim, in like manner: O, Peace! how rankling is the animosity, how cruel the warfare, how bitter the human sufferings, promoted in thy name by thy most loudly protesting votaries!

No. There is an issue between Dr. Pusey and ourselves, of extreme gravity. Let us aim on both sides, by every appropriate method, in the presence of God, and under a grave sense of responsibility, at rightly apprehending the truth. But in the name of sober common sense, let us not fancy that we can compromise, or ignore, or shirk it, by mechanical plans of ecclesiastical re-organization.

But Dr. Pusey speaks further, of "harmonizing" the Anglican "maximum" with the Roman "minimum." This serves as a text for one of the very best passages in Canon Oakeley's pamphlet. The italics are ours.

"Dr. Pusey has spoken with approval of the dictum of some Italian nobleman, who is reported to have said, that a point of contact for union might be found between the Catholic minimum and Anglican maximum. I hardly think that, if he had a clear idea of a Catholic minimum, he would feel it to be a possible basis of such a union as he could approve. To suppose that a substantial religious compound could be formed out of the weakest elements of Catholic and the strongest of Anglican truth, is to overlook the ethical bearings of doctrine, and to reduce the subject

to the unreal form of a mere question of intellectual assent to certain barren articles of faith. We ought rather to look at the matter in the concrete, and to imagine, if it be possible, the character of a minimum Catholic engrafted on that of a maximum Anglican. My own belief is that the theory would vanish, like the logical riddle of Achilles and the tortoise, under the stern operation of a practical experiment; and that a mere nondescript being would be the product of an attempt to fuse into union such heterogeneous constituents. My idea of the character of a minimum Catholic will be best conveyed by a rough sketch of what I conceive to be its leading features, with allowance for circumstantial varieties which do not affect the essence of the picture. What may be the minimum Catholic of Italy or France I have no better means of determining, than are also at Dr. Pusey's command. But I think I know in what shape this sort of Catholic would come out in England. He is one then, who considers belief to be a burden, not a privilege, and who therefore, believes no more than he can help. In ecclesiastical politics he scarcely rises to the Gallican level. *He has more fellow-feeling with his non-Catholic countrymen than with Catholics, however excellent, of other countries; that is to say, he prefers his country to the Church.* He is, therefore, more sensitive to the rights of the Queen and constitution than of the Pope; not, of course, that he should disregard the former, but that he should especially prize the latter. He dislikes our popular devotions, not only those which relate to the Blessed Virgin, but others also, considering them superfluous and rather sentimental. He wishes priests to be 'men of the world;' not in the sense of being experimentally alive to its delusions, or of meeting it half way in its own line with a view to subduing it, but of copying its ways, mixing indiscriminately with its societies, and entering

with undue zest into its peculiar interests. I half suspect that he is secretly disinclined to clerical celibacy; but upon this subject the feeling is happily too strong to allow of his giving public expression to a sentiment so unpopular. However, he has no scruple about advocating *marriages between Catholics and Protestants,* as tending to break down invidious distinctions. *He prefers mixed to exclusive education;* he sets more store by the social than by the especially supernatural virtues, and is half-inclined to doubt whether the latter have any real existence, except in the pages of saintly biography, or in the exhortations of enthusiastic preachers. He doubts the advantage of Religious Orders, excepting perhaps those of the female sex which attend the hospitals. He abhors the Irish as a dreamy unpractical people, taking little or no account of their faith and piety. He is inclined to think that objective Truth is a chimera, and a dogmatic religion the most indefensible of tyrannies. He considers that religious differences are all capable of being cleared up by mutual explanation; and that, at last, if a man be a good citizen and a good neighbour, his creed is of the less importance, since the poet has said—

'He can't be wrong whose life is in the right.'

"The formal recognition of a low standard of Catholic doctrine as a basis of union, will [would ?] have no other effect, than that of multiplying such sorry specimens of the religious character as I have just described. Is it to effect a result such as this, that Dr. Pusey would employ the latest energies of a life, laboriously and honourably spent in the inculcation and exemplification of principles the very reverse of those on which such a character is founded? And this too, at the moment when he is striving to borrow from Rome

the light and help which may enable him to realize more perfectly the ideal of Catholic loyalty and Catholic sanctity, to which he finds the resources at his command avowedly unequal?" (pp. 54–57).

We may develop Canon Oakeley's argument, somewhat as follows. On what ground do genuine Catholics denounce so sorry a specimen of their religion, as the author has here described? They have no sufficient reason for denying that in strictness he is a Catholic: but they say that he is an unsound and disloyal one; that his views, if not heretical, are unsound and censurable. On what grounds do they base this charge? Because he contents himself with a grudging acceptance, of what the Church has peremptorily laid down as the condition of his being a Catholic at all; because he will not accept on her authority her most formal instructions, which are not actual Definitions of Faith; because he does not regard her practice, as the one authentic interpretation of her Decrees; because he pays no deference to the spirit of her teaching, and to the various unmistakeable expressions of her mind. But all this is the very thing, which Dr. Pusey wishes the Church to legitimize and sanction. He wishes in fact to establish a principle, in virtue of which such a wretched creature as Canon Oakeley has described, should be accounted, rather than any other, the true model of a Catholic.

Such, we are convinced, is no legitimate exhibition of Dr. Pusey's real temper. If we may express our own augury of his future, it would be this. He is mainly retained where he is, by a most misplaced

reverence and affection for the Church of England. The hope of his conversion is precisely proportionate to the hope of his throwing off that reverence and affection. If, by God's grace, he did so, we are confident that he would be disposed, by the very same habit of mind, to feel enthusiastic loyalty towards the Church of Christ. And for this reason, we think he would find himself far more at home with what is called the more "extreme" portion of Catholics, than with those who call *themselves* moderate, and are called by their opponents disloyal.

IX.

We have now encountered two of Dr. Pusey's misconceptions: (1.) His strange notion that permanent Christian Unity could possibly be obtained, through a federation of independent societies; and (2) his impression, that the Roman Catholic Church claims no Infallibility for her practical teaching. A third misconception, as we said, remains. We referred to it at the outset of this article; we have referred to in this "Review" more than once before. To speak of "stipulations" for union at all, is to mistake the fundamental principles of that Roman Catholic Church, with which he desires to be united. That she is exclusively the One Catholic Apostolic Church; that apart from her Communion (except for invincible ignorance) no man can be saved;—this is not merely an essential doctrine of her Faith, but it is the one corner-stone, on which her whole ecclesiastical fabric is built. There are no

Roman Catholic priests in the world, who would dare to receive Dr. Pusey into communion with Rome, until he should profess that he had hitherto lived externally to Christ's Visible Church. Now we are not at all denying (of course not) that a very stable conviction may most reasonably be waited for, in order to so serious a step as change of Communion. Nor again are we denying that with many men (though certainly not with all) the acquirement of such conviction is a gradual, nay (if you will) a very slow, process. All this is beside the question. Until he have acquired this stable conviction that his own Communion is schismatical, no Anglican can be received into the Roman Catholic Church. On the other hand, so soon as he *has* acquired this conviction, he is formally committing mortal sin and meriting Hell, if he delay his firm resolve of unreserved submission. What then can possibly be meant by "negotiation," "terms of union," and the like? He is under an actual obligation,—either of remaining or of moving, —according to his conscientious conviction on a certain doctrinal issue. If he has one given conviction, he formally commits mortal sin by remaining; if he has *not* that one conviction, he *cannot* become a Roman Catholic till he acquires it. But how can that conviction be affected one way or the other—how can it be either accelerated or retarded—by the assent, or otherwise, of Rome to certain concessions and changes of discipline?

Now let us not here be misunderstood. A truly loyal son of the Church might, without any kind of

inconsistency, supplicate ecclesiastical authorities in such language as this:—"Here in England exhibit more sparingly, we pray you, public devotion to Mary;" or again, "veneration of images;" or again, "introduce a far larger amount of vernacular prayers than is now ordinary;" or, "let your translation of Scripture be in more idiomatic English." "So," he might add, "will you remove many a prejudice from our fellow-countrymen; many a misconception on the true nature of our Creed; many a barrier which now closes against them the light of truth." We should not ourselves unite in any such supplication; and we will presently give a few reasons for our dissent from it. But we are on that very account the more forward in admitting, that such a supplication to authority would be in no respect condemned by the particular argument which we are now exhibiting.

What we mean to criticise is this:—It is constantly implied—sometimes expressly said—by Anglican Unionists, that if the Roman Church would but accede to this or that disciplinary change, they would joyfully, as an united body, join her communion; but that otherwise they cannot in conscience bring themselves so to do. We would thus address any one of their number:—You don't of course contemplate the formal commission of mortal sin. So soon therefore as you are really convinced of the Roman claim, you will not delay for a moment your resolve of unreserved submission. Now this Roman claim rests on certain motives of credibility, which have their own intrinsic weight; which deserve—and which (we

cannot doubt) receive—your earnest attention, accompanied with sincere prayer for light. Nor of course can these motives of credibility depend one way or other, in the slightest degree, on Rome's concession, or non-concession, of certain disciplinary proposals. Your statement then comes to this :—(1) You prophesy with absolute confidence, that these motives of credibility will not convince you, unless this concession be made; (2) you prophesy with equal confidence, that if it *is* made, they *will* convince you; nay (3) you prophesy the same thing with equal confidence, in regard to a number of other individuals who are acting with you in concert.* Lastly, and perhaps still more strangely than all the rest, you call this augury or prophesy by the strange name of a "resolve." You *will* forsooth join Rome if she concede; and you will not join her if she do not. We do not of course insult your common sense—or rather deny your sanity—by supposing that you *mean* all which we have just drawn out. Yet there is nothing else which you *can* mean, consistently with the facts of the case. For we do not of course suspect for a moment that you intend with your eyes open to incur damnation, by refusing to fulfil an obligation which you recognize as divinely imposed,—that of submission to Rome,—because she refuses some disciplinary concession which you desire.

You will reply perhaps, that it is this very exclusive-

* [Cardinal Newman says with his usual point: "It seemed an absurdity to my reason, to be converted *in partnership*" (Apologia, p. 219).]

ness of Roman claim, which is the great enemy to Christian Union; that it is this exclusiveness, which you combat and wish to remove. Well then, we understand you. You are a Unionist, just in the sense in which Dr. Cumming and Mr. Spurgeon are Unionists. For they, no less than you, would rejoice to promote Christian Union, by inducing Roman Catholics to apostatize from their Faith.

We have never been able to hear even the suggestion of a reply to this reasoning, except by an appeal to the Council of Florence. The Pope, it is said, in holding that Council, sanctioned that very principle of Corporate Union, which our arguments would call into question altogether. We will consider that Council therefore carefully in [the following Essay].

X.

We must not conclude however, without noticing two points which may be plausibly raised against us by the Unionist party. Firstly then, a member of that party may address to us the following objection:—"You have admitted after all, in this very "article, that truth is not *invariably* to be placed "before peace; you have admitted that this or that "doctrine—even though infallibly sanctioned by the "Church—may yet under peculiar circumstances be "legitimately waived and put into abeyance, for the "sake of Christian harmony. But in admitting this, "you emphatically condemn the course undeviatingly "pursued by you gentlemen of the 'Dublin Review.'

"Let me take e.g. those tenets, which you have so "urgently advocated, (1) on the extent of Infallibility, "and (2) on the Catholic State's legitimate office in "proscribing and punishing religious error. You "will certainly admit that no tenets can tend "more powerfully than these, to inflame differences "and exasperate spirits. Let me grant then for argu-"ment's sake (what in fact I totally deny), that these "tenets are true. Yet have you not been arguing in "this very article, that the Church will often, under "circumstances, forbear from insisting on what she "regards as true, in order that Christian Unity may "be the better promoted? From your own mouths "we judge you, reckless and mischievous firebrands "that you are."

Such an objection may have occurred to many readers. It undoubtedly requires an answer, and we will express our answer with the utmost frankness. But we must first state our own principle somewhat more distinctly. There is a large body of Truths, taught by God to the Apostles, and proposed by the Church as having been thus taught. These constitute the Deposit of Faith; and they are earnestly inculcated by the Church, in all places and under all circumstances. There is further a large body of doctrines infallibly determined by the Church, which are intimately connected indeed with the Deposit, but are no integral part thereof. In regard to any one of the *latter* doctrines, there is a possibility, we admit, that under particular circumstances more harm than good may be done by its prominent exhibition. Let us suppose therefore that

a Catholic is called to account, for bringing forward tenets, which cause public prejudice against the Church. He gives no sufficient answer to the charge, by proving that these tenets are true; or even that the Church has infallibly sanctioned them. He was bound (we admit) also to consider, whether their enforcement at this particular moment were according to the rules of Christian prudence.

Now this very principle is urged against us to our condemnation. But let our readers carefully observe the qualification, with which we have invariably accompanied it. Under particular circumstances, no doubt, the interests of the Church and of the Faith are better promoted, by waiving some indubitable doctrine, than by insisting on it. *But who is to judge on the existence of such circumstances?* We answer emphatically, the Church. The problem involved is so complex and intricate, that no individual can, without the wildest presumption, dream of solving it for himself. It is the Church, enlightened by the Holy Spirit, which alone is competent to point out the true course. We are speaking throughout, as above explained, not on the Dogmata of Faith, but on other doctrines connected with those Dogmata. And just as it is to the Church and Holy See alone that we look, when we desire to know which of these doctrines are infallibly true;—so it is to the Church and Holy See alone that we look, when we desire to know which of these doctrines, *being* infallibly true, should, under particular circumstances, be prominently and urgently enforced.

Here then is our vindication. We have laid earnest

stress on the two tenets, named above by our imaginary opponent. Why have we laid on them such earnest stress? Not through any trust in our own private judgment, but because the Church herself called on us so to do; because in these times a Catholic writer would have disloyally failed in his allegiance, had he acted otherwise. For several years past, the Holy Father has been energetically summoning all Catholics to hold interiorly a certain doctrine on his civil princedom. But this doctrine neither is of faith, nor can possibly be so defined. He has therefore been energetically summoning all Catholics, to hold interiorly a certain doctrine which is not of faith. It is the Pope himself then, "the Vicegerent of Christ," "the Teacher of Christians," who has summoned Catholic writers to vindicate the due authority of those doctrinal Determinations, which are not Definitions of faith. Nor has he been less emphatic, whether by word or action, in denouncing that anti-Catholic principle called "liberty of conscience," which he and his Predecessors have so often condemned under its various shapes. The "Mirari vos"—the recent Encyclical and Syllabus—use expressions quite as strong as any which we have employed; or rather considerably stronger. And here indeed is an inquiry, which we would earnestly press on the attention of those Catholics, who think that our language on the Pope has been "extreme." Can any one statement be named which we have made concerning the Pope, which he has not first made concerning himself? Any attribute or prerogative claimed for him by us, which he has not himself been the first to bring publicly

forward? Any decision of his maintained by us to be infallible, which he has not himself enforced on the Church as uttered by an infallible voice? It has been our one wish, our highest ambition, to follow humbly his authoritative guidance,—not only as to what doctrines we shall *believe*, but also as to what doctrines we shall urgently proclaim and vindicate.

The second objection, above supposed, regards not doctrine but discipline; and it will come rather from a Catholic Unionist, than from an Anglican. "The "Church, you admit,—specially in her dealings with the "East—has made several important disciplinary con- "cessions, in order that those barriers might be more "effectually removed, which would otherwise keep "back the light from its due access to their mind. "Why then are you unwilling that she should do that "in favour of Anglican Unionists, which she has done "on so large a scale in favour of Eastern Schis- "matics?"

Now if ecclesiastical authority were in fact to make any such concessions as are here advocated, we should have no doubt at all that they were expedient. We should hold this confidently, because we are so strongly convinced that, on such a matter, the judgment of authority is immeasurably more trustworthy than our own. But as yet neither has it done so, nor shown the slightest disposition to do it; and we are left perforce to our own private judgment. Now our own private judgment strongly points to the conclusion, that nothing could well be more injurious to Christian Union, than the slightest concession of the

kind. Never was there a broader contrast of character on the face of this earth, than between a Greek Schismatic of the Fifteenth Century, and an Anglican Unionist of the Nineteenth. No men were ever less addicted to private judgment than the former. They received, with most unquestioning belief and veneration, the traditions of their Fathers; the teachings of their Bishops and Priests; the time-honoured observances of their Communion. The Church's main end then was this: that as far as possible every object of their veneration should remain in itself untouched; while they should gradually learn more and more to look up to the Roman See, as to the one earthly authority from which the whole derives its ultimate sanction. To enforce changes therefore in their ritual and practice, would have been to damage that very temper of loyal submission, which was Rome's best security for the permanence of Union.

But if any man ever lived, who exhibits the principle of private judgment in its most naked features and its extremest shape, it is the Anglican Unionist. We are not here speaking at all of Dr. Pusey. On the contrary, his reverence for Anglicanism—greatly as it astounds us—is to our mind one of his most attractive and hopeful characteristics. But, as to the ordinary Unionist, he spends his life in setting ecclesiastical authority at defiance. He despises the tradition of his Fathers; he despises his own Bishops; he despises Rome; and, if he were brought into contact with Greeks, he would (no doubt) despise them equally. He has instituted an agitation for a scheme of Union

hitherto unheard of, and is busy in getting proselytes for this scheme of his own invention. Then consider the ritualistic movement. It is carried on, against the vehement protest of all whom he accounts his spiritual governors; and it must be the means of more and more hardening him, against the very idea of humble and unquestioning submission. Such a man cannot become an endurable Catholic, until he have learned to distrust profoundly his own private judgments and impressions; to seek earnestly for supernatural guidance; to realize the all-important truth, that the Church is commissioned to teach him, and not he to teach the Church. If a large body of men, otherwise minded, obtained unhappily admission among us—the certain result would be violent and relentless conflicts against authority, and the probable ultimate issue some widely-extended apostasy. Now every disciplinary concession even the very slightest, made in favour of such men, does but confirm them in that wild delusion about "negotiations" and "conditions," which (so long as it remains) must utterly incapacitate them for permanent Christian Unity.

XI.

A very few words will sum up our general argument. Since Rome is infallible, union with her cannot be accomplished, except on her own dogmatic basis; i.e. by the method of absolute and unreserved submission to her authority. Those who deny the obligation of

such submission, are contending against God's ordinance, and are the enemies of Gospel Truth. To say that, in opposing these men, we betray indifference to the blessedness of Christian Unity, is simply unmeaning. As well might it be said that S. Athanasius betrayed such indifference, when he laboured to eject Arian bishops; or S. Paul, when he anathematized even an angel from Heaven, who should preach any other Gospel than that already delivered.

[Since the earlier sheets of this volume were printed off, we have remembered F. Knox's truly admirable exposition of the Church's ordinary magisterium. It is contained in his own well-known pamphlet, "When does the Church teach infallibly?"]

"The ordinary and regular mode by which the Church labours to imbue her children with the Faith consists principally in a direct and personal action exerted upon them one by one. To effect this, she possesses in her clergy a numerous and organized band of teachers, through whom she is able to reach and come into contact with each individual member of her flock, and thus to learn and supply the spiritual wants of each. By this means none of her children are left without a pastor whose duty it is to know his sheep personally, to watch over their well-being, and to feed them individually with the pasture of Catholic doctrine. In every parish the Church has established schools for the young, and she fails not to superintend with unceasing care the teaching which is imparted in them. She provides for the ordinary education of her clergy in seminaries specially destined for that object; and while she has always encouraged her children to a

deeper and more scientific pursuit of truth in the universities of which she was the foundress or the foster-mother, she has never ceased to superintend with jealous eye the studies pursued in them, and to banish from them every doctrine and method which was not in perfect harmony with revealed truth. But besides this direct action which the Church exercises upon the flock—her ritual and liturgy, the fasts and festivals as they recur, processions, images, shrines, special devotions public and private, the disciplinary laws which regulate her organization, her monastic and charitable institutions—these and a multitude of other things of like nature, conduce powerfully though indirectly to the same end, since they serve to bring home to the faithful and so to teach them the truths of Faith which they embody, and on which they rest. They are in fact a kind of incarnation of the Faith; and when interpreted by the voice of the living teacher, produce a most powerful and abiding impression on those who live within their influence. This method of imparting the Faith to Christians, partly direct and partly indirect, is what is called in technical language the Church's ordinary magisterium.

"But it may be asked what security have we that this vast body of teachers, none of whom are personally infallible, will transmit the Faith to their disciples in its original purity, and not teach falsehood instead of truth? How does the Church's Infallibility come in here, to guarantee their teaching from all error? The security we seek lies in the position of entire dependence which the inferior clergy occupy towards the Bishops in whose dioceses they live and teach. It is from his Bishop that each one of them receives his mission to teach, according to the Apostle's words, 'How shall they preach unless they are sent?' (Rom. xv. 10.) It is under his Bishop's eye that he teaches; and it is to his Bishop that he is responsible for all he teaches.

No supervision could be imagined more effective and no subordination more complete. Thus the Bishops are the guarantees of the orthodoxy of their clergy's teaching. And with regard to the Bishops themselves we have a double security. First, in the principles of hierarchical subordination; for as the clergy depend on the Bishop, so the Bishop depends on the Pope; and as it is the Bishop's right and duty to silence any of his clergy whose teaching is unsound, so it is the Pope's right and duty to impose silence upon a heretical Bishop, and to take from him the portion of the flock which had been entrusted to him. Secondly, in the certainty which the promised assistance of the Holy Ghost gives us, that the Ecclesia Docens—i.e., the whole Episcopate in union with the Pope,—cannot err in the Faith, nor suffer even a temporary suspension of its teaching functions. What more effectual guarantee can be desired for the practical Infallibility of the body of teachers, through whose agency the Church imbues her children with the faith?"]

THE COUNCIL OF FLORENCE.

Acta Concilii Florentini.

The History of the Council of Florence. Translated from the Russian by BASIL POPOFF. Edited by Rev. J. M. NEALE, D.D. London: Masters.

[April 1866.]

I.

IN [the preceding Essay] we have carefully considered that dream of Corporate Union, in which Dr. Pusey has indulged. Before Dr. Pusey joined the Unionist party, that party had been assailed with similar arguments by the Archbishop, the Bishop of Birmingham, and others; who showed that the scheme is based on principles, which every Catholic must reject as contradicting the very foundation of his Faith. No answer whatever to these arguments—so far as we have observed—has even been attempted by the Unionists. They have contented themselves with appealing to a certain fact of the past, the Council of Florence; and they have challenged an opponent to explain that fact, if he can, in any way consistent with his hearty denunciation of modern Unionism. In our present article we frankly accept that challenge.

We begin with an illustration from the present day.

A pious and able Anglican has trained his sons carefully in his own religion. They have hitherto been regular and steadfast in all Anglican religious practices; have rested content with their position; have looked up to him with confidence as their teacher; and so look up to him still. Why is it that the Roman motives of credibility—intrinsically so strong—have produced on these youths little effect, or rather no effect at all? Because their father's authority, from its very proximity, has eclipsed an object which, though immeasurably greater, is yet very far more distant. But now the father himself is rewarded for his faithful correspondence with grace, by a keen misgiving of his position, and a keen suspicion that the Roman claim is just. He seeks a priest's acquaintance, and makes him the intimate of his home. The priest carefully abstains from unsettling the sons in their bona fides. He abstains from this, because he is devoting all his spare time to their father's case; and he has a moral certainty, that if he convinces their father, their father will convince them. All this is most reasonable. The paternal authority has hitherto hidden from them the Roman motives of credibility; but when these motives, in addition to their intrinsic strength, come recommended to them by that revered and trusted sanction, the result cannot be doubtful. Yet what could be more ludicrous, than to represent so common sense a procedure as being the father's "negotiation" with Rome, on behalf of self and family?

Now this is a true parallel to the circumstances of

Florence. The great mass of Christians, subject to the Greek Emperor, were joined together in strict Unity of belief; and looked up with unquestioning confidence to him, their Bishops, and their Priests. Those strong worldly motives, which had hitherto been so influential in fostering the Schism, were now overborne by an opposite motive still more powerful; and Emperor and Bishops were thus led to entertain the thought of reunion. They expressed therefore their desire of examining whether, by mutual explanations, the ground of difference might be removed. It is no business of ours to defend the Greeks; though in fact their fault lay, not in seeking explanation now, but in not having sought it earlier. But we are here concerned only with the principles, implied throughout by Rome and by the Roman Catholic Church. Nothing could have been more unchristian than the Pope's conduct, had he shown himself indifferent to such overtures. There was everything to make success probable. The one point which—more than all the rest put together—had kept the more pious and intelligent Easterns in schism, had been their obstinate persuasion, that the Westerns ascribed to the Holy Ghost two Principles of Origination.* No Latin theologian ever lived who would not have admitted, that if (per impossibile) Rome had upholden this, she would have lapsed into heresy and fallen from the

* This is distinctly mentioned in the final Decree of Union. "The Greeks declared . . . . that the Latins [had] appeared to them to assert that the Holy Ghost proceeds from Father and Son, as from two principles and two spirations."

Catholic Church. Only he would of course add, that God has bound himself by promise to avert from Rome any such grievous lapse. The Pope therefore well knew that the one consummation, most devoutly to be wished, was the freest interchange of thought between East and West; so that this strange and calamitous misapprehension might be removed. He was also well aware, that with the great body of Photians nothing had so powerfully promoted their separation, as their national recalcitration against Papal Supremacy. And it appeared that this temptation was at the then juncture indefinitely neutralized, by the far more intolerable sacrifice of independence, which threatened them from Turkish domination. The case then was this:—There was great hope that the Greek Delegates, by free intercourse with the Westerns, would come to recognize the obligation of ecclesiastical submission to Rome; there was also great hope, that, if they were convinced, they would persuade their episcopal and sacerdotal brethren; and there was moral certainty, that, if these were persuaded, the whole flock would follow. What can be weaker, than an attempted parallel between such circumstances as these and the position of Anglican Unionists? Not to dwell on other contrasts,—who are those Anglican dignitaries, or who those individuals of any kind, possessing such influence over their brethren's conviction, that the former, on accepting the Truth, can be expected at once, and as a matter of course, to persuade the rest? Undoubtedly, if such influential men did exist, and if they were now pre-

sumably in invincible ignorance of Catholicity, it might be the Church's true policy to concentrate all her efforts on their illumination and conversion. But the very hypothesis supposes a stagnation of religious thought in large masses of men, to which surely no parallel can be found in modern Europe.

However, even if such individuals did exist among Anglicans—though the most extreme Unionist will not gravely maintain that they do — our principle remains absolutely untouched. Nothing whatever, said or done by the Westerns at Ferrara or Florence, can be alleged as giving the slightest support to any such notion, as is required for the defence of Unionism. Nothing, we say, can be alleged, which gives the slightest support to any such notion, as that individuals, convinced of the Roman claim, can delay for one moment their firm resolve of unreserved submission, without formally committing mortal sin. Any of the Eastern Bishops, while the Council lasted, so soon as they respectively accepted the Roman claim and made the corresponding act of faith, became at once Catholics. They were actually engaged in the work (as one may say) of *hypothetical* submission; they were actually engaged in arrangements for again subjecting themselves to the dominion of Rome, *in the event* of their being convinced that her claim is well founded. On making then such an act of faith as above supposed, that hypothetical submission became an actual one. We shall presently see a striking instance of this, in the Patriarch Joseph, who died at Florence.

But the objection may perhaps take a wider range. It may be alleged—indeed it seems often implied by the Unionists—that the question throughout was not one of unreserved submission, but of "negotiations," "conditions," "terms." We maintain in reply, that any such statement indicates a complete misconception of the whole proceedings. We admit of course, that there was much *explanation;* that the Westerns laboured earnestly to remove that fatal misapprehension of Roman Doctrine on the Procession, which kept alive the disastrous Schism. It would have been monstrous indeed, had they not laboured thus earnestly. Suppose an Englishman of the present day to think honestly that Rome, whether in her explicit or her practical teaching, ascribes to Mary an equality with God. If this misapprehension were invincible, he would be under the strictest formal obligation (while it so remains) of keeping aloof from her Communion. In such a case however, the priests with whom he came in contact would of course take all possible pains for the purpose of explanation. Is there any one living so puzzle-headed or so unfair, as thence to infer that such priests waive thereby the Church's claim to unreserved submission? The whole world would of course see that, from their point of view, they are in no way imperilling faith, while fulfilling a peremptory duty of charity.

For similar reasons, the Westerns laboured zealously and successfully to convince the Greek Bishops, that neither the addition of "Filioque" to the Symbol, nor the Doctrine expressed by that addition, was in

any respect contradictory to patristic principles. Then again there were matters of discipline. Universally men are far slower in finding out that this or that duty obliges them, in proportion as the duty is more burdensome and distasteful. Now with a people so peculiarly sluggish and stationary in religious thought as the Eastern Christians, the abandonment of an old and time-honoured practice would be the most distasteful and burdensome prescription in the world. But in the case of other duties, everyone admits the Christian wisdom of removing, as far as possible, every temptation which militates against their fulfilment. Why then should the particular duty of submission to Rome be counted an exception? The Pope acted most wisely therefore, in permitting the continued absence of "Filioque" from every public recitation of the Symbol; in leaving without innovation the Eastern Rite; and in according to the Patriarchs, even to him of Constantinople, their existing places and privileges, so far as consistent with his own divinely given Supremacy.

But if an Unionist or any other controversialist means to say, that the Pope represented such concessions as conditions on which they had a right to insist; —that he shrank from distinctly claiming, for the Church in communion with Rome, her divine authority, as the one Ark of salvation, the one infallible Teacher of Truth;—such an allegation is disproved by the most superficial study of what took place at Ferrara and Florence. Whether one looks at the preliminaries, the deliberations, or the Definition of

the Council, the falsehood of this allegation is equally apparent.

But this is much to understate the fact. That the Church in communion with Rome is infallible;—that all nations of the earth are peremptorily bound to enter her Communion on her own terms;—that the Pope is her divinely appointed centre of union, and is invested by God with a certain Supremacy over all other bishops;—this (as Archbishop Manning has pointed out) is held by Gallican and Ultramontane alike. This is the very foundation, on which every Catholic builds his faith. That this great truth was expressly and prominently testified by the Westerns at Florence, it is the first purpose of our present argument to establish. But more than this is undoubtedly true. It was not the *Church* of Rome only, but the *See* of Rome, for which Infallibility was claimed. The duty held forth as incumbent on all nations, was not simply communion with the Roman Catholic Church, but unreserved submission to the Roman Pontiff. The Western doctrine at Florence—to which the Easterns ultimately gave their full assent—was in no respect Gallican, but purely Ultramontane. Here then are the two theses, which we undertake to establish. Thesis the First: "The Westerns at Florence represented the Roman Catholic Church in no other light, than as constituting exclusively the One Catholic Apostolic Church; as teaching infallibly; as the one Ark of salvation, which all men are commanded by God to enter." Thesis the Second: "The Westerns at Florence represented the Supreme Pontiff in no

other light, than as infallible in all his teaching ex cathedrâ; as invested by God with fullest spiritual Supremacy over all baptized persons; as not limited, in the exercise of that power, by any human authority whatever, whether Bishop or Council; but on the contrary, as himself the one sole source of all ecclesiastical jurisdiction." Of these two Theses, it is the former only which is required for our present argument, and on which therefore it is necessary here to insist. But it is plain that the Second, if established, adds indefinite corroboration to the First. Moreover, we shall need the Second for our future [Essay] on Papal Supremacy. And as of course every portion of the Council's procedure throws much light on every other portion—it seemed far more convenient to consider the Second Thesis also in this place. Indeed,—as the Florentine is remarkable among all Councils for being that one, wherein Catholics and Schismatics met to promote Corporate Reunion;—so also it is remarkable among all for being that one, wherein the assembled Church explicitly and solemnly defined her doctrine on the Pope's Primacy.*

II.

We have said that we include in our general argument the "preliminaries" of the Council. We cannot exhibit our meaning on this head more clearly, than

* [It will be observed of course, that these words were written some years before the Vatican Council.]

by a few extracts from Popoff's work, mentioned at the head of this article. Take, for instance, the following:—

"On receiving from Constantinople the sudden news that the Turks had made several movements hindering the convocation of a Council, the Pope delayed his projected plans, and sent his Nuncio, Antonio Massana, to make some preliminary arrangements as to the place and time of the Council, and the conditions under which the Union might take place. The Emperor received the Nuncio very graciously (Sept. 16, 1422); and had already named the day for treating on the conditions, when of a sudden he was taken to his bed, struck by a fit of apoplexy, and was thus obliged to entrust all State affairs to his son John.

"After much delay, Antonio managed at length to lay the Papal demands first before the Emperor, and then before the Patriarch, in the presence of the other bishops. The Nuncio declared, that the Pope heartily wished for the Union; demanding only that the Emperor should, according to his promise, *receive the doctrine of the Church of Rome, and obey it;* that the Pope is agreeable to a convocation of a Council; but wishes to know when and where it will be convened. In answer to this unexpected demand, a letter was sent from Constantinople, stating that the Emperor gave *no unconditional consent to the Union;* but only promised to convene a Council like unto the seven Œcumenical Councils, and assent to all the decisions of the Fathers, made by them under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost" (pp. 15, 16).

Then next year—

"John, on his return from Hungary, renewed his negotiations with Rome concerning the Council; but

this time the Legates found their former proposition of assembling the Council at Constantinople strenuously opposed by the Pope. The Cardinals, *with strange assurance,* told them that '*the Church of Rome is the mother, the Eastern Church the daughter;* it is not usual for the mother to go to the daughter, but the daughter to go to the mother;' and then demanded the convocation of the Council in Italy" (p. 17).

And lest the Easterns should misunderstand the sense in which he agreed to a Council, Pope Martin V. expressed himself with great frankness.

"The Pope on the other hand, proposing to the Emperor to assemble a Council in Italy, was far from wishing that the causes of disagreement between the Churches should undergo lawful investigation by a Council. This was only *the wish of the Greeks,* to which, as he says himself, *he acceded from condescension*" (p. 185).

"Harassed on all sides, the Emperor was brought to the necessity of acceding to the Papal demands. He forthwith sent an embassy to Rome, with his consent to Martin's proposal" (p. 18).

"The Legates came to Rome only in time to be present at Martin's death-bed (Feb. 20, 1431). He was succeeded by Eugenius IV. (March 3, 1431). In his letter to the Emperor and Patriarch, the new Pope agreed to assemble a Council in Italy, but evinced no great energy in its cause. The Greeks *were very much offended with several of his expressions,* and rather troubled with some demands not mentioned to them by Martin" (p. 19).

Popoff adds, indeed:—

"Very soon the Council of Basle made the Pope

more attentive to the scheme of the Union of Churches, and induced him to lay aside his pride and arrogance while in intercourse with the Emperors of the East" (p. 19.)

But throughout his volume he gives no hint, nor have we found anywhere a hint, of Eugenius giving the Easterns any different impression of the Papal claims. And so, when the Patriarch ultimately arrived at Ferrara—

"The Emperor informed the Patriarch that the Pope expected him to bend his knees before him, and kiss his shoe. *This was a sad blow for the Patriarch,* who little expected such a welcome from his brother in Christ. While at Venice, he said to one in the Pope's confidence: 'If the Pope is older than I am, I will respect him as a father; if my equal in age, I shall look upon him as my brother; if younger, he shall be as a son to me.' In the afternoon six bishops were sent to congratulate Joseph on his arrival, and *demand the usual obeisance to the Pope.* The Patriarch told the Bishops straightforwardly that he could only consent to a brotherly embrace; and, assembling his Bishops, indignantly told them of the Papal demand. The Metropolitan of Trebizond reminded him that he was advised, while in Venice, to think upon the subject carefully; but then his answer was, that the Pope would receive all with honour and respect. The Metropolitan of Heraclea declared that he and the Metropolitan of Monemvasia, when presented to the Pope, did not kiss his shoes, and cared very little for his anger. Meanwhile, the Emperor sent another messenger, saying that he was still disputing with the Pope as to the means of preserving the Patriarch's dignity. Joseph made the following answer to the Bishops sent

a second time to him by the Pope: 'Tell me, why does the Pope appropriate such privileges to himself? What Council, what Church Canon, has confirmed this custom? If the Pope is the successor of the Apostle Peter, we are the successors of the other Apostles. And did the other Apostles kiss Peter's feet? Who has ever heard of this? The Legates answered that the custom was of ancient date, and that Bishops, Kings, the Emperor of Germany, and even the Cardinals, who are higher than the Emperor, remain true to it. But the Patriarch with great decision kept to his former demand of a brotherly welcome from the Pope; promising, in case of refusal, not to land, or let any of his Bishops do so either. At last the Pope acquiesced to Joseph's demand, pretending a sincere desire for peace" (pp. 38, 39).

Eugenius, of course, did not "pretend," but really entertained, "a sincere desire for peace." He refused however to receive the Greek Bishops in public, lest a false impression should be produced, that he waived his claim of Supremacy; or, as Popoff amiably expresses it, "to conceal his forced humility from the people."

Passing from these preliminaries to what took place afterwards—and by way of contrast to what we have just stated—it should be observed, that when peace was concluded and the Easterns had accepted orthodox doctrine, their demeanour to the Pope was most different. "As the other Fathers, the Latin, came to the Supreme Pontiff, kissing the hem of his garment and doing him reverence, *so also did the Greek Fathers.*"* Joseph indeed, the good Patriarch of

* Latin Acts, just before they recite the Decree.

Constantinople,—exhibited by Popoff in so invidious a light—was not on earth to see that day; but it so happens, that he also had had an opportunity of exhibiting a similar change of spirit. The very day before his death he wrote his last testament, which runs thus:—

"Joseph, by God's grace Archbishop of Constantinople, New Rome, and Œcumenical Patriarch. Whereas I have attained the limits of my life, and shall soon have to pay the universal tribute: I do now with God's help announce my opinion to all my children. I do myself confess and agree to everything held and taught by the *Catholic and Apostolic Church of our Lord Jesus Christ, the elder Rome.* I avow the Pope of the elder Rome to be the most blessed Father of Fathers, the Supreme Pontiff, and Vicar of Christ. I certify this before all. I admit the Purgatory of Souls."*

As to what followed Joseph's death, the writer of the Latin Acts, who was present at the Council, gives these particulars; to which we solicit particular attention. "There seemed so many and such great proofs of [the Patriarch's] complete conversion [totalis reductionis],that the Supreme Pontiff, with the approval of the assembly of Latins, *pronounced him admitted to*

* Popoff indeed adds (p. 145) that "there are reasons for doubting the truth of this narrative"; which reasons he proceeds to give. Our general argument is of course unaffected by the question. But both the Greek and Latin Acts contain this testament; and Gibbon and Milman, impartial judges, accept the narrative as genuine.

[I have no such critical power, as would enable me to have an opinion of my own on this question.]

the Church's communion; and he was buried with a great procession of Prelates, all the most reverend Cardinals assisting, &c., &c."*

All this, it will be at once admitted, tells very forcibly for our First Thesis; and is in full accordance, so far as it goes, with our Second. Then there is another circumstance, recorded both in the Greek and Latin Acts, which also bears on our First Thesis.

The Eastern Bishops, whom the Pope had urged to forward matters, "pressed" the Emperor much for the Union; saying this to him among other things: "if Your Majesty (ἡ βασίλειά σου) refuses to be united, we are united [without you]."†

And the Latin writer brings out the implied doctrine somewhat more clearly. "Shortly the report transpired, that several of the Greek Fathers, who had hitherto said nothing, went to the Emperor and Patriarch stating that *since God had manifested to them the Truth,* they intended to follow it."‡ Had these Easterns understood the question to be, whether two independent societies could come to terms of union, the whole of this would have been simply unmeaning. Those who are acquainted ever so superficially with the position held in ecclesiastical affairs by a Greek Emperor, must admit that if he were not brought to terms, Corporate Union could not be thought of. In such an event, these Prelates declare

* Recorded just after the Twenty-second Conference.

† Recorded in the Greek Acts shortly after Bessarion's speech.

‡ Recorded shortly after the Twenty-second Conference.

their intention of providing for their own souls, by personal submission.

III.

Let us next refer more particularly to our Second Thesis; and let us consider the language held by the Western champions concerning Papal Prerogatives, throughout the deliberations. For instance. It was a most vital controversy between West and East, as all our readers are well aware, whether the Church had any right to add "Filioque" to the Constantinopolitan Symbol of Faith. On Nov. 11, 1438, the Bishop of Forli stood forth to vindicate this right. What ground did he take up?

"And since you touch but superficially on the authority of the Roman Church, wishing afterwards to enter on it more profoundly [viz., when the formal discussion of Papal Prerogatives should come before the Council], you imply nevertheless that you deny the power of adding to the Symbol of Faith, even to Œcumenical Councils and the Universal Church; *much more to the Roman Church.* To this we answer, that such liberty and authority cannot be taken away from Œcumenical Councils, or the Universal Church or the Roman Church, either by ourselves or by the Fathers who went before us; *for she possesses it by divine right.*"

Observe he is now going to set forth the special grounds, on which he claims for the Universal Church a power of adding to the Symbol. And his ground is

simply this, that *the Pope* has been invested by God with that power.

We need hardly point out, what is so obvious from the context; viz., that in what follows, "the Roman Church" does not mean "the Church in communion with Rome," but (according to well-known theological usage) "the local Church of Rome, directed by her Bishop."

He proceeds thus:—

"This authority of the Roman Church is demonstratively [evidenter] inferred from S. John's Gospel, when our Saviour committed to Peter *the care of the whole Christian flock*:—'If thou lovest Me, feed My lambs and My sheep.' And this authority is manifestly declared by the Fathers of Constantinople, and of other ancient Councils; and by Athanasius; and by Agatho, in that Letter which was confirmed by an Universal Synod, in which he expressly says that *the Faith of the Roman Church ought to be observed by all Œcumenical Councils and by the Universal Church.* It is declared also by S. Jerome, the excellent disciple of your theologian Gregory. For in the profession of faith which he makes to Pope Damasus he says:—'This is that most blessed Faith, which we have learned in the Catholic Church, which we have always retained, wherein, if perhaps anything has been incautiously laid down, *we seek to be corrected by thee,* who holdest *both the Faith and the See of Peter.* But if this confession of ours be approved by the judgment of thy Apostleship, whoever shall have wished to blame me will prove himself [either] unlearned [imperitum] or [else] ill-intentioned, or [else] *no Catholic, but a heretic.*' Nor is it wonderful, most learned Fathers, that it should be decreed that every judgment con-

cerning the Faith must be brought before the *Chief of the faithful,* the first [in rank] of mortal men . . . . And therefore it is necessary that *by one and the same Prince of the Church should be determined, what is to be held by all as certain and defined of faith.*"*

On the same question, at an earlier period, the Archbishop of Rhodes thus speaks :—

"But [to prove] that the Roman Church has authority thus to develop [ἀναπτύσσειν] [the Creed], for the present we will bring forward one only Greek citation, whereby it shall be shown that *this Throne of Peter* has alone power of developing the Faith; and moreover, that never have the gates of Hell, *that is heresies,* prevailed against it *nor even touched it.* . . This Church, *whose office it is to develop all truths of the Faith,* has accepted this truth [the Holy Ghost's Procession from the Son] [as] being *necessary for men's salvation;* for without this truth, implicitly or explicitly received, it is not possible that men's salvation can be attained [συνεστάναι]. Therefore the Roman Church had both the power and the obligation of doing what she did [viz., adding 'Filioque' to the Symbol]. If therefore, oh Fathers, you will agree with what we have to-day brought forward, there will be no need of further investigation (οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἑτέρων χρεία πραγμάτων); but *shutting up our books,* let us embrace this Truth and be united in the Church of God."†

Nothing can be more legitimate than Orsi's comment on this :—

"These arguments are adduced by the Archbishop

* Latin Acts, Conference 10.

† Greek Acts, towards end of Session 7.

to prove that the See of Peter acting alone, without authority of a General Council, had the power of adding 'Filioque' to the Symbol, and *compelling to its profession all who desired salvation;* and that after this Oracle of the Apostolic See, there is no need of further inquiry, or of consulting other books and authors.'"*

Cardinal Julian rises, immediately after the Archbishop has concluded. He reads Pope Agatho's Letter to the Sixth Œcumenical Council, and draws from it his conclusion.

"I will recite the letter:—'If I [Agatho] should conceal that truth which *I have been commanded to impart to all who need it* by these words—'Feed My sheep,' and 'Thou being converted confirm thy brethren;' *since on us lies the obligation of teaching Christians those things, which appertain to the true Faith . . .'* And a little earlier, 'the whole Catholic Church of Christians and *all Œcumenical Synods faithfully embracing his teaching . . . .'* and the rest. Hence it appears [adds the Cardinal] that so often as any doubt arises concerning the Faith, *the Roman Pontiff* ought and is bound [ὀφείλει καὶ ἐνέχεται] *to clear it up.* And when he teaches, *all Synods and the whole Church should follow this truth.*"

The conclusiveness of such testimonies arises from this; that no other view of doctrine was put forth in the Council by any Western champion from first to last. It is admitted of course, or rather maintained, by Bossuet himself, that the Westerns claimed Infallibility for the Church in communion with Rome. What

* Orsi, de Pontificis irreformabili Judicio, l. i. c. 37, a 2.

we here point out is, that this Infallibility was invariably rested by them, not on the prerogatives of an Œcumenical Council, or of the general Episcopate; but exclusively on the Divine promises made to S. Peter's See. The direct drift of this argument is to fix the sense of that Decree which was finally passed. But for this purpose, what has hitherto been adduced—powerful though it be in itself—is really insignificant, as compared with what is next to follow. Shortly after recounting the Patriarch's death, the Latin Acts proceed thus:—

"And because doubts remained [on the Easterns' mind] concerning the [Pope's] Primacy; and concerning the consecration of our Lord's most Sacred Body; and because the question had remained in suspense, whether it had been lawful for the Roman Church to add to the Symbol; the Latin Fathers presented to the Greeks these schedules [cedulas] . . .

"'We define that the addition 'Filioque' . . . &c. &c.

"'Also that the Body of the Lord . . . &c. &c.

"'Also we define, that the Holy Apostolic See and Roman Pontiff is Successor of Blessed Peter Head of the Apostles, and true Vicegerent [Vicarium] of Christ, and Head of the whole Church, and is the Father and Teacher of all Christians, and possesses a Primacy over the whole world; and that to him, in [the person of] Blessed Peter, there was given by our Lord Jesus Christ full power of feeding, ruling, and guiding the Universal Church; as is also (quemadmodum etiam) contained in the Acts [Gestis] of Œcumenical Councils and the Sacred Canons.

"'Renewing moreover [renovando insuper] the order of the other venerable Patriarchs [as] laid down

by the Canons; so that the Patriarch of Constantinople be second, after the supreme Roman Pope; of Alexandria, third; of Antioch, fourth; and of Jerusalem, fifth: that is to say, their privileges and rights being preserved [salvis].'

"Which schedules having been presented, since the Greeks had as yet heard nothing from our [champions] on these last conclusions, they asked [to do so] . . . and a day was fixed on which two [theologians] were appointed to dispute [on these matters] in the presence of the Supreme Pontiff, the Greek Emperor, and the other Fathers of the Eastern and Western Church."

We are here only concerned with the Primacy. On this, John the Dominican Provincial was the appointed exponent of Western doctrine. He took the above (proposed) Definition as his text, except the "quemadmodum" clause; arguing for it point by point. And we here subjoin a few extracts from his oration. We translate "Vicarius" "Vicegerent"; because the extremely strong significance of the word sometimes almost escapes notice, from its frequent use in controversy.

"These words follow in the schedule:—'And Vicegerent of Jesus Christ.' This portion in itself presents no difficulty . . . *That Peter remained on earth in Christ's place,* is manifest from the Gospels. For Christ founded upon Peter that Church, which had been founded upon Himself; and gave him the keys universally and generally . . . *He excepted no one in the whole world.* From which it follows that *he can bind all, and be bound by none* . . . and since the Roman Pontiff succeeds in the same power, it follows that he is Vicegerent of Christ. For this very purpose indeed holy doctors say that Christ appointed Peter

Prince of the Apostles; viz., that the Church should have [over her] one supreme Vicegerent of Christ, *to whom all the members might recur if haply they disagreed among themselves.* But if there were different heads, the bond of Unity would be broken . . .

"The Universal Church, however it be considered, —*whether assembled* [*in Council*] *or no,*—has the relation of *members* in respect of the Roman Pontiff; and the Roman Pontiff *is always supreme over* them [præponitur], as the Head over the members.

"Then that he is Teacher of the whole Christian Faith, is shown from the synodical letter of Athanasius which he wrote to Pope Felix . . . Since all Christians agree and are required to (debeant) agree in faith, *he is appointed teacher of the undefiled Faith,* because of the privilege granted to Peter . . ."

John then quotes Agatho's letter, at somewhat greater length than Cardinal Julian had done on the earlier occasion.

"'This, the Apostolic Church [of Peter], *never wandered into any portion of error;* the authority of whose [Peter's] sanction, Christ's Catholic Church and *all Universal Synods* have ever embraced . . . This Apostolic Church is the spiritual mother of your Empire, which, through the grace of Almighty God, *has never failed by wandering from the path of Apostolic Truth;* but . . . . *remains unspotted to the end, according to the Saviour's promise.* . . '*Peter,* I have prayed for *thee,* that thy faith fail not; and thou, having been converted, strengthen thy brethren.' Consider that the Lord himself, Whose Faith it is, *Who promised that Peter's faith should not fail,* admonished him to strengthen his brethren: which, as is well known to all, *my Apostolic Predecessors have always strenuously performed.*

"And in this authority [adds the Provincial] three things are manifestly asserted. Firstly, that to feed all the sheep has been entrusted to Peter and his successors. Secondly, *that the Apostolic See has . . . ever remained spotless in faith.* Thirdly, . . . that the words, 'that thy faith fail not,' are [rightly] understood [to have been said by Christ] *concerning the Apostolic See;* [and to imply] that it is [ever] free from heresy, and that the strengthening of all who totter in faith, *appertains to that See and to the Roman Pontiff.*"

This, let our readers observe, was the authoritative explanation, tendered by Latins to Greeks in full Council, of that Definition which was proposed for their acceptance. "The Pope," said the Westerns, "is supreme over all Christians without exception—Patriarchs, Bishops, Priests, and Laymen—either separately or when they are assembled in Council. He is the one authority, to whom all are commanded to resort if they disagree concerning the Faith. Christ prayed efficaciously that the Roman Pontiff's faith should never fail: and hence it follows, that the Roman Church has never been touched by heresy, nor will be unto the end; and that it is the Roman Pontiff's duty to strengthen all others in the Faith."

IV.

And now we come to the actual Decree concerning Pope and Patriarchs, as signed by Pope, Emperor, and Bishops. It will be found to agree almost (but

not quite) word for word, with the schedule originally presented to the Greeks.

"We [Eugenius IV.], with the approbation of this sacred Universal Florentine Council . . . define that the Holy Apostolic See, and the Roman Pontiff, possesses primacy over the entire world; and that the Roman Pontiff himself is Successor of Blessed Peter, Prince of the Apostles; and is Christ's true Vicegerent, and Head of all the Church, and Father and Teacher of all Christians; and that to him, in [the person of] Blessed Peter, has been given, by our Lord Jesus Christ, full power of feeding, ruling, and guiding the Universal Church; as is also contained in the Acts [Gestis] of Œcumenical Councils and in the Sacred Canons. And we renew [renovantes], moreover, the order of the other venerable Patriarchs [as] laid down in the Canons; so that the Patriarch of Constantinople be second after the most holy Roman Pontiff; of Alexandria, third; of Antioch, fourth; and of Jerusalem, fifth; that is to say, all their privileges and rights being preserved [salvis—σωζομένων]."

The other Bishops subscribed the Decree, each naming himself after his See: but Eugenius subscribed at the head, naming himself "Bishop of the Catholic Church." And now let us consider what inferences may legitimately be drawn from this Decree.

In the first place, no one can attempt to deny that it irrefragably establishes *the former* of our two Theses. Gallicans maintain indeed, that the Papal Supremacy, proclaimed by it, is not ecclesiastically absolute*;

* We use the qualification "ecclesiastically," to avoid possible misconception. Of course, in one sense the Pope's Supremacy is not absolute, because it is restrained by God's Law within certain

but limited in its exercise by some human authority. This question we shall immediately proceed to consider. But so much is evident on the surface: the Decree ascribes to the Pope a *certain* divinely given Supremacy over the Universal Church. The Decree decides consequently, that any Society, which yields to the Pope no submission at all, is external to the ecclesiastical organization set up by Christ; or (in other words) is external to the Visible Church. Neither Dr. Pusey nor any other Anglican can accept the Decree, even in that sense for which Bossuet and De Marca contend, without admitting his present position to be one of schism. And the Easterns, in signing it, acknowledged themselves to have been hitherto (materially at least) schismatics and spiritual rebels. All this, we say, is absolutely incontrovertible; and no one (we suppose) has ever thought of denying it.

But we hold it as incapable of any fair doubt, that the Decree establishes our Second Thesis as well as our First; that it is conclusive against Bossuet, as well as against Dr. Pusey. In order to evince this, we must first state the method adopted by the former, that he may elude (what we must call) the one obvious and undeniable sense of most intelligible words.*

limits. But we regard it as *ecclesiastically* absolute; i.e., as controlled in no respect by any ecclesiastical person or body on earth.

* The work from which we quote throughout is the "Défense de la Déclaration, &c." It is extremely doubtful however, whether Bossuet be the real author of that work; which is certainly very unworthy of his illustrious name. [Here again I can have no

The final sentence, above quoted, is of course a disciplinary enactment, not a doctrinal decree. Of the Definition properly so called, the last clause runs thus in the original Latin; both as first proposed to the Greeks, and as finally signed by them :—"Quemadmodum etiam in gestis Œcumenicorum Conciliorum et in Sacris Canonibus continetur." No one would have imagined à priori the slightest difficulty in the interpretation of these words. Christ has given the Pope plenitude of power; "as is contained or expressed [not in this Decree only, but] also in the Acts of Councils and in the Sacred Canons." Nor assuredly is any the slightest philological difficulty introduced by the Greek translation of the above words :—"*καθ' ὃν τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρακτικοῖς τῶν οἰκουμενικῶν συνόδων καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς κανόσι διαλαμβάνεται.*" Bossuet however translates these words (Déf. Cl. Gall. vi. 11) "*according to that method which* is contained, &c." And he understands them to mean, that the Pope's power is ecclesiastically limited as regards various particulars, which have been before now expressed in Councils and in Canons.

opinion of my own, on the authenticity or otherwise of the treatise.]

[I have treated Bossuet's interpretation of the Definition at much greater length, than its extravagance might seem to merit. My reason was that, when I wrote my article, the "Union Review" had just been publishing a series of short papers in defence of that interpretation. But that a writer who could be mistaken for Bossuet should have so lost himself, shows how opportune, or rather necessary, was the Vatican Definition of the Roman Primacy.]

1. Now firstly the original Latin, at all events, utterly refuses any such interpretation. No one ever dreamed in any other case, of translating "quemadmodum" "according to that method which." Even if this unexampled violence were done to language, what can be said about "etiam"? By no imaginable manipulation or perversion, can it be made consistent with the rival theory. This is frankly admitted indeed by the Gallicans, De Marca and Launoy; who suggest accordingly, that the word found its way into the text by some error. Bossuet himself however (ib.), testifies personally to the fact, that the text, as it stands, is that to which the names of Eugenius and the rest are affixed. And De Marca again cannot deny, that S. Antoninus, a contemporary of the Council, quotes the text just as we have it now. Indeed he is actually driven to suggest, that the Greeks were *cheated* into subscription by the Latins. See then the position of these three Gallicans. De Marca and Launoy admit that the text, if genuine, is inconsistent with their tenets; and Bossuet testifies that it *is* genuine.

2. It is *imaginable*, of course, that the Greek text might present on the surface so much discrepancy from the Latin, as to necessitate a certain violence of interpretation. But can any man in his senses allege this in the present case? We believe that any ordinary scholar, who saw the Greek by itself, would at once translate it in substantial accordance with the Latin. And this for two reasons. Firstly, "*καθ' ὃν τρόπον*," we believe, signifies more commonly "quemadmodum" than anything else. Acts xv. 11 is com-

monly appealed to in the controversy; and with very good reason:—"πιστεύομεν σωθῆναι καθ' ὃν τρόπον κακεῖνοι":—"We trust to be saved, even as [quemadmodum] they were saved." Bossuet would translate this, we suppose, "We hope to be saved [not absolutely, but] according to that particular method of salvation which they achieved." Few however would follow him in such a translation, if he attempted it. Then the whole texture of the Florentine clause protests against its Gallican rendering. According to Gallicans, the sense here intended is, that the Pope has "Supreme Power;" confined however within those limits which have been laid down in Councils and Canons. How in the world could men have thought of conveying so simple a thought, in so perplexing a way? "Restrained within those *limits* which *have* been laid down" is expressed "*full* power according to that *method* which *is* contained."

3. Moreover, according to the Ultramontane interpretation, the clause is exactly what was to be expected. Œcumenical Councils are seldom contented with simply defining a doctrine; they ordinarily add, that this doctrine has been held in the Church from the first. In like manner, according to Ultramontanes, the Florentine Council not only defines the Papal Supremacy, but adds that it has been asserted as of Divine institution by Councils and Canons.

4. Further, on the Gallican view, this Decree contradicts itself. The very lowest sense which can be given to the words "full power," is surely "power limited by no other ecclesiastical authority." Accord-

ing to Bossuet then, the Council decides that God has given the Pope a full power, which however is *not* full. Then how very strong a phrase is "Christ's *true Vicegerent.*" Gallicans themselves hold, that the Church is a Society placed by God under one supreme earthly government. He then, who is Christ's true Vicegerent, must be he, and he only, who wields that government in all its plenitude.

5. The Latin Definition is admitted by Bossuet to have emanated from the Council; and he must admit it therefore to be infallible. But the Greek Definition also issued from the Council; and his argument turns on the assumption, that in sense it contradicts the Latin. He must hold therefore, that the Council issued two contradictory infallible Decrees.

6. If so monstrous a hypothesis could be made as that the Latin and Greek Decrees really differ in sense,—then that one would be authoritative (even on the Gallican view) which was confirmed by the Pope. But Bossuet himself tells us, that it is the Latin to which Eugenius subscribed his name.

These arguments are intrinsic to the Decree itself; but we may confirm them from extrinsic sources.

7. It is admitted by Gallicans, that the Greeks at Florence accepted the Roman Catholic doctrine, concerning the Church's indivisible Unity and her Supremacy over all nations. But, as we pointed out a few pages back, throughout the deliberations this Roman Catholic doctrine was presented to them exclusively in its Ultramontane form. If this or that Latin champion persuaded them *at all,* he persuaded them

surely of something which he maintained; not of something which he did *not* maintain. If he persuaded them e.g. that *the Roman Catholic Church* is infallible, he did so by persuading them that *the Holy See* is infallible. For no other seat of Infallibility was advocated at Florence by the Westerns at all.

8. It is worth while also to quote here the Profession of faith on Papal Supremacy, which had been made by the Easterns 150 years earlier, at the Second Council of Lyons (Denz, n. 389). It runs thus, having been put into shape by Pope Clement IV. :—

"The holy Roman Church herself possesses supreme and full Primacy and Princedom over the whole Catholic Church; which she truly and humbly recognizes herself to have received, together with the fulness of power, from the Lord Himself, in [the person of] blessed Peter, the Prince or Head of the Apostles. And as, before other churches, she is bound to defend the truths of faith (fidei veritatem), so if any questions concerning the Faith have arisen, *they should be defined by her judgment.* To which [Church] any one may appeal who has been aggrieved on matters belonging to the ecclesiastical forum; and in all causes relating to ecclesiastical inquiry, reference can be made to her judgment; and to her all churches are subject, their Prelates yield her obedience and reverence. But [this] fulness of power so resides in her, that she admits other churches into a part of her solicitude; many of which, and especially the patriarchal, *the same Roman Church has honoured with divers privileges;* preserving however untouched her own Prerogative, as well in General Councils as in certain other particulars."

Here, it will be observed, there is no qualification,

at all resembling that which Bossuet would insert into the Florentine Decree. And it is not very probable, that Rome would be content with a less full profession from the East in the Fifteenth Century, than she obtained from it in the Thirteenth.

9. We have already pointed out, that the Decree, finally passed, was almost word for word that originally proposed by the Westerns. It is in itself imaginable, no doubt, that the Westerns might have made *concessions* to the East; but here (we see) there is no question of concession, but of the schedule which the Westerns themselves originally prepared. Now it must be remembered, that the controversy concerning Papal power, raised so long afterwards by Bossuet, was at this very time most actively pressed, between Eugenius and the Florentine Westerns on one side, and the schismatical Synod of Basle on the other. It is not very probable, everyone will admit, that the Florentine Westerns should draw up their own schedule in such a form, as to leave an opening for errors which they considered so serious. Moreover, Orsi opportunely reminds us* that we have most unexceptionable evidence what was Eugenius's Doctrine, in the "Assertiones Eugenianorum" at the Congress of Mayence (Diæta Moguntina); which took place less than two years afterwards. Orsi thus quotes them.

"That the Pope is superior to all Christians; and *in such sense to a General Council, that he gives it its power.* That a General Council has not power imme-

* De irreformabili Judicio, l. i. c. 37, a 2.

diately from Christ, but *from Blessed Peter and his Successors.* That the Church's supreme tribunal and supreme judgment on earth *resides with the Pope alone.* That the use of the keys [exercitium clavium] in the fulness of power appertains on earth to the Pope alone, *who can do all things on earth.* That a General Council is *as sterile sand* unless it be *fertilized by the Pope.*"

V.

To these cumulative arguments, two principal replies may be found in Bossuet's work. One of these will be more conveniently considered, somewhat later in our article. The other is based on the various conferences which took place between the Latins and the Greeks, in reference to this very Definition. We will first then give a narrative of these various conferences. We cannot indeed do any justice to the controversy between Bossuet and Orsi, without drawing out this narrative to some considerable length. Yet we hope our readers will forgive us for so far taxing their patience. Nay we even venture to hope that we shall not tax their patience at all; because we shall be led to present them with a very interesting and characteristic scene, in an important drama. Our authority throughout, unless we expressly state to the contrary, are the Greek Acts of the Council, written by Dorotheus of Mytilene, an ardent promoter of the Union.

Our narrative goes back to the Dominican Pro-

vincial's oration, from which we above selected several extracts. Our readers may remember, that we took that speech from the Latin Acts; the Greek Acts merely mentioning its delivery, but giving no particulars whatever of its purport.* A schedule, it will be remembered, had been "placed by the Latins before the Greeks," as the basis of a Definition. The Provincial argued for the contents of this paper on the Primacy, as we have seen; and he was succeeded by Turrecremata, who argued for it on the question of the azyma. No objections to either of these arguments were made by any Eastern Bishop: Mark of Ephesus (who remained to the end obdurate in schism) having apparently been absent. But the Emperor was grievously offended. Indeed, to understand the scene which follows, it must be remembered that the Eastern Bishops were labouring to unite two conditions, somewhat difficult of reconcilement; viz., faithfully to testify the Truth so far as they had accepted it, and at the same time to keep the Emperor in good humour. An Emperor, who writes a history of Julius Cæsar, is a startling exception to all general rules. Nor can it be expected that an ordinary specimen of

* Many controversialists, on both sides, are indefinitely more learned than the present writer. If any of these will show him any mistake into which he may have fallen—whether from ignorance of authorities, or from imperfect study of those which he has consulted,—he will gratefully attend to such criticism. He confesses to a total ignorance of Syropulus's history of the Council. He has taken Popoff as representing those Easterns who were averse to Union; the Greek Acts as representing those favourable to it; and the Latin Acts as representing the Westerns.

the class, and that too in the Fifteenth Century, should be remarkable for speculative or theological acumen. Turrecremata then completed his oration. 'No further discussion is now needed,' said the Pope; 'let the Definition and Union be accomplished.'* 'No further discussion *is* needed,' replied the Emperor; 'I shall go back to Constantinople at once.' 'At least take with you the schedule which we have drawn up,' replied Eugenius, 'and answer us as to its contents.' But the Emperor was unwilling to gratify him even so far as this; nor would he have even taken the schedule, had not the Bishops (as it were) compelled him to do so. 'I have no more to say,' he continued; 'in Florence I can remain no longer.' The Pope suddenly rose and left the Assembly; overcome with grief and disappointment, at this sudden check to his hopes in the very moment of their expected fulfilment.† But he entreated Cardinal Julian Cesarini to do all he could towards changing the Emperor's mind. The Cardinal at once assured the latter that—Union or no Union—provision should be made for his safe return; and that on this head at least, there was no cause for anxiety.

The Easterns now went back with the Emperor to his abode. "We all met there," says Dorotheus, "and examined the Latin demands. We found them five in number, *and all just and good.* Firstly, con-

* When we quote the actual words of Greek or Latin Acts, we use double inverted commas (" "); otherwise we profess to give only the purport of what was said.

† *Ταῦτα ἀκούσας ὁ πάπας ἀναστὰς ἀπῆλθεν, ὡς ἔδειξε, λυπούμενος.*

cerning the Procession of the Holy Ghost; secondly, concerning the unleavened and leavened bread; thirdly, concerning the Pope's Rule; fourthly, concerning the addition [to the Symbol]; and fifthly, concerning Purgatory. And we urged the Emperor . . . . that he would complete the work. But he would not."

The reader will observe, that the schedule drawn up by the Westerns on the Primacy, precisely as it stood, was considered "just and good" by every Eastern Bishop, except Mark of Ephesus.

All this took place on Tuesday June 16, 1439. The Emperor's present mood seems to have brought him back into relations with the said Mark of Ephesus. For the next day he invited a committee of his Bishops to confer with Mark; hoping probably, that he might bring them round by his influence. In vain, however. "Jackdaw remained jackdaw," concludes Dorotheus, and the time was wasted.

The next day (Thursday, June 18), "the Pope sent for the Eastern Church to come to him. And when they came, he commissioned two teachers, and they again held forth concerning his Prerogatives: how that he is Supreme Pontiff, and Peter's Successor, and Vicegerent of Christ, and *judges and directs the Catholic Church as her Teacher and Shepherd.* Then they taught also concerning the Sacred Bread . . . . When they had spoken much of these things, we left the Pope's presence. And after dinner we assembled at the Emperor's abode, and recited to him the whole: for he had not gone with us to the Pope." These dissertations were avowedly delivered, in consequence

of the Emperor's disgust at what had been said by the same two speakers on the former occasion; and it is therefore of considerable moment, to observe what was precisely set forth by John the Provincial this second time. The Latin Acts here again repeat his speech at length.* The Emperor indeed refused even to be present at the explanation, so disgusted did he still remain. But it appears from the Latin Acts, that Cardinal Julian had in the interim waited upon him, and learned from him the particular statements at which he had taken exception. "The most serene Emperor," begins the Provincial, "has desired to have some explanation; and in order that the explanation might be fuller, he has given it in charge to the Archbishop of Nicæa [Bessarion], that he should make objections for us to answer." Now in consequence of what afterwards occurred, the reader must pay particular attention to John's first response. All who look at the speech will be struck throughout with the extreme frankness of his explanations.

"The day before yesterday, in illustrating the particulars stated in that Capitulum [viz. the proposed Definition placed before the Greeks], I adduced testimonies from certain Epistles, which were despatched by the Holy See, and received with great veneration by those Œcumenical Councils. Among which, three Epistles were quoted in particular: that of the Chalcedonian Synod to Pope Leo; an epistle of Pope

* They date it indeed on the 20th instead of the 18th. The matter is of no moment: but in all probability Dorotheus's date is correct; because he chronicles all the events of each successive day, from this time to the completion of the Union.

Hadrian . . . . ; and one of Pope Agatho.* And with regard to those Epistles, it was said [by the Emperor to Cardinal Julian] that those phrases which we quoted from these Epistles seemed words *expressed [vaguely] for the sake of honour;* and such that they did not carry with them so much authority as [certain persons, i.e. the Emperor] could have wished: and that [said persons] could have wished to see *Canons or Capitula of Councils,* from which those things may be inferred which are laid down in the schedule and capitulum [proposed as a definition on] the Primacy. To this objection I thus answer: that those Decretal Epistles, *since they were all Synodical Epistles,* have no less authority than Canons themselves. Nay, *they seem to have greater authority;* because your Paternity well knows that in all Œcumenical Synods in which Definitions of faith have been made, before such Definitions were promulgated, *it was necessary to produce testimonies and Epistles of the Saints,* from which [sources] the Fathers of Councils promulgated their Definitions and Canons: so that that [further act of] the Definitions (id definitionum) was performed *on the strength of those testimonies.* And you know that in the third [Œcumenical] Synod . . . . [Epistles were read from Popes Julius and Felix], and *if these had not been of authority as Canons* [i.e. as rules to guide men's faith], *they would not have been read;* but whereas they were Synodical Epistles [i.e.—as the Editor explains from the immediate context—Epistles sanctioned respectively by local Roman Synods] *they were of greater authority than Canons which were made in [other] Synods,* because the Holy Ghost works in the Roman Church as in other Councils. The Letter

* This little confusion of expression (the mentioning a letter of the Chalcedonian Synod *to* the Pope, as though *despatched* by the Pope) originates with John or the narrator, not with us.

of Pope Agatho was of such great authority . . . that the Sixth Œcumenical Synod *did not dare to add to that Definition which had been made in the Roman Synod . . . . In no way can it be said* that [Pope Agatho's] Epistle *is of less authority than Canons* . . . . Therefore it is to be said that these Decretal Epistles which have been sent concerning such great matters of faith, *contain truth, and contain nothing of falsehood.*"

This then is John's argument. 'Since the Dicta Sanctorum, which I quoted in confirmation of our doctrine, include Synodical Epistles from Popes, they are not to be considered as of less authority than Canons of Councils, but rather of more; since such Synodical Epistles contain the very direction, which the Council is obliged to follow.'

The next question asked by the Emperor was this. "You say that [the Pope] is Father and Teacher and Guide of Christians. We would wish to understand, whether by these words *a certain reverence* is denoted, as that he is first among Patriarchs; . . . . or any *power* is introduced over and above reverence." And the sequel shows, that the Emperor particularly wished to understand, whether he was expected to recognize the Holy See as having any authority over *himself*. John answers with unmistakeable clearness; and we wish we could transcribe the whole of his admirable exposition. We will give a very few specimens.

"This power, which is in Peter and his successors, is called the power of spiritual jurisdiction, being directed to the salvation of all Christian souls. And as regards this power, both clerics and laics are subjected thereto: the laics in those things which concern

the salvation of their soul. For instance, if they have committed sin, it specially appertains to their spiritual Pastor that he should correct and reclaim them, as is evident. And so if they acted against the Faith, *and acted as some Emperors did, who persecuted their Metropolitans,* and it was necessary to resort to the Apostolic See; and in like cases: *since the end* [*pursued by*] *the Apostolic See is the Church's peace, in order that through that peace men might arrive at eternal glory.* . . . .

"Neither does this do any prejudice to the Emperor's [true] power; because this lies in things civil and temporal, the other in things ecclesiastical and spiritual: . . . . and these are the two powers, one of which assists the other. And Leo therefore says:—"Things cannot be secure, unless *those matters which pertain to the knowledge of God are defended at once by the royal and the sacerdotal authority.* And therefore it is said that God made two great lights. And because *the spiritual power is the more noble* . . . . this power is likened to the sun."

The Emperor had next asked whether a power was claimed for the Pope—rather than for the Emperor—to call together Œcumenical Councils. John replies, "assuredly." "Although the Emperors convened Councils, when they possessed government over the whole world [monarchiam mundi]; we say that this was done by the Pope's commission and consent." Lastly the Emperor had inquired on the authority claimed for the Pope over Patriarchs. John replies, that the Church is not built on "three or five Patriarchs, but on Peter." He adds, that originally the Alexandrian and Antioch patriarchates had come

in dignity next after the Roman: still in honour of S. Peter, whose disciple S. Mark founded the Alexandrian See, while Peter had himself once presided at Antioch. In due time however, John proceeds, the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate obtained precedence over both. "The Constantinopolitan Church is also a daughter of the Roman, and honoured with many privileges: nor does the Roman Church wish to disturb her privileges; but, on the contrary, wishes to preserve their privileges both to her and to the other Churches." He explains however, that whereas no Patriarch has authority in another patriarchate, "the Successor of Peter has *over all men* the immediate power of a Superior." Just, he adds, as "Moses was superior over all Jews; but because he could not suffice for them all, *he appointed certain other men* [to assist him]."

Turrecremata followed on the Eucharist. But there is no reason for our entering on this question, and we return therefore to the Greek Acts.

The same day, Thursday, June 18th, the Bishops went back straightway to the Emperor, and reported the proceedings. On the Eucharist we find no more said. As to the Supremacy, his interest seems to have been considerable, and a great impression to have been made on his mind. The whole of that day, all Friday, and all Saturday, were spent by the Bishops and himself over their books; in searching for precedents, and "examining the privileges of the Churches." On Sunday they wrote down their conclusion. They admitted all the Prerogatives claimed for the Pope,

except two: (1) the absolute authority ascribed to him in the matter of assembling Œcumenical Councils; and (2) his power of summoning a Patriarch to Rome in answer to a complaint of injury. "Let the Pope rather send inquisitors into the patriarchate itself," and there do justice to the injured party. On Sunday evening the Emperor took this answer to the Pope, and received next day a very decisive rejoinder. "On Monday, Eugenius sent three Cardinals to the Emperor; and replied that he desires (θέλει) [to have] all the Privileges of his Church; that he desires [personally] to receive appeals; to direct and feed the whole Church of Christ, as *Shepherd of the sheep;* besides this, that he have the authority and power of summoning an Œcumenical Council when necessary; and that *all the Patriarchs should obey his will.*

"The Emperor, on hearing this, gave up hope; and gave no other answer except, 'prepare if you please [at once] for our return [home].'"

This however was June 22nd. On June 24th, the Nativity of St. John Baptist was kept at Florence with unusual solemnity. On the 25th, three of the Eastern Bishops mediated between Pope and Emperor; and the two, having met together, agreed that four Eastern deputies should meet four Western, and discuss the whole question. After this had taken place and was concluded, the Greek Bishops consulted together, and then wrote as follows:—

"Concerning the Pope's rule, we confess that he is Supreme Pontiff; and Steward and Vicegerent and

Vicar (ἐπίτροπον καὶ τοποτηρητὴν καὶ βικάριον) of Christ; the Shepherd and Teacher of all Christians; and that he directs and guides the Church of God: the privileges and rights of the Eastern Patriarchs being preserved (σωζομένων), so that he of Constantinople be second after the Pope; then, he of Alexandria; after him, of Antioch; then, of Jerusalem."

"When we had written this," adds Dorotheus, "we determined to write or do nothing more; but that if this were not received by the Pope, nothing further should take place." They heard at once however, that it had been well received by him. The next day two of them (one being Dorotheus himself) went to the Pope, and said "Behold, our most serene Emperor *has consented to everything your Blessedness wished; and we have all done everything you desired.* And for no other reason did we decline to stand out [further], except for the sake of briefly completing the transaction."* They added a hope, that the Union might be completed on the forthcoming Feast of St. Peter and St. Paul.

Here let us pause for a moment, to look at the Latin account of the theological conference which issued in these results. Cardinal Julian announced it to the Pope and Westerns; and on the Supremacy he spoke thus:—

"The last point of difference was on the Primacy. And this seemed more difficult [than the rest], through human [weakness]; because subjects readily deflect from [obedience to] their head: and in truth, up to

* This last sentence will be afterwards considered.

this time, they have not held just opinions on the power of the Roman Pontiff: . . . And having heard sacred Scriptures and Councils, *the truth was seen by them*—viz., that the Apostolic See and Roman Pontiff is the Successor of Peter. Then by disposition of Divine mercy it came to pass, that the Greeks assented *according to the schedule given in by the Latins.* They then said that we ought to hold some deliberation on the patriarchal Sees—viz., that that of Constantinople should be second."

On Saturday evening then, June 27th, three Bishops came from Eugenius to the Emperor, announcing that the Union was agreed to; that next day all might sign the Decree; and so that the solemnity might take place, as had been desired, on Monday the Feast of the Apostles. On Sunday morning accordingly, Latin and Greek Delegates met in the Church of S. Francis, wrote out the Decree, and brought it to the Emperor. It did not however at all please him. Firstly, he would not consent that the Pope's name should appear without his own. Secondly, the Decree had been so worded as to re-open an old sore. It has been seen that he objected from the first to the Provincial's argument, from the Dicta Sanctorum. "The Saints," he had replied, "might often use some expression, when speaking of a Pope, not in its literal sense, but by a kind of complimentary exaggeration," "Videbantur verba per modum honoris posita;" as his words were quoted by John the Provincial, in order to answer them. And now he repeated the same objection. Dorotheus thus reports the scene. The proposed Decree "contained (διελάμβανε) also [a clause] con-

cerning the Privileges of the Pope: viz., that he should have them, as is determined by Holy Scripture and the Dicta Sanctorum. And neither did this please the Emperor. If any of the Saints,' he said, '*in some letter honours the Pope,* should one [be bound to] accept this [as answering] for [Papal] Privileges?'"

Here arises a historical difficulty. The Latin Acts expressly state, that the final clause of the Definition stood originally just as it now stands. How can it have been then, that the form now brought to the Emperor ran: "quemadmodum definiunt Scripturæ Sacræ et Dicta Sanctorum;" or in some equivalent words? Our argument is not in the least affected one way or other by this difficulty; but we see no way of solving it, except by Orsi's supposition. The Dicta Sanctorum, as we have seen, include, as their most prominent portion, the Synodical Letters of Popes. The Latins were of course therefore much shocked at the Emperor's disparagement of them. And Orsi supposes that they wished to obtain from him a tacit revocation of his error, by introducing "Dicta Sanctorum" into the Decree.

However this may be, there the words stood; and he at once resorted, for the third time, to his old threat. "Let these things be changed," he said, "or to Constantinople I shall at once return." As to his first objection, no difficulty was made. The Pope at once agreed to add in the Decree, after mention of his own name, "by consent of Emperor and Patriarchs"; as in fact it now runs. But on the Dicta Sanctorum, the Pope made a stand. "How can we *better* prove

the Primacy," asked the Cardinals, "than from the Dicta Sanctorum"?* "No," answered the Emperor, "let it be according to the effect of the Canons" (*κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν κανόνων*).

Our readers will have observed all through, that the question does not turn in the slightest degree on expressing any *limitation* of the Pope's Prerogatives; but on the *historical testimony* to those Prerogatives, which shall be stated in the Decree.

So the Feast of the Apostles, on which the Union was to have taken place, passed in suspense and anxiety. Nothing however was done on the matter that day; probably because the Holy Father was occupied in its solemn celebration. On the 30th, the Greek Bishops assembled in the morning, and discussed the state of affairs; some laying the blame on the Latins, and others on their own Emperor. Meanwhile, the Cardinals went again to the latter; and finding him intractable, entreated him at least to take counsel with his Bishops: and this he agreed to do. In the evening therefore, both Cardinals and Greek Bishops assembled in the Emperor's presence. Cardinal Julian entreated the Greeks not to let the Union fall through, for the sake of these Dicta Sanctorum. "Through these Dicta," argued he, "the Symbol of Faith was formed; and the Holy Sacrifice [duly ordered]; and every part of the Canons [enacted]; and without the Dicta Sanctorum, nothing was [ever]

* *Πῶς δυνάμεθα κρειττοτέρως ἔχειν τὴν ἀρχὴν, παρ' ὃ γράφουσιν οἱ ἅγιοι.*

done." The Emperor consulted with his Bishops. This consultation issued in their extemporizing ("σχεδιάσαντες") a Definition, "that the Pope should have his Privileges, according to the Canons, and the Dicta Sanctorum, and the Divine Scripture, and the Acts of Synods." This the Cardinals took back with them to the Pope, and so the day closed.

On Wednesday, July 1st, the Cardinals brought back the Definition, just as it finally stood.* And it was so fortunate as to give the Emperor satisfaction. We can find no reason assigned, for the rejection of the draft extemporized by the Easterns; but we think it not difficult to guess. The Pope would undoubtedly object to the *order* in which the Greeks had placed their respective "loci theologici." Scripture, if mentioned at all, should be mentioned first: this however, no doubt, the Greeks would have conceded. The real difficulty would be, the "Canons" being mentioned before the "Dicta Sanctorum." It is obvious that the Pope would prefer the total omission of these latter, to that disparagement of them, which was involved in placing them after the "Canons." And it was probably felt to be a very hazardous experiment, troubling the Emperor further on the matter.

On Thursday, July 2nd, six of each party met, wrote out the Decree, and brought it to the Emperor. Then

* According to the Greek Acts, the Cardinals said, "The Holy Father has accepted two schedules, and commissioned us to choose one of them." Which was the other, and why this was preferred, —so far as we have observed—does not appear.

rose the last contention; and this time on the Latin side. The Easterns had earnestly pressed for an explicit preservation of Patriarchal rights and privileges; but the word "all" had crept in, by some mistake of transcription. The Westerns were not unnaturally disturbed, at what might appear foul play; and the signature was thus deferred over Thursday and Friday. But the Pope no doubt (though this is not stated) overruled their objection. On Saturday the Decree was written, and on Sunday signed. Finally, on Monday, the Octave day of the Apostles, the Pope celebrated high mass, surrounded by Easterns and Westerns; the Decree of Union was solemnly read in both languages; and Eugenius IV. called on "heaven and earth to rejoice," because "the wall was" at length "broken down, which had" so long "separated the Western and Eastern Churches."

VI.

We have given this narrative at much length, in order that our readers may fully understand the controversy raised on it between Bossuet and Orsi. Nor have we knowingly omitted any one particular, on which controversialists of any school would desire to insist. Bossuet maintains that the Pope indeed originally put forth Ultramontane pretensions, and wished to embody them in the Decree: but that, in consequence of the Eastern resistance, he abandoned all attempt to do so. Orsi denies that there is the slightest

trace of any such abandonment. And we certainly consider that he has triumphantly proved his point.

Bossuet's argument is twofold. First he dwells on the Eastern declaration, put forth on June 26th, that they admitted the Papal Prerogatives, patriarchal privileges "*being preserved*" (σωζομένων). Here, argues Bossuet, is a distinct protest on their part, against any theory of the Pope's ecclesiastically absolute and unlimited power. Now the expression does, or does not, involve such a protest, according to the sense you give it. So far as the words go, they *may* mean, no doubt, "patriarchal privileges being exempted *by God's appointment* from the fulness of Papal power." But they may quite as naturally bear a sense altogether different: viz., "the patriarchal privileges being preserved however, *by Papal sanction*." Our readers will remember how distinctly the Provincial had protested against any suspicion, that the Pope had any wish whatever to disturb those privileges; and the Emperor would very naturally wish to obtain some definite promise of such non-interference. The question then is, which of these two interpretations is correct: the former interpretation given by Bossuet, or the latter given by Orsi. We say, the latter; and we give three reasons for our opinion.

In the first place, it is absolutely impossible for the Easterns to have thought that the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate—which however they distinctly mention—had received its privileges immediately from God. They themselves always rested those privileges on the secular pre-eminence of Constantinople; and

even could they otherwise have been ignorant of notorious facts, the Provincial had recently reminded them, that the privileges claimed for that Patriarchate had been quite of modern date. In the second place, refer to Cardinal Julian's account of that interview between the Latin and Greek Delegates, which led to the latter drawing up this formula. He says, that *after the Greeks had fully assented to the Papal claims,* "they said we ought to hold some deliberation on the Patriarchal Sees; viz., that that of Constantinople should be second." They did not consider then the patriarchal privileges as *limiting* the Pope's divinely given Power; but, on the contrary, as a matter to be separately discussed, after they had fully admitted that power. In the third place, look at the final Decree: "We, Eugenius IV., with approbation of this holy Council, *define,* &c. *renewing* the order, laid down in the Canons, of the other venerable Patriarchs . . . . all their privileges and rights being preserved." No words can possibly be plainer than these, in declaring that the patriarchal privileges issue, not from Divine Law, but from Papal concession. And yet the Greeks never objected to these words from first to last.

It may be argued indeed on Bossuet's side, that when the Eastern Bishops had drawn up the above resolution, they "determined," as Dorotheus tells us, "that if this were not accepted by the Pope, nothing more should be done." For this language may be represented as meaning, that they had gone as near to the Pope's wishes as they could in conscience, and that they would admit nothing further.

But here again the words in themselves *may* have quite a different signification. They may merely signify: "We have stated in our own way the full Doctrine for which the West contends; and if this does not satisfy the Pope, no more can be done." Here then is the issue. Did they mean to say "we *have*," or "we have *not*," accepted the full Papal Doctrine proposed to us? And, as it happens, we have evidence absolutely irresistible for the former alternative. Two Easterns—one the very writer of the Acts—went next day to the Pope on the matter Did they tell him that they had gone as near to his wishes as they possibly could? Did they beg him to be satisfied, with something less than he had demanded? On the contrary: "The Emperor," they said, "has acquiesced in everything which you sought; and we have all of us done all that you desired." And the Pope, in reply, neither on the one hand consented, nor on the other hand refused, to make some concession. He spoke just as any one would speak, of whom no concession was even asked. "I thank you for your zeal in the matter; and hope, with you, that the Union may take place on the Feast of the Apostles."

As to Bossuet's first argument then, we must maintain that it is demonstratively confuted. Secondly, he dwells on the curious scene about the Dicta Sanctorum; and strangely misconceives its purport. He considers that the Greeks were here pressing on the Latins some limit to Papal authority. We have already shown (under Orsi's guidance) the true character of that scene. But Bossuet's whole theory

on this head is completely overthrown by one simple fact. The "quemadmodum" clause—whether worded this way or that way—whether to be understood in this way or that way—*was not originated by the Greeks at all.* It was both introduced and supported exclusively by the Latins.

In truth, it seems to us that far more controversial capital may plausibly be made out of these final conferences by an Anglican Unionist, than by a Gallican. He may argue in some such way as this: "Even up to the time of signing the Decree, the Greeks were never fully penetrated with the Doctrine, that the Church in communion with Rome is the One Catholic Church. For from that Doctrine it would of course have necessarily followed, that they were under the immediate obligation of entering the Roman Communion, whether the Pope did or did not make concessions to Patriarchs or Emperor. Whereas they continued to the end stipulating for such concessions, as a requisite for Union."

We reply firstly, that the only relevant question concerns the Pope's conduct. And it is on his conduct, indeed, that the Union "Reviewer" (September, 1865, p. 569) rests his general argument. Undoubtedly, according to the Roman Catholic Creed, it was Eugenius's clear duty to receive no one into his Communion, who did not expressly recognize that that Communion is the One Catholic Church. But no one could possibly sign the Florentine Decree, without making that express recognition; nor can any one doubt that all who signed it believed this doctrine in

their heart. All which can be objected is, that some of them did not *realize* it, whether in itself or in its consequences. Now, as a Catholic writer has truly observed, almost all non-Catholics before their conversion (and he might have added converts some little time after it) are more or less misty and confused in their theology. It is by their admission into the Church, that such mistiness is gradually removed.

There is one circumstance indeed in the above narrative, which on the surface presents difficulty. For on June 26th, the two Eastern Delegates, who went to the Pope, told him that they had waived further resistance to the Decree, from their great desire of Union (see p. 269). This then might at first sight be taken as implying, that they did not fully hold what they were about to subscribe. The difficulty however is most easily removed. The two points they now waived were these. (1.) They had claimed that the Pope should never assemble an Œcumenical Council, without seeking the assent of the Emperor and Patriarchs; though the refusal of these to come was not to prevent the Council from being held.* (2.) They had claimed that no Patriarch should be summoned to Rome for judgment; but that the Pope should send inquisitors to the patriarchate. Now no one can

* We have given what seems the meaning of the Greek, which is not however extremely intelligible. It runs thus:—"*ἵνα μὴ συναθροίζῃ σύνοδον οἰκουμενικὴν ἄνευ τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ τῶν πατριαρχῶν. εἰ δὲ μηνυθῶσι καὶ οὐκ ἔλθωσιν, ἵνα μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἀπομείνῃ ἡ σύνοδος.*" We take the word "*ἀπομείνῃ*" to mean, "should not remain in abeyance," "should not wait for them."

possibly say, that these claims constituted any doctrinal statement. The Easterns had urged certain disciplinary concessions; the Pope had refused them. And the two now tell the Pope, that they waive all further argument for these concessions, in their desire to get home again. What could Eugenius do, other than he did? He thanked them for their zeal; and promised that the Union should take place as soon as possible.

There is every reason to suppose that in this, as in all similar instances, there was a certain proportion of Bishops, who were clear-headed in grasping whatever doctrine they speculatively accepted; but that the majority did *not* possess this quality. On one side Mark of Ephesus; on the other side those three Bishops, who told the Emperor that they would unite even without him;—were such clear-headed men: and there were probably several others. But clear-headed or puzzle-headed, there can be no possible doubt that, after the Provincial's first oration, all the Easterns present, except the Emperor, accepted vaguely and generally the Pope's divinely-given Supremacy, and the obligation consequently incumbent on them of submitting to his authority. That confidence in their own theology, with which they had started, had been rudely and utterly overthrown, by their prostrating discomfiture in the discussions on the Procession and on the addition to the Symbol. And they were now accordingly very much disposed to accept all Roman Doctrine. Then came the Provincial's *second* speech; then the three days of busy investigation over their books; and lastly Cardinal Julian's arguments, urged

in more private conference. How is it possible to doubt, that during the whole of this time the definiteness and depth of their conviction was constantly on the increase?

That the Emperor was far more misty in his views than anyone else, was only to be expected. If Emperors choose to assume spiritual authority, they must pay the penalty by making fools of themselves. But even he cannot have been so thick as to doubt that, in signing the Decree, he admitted a command to have been imposed on him by Christ, of submitting in spirituals to the Papal authority. And this was all on which the Pope was obliged to insist.

VII.

We are now to consider other objections which have been derived from the Florentine Council; whether against our Second Thesis by Gallicans, or against both our Theses by Anglican Unionists. And first, a difficulty has been suggested in behalf of the Unionists by a Catholic writer, which we do not think he has himself satisfactorily solved: "How is it, if the Greeks were held to be schismatics, that they were placed so honourably in the Assembly, and counted as an integral portion of an Œcumenical Council?" He replies, because they were not held to be formal schismatics; and he adds, that they were never required to consider themselves as having been such. But we cannot admit this solution as satisfactory. A schis-

matic is formally such, when his ignorance is not invincible. But to judge of this or that man that his ignorance is or is not invincible,—is a pretension, which not only the Church has never made, but which she has always expressly disclaimed. Her official demeanour towards schismatics then could never be affected, by the invincibleness, or otherwise, of their ignorance.

But let us consider what was the Ecclesiastical Society, whose chief rulers and representatives were assembled at Ferrara and Florence. She was the lineal descendant of that illustrious Eastern Church—the inheritor without rival of those august patriarchates—which had taken so prominent and so glorious a part in the Church's history. She possessed true Sacraments and a true Priesthood. She imparted Christ's Body and Blood with real spiritual fruit, to those among her people who were invincibly ignorant of the Pope's Prerogatives, and were otherwise free from mortal sin. She had preserved orthodox doctrine, in almost every particular, pure and undefiled. And now (as appeared) she was animated by an eager wish, of once more submitting herself to "Christ's true Vicegerent." No demeanour towards such body would be too deferential, too affectionate, so long as the great doctrines of Ecclesiastical Unity and Papal Supremacy were neither compromised nor obscured. It would have been truly strange then, had they been treated with less signal demonstrations of honour and of welcome, than were in fact exhibited. Moreover, the distinguished places assigned to them in the Assembly no more proved

that the Pope considered them true members of the Council,—than the still more distinguished place, assigned to the Emperor, establishes a similar conclusion in respect to *him*.

However, the Unionists may fairly expect a plain answer to the plain question; whether, according to Roman doctrine, we can consider the Greek Bishops as having formed an integral portion of the Council. We are not aware that any of our theologians have distinctly treated this question; but we will submit that answer which commends itself to our best judgment, as accordant with Catholic principles. And first, it is certain from those principles, that the Council was Œcumenical—not because the Greeks were present,—but on grounds altogether different. "Œcumenical Councils," says Benedict XIV.,* "are those to which the Bishops of the whole world are called,—who may, and [indeed] ought to be present thereat, unless legitimately hindered,—and over which the Roman Pontiff presides either himself or by his Legates:"—where, of course, by the word, "Bishops," he means "Bishops in communion with Rome." Further, it seems equally certain on Catholic principles, that the Greeks were not (at first) members of the Council, in the *strictest sense of that word*.† For to be members thereof in the strictest sense would imply, that they sat in the Council as *true judges of doctrine;* and this neither Ultramontane nor Gallican can possibly admit. On the other hand, we may

* Quoted by Dr. Murray, de Ecclesiâ, vol. iii. p. 182.

† See Dr. Murray, pp. 155, 156.

suppose a Greek Bishop to arrive at a firm conviction, that the Church in communion with Rome is the Catholic Church, and that the Doctrine taught by her is therefore divine. We have seen this, even before the final conferences, in the case of Joseph the Patriarch; and also of the three, who professed their resolution of uniting though without the Emperor. We conceive that, from the moment when they thus believed with divine faith, they became true Catholic Bishops and members of the Council in the strictest sense. Consequently, when the Decree was signed, every Bishop at Florence, except only Mark of Ephesus, was a Catholic Bishop.

The question then, asked by Unionists, resolves itself into this. What precise position did the Eastern Bishops hold, in a Roman Catholic's view, during the earlier sessions and debates? If a Roman Catholic cannot regard them as having then been in a strict sense Catholics,—he must be much further nevertheless from regarding them as having then been in any strict sense (even materially) schismatics. Let us suppose in our own times that some baptized Protestant spoke thus to a Catholic Bishop: "I confidently expect that, through joint examination and by mutual explanations, I shall be able to unite with you on the basis of religious truth: there is nothing which I so ardently desire as this, and I shall account no pains too great for its achievement." All Roman Catholics, we think, would say that such a man, supposing him of course to be really so minded, is much further from being (even materially) a schismatic, than from being

a Catholic; that he has advanced, as it were, three-quarters of the way from schism to Unity. Now this was the spirit in which the Greeks professedly came to Ferrara. Nothing was further from their mind, than the Unionist and Indifferentist habit of compromising essential differences for the sake of Unity. The research of *truth* was to be the one means of bringing about the contemplated Union. This is abundantly evinced in the speech, addressed by Bessarion to the Council at the opening of its public sessions. We will give two extracts, taken from the Greek Acts; but the Latin are in close agreement.

"For we have come together on both sides with the same aim and eager desire: *leaving no room for anxiety as to whether we conquer or are conquered;* for such anxiety would not be suitable to Christ's disciples and sober-minded men, but rather to such as are contentious and self-indulgent. *We desire only to find the Truth:* in company with Truth, we welcome defeat; apart from Truth, we reject victory. So that it is now urgently important that Truth shall be publicly proclaimed, and shall overcome those things which vainly impede it, and shall dwell in the souls of all"

. . . .

"Oh Holy Ghost, the Fountain of spiritual gifts, the Spirit of wisdom, the Spirit of understanding, the Spirit of God's fear, *concerning Whom,* and with Whose aid, the coming contest between the Churches is [to be] carried on, banish from us every proud thought; infuse the fear of God into the minds of us all; bestow on us prudence and wisdom; and [presiding over] that contest which is carried on *concerning Thyself, make manifest the Truth to all,* as being and being called *the Spirit of Truth.*"

We wish we had room to translate a far larger part of this most beautiful oration: but the above will suffice to illustrate our statement. The view then, reasonably taken by a Roman Catholic of these Easterns, would, we think, be such as this. Here was a number of Bishops, professing, and with every appearance of sincerity, a desire profoundly Catholic; a desire most extremely removed from the schismatical temper; a desire of cementing unity by submission to Truth. By the Pope's urgent invitation, they attended an Œcumenical Council, which was summoned for the express purpose of receiving and conferring with them. They debated in that Council with most perfect freedom, under the Pope's Presidency; and were brought by every debate nearer to Apostolic Doctrine. "They have come joyfully," says Eugenius in his Decree of Union, "*to this sacred Œcumenical Council,* from a desire of most sacred Union . . . Latins and Greeks, meeting together *in this sacred and holy Œcumenical Council,* have used great zeal and mutual argument, in order that" Truth "should be discussed with the greatest possible care and with assiduous inquiry." In every sense then except the very strictest, they were members of the Council. In that very strictest sense, they were *not;* because no Roman Catholic can admit, that they sat there as divinely appointed judges of doctrine. And indeed—as we have already pointed out—it was not until the Patriarch Joseph had given "so many and such great proofs of his complete conversion," that the Latins accounted him to be in "the Church's Communion."

It will be objected, that the Eastern Bishops considered *themselves* to be members of the Council in quite as strict a sense as the Latins were; and that the Pope took no means to disabuse them of that impression. We thoroughly admit this, and see no difficulty whatever in the admission. As we have urged in [the preceding Essay], the Church lies under two divergent obligations. It is her indispensable duty to maintain inflexibly the Deposit of Faith. But she is also bound to labour earnestly, in drawing the greatest possible multitude into the fold of Unity and Truth. And she must so therefore pursue the former end, as least to interfere with the latter. It is precisely because of these two divergent obligations, that she incurs reproaches so violently inconsistent with each other; that she is stigmatized at one moment as narrow and bigoted, and the next moment as supple and insincere. Now what injury to truth can one even imagine as having resulted, from the prudent economy which she exercised towards the Greeks? Let us suppose that she had acted otherwise; that she had refused even to parley with them on equal terms; that she had required them at starting, by the very ceremonial of the Council, to confess themselves external to the Catholic Church. Of course all hope of Union would have been nipped in the bud; and there was every reason to expect that, by her so acting, unspeakable injury would be inflicted on millions of souls as yet unborn. The course they pursued was above all things in accordance with Christian charity. Who can mention one single

particular, whereon it was injurious to Christian faith ?*

VIII.

We now proceed to a passage in the Greek Acts, on which Bossuet lays emphatic stress, and which we are greatly surprised not to have seen brought forward by some Anglican Unionist. For—though the argument founded on it, in Bossuet's mouth, is simply suicidal—in the mouth of an Anglican Unionist, it would be most cogent. Lord Macaulay speaks somewhere of an author, who has used two kinds of controversial artillery: one kind consists of pieces which will not go off at all; the other of pieces which go off with a vengeance, since they recoil with fatal effect on him who employs them. Bossuet, in his whole treatment of the Florentine Council, reminds us of this criticism. The words which we are about to

* [Some paragraphs here followed in the original article, on a statement ascribed to Eugenius IV. in the Greek Acts, that he "heartily desired to unite the Church of God." I argued that there was in truth no proof whatever of the Pope having used this precise expression. At a later period however, Mr. Ffoulkes cited very similar words, which were undoubtedly uttered by Clement IV. and Gregory X. respectively. In April 1869 (pp. 292–296) I adduced passages from the two identical Letters of those Popes which Mr. Ffoulkes had quoted: passages which show to demonstration, that neither Clement IV. nor Gregory X. can by possibility have meant what Mr. Ffoulkes supposes. I have also there given what seems to me the one obvious and unforced interpretation of their language.]

quote, and on which he lays the greatest stress, would undoubtedly (if his view of them were correct) overthrow Ultramontanism altogether; there being only this attendant disadvantage, that they would quite as crushingly prostrate Gallicanism by the same shock. The following narrative then is contained in the Greek Acts (after Session 25):—On Easter Friday the Emperor conferred with his Bishops, and resolved on a message to the Pope that they would debate no more. 'The Latins,' they said in effect, 'have always plenty of replies, and there is no end of it. If there is any other path to Union, let us hear of such a path. As to our doctrines, they have been received from the tradition of our Fathers, and we are contented with them.' This message, no doubt, was really the Emperor's; who (as we have already seen) was throughout far more averse to Union, than was the body of his Bishops. And indeed what immediately followed shows, how little the message can be taken as representing *their* opinions. It is not however on this message that Bossuet's argument turns, but on the Pope's reply. This was brought back by the two Bishops who had carried him the message; and it is reported as follows. We put into italics the part on which Bossuet relies.

"For my part, as you see yourselves, I have zealously laboured for this work of the Union of the Churches, and still I neglect nothing [I can do]. But you from the beginning have been careless and dilatory; nay (what is worse) you do not even come together for disputation, as we had on both sides agreed to do.

However, I propose this to the most serene Emperor, and to my brother the Patriarch, and to the whole Eastern Church. There are four things desired at your hands. First, if you are contented with that most clear and distinct proof which we have exhibited from the Scriptures, that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, well. But if not, tell us wherein you doubt, and why you do not receive this Doctrine; in order that we may remedy the defect, and establish evidently and distinctly that His Procession is really from the Son. Secondly, if you have authorities from the Holy Scriptures speaking in an opposite sense, that you will show them to us. Thirdly, if you have strong passages of the Scriptures, establishing that what you hold is better and more pious than our Doctrine, [adduce them]. Fourthly, if you will do none of these things, let there be a meeting; let the priest say mass; let us swear, Latins alike and Greeks, and let the truth be openly spoken under sanction of an oath: and *whatever shall appear good to the majority* (*τοῖς πλείοσι*), *let this be accepted among you and among us.* For an oath among Christians is not deceitfully sworn."

We will add what immediately follows in the Acts: firstly, as throwing light on the Eastern state of mind; and secondly, as enabling us the better to appreciate Bossuet's argument.

"When we heard this answer brought back by those who had been sent, we looked into each other's faces; and finding the whole incontrovertible, we said: 'We have nothing to answer. As to the first, there are Saints who say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son. What possible doubt of this can we allege? As to the second, are there any Saints who contradict those who say this? We cannot profess

that Saints contradict each other. As to the third, how can we establish that our Doctrine is better and more pious than that of the Latins? For ours indeed is pious, as having been handed down by our Fathers; but their Doctrine again is not less pious, for there are holy Fathers who say this also. As to the fourth,—that we should swear by Christ's Precious Body and Blood—what other Synod ever did this, that we should do it? Neither does this admit of any reply.' "

Then Dorotheus himself urged immediate Union, on the Pope's terms; "and no one spoke against him nor answered." The Emperor however sent back a second message to the Pope, resembling the former in its purport.

Now then for Bossuet's argument. "See," he says in effect, "the Pope himself admits, that not on the Pope himself, but on the Council's vote by a majority, depends the Church's infallible judgment." Nothing, as we have said at starting, can be more suicidal than this, as coming from Bossuet. For (1) as Orsi conclusively replies, the doctrine in question—the Holy Ghost's Procession from the Son—had already been defined by a Council, admitted by Bossuet himself to be Œcumenical; the Second Council of Lyons. If Eugenius then had really meant that the question was still an open one,—that it was still dependent for its determination on a Florentine majority,—he would have denied, not merely the Infallibility of Popes, but quite as emphatically that of Œcumenical Councils. Moreover (2) on such a supposition, he must have intended to say that a body of Bishops, external to the

Roman Communion altogether, sat in a Council as true judges of doctrine: a notion, which Bossuet himself would have regarded as simply and fundamentally heretical.

But this very circumstance, which makes the argument so monstrous as coming from Bossuet, adapts it singularly to the purposes of an Anglican Unionist. Nor indeed do we see any possible answer available to a Roman Catholic—whether he follow Bossuet or Bellarmine in his theological views—except one which we trust convincingly to make good. We maintain that the Pope never used these particular words at all.

Various Catholic writers have dwelt on the circumstance, how little trust can be reposed in any isolated quotation of words which the Acts may contain, where such statement rests on no *documentary evidence* accessible to the writer. If ever there were such a quotation, it is this. Two Bishops received from the Pope a verbal message; they reported that message verbally to their brethren; and Dorotheus wrote down his own remembrance of its purport. The quotation again is emphatically individual and isolated. Throughout the whole Council (we believe) there was never the slightest mention, either before or after this date, of the very idea, that a final decision could be obtained by majority of votes. The Greeks perhaps, before arriving at Ferrara, had expected some such rule of action;* but it was never mentioned in the Council

* Just before the First Session there is this passage in the

itself. The *disputations* undoubtedly took place at public sessions of the Council. But the mode universally adopted for arriving at a *decision* was, that some draft was drawn up separately by the Latins, and proposed separately to the Greeks for their acceptance. A very few days after the scene which we have reported, Cardinal Julian attended on the Emperor, to urge orally the Pope's proposal.* The Emperor made the very same objection as before. The Cardinal urged one thing, and one thing alone; viz., that the disputations should continue. "It is *necessary,*" he said, "that the disputations continue, until the truth shall be discovered; but *it is not possible* to find any other method of Union." The method of Union then, through majority of votes, was quite unknown to him.

We have no means in this particular case of correcting the Greek by the Latin Acts, because the latter are wholly silent (as is very natural) on a private communication between the Pope and the Easterns. But the Greek narrative is on the surface very suspicious on four different grounds. Firstly, Eugenius begins his speech (as was of course to be expected) by expressing unbounded confidence in the Catholic Dogma of the Procession; but he ends it by declaring

Greek Acts :—" We, dreading the vote and judgment *of the majority*, feared lest the majority of votes should prevail against us, according to the law of voting; but this [difficulty also] was resolved by" the Latins. We do not profess to understand these last words.

* Reported in the Greek Acts, shortly after Bessarion's long speech to his countrymen in behalf of Union.

his readiness to abandon that Dogma, if he is outvoted. Secondly, he speaks throughout of *Scripture* as being the one standard, to which the disputations had appealed: whereas the most cursory perusal of these disputations will show that, though the Scripture question was no doubt carefully treated, yet the main stress of the argument rested on *the Fathers.* In fact, when the disputations were renewed in a more private shape, the Delegates at once began, not with a text of Scripture, but with a passage of S. Maximus. Then thirdly, whereas the Pope's speech, as reported, represents the controversy as having turned wholly on Scripture,—the Bishops in reply, as *they* are reported, speak as though it had turned wholly on the Fathers. This will be evident to any one who reads the passages which we quoted above. And lastly, the fourth alternative reported as coming from the Pope, speaks,—subordinately indeed of an oath,—but prominently of a decision by majority of votes; whereas the Eastern answer makes no mention ever so distantly of the latter, and deals exclusively with the proposed oath.

The evidence then accruing from the Acts, for the genuineness of Eugenius's speech in this particular, must be ranked by all candid inquirers as among the slightest. And at the same time a reasonable man could hardly be convinced of such genuineness, even by the strongest. Let us briefly consider its wild improbability. Popes, no doubt, in the first seven or eight centuries, had again and again permitted to Councils a full discussion of doctrines

already ruled ex cathedrâ by themselves. True. But what single instance (apart from this one) has ever been adduced, by Catholic, by Protestant, by infidel, in which any Pope has promised beforehand to acquiesce in a vote of the majority? Did S. Celestine tell the Ephesian Fathers, that he would withdraw his condemnation of Nestorius if they should absolve that heretic? Did S. Leo make such a promise to the Council of Chalcedon? Yet such a promise would be quite commonplace and ordinary, as compared with that here ascribed to Eugenius IV. For a number of Bishops were to vote, not only who were external to the Pope's Communion, but who avowed a tenet, already condemned in a Council which he regarded as Œcumenical. To imagine a parallel, we must suppose that S. Celestine had convoked another Council after that of Ephesus, in order to confer with certain Nestorians who desired further light; and that he promised these latter to embrace Nestorianism himself, should the majority of the new Council thus determine.

And who is the Pope reported to have made so strange an engagement? One who at this very moment was at violent issue with the pseudo-Council of Basle, because they denied the Pope's Supremacy over an Œcumenical Council.

We almost owe our readers an apology for arguing further, on a matter which is really so manifest. Yet we must not lightly put aside a statement, which has been accepted by Orsi and De Maistre, no less than by Bossuet. Let us proceed then to point out, how

completely at variance it is with the Pope's whole attitude throughout the Council. We will mention two most prominent illustrations of this. What had been the one thesis, urged consistently by the Westerns, on the addition of "Filioque" to the Symbol? That the words had been rightly added, *because added by an infallible authority.* Yet Eugenius is here reported to have so completely abandoned this allegation of Infallibility, that he declared his hypothetical readiness to abandon the Catholic Dogma itself on the Procession. Passing from the earlier to the later sessions, he claimed—and required the Easterns to accept his claim as a necessary preliminary of Union—to be by divine right "the Teacher of Christians." How could he with a grave face put forth such a claim, if but a few weeks before he had offered to surrender his Supremacy of teaching, to the accidental majority of a Council? And how can any one suppose, that so glaring an inconsistency should not have struck the Easterns, and been thrown by them in his teeth? Orsi indeed well points out the curious inconsistency of Bossuet's language about Eugenius. The French Prelate represents him as on one occasion offering a concession, which to Bossuet himself must appear monstrous; and then as, within a few weeks, claiming for his See an absolute and intolerable Supremacy, such as the Eastern Bishops peremptorily refused to admit.

It may be asked, what is our own suggestion as to the real answer returned by Eugenius. We express an opinion with the greatest diffidence; but the fol-

lowing has struck us, as having possibly been his proposal. He may have suggested that each Bishop present, whether Latin or Greek, should at once express his judgment, under the sanction of an oath. He must have been aware that the Greek Bishops were far more disposed for Union than was their Emperor; and he may have thought it an important gain, that the latter should come to know what root had been taken among them by Latin ideas. Nor would it be at all unnatural for the two Easterns' to fancy that such a proposal implied—though of course it could not have implied—that a majority of votes should determine the judgment of all.

IX.

The only remaining procedure of the Council (so far as we know) which can possibly be wrested by the Unionists to their purpose, is the decision on Purgatory. We are not aware indeed that they *have* alleged this decision; but they might imaginably argue thus:—"The Latin Church held, as a most certain Dogma, that purgatorial suffering is by fire: yet they did not attempt to make this belief a condition of Union. It may be inferred from this, that the Roman Catholic Church did not claim to be the One Catholic Church, whose Dogma was to be received on her infallible authority; but that she negotiated Union with the Easterns, on some common basis, to which both parties might freely consent." Before directly

encountering such an argument, (if indeed anyone should think of urging it,) we will answer it indirectly by a reductio ad absurdum. No one will say that the Council of Trent was occupied with arranging, on equal terms, a union between "the two independent societies of East and West." And yet the Council of Trent made a doctrinal concession in favour of the Easterns, to which no parallel, even the most distant, can possibly be alleged from the Council of Florence. And we are rather disposed to dwell on this concession, because it throws much light on several principles, which we have been from time to time discussing. We are referring to the Decree on divorce; and we refer for a full account of the facts, to Perrone's most useful work "on Christian Matrimony," vol. iii., p. 407, et seq. The Council was on the point of branding with an anathema the tenet, that marriage is dissolved by adultery. It was suggested however by the Venetians, that great offence would probably be taken at this by those Orientals in communion with Rome, who abode whether in East or West, and who practised the very custom in question. The Canon was consequently changed into its present form: "If any one shall have said that the Church errs, when she has taught and teaches, according to evangelical and apostolical doctrine, that the bond of matrimony cannot be dissolved because of the adultery of either party, . . . let him be anathema." And though it is difficult at first sight to see the difference of purport between this and the form originally proposed, Perrone explains it clearly enough.

The Eastern Christians are characterized by nothing more conspicuously, than by a certain sluggishness and stationariness of religious thought; a tendency to proceed, without theory and without reflection, in their Fathers' way, simply because it has been their Fathers'. Nothing then would be more natural, than that many United Greeks should continue this practice of divorce which they had hereditarily received, without therein intending to censure the Roman Catholic Church, or to criticise her Doctrine at all. By this new Canon, their practical view of the case was not directly anathematized: those only were anathematized who, like Lutherans and Calvinists, expressly spoke against the Church's teaching. Ever since the confirmation of this Canon, — "whoever accuses the Church of *error* in this particular is a *heretic*, and incurs an anathema; but he who teaches a *contrary* doctrine [*without* however expressly accusing the Church of error] is plunged [not strictly in heresy, but] at least in an error bordering on heresy."—(Perrone, p. 415.) Or, in other words, the tenet that marriage is dissolved by adultery, has been infallibly condemned by the Church. Yet it has not been condemned by her as actually heretical, but as unsound in some lower degree. The ascribing however of *error* to this infallible condemnation, *has* been proscribed as directly heretical.

From this an important consequence follows, to which however Perrone does not expressly refer. Suppose you disbelieve (e.g.) the doctrine of Transsubstantiation, though you well know that it is taught

as strictly of faith by the Church in communion with Rome. However invincible may be your ignorance of that Church's authority—and however convinced a priest may be of such invincibleness—he cannot admit you to the Sacraments. But suppose that, through invincible ignorance, you disbelieve some doctrine, which is infallibly taught indeed by the Church, yet not as strictly *of faith*:—the priest then is *not* bound to exclude you. Consequently those Easterns in communion with Rome, who hold that adultery dissolves a marriage, and whose ignorance of the contradictory truth may be presumed invincible, are admissible to the Sacraments; which they would not have been, had the Canon remained in its original shape. And this is just one of those instances, on which we have spoken more than once on earlier occasions, where the Church aims at so enforcing truth, as least to interfere with the salvation of souls. There is no possible danger that the Easterns can corrupt the true Dogma; for the Church by her discipline guards successfully against any such possibility. And at the same time their position is far more hopeful, than if they had been required to choose explicitly, between an abandonment on the one hand of their traditional error, and a forfeiture on the other hand of all communion with Rome.

No one can possibly allege, that any concession on Purgatory was made to the Greeks at Florence, which even distantly approaches to this. But in point of fact no concession was made at all. It is true that

the Western theologians of that period unanimously held, as certain, the doctrine of purgatorial *fire*, strictly so-called. But the certainty, which they ascribed to that doctrine, was only (to use Suarez's expression) "within the latitude of theological opinion."* We believe no single writer can be named, who advocated the existence of purgatorial fire as being in such sense certain, as that its denial is theologically unsound.† And as to the Westerns in general, there was most undoubtedly a living tradition among them, that this was no question on which their opinion could legitimately be enforced on the Greeks as a condition of Union. The Profession of Faith to which we have already referred, drawn up in the year 1267 by Pope Clement IV. stated the doctrine of Purgatory almost in the very words afterwards adopted at Florence. And at Florence the Westerns made no attempt whatever to introduce any mention of *fire*. On the contrary, they offered to the Greeks the Definition, almost word for word as it now stands, as expressing "the Faith of the Roman Church concerning the truth of Purgatory" (Latin Acts).

Indeed, on the very opening of the first private conferences, the difference of the two views was found in principle comparatively trifling. "This therefore" say the Greek Acts, "was the difference between

* In 3 m., d. 46, s. 2.

† Our authority for this statement is a friend extremely well acquainted with mediæval scholastics, who in vain attempted to find in any of them this latter opinion.

[This was my excellent friend Mr. David Lewis.]

them. The Greeks assert chastisement, and grief, and a place of chastisement; but not by means of fire: whereas the Italians assert chastisement and purgation by means of fire." It is probable enough indeed, that the prevalent belief among Easterns, on the *severity* of purgatorial punishment, was considerably short of that which the Church practically teaches; but the one most hopeful course for imbuing them with that full doctrine, was the accomplishment of Union. There was every reason to expect, that thence would result a constantly increasing communication between East and West, and a constantly increasing infusion of Latin ideas into the Eastern mind. But as to any kind of objection or protest raised by Greeks against the Latin practical system—such a protest e.g. as is raised against it by Dr. Pusey, —we have been unable to find, either in the Greek or Latin Acts, the slightest hint, the remotest trace, of any such phenomenon.

X.

We think that, on the whole, a candid study of the Florentine Acts, both Greek and Latin, will lead to the following conclusions, on the respective attitude of the two convening parties. The Easterns arrived at Ferrara with an extremely strong conviction, not merely that the Roman addition to the Symbol was most unwarrantable, but that the Dogma which it expressed was utterly false and even heretical. On the consti-

tution of the Church, they had no definite theory whatever, which could admit of being scientifically stated. They were however fully convinced that they were true members of the Church, though separated from Papal communion; and they undoubtedly held that an Œcumenical Council is infallible. On the other matters at issue, they seem to have had no very decided conviction; except of course in holding that their own use of leavened bread in the Eucharist did not interfere with the validity of the Sacrament.* To their unspeakable surprise, as the debates proceeded, they felt more and more that they were wholly unable to contend against the Latins, on those very points which they had regarded as their stronghold. This circumstance then inspired them with a deep distrust of their own theology, and a great readiness to accept the Latin Creed on other matters also. Consequently, as soon as an agreement was obtained on the Procession, the main difficulty was at an end.† From that moment the Emperor was the only remaining obstacle; and Easterns combined with Westerns, in labouring to remove prejudice from his mind, and bring the truth home to his apprehension.

As to the Westerns, we do not see how a second

* "Concerning Purgatory and the consecration of the gifts [the Easterns resolved] to say nothing whatever about them—*not knowing, as I think, the true determination of the matter.*" Greek Acts, soon after recording the Patriarch's death.

† On June the 8th, when this agreement was finally consummated, [the Latins] "rose and kissed us, and there was great joy on both sides."—Greek Acts.

opinion is possible on the position which they consistently maintained. On every single point at issue, their view, from the first, was precise, definite, and stable. On the Pope's Prerogatives in particular, they held, not merely that communion with him is necessary to salvation (though this, of course, was *included* in their doctrine); but also, that his power is in no respect limited or circumscribed by any ecclesiastical authority; that he is the one source of jurisdiction in the Church; the one infallible Teacher of Divine Truth. To this doctrine the Easterns finally acceded. And such is the true and germane sense of that Definition, which originated with the Westerns substantially as it now stands, and to which Latins and Greeks alike subscribed.

HISTORICAL ARGUMENT FOR ECCLESIASTICAL UNITY.

An Eirenicon. By E. B. PUSEY, D.D. Oxford: Parker.

The Anglican Theory of Union. By the Right Rev. Bishop ULLATHORNE. London: Burns & Co.

Peace through the Truth. Essay the First: The Unity of the Church. By Rev. T. HARPER, S.J. London: Longmans.

Dr. Pusey and the Ancient Church. By T. W. ALLIES, M.A. London: Longmans.

[January 1867.]

I.

THE truth of Catholicity rests on historical arguments, which are not only incontrovertible, but in some sense irrresistible. "The proof seems" to F. Newman "such, as even to master and carry away the intellect directly it is stated; so that Catholicism is almost its own evidence."* We cannot of course tell into what particular shape F. Newman would throw the historical proof of which he speaks; but for ourselves we should put the thing thus. The three following propositions seem to us so absolutely undeniable, that no one in his senses would have thought

* Lectures on Catholicism in England, Preface.

of calling them in question, except for his dislike to the conclusion which they indicate. I. The Christian religion was identified at its first promulgation with a certain corporate Society. And this Society was preserved in unity by its members' belief, that God commanded their obedience to one supreme central government; that of the Apostles. II. It was a fundamental doctrine of Christianity from the first, that this Society should remain to the end of the world as the one authorized teacher of religion. III. No other corporate society in subsequent times either has been, or can be, suggested as the appointed continuation of this original Society, excepting only the Church in communion with Rome. Assuming therefore that Christianity came from God,—these propositions directly establish, that none but a Roman Catholic can be said in any strict sense to accept that religion which Christ revealed.

Now innumerable objections have been raised against this *conclusion;* and that on every imaginable ground: on moral and spiritual grounds; on Scriptural, philosophical, historical, political grounds; on grounds of secular science; on grounds of common sense. But, extreme as such a statement must appear, we really believe that no one anti-Catholic, up to this very moment, has attempted directly to impugn any one of the three propositions above recited. On the contrary, the tactics of Protestant controversy have invariably been, on the one hand to accumulate argument and invective against Catholic *Doctrine;* on the other hand to put (as far as might be) out of sight

and out of memory the historical basis on which Catholicity reposes. And this very circumstance, of course, much encourages the faith of an educated Catholic. As to the assaults made on individual doctrines—from the very fact of being a Catholic, he perceives as a matter of immediate experience, that the great majority of them are simply imbecile and worthless. When e.g. Dr. Pusey and others tell him on à priori grounds, that his constant and unintermitting worship of Mary lessens his simple trust in Jesus,—such a statement can only elicit from him amazement and pity. He knows, as a matter most strictly within his own personal cognisance, that devotion to our dearest Lady is among his most efficacious helps for growing in the knowledge and the love of God. Assaults indeed on the *historical evidence* of Catholicity might in some sense be far more intellectually formidable; but no such assaults are attempted.

It is the purpose of our present [Essay] to dwell on the three propositions which we began by reciting. It is exactly a year indeed since, on the first appearance of Dr. Pusey's Eirenicon, we went briefly over the same ground.* But our then discussion was occupied with a large number of other matters also; and this particular argument therefore did not perhaps stand out in sufficiently strong relief. But in our next [Essay] we are to encounter Dr. Pusey on Papal Supremacy. And no one can do any kind of justice to the

* [See the fifth Essay in this volume.]

overwhelming body of proof which establishes that Doctrine, unless he first places in a clear and full light the (logically) preliminary question of Ecclesiastical Unity. This subject has been, during the past year, powerfully handled by three eminent writers, whose works we have named at the head of our article. The Bishop of Birmingham's pamphlet is full, as might have been expected, of orthodox and weighty comment on Dr. Pusey's fallacies; several of which, and those among the most un-Catholic, had never been pointed out till the Bishop took them in hand. F. Harper's first Essay is especially successful in its exhibition of the fantastic incongruities which are involved in any notion of the Anglican Church being Catholic. Moreover, he is a very Œdipus in solving the hardest riddle of our time; viz., Dr. Pusey's meaning in those odd utterances which he has put forth (pp. 45–66), concerning Ecclesiastical Unity. We are adding but small praise to this, when we say that F. Harper has succeeded to a marvel in *replying* to Dr. Pusey's statement; for the whole difficulty consisted, not in the reply, but in the preliminary interpretation. Lastly, Mr. Allies has written a work which, though in form a pamphlet, will remain (we are convinced) among the permanent treasures of English Catholic literature. This pamphlet is logically even more complete and unanswerable than that treatise on S. Peter's See, which obtained the signal honour of being translated into Italian at the Holy Father's command. It is far more concerned indeed with Papal Supremacy, than with Ecclesiastical Unity.

But it contains a patristic catena on Unity, which will be most serviceable for our purpose; and to which we shall draw attention before we conclude. Now then for our argument.

II.

We assume at starting the divine origin of Christianity. In other words, we assume that, at a certain period of the world, certain Apostles were commissioned by God to teach all nations a newly-revealed religion. We assume also that the New Testament is a substantially correct narrative of facts on the whole.* Those who do not accept these two fundamental premisses, are external to our present argument. Now two different ways were imaginable (to mention no more) by which the Doctrines of this new religion might have been imparted. They might have been imparted, in the way adopted by some London lecturer to promulgate his favourite tenets. Supposing he has not published any book,—those who wish to know his views come to hear him; or else pick them up from others who have been to hear him. So it is

* We by no means assume that the New Testament is inspired; nor even that it is correct in every individual statement of fact. From our point of view, we should be guilty of a "petitio principii," if we assumed either of these two propositions. We do not believe that either of them can be definitively established, except as *conclusions* from the Doctrine, that the Roman Catholic Church is infallible.

abstractedly imaginable on the surface at least, that the Apostles simply communicated their doctrine to those who came; that these talked of it to others; and so that in greater or less degree believers learned it. Even on such an hypothesis, Christians would of course associate very much together; because men always like to associate with those of like principle with themselves. Still (had such been the divinely chosen method of teaching Christian Doctrine) for a man to be a Christian, would not *imply* association with his fellow-Christians. To be a Christian would only imply that he believed in the Apostles' mission, and laboured, as opportunity might serve, to acquire a knowledge of what they taught. We are not at all maintaining that *in fact* such a body of Dogma as the Apostolic could be brought home to the mind of learners in any such way; on the contrary, we are convinced that it could *not*. We are only saying that on the surface such a method is imaginable.

But all the world knows that the Apostles proceeded by a way totally different from this. Catholics in particular point out, that on all who accepted the new religion as true, a divine precept was imposed of uniting themselves to a certain Society, and of submitting themselves to the Apostles as to the divinely appointed rulers of that Society. We spoke [in the Fifth Essay of this volume, pp. 117–119] on the unparalleled efficacy of such a method, for enriching the mind of believers with a deep apprehension of Dogmatic Truth. Here however we are merely concerned with the fact itself. Now there is no fact more certain

than this in all history; and it is a fact admitted as fully by those who disbelieve, as by those who believe, the divine origin of Christianity. The former indeed do not of course think that God really *imposed* the precept of submission to the Apostles; but they quite admit that the Apostles *alleged* such a precept. It is really not more certain than Christianity ever came into the world at all, than that it came into the world as identified with a Society claiming divine authority; and that the first believers considered themselves obliged by God's command to obey a certain supreme government, the Apostolic.

But as it is not our immediate purpose to argue with unbelievers, we will assume (as we have already said) the substantial truth of the general drift of the New Testament history. And we shall thus be able much to narrow the issue. Now it is testified in every line whether of the Acts or the Epistles, that no Christian was permitted to remain (so to say) "unattached;" that every believer was required to unite himself with some local Church, and obey her laws. This is so transparent on the surface, that its evidence would only be obscured by any attempt to draw it out in detail. The point on which we insist is, that the Christian Society or Church, *as a whole,* was (as we have before expressed it) "hierarchically" one; i.e. that it was wrought by God into Unity, by being placed under one supreme government. There were twelve Apostles. It is readily imaginable, that each Apostle should have been constituted by God a ruler over his own flock, with no dependence on any higher authority except God Himself. What we are

here pointing out is, that such was by no means the case. Christians were not divided into twelve hierarchical societies, united together indeed in bonds of strictest amity, but each independently governed by an Apostle. On the contrary, all Christians were aggregated into one sole hierarchical Society, governed by the Apostolic Body as a whole. We are not inquiring in this article—we expressly reserve such inquiry for future discussion—what was the *mutual relation* of the Apostles in their work of government.* For anything we say at present,—our non-Catholic reader may suppose, if he will, that the decision rested on each occasion with a *majority* of the Apostles; so that seven should carry it against five. Or he may suppose (what is certainly a far more reverent and probable hypothesis) that the Apostles were specially overruled in each particular case to issue harmonious commands, just as they were inspired to teach harmonious doctrine. We do but maintain, that the Church of the Apostles, *as one whole,* was placed under the government of the Apostles, as of *one governing Body.*

* "All we maintain then at present is this. There must be *some* central authority, *some* supreme source of jurisdiction, *some* court of ultimate appeal, *some* legislative and executive head—of whatever kind it may be—in the Church of Christ. And if legitimately established over her, it must be of Divine Institution. We do not define what it is. We do not say that it exists in a Pontiff, or in a Council of Patriarchs, or in an Œcumenical Council. But a headship of some sort there must be. For a human society cannot be truly one visible body, unless it have a central authority. And since Christ founded His own Church and prescribed Its details, that authority must be of Divine Institution."—F. Harper, p. lxvii.

Now as to the earlier portion of the "Acts," no comment can possibly make this clearer than a simple perusal will make it. To say that in these chapters S. Peter is represented as supreme over one Christian society; S. John over another; S. James the Greater over a third; would not be simply false, but rather unmeaning and preposterous. The case of S. Paul is undoubtedly different. Indeed there is more than one fact recorded in Scripture which is understood by some as implying, that he felt himself at liberty on various occasions to act in opposition to the earlier Apostles. It is for this reason that we have elsewhere considered this question in detail;* and we do not think anyone can fairly give his mind to the case there exhibited, and entertain any doubt on the truth of our general conclusion. S. Paul never dreamed of teaching and governing a special Pauline Church of his own; but, on the contrary, he simply co-operated with the earlier Apostles, in teaching and governing the Church Universal.

We may express the same truth by saying that, during the Apostolic period, all ecclesiastical jurisdiction (to use the modern term) came downwards from the general Apostolic Body. SS. Barnabas and Paul, before their elevation to the Apostolate, possessed their authority at Antioch, because it had been delegated to them by S. Peter and the rest. SS. Timothy and Titus governed respectively the Churches of Ephesus and Crete, because such government had

* [See the Sixth of my "Essays on Devotional and Scriptural Subjects."]

been committed to them by S. Paul, in exercise of a function recognized by all his brother Apostles as his.

"The *community* did not make its rulers, but *the Apostles* made them; they and those they sent *formed the community and gave them overseers.*

"The Apostles did not first make an agreement with their flocks, or receive rights from them, but stood over them with fatherly authority, as over their sons begotten in Christ. The very name of 'Apostle' pointed back to One higher, whose messengers and ambassadors they were, so that whoever met a bearer of that title was compelled to ask or answer for himself the question, Whose Apostle this man was? The Twelve gave laws, as well conjointly (as at the Synod of Jerusalem) as separately, many of them not expressly ordained by Christ . . . . S. Paul promised the Corinthians that he would make several regulations when he came to them. He knew how to exercise his power of punishing transgressors; the Corinthians themselves received Titus, whom he deputed, 'with fear and trembling;' he threatens that he will come to them with a rod; he is ready to punish all disobedience, and will not spare when he comes; he bids the Thessalonians separate from those whose conduct is disorderly, and desires that the names of such persons may be given him. Where, as at Corinth, individuals or parties hesitated to recognize his authority, *this was from not holding him to be a true Apostle:* so that he simply maintained against them his claim to the Apostolic office, and *did not contend about the extent or rights of the office.*

"Those really converted entered the Church to obey, and not to rule. Being told expressly that they were members of a Body, they knew that it was a self-evident duty and necessity for them, as members, to

obey the impulses emanating from the higher organs of the Ecclesiastical Body."* .

As our direct subject is Ecclesiastical Unity, it is important here to point out that, during Apostolic times at least, the preservation of corporate or hierarchical Unity was (1), a precept divinely imposed on each Christian; and (2), an essential attribute of the Church. Let us put the imaginary case—in consideration of our motives, the Saint will forgive our insulting supposition—that S. Titus had summoned the Cretan Church to follow him into a state of separation from the Apostolic Society. Firstly, he and all his followers would have committed mortal sin; but secondly, they would also have rendered themselves external to the Visible Church. The Church consisted exclusively of a certain corporate hierarchical Society; and those therefore who were external to that Society, were external to the Church.

III.

One very principal reason contemplated by God in thus constituting the Church, was undoubtedly that on which we insisted in [the Fifth Essay of this volume]. We refer to the extremely important assistance which the Apostles derived from eccle-

* Döllinger's "First Age of Christianity," vol. ii. pp. 19, 98, and 26, of Oxenham's translation.

[I need hardly say that the force of such statements is increased by the fact, that it is Dr. Döllinger who makes them.]

siastical *discipline,* in their momentous and most arduous task of communicating Christian *Truth.* We are thus led to consider the original extent of the Church's Infallibility. And as this consideration is indispensable towards appreciating Dr. Pusey's ecclesiastical position; so also, independently of Dr. Pusey altogether, the circumstances of this time render it extremely important that the matter should be clearly understood. For the purpose then of afterwards prosecuting more effectually the argument we have begun, we will digress for a few pages, that we may explain what are those circumstances to which we here refer. Catholics just now, it seems to us, are menaced both here and abroad with a doctrinal danger, new and most formidable. Of course in every age, as there have been Catholics reckless of venial sin and desiring only to avoid mortal;—so also there have been Catholics, who were desirous indeed of remaining Catholics, but who cared extremely little to avoid any error which did not actually amount to heresy. Such men have doubtless often enough persuaded themselves, that the Church teaches nothing as strictly of *faith,* which she has not expressly so *defined;* and therefore have naturally said (as it were) off-hand, that the Church's Infallibility is confined to her Definitions of faith. But what strikes us as so alarming at present* is, that such a mode of thinking is no longer confined to those whose interests are merely secular, and who have no care for the Church

* [At the beginning of the year 1867.]

beyond desiring not actually to break with her. On the contrary it extends, we fear, to many, who are full of zeal in her service according to their own idea of the due means for its promotion. We may possibly much over-estimate the prevalence of these opinions. But at all events there are so many signs of mischief, that it has become of great moment to exhibit, on every fit occasion, the extravagant falsehood and the extreme dangerousness of the proposition above recited. "The Church's Infallibility," say these Catholics, is "confined to her *Definitions of faith;* to those Definitions which prescribe some tenet, not as *unsound* (for in such Definitions the Church may be mistaken), but as actually *heretical.*" Such a proposition would unquestionably have impressed Bossuet, no less violently than Bellarmine, as simply portentous. And certainly, it seems to us, the question between "Ultramontane" and "Gallican" shrinks into actual insignificance by comparison.* In one point of view, even Dr. Pusey's theory is more intelligible and reasonable than that of these minimizing Catholics. He simply denies that the Pope and Roman Catholic Episcopate *have* been exclusively entrusted by God with custody of the Apostolic Deposit. But put *these* thinkers through a catechetical process, and let us see the result.

Do you deny that the Ecclesia Docens, the Pope

* [When I thus wrote, I did not dream of such a Gallican exhibition as Mgr. Maret's. I only thought of such a doctrine as Bossuet's.]

and Roman Catholic Episcopate, is endowed with Infallibility, for the very purpose of faithfully maintaining that Deposit of Faith with which she was entrusted? "On the contrary, we admit it as a Dogma of the Faith." Do you deny that there are various tenets, not theological only but philosophical and in some sense secular, which lead by necessary result to actual heresy? "It is manifestly impossible to doubt this." Nay, do you deny that various tenets of the kind, even when not leading to heresy *by logical consequence*, yet are most intimately connected with heresy? Nay do you deny that, if they unhappily took root among Catholics, heresy must be the practically inevitable result? "We do not see how this can be doubted, any more than the former." If the Ecclesia Docens then had no power to expel these errors from the mind of believers, she would have no power to guard securely the Deposit of Faith? "Apparently not." You admit then that she has power to expel these errors from the mind of believers? "We must necessarily admit it." But she cannot expel them from the mind of believers, unless she can decide for certain in the first instance what tenets *are* thus erroneous and unsound? "That is but common sense." Then she is *infallible*, not only in condemning tenets as heretical, but also in condemning them as theologically unsound?* "On the contrary, this is that Ultramontane pretension, which all intelligent Catholics so indignantly repu-

* See Dr. Murray's most unanswerable argument: "De Ecclesiâ," d. xvii. n. 56–63.

diate." But why "Ultramontane"? What has it got to do with the point at issue between Bellarmine and Bossuet? "I have not sufficient patience with these tyrannical pretensions, even to examine their precise nature."*

The pronouncements, thus contemptuously treated, occupy no minor or subordinate place in ecclesiastical history. Look at the last three hundred years alone. The ecclesiastical Decisions belonging to this period occupy far more than one-third of Denzinger's volume; and (as Dr. Murray truly observes) Denzinger has been very far from including them all. But among these, how many *Definitions of faith* are to be found? We have before us an earlier edition of Denzinger issued before the recent Syllabus, or our case would be even stronger. But of all the Decrees which his work contains from n. 881 to n. 1501—i.e. 620 Decrees,—we doubt whether there are more than ten which brand any condemned tenet with the precise stigma of *heresy*.† Now the minimizing Catholic not only refuses to accept these decrees as *infallible;* he disavows any obligation of accepting them with interior assent. He admits indeed sometimes in theory, that he is bound not to *write* or *speak publicly* in favour of any tenet which they condemn. And yet even as to this, we would rather leave others to

* This answer was actually given in conversation.

† We do not include any tenet of Baius, Molinos, or Quesnel. There is no *one* of these which has been condemned as heretical; though the Pope has ruled that *some* of them are so, without mentioning which.

decide how far he ordinarily takes any pains to fulfil such an obligation; how far he habitually scruples at publicly advocating any tenet, condemned e.g. in the "Mirari vos." What then is his especial boast? what is the particular benefit, which he considers himself to gain by his free-and-easy procedure? He is at once ready with his answer—"intellectual independence." And it is this very principle of "intellectual independence," which the argument of our present article requires us to examine with special care and attention.

We say then confidently, that independence of intellect, just like independence of will, is not man's healthy state, but his disease and calamity. Independence of will consists in setting at nought every law, human or divine, and following each momentary passion and inclination. This is depravity; this is misery. A man's will is in a happy, healthy condition, precisely so far as it submits itself humbly and unreservedly to God's commands, and aims on each occasion at discerning and pursuing His preference. Undoubtedly subjection of the will to a *wicked* master would be bitter slavery; though whether even that would be more bitter than simple independence, may perhaps be doubted. But the will's *perfection* consists, neither in independence, nor yet in subjection to tyranny; but in subjection to God, Who is Sanctity. Just so as regards one's intellect. Its perfection consists, neither in independence from authority on the one hand, nor in subjugation to false oracles on the other hand; but in absolute surrender to God, Who

is Truth. It consists in submission to His express voice,—whether that voice be heard in the dictates of Reason or Revelation—and in docility to His discoverable intimations. Not in "intellectual independence," but in "intellectual captivity,"* is true intellectual liberty and perfection. Dr. Pusey draws attention to the large number of doctrinal pronouncements, which Pius IX. alone has put out (p. 290). He has greatly exaggerated under this head. But let us look at the thing as a matter of principle. Is not an increase of Infallible Truth greatly to be desired? A true theologian, we must maintain, is ever desirous of obtaining the fullest possible light from ecclesiastical authority; and throughout his investigations is ever gazing (if we may so speak) on the aspect and countenance of his mother the Church.

Now it is theoretically admitted by every Catholic, that the Church's Infallibility has lineally descended (if we may so express ourselves) from Apostolic times. For the sake therefore of our controversy with minimizing Catholics, not less than for the sake of our controversy with Dr. Pusey, it is of extreme importance to consider *how far that Infallibility originally extended.* Here, then, we are brought back to the very point at which we digressed. And on this issue, we believe that there is really no room for differ-

* "In captivitatem redigentes omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi": "*αἰχμαλωτίζοντες πᾶν νόημα*" (2 Cor. x. 5).

[Mr. Carlyle has somewhere this remark: "True guidance, in return for loving obedience, (did he but know it) is the prime need of man."]

ence of opinion, as soon as the question is distinctly contemplated.

1. We would draw attention to this fundamental and general principle, from which every particular truth on the subject is derived. The *extent* of her Infallibility was precisely coincident with her *claim* of Infallibility. How could any convert know that the Apostles were infallible *at all*, but by accepting their own statement concerning themselves? But their own statement concerning themselves included, not simply the fact of their Infallibility, but also its extent. No one could have any possible ground for believing the former, which would not with quite equal cogency induce him to believe the latter. This is self-evident.

2. Then, secondly, the principle of "intellectual captivity" was admitted to its fullest extent. A Christian, on becoming such, was brought into contact more or less direct with certain personages, the Apostles, who claimed to be the organs of an indefinitely-extending Divine Revelation. From that moment, so to speak, his thoughts were not his own, but another's; and he gloried in that circumstance, because of his firm conviction that that other spoke as the oracle of God. There is no charge of intellectual bondage and degradation brought by minimizers against more orthodox Catholics, which would not apply, in its full extent and in more than its full extent, to a highly educated Jew or heathen, who should have been converted by S. Paul.*

* [Since the Vatican Definition, it has been a favourite theme

3. A large assemblage of devotional practices must have existed throughout the Church, either expressly approved or tacitly sanctioned and encouraged by some Apostles. It will be admitted by all who believe the divine origin of Christianity, that every doctrine implied in these various practices was infallibly true.

4. So also as to Apostolically-sanctioned methods of spiritual guidance and advice; of ecclesiastical discipline; ecclesiastical usage. Every doctrine involved in these was infallibly true.

5. Again, it will be admitted by all who believe the divine origin of Christianity, that an Apostle was not merely commissioned to teach his disciples (without note or comment, as one may say) the naked Doctrine which he had received from God; but in every respect to guide them infallibly along the road to heaven. Suppose then a number of Stoics and Epicureans had been converted to the Faith; but that they retained various portions of their old philosophy which, in the judgment of S. Paul or some other

with anti-Catholic controversialists, that Catholics have now no protection against the bondage of any new doctrine, which a Pope may be pleased to excogitate. These objectors, on their own showing, could never have become Christians during the Apostolic period. What security had Christians then against the bondage of any new doctrine, which an *Apostle* might be pleased to excogitate? The objector will reply, I suppose, that the Apostles were prevented by divine interposition from *inculcating* any false doctrine. Why cannot we get them to see, that a Catholic of this day is *no less* fully persuaded of the same thing in regard to the Pope, than a primitive Christian was in regard to an Apostle? The Catholic's state of mind on this head is but an additional point of resemblance, between him and the Christian of Apostolic times.]

Apostle, were both false and perilous to sound religious Doctrine. In the exercise of his Apostolical office, he explains to them that these tenets are erroneous. We suppose no minimizing Catholic will deny—we are quite certain Dr. Pusey will not deny—that such warnings—and they must have occurred not unfrequently—would be infallibly just.

6. Or suppose, again, that some Apostle denounced—not any particular tenet—but this or that *book;* some book e.g. written by a Judaizer or by an insufficiently converted heathen. The Apostle declares it to be imbued with unsound Doctrine, and most dangerous to the unwary reader. Such a judgment as this comes most clearly within the sphere of Infallibility.

7. Or lastly, if various insufficiently converted heathen underrate the evils of some educational system, and are disposed to place their children under its influence, any Apostolic warning against such a system would be infallibly just.

On the hypothesis then that Christianity is Divine, the following results ensue from our preceding remarks. When Christian preachers made a convert during the Apostolic period, it was involved in the very fact of his conversion, that he submitted himself to a certain corporate Society or Church. He submitted himself (we say) to a Society, which was to extend indefinitely over the orbis terrarum, but which was wrought into hierarchical Unity by the precept of submission to one Supreme Authority. This Church possessed Infallibility, not only in her

explicit, but also in her practical teaching. Her explicit infallible teaching, moreover, was not confined to the condemnation of tenets directly contradictory to the Faith; on the contrary it extended on occasion to a condemnation of all false tenets which were *perilous* to the Faith. The convert then at once abandoned all private judgment, within that wide sphere which appertained to Infallibility. He learned his religion by various acts of intellectual captivity: by humbly submitting his intellect to the doctrinal instruction given by the authorized superiors of his local Church; by regulating his interior life according to the rules and counsels placed before him; by joining heartily in the prevalent practices of devotion; in one word, by unreservedly surrendering himself to the new moral and spiritual atmosphere, which he had begun to breathe.* And his security against being

* "It follows from the nature and design of the Church, that all its members *are under a continuous educational influence.* The Church is a moral power, holding together all its members in a real fellowship, even those not inwardly good, where on the whole the purifying and sanctifying influences are stronger than the indwelling evil in individuals. It is *a great educational institution,* not for one particular period of man's life, but for the whole of it: receiving him as a child, and constantly acting on him, cleansing, instructing, building up, and sanctifying through teaching, example, common prayer and worship, and means of grace; *constantly nourishing and enlightening his mind,* and seeking to strengthen his will, and only leaving him at his death, without even then regarding him as cut off, or renouncing its influence over him. In the Church, all are called: all, however sinful, are capable of salvation, and subjects of her educational action; all are intended, by taking and giving, to hold at once active and

led astray in all this, was the gift of doctrinal Infallibility which each Apostle had received, and by the light of which he directed his various local Churches. So far as the New Testament is concerned, men might not less plausibly allege that it points to Delphi or Dodona as to Christian oracles, than that it contemplates any other method of learning Christian Doctrine except that which we have described.

Now the loyal Catholic's contention is the most obvious and simple that can well be imagined. It holds its ground most firmly and irrefragably, whether against non-Catholics or minimizers. As Christianity entered the world in this particular shape, so (he maintains) it is to wear the same shape even to the end. Of course, this conclusion is not self-evident. It is most easily imaginable, that God may have wrought changes in His own work; that during the progress of Christian history—for instance, at the death of the Apostles,—He may have revolutionized the Rule of Faith. We only say, that the onus probandi rests emphatically on those who may maintain that He *has* so acted. No one can doubt that God's work is to continue as it began, *unless* God has plainly proclaimed

passive relations. All are to be prayed for, and to pray for others. All are to set an example to their fellow-members of the body, and to take example from them. None can sink so low that the Church need despair of him, or is not bound to stoop to him, and seek to lift him up again. While he lives, he is not given over; and the Church relies on the means of grace entrusted to her, which can fan into a bright flame the spark of light remaining, in spite of all sin, in the baptized, however near extinction."—Döllinger's "Apostolic Age," vol. ii. pp. 27, 28.

the contrary. The mass of Protestants say, "Go by Scripture:" well, it is to Scripture that we have appealed. Anglicans say, "Go by Scripture and Antiquity:" on this point at least, the two are most unmistakably in unison. At present however, we are speaking merely of Scripture. I study the New Testament, for the purpose of seeing and apprehending the lineaments of the Church of the Apostles. What results? Behold there gradually rises up before me a fac-simile of the present Church in communion with Rome. If the one appointed way of learning Christian doctrine be *now*—as undoubtedly it was *at first*—docility to the general tone and spirit of one infallible corporate Society, and obedience to the magisterium of those placed in authority over that Society,—you must all become orthodox Roman Catholics at once. For there is no other corporate society now on earth, which even *claims* Infallibility in her magisterium. It is sometimes thoughtlessly said, that the "Greek Church" claims Infallibility; but no statement can be more undeniably unfounded. Ask any Russian why he believes any doctrine. Will he say because the Church in communion with the See of Moscow cannot err? or the Church in communion with some Patriarch he will name? or some specified body of Bishops? or the majority of them? He will give you his own *opinion*, that his Church was right in her quarrel with Rome; but he will not say that she had any *promise* of being right. No. The very word "Infallibility" suggests to everyone's mind the further word "Rome."

Or let us put our argument in a somewhat different shape. What was the Church's constitution in Apostolic times? She was one corporate Society. Hierarchical Unity was one of her essential attributes; and that Unity was secured by the precept of submission to the joint government of twelve supreme Rulers. These Rulers were infallible in their whole body of teaching, whether explicit or practical. Moreover their utterances extended on occasion to the condemnation of tenets, which were not directly at variance with the Faith, but only perilous thereto. What was the intellectual attitude of a really consistent and docile believer? The attitude of intellectual captivity. He regarded the Church as an educational institution; and he submitted his whole mind to her invigorating, elevating, transforming influence. He was prepared at her bidding to sacrifice any of his most cherished convictions, excepting those which she had already explicitly or implicitly approved. Nor again could he even guess how great might be the intellectual sacrifice, which this course of conduct demanded at his hands. What was the Objective Rule of Faith?* The voice of the living Church. What was the Subjective Rule of Faith? He learned the doctrines of his religion, by submitting his intellect to the instructions which he received from her ministers; by conforming his conduct to the rules and maxims which they prescribed; by uniting himself with the spirit

* It need hardly be said that we speak throughout this article of the "Regula proxima," not the "Regula remota."

of her whole practical and devotional system; in one word, by surrendering himself to the moral and spiritual atmosphere with which she surrounded him.

It is absolutely certain,—we are confident Dr. Pusey himself will not think of questioning it,—that during the Apostolic period such respectively were (1) the Church's constitution, (2) the believer's intellectual attitude, and (3) the Rule of Faith. It is equally obvious that, according to approved Roman Catholic doctrine, Christianity has remained identical in all these particulars up to the present moment: and, further, that it will so remain until Christ's second coming. Moreover, a third proposition is equally undeniable with the former two. This third proposition is, that those who follow Dr. Pusey must consider some most vital and important change to have been divinely superinduced upon the original Christianity, at one or other intervening period. We are next to consider the character and extent of that change, which Dr. Pusey's theory supposes.

IV.

In studying Dr. Pusey's work with this object before us, the most wonderful fact we find is the following. Dr. Pusey cannot possibly be ignorant that his view *does* suppose God to have made some marvellous change, since the Apostolic period, in His Church's constitution. And yet he never once contemplates that

fact, or looks it steadily in the face. Consequently we have to labour through a dreary succession of misty, obscure, confused sentences, in order to answer that most perplexing question, what on earth does Dr. Pusey mean? His Prayer-book complains that, in the Breviary services, it was often a work of greater labour to find out the Scripture lesson, than to read it when it *had* been found out. In like manner, the chief labour of his Roman Catholic opponents has come to an end, when they have discovered what *are* his propositions. For a *reply* to those propositions, their clear and intelligible statement will in general abundantly suffice. On no matter does this so forcibly hold, as on this particular question of Ecclesiastical Unity. And as an illustration of the extraordinary difficulty which he has imposed on his interpreters, we will cite two different passages by way of introduction. Thus (1) he quotes the following opinion from a Photian Bishop of the Seventeenth Century:—

"I hold the dispute about the supreme power of the Pope to be the principal cause of our divisions. This is the wall of division between the two Churches. The chief controversy I hold to be about the sovereignty of the Pope. For this is at this time the great wall of separation which divides the two Churches. If all Christians were agreed on this chief point, viz., how the Church was to be governed, *whether by aristocratical rule as we think, or monarchical as the Latins think,* there would be very little trouble in agreeing about the rest" (p. 63).

Dr. Pusey does not indeed expressly say that he

agrees with this statement; for his constant vagueness indeed is the very complaint which we make. But he quotes it with warm sympathy, and without hinting any kind of dissent. According to this view, the Church remains to this present day entirely unchanged. She was aristocratically governed in Apostolic times, and is aristocratically governed still. The Greek Prelate seems further to have held, that his own Communion is one corporate Society, aristocratically governed; and consequently that she is the one Catholic Church, lineally descended from that of the Apostles. As to Dr. Pusey, if he agrees with the authority cited by himself as in his own favour;—if he holds that the one Catholic Church is one corporate Society;—he must embrace a very remarkable doctrine indeed. He must exclude from the Catholic Church either (1) Romans and Photians; or (2) Romans and Anglicans; or (3) Photians and Anglicans; or (4) all three. Yet if there is one doctrine more than another characteristic of his work, it is that *none* of these are to be excluded; that the three Societies *jointly* constitute the Catholic Church.

Here then is one extreme. He complacently inserts this Photian citation, as though he really held that the Church remains unchanged in constitution from the Apostolic period. In another place he goes to the opposite extreme; and implies that the very notion of the Church's remaining unchanged is self-evidently false. "Another principle came in," he says (p. 148), in the discussions on the Immaculate Conception, which he represents as a self-evidently

false principle. What is this self-evidently false principle? The following: "That the Church being incapable of erring, anything taught throughout the Church, although not defined by any authority or representing anything beyond the opinion of the actual clergy, was necessarily true. In the old words, the 'quod ubique' was to be ipso facto a test of the 'quod semper.'"* Now most indubitably, in *Apostolic* times, that very doctrine was true, which Dr. Pusey so blames Roman Catholics for holding. "The Church being incapable of erring, anything taught throughout the Church," with full knowledge and approbation of the Church's Rulers,—"although not" publicly and explicitly "defined by any authority, or representing anything beyond the opinion of the actual clergy,—*was* necessarily true." Dr. Pusey therefore treats as manifestly and self-evidently false the very supposition, that there *can* be a Church in the Nineteenth Century, possessing equal privileges with that of the First.

But in seeking to discover Dr. Pusey's real mind, we must put aside either of these extreme views. It is impossible (considering his other tenets) he can deliberately think,—either on the one hand that the Church has remained without any change in her constitution;—or else, on the other hand, that the very notion of her having so remained is self-evidently false. As yet however we are none the

* F. Harper, in p. 390, has an admirable criticism on this complaint of Dr. Pusey's.

nearer to discovering, what is the *particular* change which he considers God to have made. In a careful study of his volume however, we have lighted on one passage which will perhaps help us in this investigation. And this passage may perhaps be accepted as the authentic key, to that bewildering disquisition on Ecclesiastical Unity, which has so taxed the ingenuity of distinguished Catholic writers. In the earlier post-Apostolic times, says Dr. Pusey, "the Church was connected and joined together by the cement of Bishops *mutually cleaving to each other;* each Bishop ordering and directing *his own proceedings,* having hereafter to give account of his intentions to *the Lord*" (p. 236).* Here then we do obtain an intelligible statement, with which we can fairly grapple. Moreover, it is the very doctrine which was put forth as S. Cyprian's twenty-five years ago, in the Oxford translation of that Father.† And F. Harper (p. 45) again mentions, that it was declared by Dr. Pusey on occasion of the Gorham judgment. The theory may be thus expressed: "Every Catholic Bishop "derives his authority exclusively from God. It is "his sacred duty vigilantly to guard faith and morals; "to condemn and expel heresies; to instruct and "guide his flock: but for his mode of performing

* The words are S. Cyprian's; and we shall presently, in the text, consider that Father's mind. It is plain however, in what sense *Dr. Pusey* adopts them.

† Pp. 150–152. For instance, "We [Anglicans] make schism and separation from Christ lie in opposing *our Bishop;* they [Roman Catholics] in opposing the *Bishop of Rome.*"

"these duties, he is responsible to God alone. Every "diocese is one independent corporate Society; and "'the Church Catholic' is a name to express the "aggregation of these dioceses. *Diocesan* unity "consists in subjection of the flock to the shepherd. "But *the Church's* unity consists merely 'in the "cement of Bishops mutually cleaving together;' "that is, in a state of amity and harmony between "the various independent Bishops. If laymen or "presbyters separate from the communion of their "Bishop, they become ipso facto schismatics. But if "a Bishop separate himself from the communion of "his brother Bishops, he does *not* thereby become "ipso facto schismatical. Such a Bishop may very "probably exhibit a most unchristian spirit; but he "does not divide himself from the Church's Unity, "and separate himself from Christ. The Bishop is no "more subjected by God to Patriarch or Council, "than he is to Pope."

This theory, which Dr. Pusey persuades himself is S. Cyprian's, underlies the long and obscure disquisition in the Eirenicon (pp. 45—69), to which we have already referred, and which F. Harper most patiently and sagaciously analyses (pp. 54—58). Now Dr. Pusey does not expressly say,—but he cannot possibly deny when his attention is called to the circumstance,—that in his view a change, not less than *fundamental*, was wrought by God in the Church's constitution, at some period intervening between S. John's death and S. Cyprian's Episcopate. He considers S. Titus to have been no less truly Bishop of Crete, than

S. Cyprian was afterwards of Carthage, or than Dr. Hamilton is now of Salisbury. Yet he will admit that had S. Titus left the communion of the Apostles, he would ipso facto have fallen into schism; and that all the Cretan clerics and laymen would have been under the strictest obligation of renouncing his authority. But this is the very doctrine, which he *rejects* in the case of S. Cyprian and of Dr. Hamilton. He considers therefore, in effect, that the mutual relation of Bishops is now essentially different from what it was under the Apostles. And since no such change can possibly take place except jure divino, God Himself must have wrought it. Nay it is not too much to say that, according to Dr. Pusey, the Church founded by the Apostles was simply *overthrown* at some period after their death. For consider an illustration. France has remained "one and indivisible" under the Bourbons, the Republic, and the Empire. But suppose that, through some strange vicissitude of fortune, each one of the separate Departments into which France is divided were placed under a supreme and independent government of its own. France would still remain as a "geographical expression;" but that *Body Politic*, which men call France, would be totally dissolved. In like manner, according to Dr. Pusey, that corporate Society, which the Apostles founded, after their death was dissolved and overthrown by God. The Church of the Apostles was appointed by God to be one hierarchical Society; but the later Church was appointed by God to be a multitudinous assem-

blage of independent hierarchical Societies. The original Church was overthrown, and the new institution substituted.

So as to the Rule of Faith. The Objective Rule of Faith, now appointed by God, is considered by Dr. Pusey to consist of these elements: (1) the concurrent teaching of Anglican, Roman, and Photian Bishops, so far as they do concur; (2) the decrees of those Councils which he considers Œcumenical; (3) as regards the vast sphere of Doctrine which lies beyond this circle, Scripture, and (4) Antiquity. The Subjective Rule of Faith, according to him, no longer lies in that unreserved self-surrender, of which we have spoken more than once, to the explicit and the practical teaching of ecclesiastical superiors; to the spirit which animates that teaching; to the Church's circumambient atmosphere. On the contrary, as regards far the larger portion of what he accounts the Catholic Church, he holds that nothing could well be more mischievous than such self-surrender; that such a course would keep back Catholics from all clear apprehension of Divine Objects; and would make them next door to idolators. His very summons,—the very suggested ground of his Eirenicon—is the truly anti-Apostolic proposal, that Christians on both sides shall cling to the naked letter of their formularies, disregarding the traditional and authoritative interpretation thereof. The Subjective Rule of Faith then, now appointed by God, (according to him) involves an independent exercise of private judgment by each man for himself, on the following questions:—(1) Who are

those Bishops throughout Christendom, who may justly be considered orthodox and Catholic? (2) What are those doctrines, which these Bishops concurrently testify? (3) Which of the various past Episcopal assemblages were truly Œcumenical Councils? (4) What are their various Decrees, and the precise force of those Decrees? (5) On the innumerable remaining questions, what is the sense of Scripture and (6) of Antiquity? Dr. Pusey would urge, of course, that an inquirer should *begin* with a certain prepossession in favour of the teaching which he has received; but he must also urge, that no stable and firm *belief* can be reared, according to God's Law, on any foundation except the above. We are not here offering any other criticism on this extraordinary Rule of Faith; we are only expressing what no reasonable man will doubt. Dr. Pusey, we say, virtually alleges, not simply that the Apostolic Rule of Faith has been importantly *changed* by God, but that it has been absolutely overthrown. He alleges that the original Rule has been totally destroyed, and replaced by another differing from it in every particular.

V.

Now, if we have really established the above two conclusions, our argumentative victory is secure. For —confused and mutually contradictory as Dr. Pusey's statements may be—still (when his attention is called to the fact) he will not dream of maintaining or think-

ing what is really implied in his argument. He will not dream of maintaining or of thinking, that the Church's constitution and the Rule of Faith have been actually *revolutionized* by God since the Apostles' death. Still less will he maintain or think that the Apostolic Church has been overthrown, and replaced by some entirely different Institution. Yet,—though it might seem that in replying to such a notion we are combating a shadow,—it will be worth while briefly to indicate the course of argument, which would peremptorily refute such an allegation, were anyone to think of making it. But firstly at *what* period, subsequent to Apostolic times, can one possibly suppose that this revolutionary change was effected? There is *no* period, of course, to which it can be assigned with the slightest plausibility. But there is only one which can be named without absolute infatuation; viz., the death of the Apostles. Will it then further be maintained, that God made this change at the said period by a special intervention? that He made a second Revelation, to repeal so much of the former? To say *this* again would be absolute infatuation. The only suggestion therefore, against which it is possible to argue, may be thus expressed. "God originally appointed to the Church "a certain constitution, and to the believer a certain "Rule of Faith; but He appointed both as merely "temporary provisions. According to His original "appointment, they were to come to an end when the "Apostles died; and were to be succeeded at that "epoch by provisions fundamentally different."

To so strange an hypothesis, we will but state very briefly the obvious reply. Except indeed so far as, on this or that particular, some circumstance of the moment may call for greater detail.

We will begin with Apostolic times, and with the New Testament as their substantially true record. The corporate Society set up by the Apostles was called "Christ's Kingdom," and "Christ's Church." Our Lord before His Death proclaimed it to be at hand; after His Resurrection He commanded its establishment; and after His Ascension the Apostles obeyed that command. Not only there is not the slightest indication that its establishment was to be but temporary; the direct contrary is everywhere expressed or implied. His first command, "Euntes docete omnes gentes," was accompanied by the promise, "Ecce Ego vobiscum sum *usque ad consummationem sæculi.*" He was to be then with the Teachers and Rulers of His Kingdom *to the end of the world.* But He knew of course that the Apostles would not themselves live for that period; it was with them therefore, and *their Successors in office,* that He promised His perpetual presence. Nay, if you confine His promise to those individuals whom He was addressing, you exclude S. Paul himself from the office of "teaching the Gentiles;" to say nothing of SS. Matthias and Barnabas. And in like manner He had promised that "the gates of hell should not prevail against His Church;" i.e. as every commentator explains whether Protestant or Catholic, that his Church should never be destroyed, *while the world*

remains. Nor was it called the *Apostles'* Kingdom, but *Christ's* Kingdom: they reigned as His vicegerents. Does a reign generally terminate, because the king's *vicegerent* dies? Indeed S. Paul expressly says (1 Cor. xv. 25—28) that Christ is to reign until the very end. As S. Paul approached the termination of his course, he made provision for the continuation of that ecclesiastical organization *which existed;* and exhorted S. Timothy to train up future Teachers of the Church (2 Tim. ii. 2). Shortly before, he had mentioned "the Church *of the Living God;*" as though to express her permanent life: and called her "the pillar and basis of the Truth." It is on the Church of the Living God then, and not on some new foundation, that the superstructure of Gospel Truth was in future times to rest.

From the Apostolic, we now pass to what may be called the transition period: we mean that which elapsed, between the death of the other Apostles and that of S. John. And the facts of this period are precisely those on which the whole inquiry critically turns. They are such, we will add, as to prove the Catholic conclusion with a peremptoriness, which may be compared to mathematical demonstration.

The Apostles certainly had no end more nearly at heart, than the future preservation of Christian Dogma in its fulness and purity. It is further evident that there could be no security for such preservation,—no safeguard against that doctrinal corruption which they regarded as among the gravest of calamities,—unless Christians were trained to hold firmly the Divine Rule

of Faith. Now our imaginary opponent thinks, that at their death the Divine Rule of Faith and the Church's constitution were to be fundamentally changed. Had this been really God's appointment, the Apostles must of course have been inspired accordingly. Had they been so inspired, it is most certain that, in their keen zeal for doctrinal purity, they would have inculcated this truth with earnestness and perseverance. No topic would have occupied a more prominent and more emphatic place in their teaching, than the Rule of Faith which was to be called into existence at their own death. They would have guarded with most jealous care against the danger, otherwise so inevitably imminent, of their disciples supposing that the existing Rule was to remain unchanged. On such a supposition, S. John—throughout those many years during which he survived the other Apostles—would have been universally recognized as the Church's last infallible teacher; and his death would have been the most startling epoch in Christian history, since the great day of Pentecost had passed. We do not see how anyone can doubt that this is temperately and fairly argued: and it is hardly necessary to add, how violently inconsistent are the actual facts with any such hypothesis. S. John's death, instead of being the most critical event in history, passes almost "sub silentio." The supreme teaching of inspired men was succeeded by that of uninspired, in a natural and easy succession; no trace, even the most distant, can be found of any new Rule of Faith; and the Church of the second century occupied, as of

right, the very same position with the Church of the first.*

Lastly, for post-Apostolic times. Certainly, if there is one fact more than another exhibited in every page of early ecclesiastical history, it is the firm belief of Christians, that the Apostolic office in some sense continues. "Successors of the Apostles" is the recognized name given by everyone to the Catholic Episcopate.

Then consider that phrase, "the Catholic Church," universally prevalent from the days of S. Polycarp. The word "Church" would surely be an extraordinary word to express the amicable coalition of independent corporate societies; "*one*" Church still more extraordinary; one "*Catholic*" Church the most extraordinary of all.

Passing to individual patristic passages, Mr. Allies has most serviceably given a catena of such from pp. 90 to 115. He begins with S. Clement of Rome, who was Pope before S. John's death; and he carries the series down uninterruptedly to the time of S. Augustine. He thus sums up his citations:—

"As there is one only Christ, so there is one only Church; as the Church is one, because Christ is one, so it is *one Body*, because He has taken a Body: it is therefore the work of His Incarnation, and *to dissolve this Body is to dissolve Christ;* for as Christ cannot be divided, so neither the Church; the Church, as His Body, is the receptacle of His truth and grace. As the Holy Spirit dwelt in Christ upon earth, so

* The preceding paragraph and another occurring later are reprinted from [the fifth Essay of this volume].

He dwells in the permanent order of the Church's ministry, *the perpetual existence of which, in the unity of His Body is the safeguard against error.* Through this ministry, as the joints and ligaments of this one Body, the life of Christ descends from the Head to the members, and Christ's life is Truth and Grace. Thus *the Holy Ghost dwells in the Church permanently,* as in a home, as in a shrine, as in the Body of Christ, as the marriage-ring with which she is espoused as His Bride: but the same Spirit dwells in particular men *only as members of the Body, and so long as they continue to be members of it;* as dwellers in the House, and so long as they continue to dwell in it; as worshippers in the Shrine, and so long as they continue to worship in it. By virtue of this union with Christ, as of the Body with the Head, the Church possesses *the great function of receiving, teaching, unfolding, and preserving the Truth,* and of communicating the Grace by which the Truth is held; and the mode of this union is the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in her, as the Spirit of the Head. Thus, belief in our Lord and His Incarnation is blent and fused throughout with belief in the unity, truth, grace, stability of the Church: the Head and the Body stand together."

It cannot possibly then be questioned, that the Fathers unanimously proclaimed Visible Unity as an inalienable attribute of the Church. And for a merely controversial purpose against Anglicans, this is enough. Assuredly neither Dr. Pusey nor any other Anglican can allege that, on the Anglican theory, Visible Unity remains.

But further. There can be no doubt that "Visible Unity" involves what we have called corporate or hierarchical Unity. Dr. Pusey indeed considers that

Visible Unity remained in the time of S. Cyprian; when nevertheless (according to his own interpretation of S. Cyprian's words) no Bishop in Christendom was subject to any superior ecclesiastical authority. But now take the case of a local Church: the Church of Carthage, e.g. in the time of this very S. Cyprian. Let us suppose that all the Presbyters agreed with each other in doctrine; but that in matters of discipline, worship, education, &c., no Presbyter were subject to any higher earthly authority. Each one is busy in promoting his own schemes for the spiritual welfare of his parish. Each one declares that no one on earth has a right to interfere with him; that he will introduce whatever devotional practice he pleases; whatever discipline he pleases; inflict what penance he pleases; excommunicate whom he pleases. Would Dr. Pusey mention "visible Unity" as the characteristic of such a diocese? Or would he not rather call loudly for Episcopal discipline, in order to remedy the confusion, bewilderment, discord, tyranny, misery, loss of souls, which must thence result? If then it would be absurd to say that *a diocese* can possess Visible Unity without *submission to one supreme government*, —how can it be considered reasonable so to dream concerning the Church Universal?

But the absolutely decisive consideration is this. Post-Apostolic Catholics had the Books of the New Testament before them; and on the very surface of the New Testament they discerned, that the Church's original Unity was a corporate, hierarchical, Unity. According to Dr. Pusey, they were well aware that all

this was now changed; that God, instead of *enjoining* on Bishops *subjection* to one supreme authority, now only *exhorted* them to mutual *concord;* that the *precept* of *corporate* Unity was superseded by a mere *counsel* of *affective* Unity. On such an hypothesis, it is plain that whenever the Fathers spoke of ecclesiastical Unity, they would dwell earnestly, and perhaps regretfully, on the contrast between Apostolic and post-Apostolic times. The one thing which could not by possibility have happened, is precisely that which in fact did happen. For what happened was, that the Fathers exhausted every imaginable phrase and simile to express the perfection of the Church's Unity, without throwing out the slightest hint that such Unity was inferior in *kind* to that enjoyed by the first Christians.

What testimony then can Dr. Pusey allege for his opinion, that the Fathers did not regard corporate Unity as strictly essential to the Church? The whole number of his patristic quotations is exactly four. Three of these have been encountered by F. Harper (pp. 68–71); and the marvel is what can have induced Dr. Pusey to allege such wildly irrelevant fragments. The fourth is that passage of S. Cyprian's, which we quoted above, and which seems to have escaped F. Harper's observation. We are so very glad to obtain from Dr. Pusey any patristic allegation whatever in favour of his view, that we will not fail to discuss this one at greater length, than would be due to any force or plausibility which it possesses. Now it so happens, that a very

few years earlier S. Cyprian had expressed explicitly and in detail his doctrine on "the Unity of the Church;" and Dr. Pusey should surely have referred to that work, if he wished rightly to understand the meaning of S. Cyprian's later words. To prevent any possible charge of unfair quotation, we will take that treatise precisely as it stands in the Oxford translation.

One can hardly imagine a more amazing subterfuge than the old Tractarian statement, that S. Cyprian in this treatise describes the Unity, not of the Church *Catholic*, but of the Church *local:* i.e. of the individual diocese. We know not whether Dr. Pusey retains this view; but it will be more satisfactory not to omit its refutation. S. Cyprian begins his whole argument by mentioning Christ's commission to S. Peter, "Feed my sheep;" and by mentioning the undoubted fact (p. 134), that "He built His Church upon Peter, being one." Are *Christ's sheep* merely *the Catholics of one diocese?* Is "the Church" which Christ expressly promised "to build upon" Peter,—the *local*, or is it not the *Catholic* Church? S. Cyprian proceeds to say (ibid.) that "the Episcopate is one and undivided." He is not speaking therefore, you see, only of Presbyters being united to their Bishops; but of Bishops being united with each other. "The Church," he proceeds, "is *one*, though she be *spread abroad*, and multiplies with the increase of her progeny." Is the local Church then "spread abroad"? All this occurs at the very outset of his argument: and it would be really impertinent to say

more against a theory, of which one must unfeignedly wonder that grave and sincere men can have embraced it.

Secondly, S. Cyprian speaks of a certain Visible Unity as existing throughout the Catholic Church; an Unity which is so indispensably prescribed by God, that no one external to it can be saved. No controversialists, who admit that he is speaking of the Catholic Church at all, have ever doubted that this is his statement concerning her constitution. We will therefore briefly refer to a few such sentences as these:—"He who holds not this Unity, . . . holds not the truth *unto salvation*" (p. 135). "Who is the criminal and traitor . . . as to think *aught can rend* . . . . *God's Unity*, the Lord's garment, Christ's Church?" (p. 136).

But now thirdly,—and this is the critical question—of what nature is this Visible Unity? No one who reads the treatise carefully, can give any answer except one. But there is one passage in particular, which expresses it beyond the possibility of misconception. In p. 136 he compares the Church's indivisible Unity to our Lord's "inviolate and individual robe," which was received "once for all *and indivisibly* as one *unbroken whole*." Then he thus proceeds:—

"On the other hand, when, on Solomon's death, his kingdom and people were split in parts, Ahijah the Prophet, meeting King Jeroboam in the field, rent his garment into twelve pieces, saying, 'Take thee ten pieces; for thus saith the Lord, Behold I will rend the kingdom out of the hand of Solomon, and

will give ten tribes to thee; and two tribes shall be to him for My servant David's sake, and for Jerusalem, the city which I have chosen, to place My Name there.' *When the twelve tribes of Israel were torn asunder,* the Prophet Ahijah *rent his garment.* But because *Christ's people cannot be rent,* His coat, woven and conjoined throughout, was not divided by those it fell to. Individual, conjoined, coentwined, it shows the coherent concord of our people who put on Christ. In the sacrament and sign of His garment, He has declared the Unity of His Church."

Christ's robe then *undivided* represents the Church's indivisible and inalienable *Unity;* Ahijah's garment *rent* represents *Schism.* What then, we ask, was that event in Jewish history, which S. Cyprian cites as his parallel to ecclesiastical Schism? *The division of that corporate Society* which had hitherto existed entire. According to S. Cyprian then, this is that calamity which (by Divine promise) cannot possibly befall the Church: the breaking-up of her hierarchical Unity. By the Church's Unity, we say, he most undoubtedly understands her corporate, hierarchical Unity; her Unity under that divinely appointed supreme government, which is parallel to the divinely appointed government of Solomon.

Then finally it was a manifest fact before S. Cyprian's eyes, whenever he opened any book of the New Testament, that the Church's original unity was corporate and hierarchical. But his whole argument is built from first to last on the assumption, that that Unity which she first possessed was ever to remain her essential attribute.

It happened however a very few years afterwards, that the writer of this treatise on the Unity of the Church, came into conflict with Pope S. Stephen. In the course of that conflict, he used the words quoted by Dr. Pusey, in regard to "each Bishop ordering and directing *his own* proceedings, having hereafter to give account of his intentions to *the Lord*." Now we will here assume, for argument's sake,—what we cannot for a moment admit—that the words mean what Dr. Pusey supposes.* Now we cannot directly expose the complete irrelevance of Dr. Pusey's citation, without irreverence to so glorious a servant of God as S. Cyprian. We will therefore suppose that the then Bishop of Carthage, instead of being a Saint, was a very ordinary every-day person. His history, according to Dr. Pusey, ran thus :—He was led at one time to consider the Church's traditional doctrine on her own Unity. And he carefully explained to his flock, that this Unity is corporate and hierarchical; that no one, Bishop or other, external to this Unity, could be saved. Soon afterwards he took up a most serious doctrinal error, concerning the Baptism administered by heretics and schismatics. On being corrected by the Pope for this error, he warmly resisted Papal authority; and (incredible as it must appear) went the length of saying, that no Bishop was accountable to any authority on earth for his ecclesiastical acts. Here is a proposition directly contradictory to the theory,

* The "Etudes Religieuses" of last August [1866] carefully examined S. Cyprian's words (see particularly p. 492), with particular reference to Dr. Pusey.

which he had so recently laid down as traditional and Apostolic. Either therefore his testimony must be waived altogether—it must be rejected as worth nothing on either side—or else a comparison must be made between the respective occasion of these two dicta. When he put forth the former, he was contending for a cause (resistance to Felicissimus and Novatian) which Dr. Pusey holds as Catholic and orthodox. When he put forth the latter, he did it in order the more freely to advocate what Dr. Pusey himself considers a most serious doctrinal error. "See, then," one would naturally say, "the result of doctrinal error! His unhappy mistake about Baptism has led him into an even more unhappy mistake about Ecclesiastical Unity."

Let us again explain ourselves to avoid all possibility of misconception. S. Cyprian is a great Saint; and his words have no such sense as Dr. Pusey supposes. We have but argued that even if they had such a sense, they could in no way advance Dr. Pusey's cause. What they really do mean, is a question on which we have no space to enter on the present occasion.

Finally let it never be forgotten, that at last the real question most undoubtedly is, whether or no the Church's constitution were *revolutionized* by God at some period after the Apostles' death. Or (to speak still more correctly) the question is whether at some period after the Apostles' death the Church were by God's command dissolved, and replaced by an entirely new Institution. And in favour of *this* conclusion,

Dr. Pusey not only does not dream of alleging any one patristic testimony; but he does not dream of even expressing his own individual opinion.

VI.

Our argument then, on the whole, is this. The Apostolic Church was constituted by Christ as one corporate and hierarchical society: claiming to teach with infallible authority the truths committed by Him to her charge; and inculcating them on all her members, through her various living organs and representatives. Moreover, the Apostles' death was not, by God's appointment, to make any change whatever in her organization. On the contrary, Christ and His Apostles had expressly declared that she was to remain on earth until His second coming. Correlatively with this broad fact on the one hand, there stands forth in history a broad fact on the other hand. From that time to the present, there has always been one, and (speaking generally) there has never been more than one Society, precisely answering to the description which we have given. This Society therefore, in every age, has been the One Catholic Apostolic Church. There have been rare and exceptional periods, we admit—specially the period of that Schism which terminated at the Council of Constance—when there were two rival claimants of Apostolic privilege. But the fact that at rare intervals there have been rival claims, does not tend ever so remotely to cause doubt

in ordinary times, when there is no such rivalry. The Apostolic Church, such as we have described it, was to last till the end of the world. In the time of S. Irenæus there was one, and one only, such Society. In the time of Constantine there was one, and one only, such Society. In the time of S. Gregory—in the Middle Ages—at the time of the Reformation—there was one, and one only, such Society. At the present moment there is one, and one only, such Society. Hence she is the One Catholic Apostolic Church. And her teaching, whatever it may be, is infallibly true; simply because it *is* her teaching.

We have already said that, on the hypothesis of Christianity coming from God, we know of no argumentative chain, external to the region of pure mathematics, more irrefragable than this. Let us sum it up in four propositions:—(1) Christ entrusted His religion to the care of one corporate Society as its infallible expositor. (2) He declared that this corporate Society should last to the end of the world. (3) In every age, therefore, one corporate Society exists which is thus infallible. (4) But there is no existing corporate society of which any one even alleges that it is thus infallible, except the Church in communion with Rome. Consequently, no one who is not a Roman Catholic belongs to that Visible Church which Christ founded; nor accepts in the strictest sense that religion which He taught.

VII.

We have avoided throughout all comment on the incredible extravagance of the Anglican theory, because we have wished to fix our readers' attention on our central argument. But now that we have completed this argument, we would earnestly recommend to the notice of Dr. Pusey and other Anglicans, Mr. Allies's singularly eloquent and effective exposition of their ecclesiastical attitude. For ourselves, we have a most kindly feeling towards Dr. Pusey; and we do not therefore entirely sympathize with Mr. Allies's *tone*. But we really cannot wonder, with the Eirenicon before us, that many other Catholics judge him far more severely than we do.

"Dr. Pusey [says Mr. Allies] with determined blindness to all the parties which internally distract his community (*the only connection of which with each other lies in that civil supremacy which he ignores*), takes up, from the beginning to the end of his book, a position which is ridiculous to those who know the real condition of that community; for, with his singular views, he, being *frustum de frusto*, assumes to represent the whole *frustum*, self-commissioned as he is in this very representation, while he is really speaking at the utmost for one-tenth part of a dissolving heresy, which *in its single bosom contains more contradictions than Donatists, Nestorians, and Monophysites put together*, and is in truth the self-acknowledged, often the proudly-vindicated, domain of individual self-will and individual opinion, and represents the theological varieties of the English mind, as the daily press its political parties; and so *is called the National Church, as em-*

bracing the multitudinous heresies of the nation, and giving to each their respective influence, while it links them all together in a civil unity.

"And thus, again, a particular interpretation of the Thirty-nine Articles, which was presented some twenty-five years ago by its author only as one of several allowable varieties, yet even so was rejected by the vast majority of Bishops, clergy, and people as not within the range of permission, Dr. Pusey now borrows from that author, disowning it, and produces as the proper interpretation of the whole community; and by the aid of this subterfuge, as if it was a true picture of the life of this community during the three hundred years of its existence, confers 'a truth and office' upon what he calls the English Church, being *his conception not of what it is, or even of what it ever was, but of what it ought to be.* This conception, then, of something which should be, *but is not and has never been,* is presented by him on one side over against a caricature of the Catholic Church on the other; and this insult to truth, on the one side and on the other, he terms an *Eirenicon,* while it is constructed as a scarecrow to frighten troubled consciences from seeking their true home."

[If this article had been published a few years later, I should indubitably have drawn special attention to Mr. Rhodes's very valuable and most carefully elaborated work on "Visible Unity." A very interesting article on this work appeared in the "Dublin Review" of October, 1870; written by my friend the late Mr. H. W. Wilberforce.

I should add, that I do not forget certain isolated ecclesiastical facts and dicta, which on the surface militate against the Catholic Doctrine of Unity. These will be briefly dealt with in subsequent pages.]

HISTORICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE POPE'S PREROGATIVES.

An Eirenicon. By E. B. PUSEY, D.D. London: Parker.

Dr. Pusey and the Ancient Church. By T. W. ALLIES, M.A. London: Longmans.

Tractatus de Ecclesiâ Christi. Auctore Patricio MURRAY. Dublin: M'Gloshlan.

Clementis Schrader de Unitate Romanâ. Vienna: Mayer & Co.

[July 1867.]

I.

THE Scriptural and patristic argument for Papal Prerogatives is so overwhelming and irresistible, that the insensibility of Anglicans to its force is at first sight one of the most amazing facts in the whole world. It would be a great mistake however to suppose, that this insensibility proceeds chiefly from any intellectual cause whatever. To a thinker like Dr. Pusey, various doctrines practically taught by Rome are so very distasteful,—and the very supposition of his being simply external to the Visible Church is so absolutely intolerable,—that arguments have no access to his mind. We may add that, even were his prejudices far less violent than they are, his is not the structure of intellect which would appre-

ciate a chain of reasoning, be its force ever so solid and unanswerable.

Putting aside however personal considerations,—with which we are but indirectly concerned,—there is one very serious argumentative fault, which has considerable share in blinding an Anglican's perception. The two questions of Papal Primacy and Ecclesiastical Unity are indissolubly connected with each other; so that the latter Doctrine is of prominent importance, as a means of establishing the former. Now Anglicans persist in perversely separating the two. It was for this reason that in January* we prefaced our argument on the question now before us, by a careful consideration of that other logically preliminary subject. Anglicans and Catholics are of course agreed in the fundamental proposition, that Christianity came from God. This then being assumed, there is no thesis in the world which (on historical grounds) is more irresistibly certain, than that the Christian religion, according to God's immutable appointment, was to be identified in every age with one corporate Society. This was part of our conclusion in January. But if so much as this be granted, then a further thesis follows no less irresistibly. That thesis is, that the Church united to Rome is in every age that one corporate Society, which Christ appointed to be the infallible expositor of His religion. Such was the remaining part of our January conclusion. Lastly, from this thesis a third thesis follows, no less irresist-

* [See the preceding Essay in this volume.]

ibly and even more self-evidently. This third thesis is, that God invested the Pope with all those Prerogatives which Roman Catholics ascribe to him. And it is this latter thesis, which is to occupy us on the present occasion. Let us first then see where we were landed in January: and let us pursue our argument from the point where we then left it.

"Our argument on the whole then, we said, is this. The Apostolic Church was constituted by Christ as one corporate and hierarchical Society: claiming to teach with infallible authority the truths committed by Him to her charge; and inculcating them on all her members, through her various living organs and representatives. Moreover, the Apostles' death was not, by God's appointment, to make any change whatever in her organization. On the contrary, Christ and His Apostles had expressly declared that she was to remain on earth until His second coming. Correlatively with this broad fact on the one hand, there stands forth in history a broad fact on the other hand. From that time to the present, there has always been one, and (speaking generally) there has never been more than one society, precisely answering to the description which we have given. This Society therefore in every age has been the One Catholic Apostolic Church. There have been rare and exceptional periods, we admit—specially the period of that schism which terminated at the Council of Constance—when there were two rival claimants of Apostolic privilege. But the fact that at rare intervals there have been rival claims, does not tend ever so remotely to cause doubt in ordinary times, when there is no such rivalry. The Apostolical Church, such as we have described it, was to last till the end of the world. In the time of S. Irenæus there was one, and one only, such Society.

In the time of Constantine there was one, and one only, such Society. In the time of S. Gregory—in the Middle Ages—at the time of the Reformation—there was one, and one only, such Society. At the present moment there is one, and one only, such Society. Hence she is the One Catholic Apostolic Church: and her teaching, whatever it may be, is infallibly true; simply because it *is* her teaching."

We should further add that this Society has ever preserved an identity of name: an identity which both symbolizes and testifies its identity of essence. From the very days of S. Ignatius Martyr, says F. Schrader (vol. i. p. 2), the name of "Catholic" has prevailed as intrinsic and peculiar to the One True Church, and as distinguishing her from all other societies.

Here then at once arises our obvious and irresistible demonstration of Papal Prerogatives. The Church in communion with Rome has ever been the One Catholic Church; and whatever is taught at any period by the One Catholic Church is infallibly true. These two propositions were established in [the preceding Essay of this volume]. But Dr. Pusey will himself admit that the Church in communion with Rome has, in these later centuries, uniformly taught that very Papal Doctrine, which he denies as false and denounces as tyrannical. Since therefore she teaches Papal Doctrine,—and since *all* her Doctrine is infallibly true,—her Papal Doctrine inclusively enjoys that privilege. It is infallibly true, as the Council of Florence decreed, that the Roman Pontiff is Christ's true Vice-gerent;

that he is Father and Teacher of all Christians; that he possesses full power of feeding, ruling, and guiding the Universal Church; that his See possesses Primacy over the whole world.* It is infallibly true, as the Council of Trent affirmed (sess. 14, c. 7), that "to him has been delivered Supreme Power in the Universal Church." It is further infallibly certain, that he has power, in what he may consider extreme cases, to withdraw all ecclesiastical jurisdiction from this or that individual Bishop, not in punishment of any canonical offence, but in order to the Church's general good. This, we say, is infallibly certain. For Pius VII. exercised this very power in the year 1801 over a considerable number of French Bishops; and all the Roman Catholic Bishops throughout the world taught, that whoever disobeyed his Decree became thereby schismatical.† But there is no reason for here proceeding further in our enumeration of those Prerogatives, which all Roman Catholics ascribe to the Holy Father, and which Dr. Pusey denies to him.

Our direct historical argument against Dr. Pusey is therefore completed at starting. The main business of our article is to answer Dr. Pusey's objections—

* In [the Seventh Essay of this volume] we showed how extremely strong is the Florentine Doctrine on Papal Prerogatives.

† It may be worth while to quote a few words from Pius VII.'s Apostolic Letter on the occasion:—"Derogamus expressè cuicunque assensui legitimorum Archiepiscoporum, Episcoporum et Capitulorum respectivarum ecclesiarum ac aliorum quorumlibet ordinariorum: et *perpetuò interdicimus iisdem quodcunque exercitium cujuscunque ecclesiasticæ jurisdictionis*; nullius roboris declarantes quidquid quispiam eorum sit attentaturus."

not, be it observed, against the reasoning which *establishes* our conclusion—but only against that conclusion itself. He falls back on his favourite authority, the first five centuries; and he alleges that a Doctrine, directly contradictory to the Papal, prevailed during that period. We have already pointed out more than once, that if his reasoning were really cogent, the inevitable conclusion must be one which he is extremely far from desiring. Dr. Pusey, we have said, does not attempt to controvert the Catholic *argument;* but applies himself to a denial of the Catholic *conclusion.* Let us suppose for a moment that his reasoning in this direction were completely successful. Catholic controversialists maintain—and Dr. Pusey does not even notice their arguments—that if Christianity came from God, the Church in communion with Rome is infallible. Dr. Pusey professes to establish a further conclusion; viz. that this very Church has during late centuries fallen into error. If then you unite that proposition which he labours to establish, with that other proposition which he does not attempt to controvert,—you are landed in the conclusion, that Christianity did not come from God. We are therefore occupied in defending the Divine origin of Christianity, against Dr. Pusey's earnest (though most unintentional) assault.

II.

Before entering on our reply to Dr. Pusey's various objections, we must begin with an introductory re-

mark. On many matters Dr. Pusey makes more or less approach to the Doctrine of Scripture and Antiquity: on some it may even be said that he coincides with that Doctrine. But on the Church's office (1) in teaching, and (2) in governing, not even Mr. Spurgeon is more widely at variance than he, from that standard to which he appeals. We have before insisted on this, and we will here briefly refer to what we have said.

Let us first then consider the Church of the Apostles. Let us inquire what were the means appointed by God at that time, for a Christian to learn the doctrines of his religion. He obtained this important knowledge by repeated acts of intellectual captivity; by humbly submitting his intellect to the doctrinal instruction given by the authorized superiors of his local Church; by regulating his interior life according to the rules and counsels placed before him; by uniting himself heartily with the spirit of that large practical and devotional system which surrounded him; in one word, by unreservedly surrendering himself to the new moral and spiritual atmosphere which he had begun to breathe. And his security against being led astray by all this, was the gift of Infallibility, which the Apostles had received, and by the light of which they directed their various local Churches. All this is so very obvious on the surface of the New Testament, that we believe no Scripture-reading Protestant will dream of denying it. He will probably say indeed that, when the Apostles died, the Rule of Faith was essentially and fundamentally changed; and to this allegation we replied in [the preceding Essay]. But

Dr. Pusey himself will admit (as far as words go) that the death of the Apostles made no change in the Rule of Faith.

In fact, on passing to the post-Apostolic period, we find the same Rule universally prevailing. Individuals still learned the Faith in the old way and in no other. They learned the Faith by submitting themselves with simplest docility to the instruction of their local superiors, and by surrendering themselves to the doctrinal atmosphere with which they were surrounded. In this period again, just as in the Apostolic, their security against being led into error by such unquestioning submission, was the Infallibility,—not indeed now of the Apostles—but of the existing Ecclesia Docens. Of course this Rule of Faith, like every other earthly thing, had its disadvantages. The Constantinopolitans e.g., under Nestorius, were exposed to much doctrinal peril; though far less than might at first sight appear.* But the most orthodox and clear-sighted among them knew only of two securities for protection against this peril. On the one hand, they adhered most firmly to those lessons which they had

* "Far less than might at first sight appear;" because ordinary Catholics imbibe their Faith, much more from the circumambient doctrinal atmosphere, than from direct doctrinal statements. A *succession* of Nestoriuses would doubtless have rendered that atmosphere pestilential; but it is precisely this, against which the Church's infallible intervention securely guards her children. And so say the very Oxford Tracts. Vincent Lirinensis "considers the Church to possess within it that principle of health and vigour, which *expels heresies out of its system.*" See the words quoted by us in [the Fifth Essay of this volume, p. 132].

been taught from their childhood upwards. On the other hand, they earnestly invoked the Church's Supreme Authority, for aid against the corrupting influence of their local superior. But would they pursue such a course as Dr. Pusey recommends? Would they think of deserting their traditional Doctrine—of opposing the prescription of Supreme Ecclesiastical Authority—in deference to their own private interpretation of the Nicene or the Constantinopolitan Decrees? They would have regarded such a course as being purely and simply rebellion against God, apostasy from Christ. The one authority to which they looked, was the existent Church's teaching. Such was the principle accepted by all, and blended with their very first springs of thought.

Now we say that Mr. Spurgeon does not differ more widely from this Rule of Faith, than does Dr. Pusey. Consider e.g. his demeanour to Roman Catholics; whom he considers to be no less truly members of the Church, than were the Constantinopolitans of the Fifth Century. In effect he addresses them thus: "You have been trained from "childhood by your teachers, — you have been "earnestly encouraged by your highest eccle-"siastical authorities,—in a certain most mischie-"vous system; which I beseech you to abandon. "Appeal, I entreat you, from the practical teaching of "Pope and Bishops, to your Church's Definitions of "faith, and especially to the Decrees of Trent. In "those Decrees you will find no kind of sanction for "that system, which your authorities have taught you,

"and which has been in truth the mere invention of "individuals. This practical system — especially in "what concerns its one most prominent feature— "overthrows your trust in Christ; ruins true spiritu- "ality; and verges closely on idolatry." Now let us suppose that some individual had addressed such language as this, to any section whatever of the early Catholics. It is very certain that they would have regarded their self-elected monitor with disgust and horror, as soliciting them to heresy and apostasy.

So long as Dr. Pusey's opinions on the very foundation of Church-doctrine are thus violently anti-Scriptural, thus violently anti-patristic,—no one can wonder that he should be stone-blind to the historical evidence for Papal Prerogatives. In our own argument we shall assume that God appointed that Rule of Faith, which both Scripture and Tradition on their very surface so unanimously, so prominently, so emphatically testify.

III.

It is most certain then, that when Nestorius or any other Bishop fell into heresy, some divinely appointed authority was at hand, promptly to redress the evil. And we use this word "promptly" for a special reason. In some places Dr. Pusey seems to hold, that each Bishop is by divine right supreme in his own diocese, and subjected by God to no higher tribunal

on earth. Yet elsewhere he speaks, as though a Bishop were placed by God under the jurisdiction of an Œcumenical Council. Here is but one of the strange mutual contradictions which abound in the Eirenicon. Still we will do Dr. Pusey the justice to admit, that this particular contradiction is by no means as great as at first sight appears; because such an authority over Bishops as he recognizes, has long been practically equivalent to none at all. "An Œcumenical Council is supreme over Bishops." Yes: but, on Dr. Pusey's view, God has made no provision whatever for the summoning of such a Council, or of otherwise collecting Episcopal suffrages; however frightful the dangers with which Dogma is threatened. For more than eleven centuries, according to him, the Church's Supreme Authority has been in abeyance. And during this abeyance, what provision has God made for purity of doctrine? One "branch" of the Church has been permitted to inculcate most earnestly a devotion, closely verging on the idolatrous; nay, to enforce as actually of faith a tenet directly contradictory to God's Revelation.* Another "branch" has permitted errors to prevail most widely within her bosom, which are worse than Mahometanism itself.† And yet, forsooth, God has appointed some power in the Church, sufficient to guard her against doctrinal corruption!

Such a notion has, of course, been already refuted

* [I refer to the dogma of the Immaculate Conception.]

† See Dr. Pusey's letter cited in [this volume, p. 142, note].

in [the preceding Essay]. In carrying on our argument indeed from that [Essay], we must not forget that we are here reasoning "ad hominem" against Dr. Pusey's objections; and that we must confine our view therefore to those earlier centuries, which he himself regards as authoritative. This therefore is to be understood throughout, that we are arguing from no other data than those supplied by Dr. Pusey's golden age. Yet those data, as we showed, abundantly evidence two all-important conclusions, which may stand as the basis of our present reasoning. (1) Christ established a certain infallible Oracle, for the very purpose of securing purity of doctrine within the Church; an Oracle which should not go to sleep for centuries, but which on the contrary was to be available, whenever its utterances might be required. (2) The Authority, thus infallible in teaching, was to be no other than that which was to be supreme also in governing. These two conclusions then we here assume. We assume that a certain Authority is placed over the whole Church, (1) infallible in teaching; (2) supreme in governing; (3) available in case of need. And we now proceed to inquire, *what* precisely that Authority is. Now this inquiry again was *partially* answered in [the preceding Essay]; for that Authority, beyond all doubt, was the Apostolate at first and the Catholic Episcopate afterwards. But then this statement conveys no definite meaning, until it has been further explained. Suppose it were said that the House of Commons possesses this or that prerogative. There is no meaning in such a statement, unless there is first some

understanding as to what are to be accounted *decrees* of the House of Commons. It might imaginably be the constitution of that House, that no decrees are considered to possess its authority, unless two-thirds of the members present have assented; or the majority of all its members present and absent; or the majority of county members, and also separately the majority of borough members. All the world knows how cardinal a question it was in the first French Revolution, whether the States-General were to vote in one body or separately by orders. Again and again it happened, that measures were passed by the former method, which would have been promptly rejected by the latter. When you say therefore that God has invested the Catholic Episcopate with a power of teaching and ruling,—you have said nothing definite, until you further explain *how* the said Episcopate is to put forth its voice. You must explain whether you mean, that God has given to a *majority* of Bishops a power of binding the minority; or that He has given e.g. supreme power to a majority of the *Patriarchs;* or, in fact, what you *do* consider the divinely appointed method of Episcopal corporate action.

Nay, there is a still further question which requires an answer. Every one knows who are the members of the House of Commons: every one knew who were members of the States-General: but who are the Catholic Bishops? Of all the corporate ecclesiastical societies which exist at any given moment, what mark of identification has been given by God, that men may know *which* is the Catholic Church?

The first teachers and governors of the Church, however, were not the Bishops, but the Apostles. In regard to these, very much less remains to be decided. God appointed them individually, and made known such appointment to the others. Moreover, as regards their office of *teaching* the Church, each was separately infallible. Still, as regards their power of *government*, a question has to be asked concerning *them*, similar to that asked concerning the Bishops who succeeded them. Did God infallibly secure the *mutual agreement* of the Apostles in all their disciplinary decrees? or did He give to a majority power to bind the minority? or did He give to the Apostolate some different constitution altogether?

And here you see what theologians mean, when they speak about the "centre" or "principle" of Unity in the Church. Having established that the Church possesses corporate Unity essentially and indefectibly, they proceed to inquire what is the centre or principle of that Unity. This is the exact point which we are now considering.

To fix our ideas then more definitely, let us for a moment assume that hypothesis, which will most readily occur to an Englishman. Let us suppose that God had vested the supreme rule of His Church in the *majority* of those appointed by Him as her Rulers. And this hypothesis being assumed, let us express in detail what would accordingly be the Church's constitution. However strange the theory we are going to draw out, every particular in it would be quite consistent with our conclusions [in the preceding Essay],

so far as those conclusions are based on data of the early centuries.

"On every matter of discipline, a majority of the "Apostles bound the minority; and each Apostle, "being infallibly secured against mortal sin, was "infallibly secured against refusing due obedience "and originating schism. So long as they lived, the "Catholic Church was that corporate Society which "they governed by majorities. During the years when "S. John survived the other Apostles, he governed "that Church with absolute authority. When he died, "that was the Catholic Church, which had been "governed by him up to the moment of his death. "From that moment the Bishops of that Society, "deciding by a majority of their number, are infallible "in teaching and supreme in governing. One of them "indeed has the prerogative, when any urgency exists, "of collecting the Bishops into a representative "Assembly, or of taking their separate votes; and "God, by His Providence, ever secures that, when "the Church is threatened with doctrinal disaster, due "action shall be invariably taken.* On every such "occasion the majority of votes decides the point at "issue. In matters of discipline it demands universal "obedience; in matters of doctrine it is infallible; in "matters of Dogma strictly so called, i. e., in defining "this or that portion of the Deposit, its decisions bind "under pain of heresy. If any Bishop—of Rome or

* Some such supposition as this must be necessarily inserted, in order to guard against Dr. Pusey's strange conception, of a Supreme Authority which goes to sleep for centuries.

"any other—refuses acceptance of a Dogmatic Defi-
"nition, he ceases ipso facto to be a Catholic; and the
"majority can either appoint another Bishop in his
"place, or suppress the particular See altogether.
"This has been the constitution appointed by God for
"the Church since the Apostles died. The majority
"of Bishops, and not any particular Bishop, has
"been ordained by Him to be the principle of unity."

We need not say that no human being ever held this strange farrago. But its methodical exhibition will, we hope, vividly set forth, what are those questions which remain to be decided from the history of early Christianity, after the conclusions [established in the preceding Essay] have obtained acceptance. There are, of course, other imaginable non-Catholic views; as, e. g., that the majority of *Patriarchs*, or some other Patriarch than that of Rome, is the principle of Unity. But all these are (if possible) even more void of substance and of colourable foundation, than the theory drawn out above. We will throughout therefore treat this theory as the anti-Catholic alternative. We may name it "the Episcopal theory."

IV.

Among Roman Catholics, as is well known, there are two different schools,—the Ultramontane and the Gallican.* Our next step therefore should be, to state

* [Here again I need hardly remind my readers, that I was writing before the Vatican Council.]

systematically the Gallican theory. But we must profess ourselves unable to do so. Gallican theologians, it seems to us, are very far more given to attacking Ultramontane doctrine, than to expressing and vindicating their own; and we are honestly unable to understand what their own is. They all agree in representing the Holy See as the divinely-appointed centre of Unity; and we have never been able to understand how this harmonizes with their other propositions.

First as to Apostolic times. Do they consider that in matters of discipline S. Peter was subject to a majority of the Apostles? Such a conclusion seems to follow, from their tenet that an Œcumenical Council has authority over the Pope. Yet we never happened to meet with a Gallican controversialist, who has fairly stated it. Let us assume it however to be the Gallican tenet. We ask then, how such a tenet can be reconciled with the doctrine, that S. Peter was the centre of Apostolic Unity. We cannot understand what is *meant* by this latter doctrine, if the Church could possibly act *against* S. Peter's determination in her united and corporate capacity. If S. Peter were subject to a majority of the Apostles, not S. Peter, but that majority, would be the Church's principle of Unity.

We move on to the post-Apostolic period. In this period, according to Gallicans, God still established S. Peter's See as the Church's centre of Unity. Let us suppose then certain thinkers to be excommuni-

cated by that See as heretics.* Since that See is the centre of Catholic Unity, those whom the Pope avowedly *excludes* from Catholic Unity, are at once removed by God from the Visible Church; unless indeed they were external to her already. This must be held no less by a Gallican, than by an Ultramontane. Yet the former maintains that the Pope's judgment is not infallible; but that, on the contrary, the tenet held by these men may possibly be the very Truth of Revelation. According to the Gallicans then, a number of men may be removed by God from the Visible Church for no other fault, than that of holding the very Truth which God has revealed. The Gallican maintains—no one more earnestly—that the Visible Church is founded on profession of the One Faith. And yet, if he is to carry out consistently his characteristic tenet, he must admit that men may be banished by God from that Church for no other offence, than the professing that Faith in its purity and integrity.†

It would be easy to multiply similar instances of

* No one will deny, we suppose, that the Pope often *does* excommunicate heretics, without waiting for the concurrence of other Bishops. Take, e.g., the Pope's last Definition of faith [the Definition of 1854]: "Si qui secùs ac a nobis definitum est præsumpserint corde sentire, ii noverint . . . . se naufragium circa fidem passos esse, et *ab Unitate Ecclesiæ defecisse.*"

† All Gallicans deny the Pope's Infallibility in *Definitions of faith;* and we have argued therefore against them on that ground. The argument in the text would be by no means equally conclusive against any supposition (which for ourselves, of course, we utterly repudiate) that the Pope is not infallible in pronouncing *moinr* doctrinal censures, without tacit assent of the Episcopate.

self-contradiction, into which consistent Gallicans must inevitably fall. But there is no need for doing so: because we are not here writing against Gallicanism; and because we have said enough to justify us in assuming the Ultramontane Doctrine, as alone genuinely representing Roman Catholicism. In fact, without any injury to our argument, we might have ignored Gallicanism altogether. We conclusively refute Dr. Pusey, if we show that even against Ultramontanism his objections are worthless.

Yet we must not fail, in passing, to vindicate Gallicanism against Dr. Pusey's withering advocacy; an advocacy, which must be more unwelcome to Gallicans than even to ourselves. Dr. Pusey writes constantly under an impression, that Gallican tenets stand at least halfway between his own and Ultramontanism. But in truth it is hardly too much to say under present circumstances, that their practical difference from the latter is imperceptible and evanescent;* while they are separated from Dr. Pusey by a gulf impassable and unfathomable. Gallicans profess no doubt, in theory, that the Pope is subject to an Œcumenical Council. But while no such Council is sitting, they hold, as strongly as any Ultramontane, the unreserved obedience due from each Bishop to the Pope. When, in the instance already mentioned, Pius VII. deposed so many French Bishops, whoever resisted this exercise

* [This statement is extremely far from the truth, if such a writer as Mgr. Maret afterwards showed himself be accepted as representing Gallican doctrine.]

of authority was regarded, not as a Gallican, but as a schismatic. And as to the matter of ecclesiastical *teaching*, the contrast between Gallicans and Dr. Pusey is still more striking and violent. It is Dr. Pusey's position, that for the last eleven centuries the Church has exercised no power of infallibly condemning newly arisen error.* But according to Gallicans, the exercise of this power has been most active and unintermittent. According to them indeed, it was displayed on the largest scale only two years ago; viz., so soon as the "Quantâ curâ," with its appended Syllabus, had been tacitly accepted by the Catholic Episcopate.

Having drawn out then, a few pages back, what we called the "Episcopal" theory, we are now to draw out the Papal. We are to explain, from the Ultramontane standpoint, what is that principle of hierarchical Unity, which binds the Church together. We are to explain by what means, under what circumstances, the Church is capable of united and corporate action. We beg our readers to look back at the "Episcopal" theory as we presented it above; in order that they may compare it point by point with that Papal theory which we are now to exhibit. The following then is the scheme for which Ultramontanes contend.

The Apostles *taught* the Church, as being each

* See, for instance, Eirenicon, p. 84. "I see not what this question as to the present ability of the Church to meet fresh errors which may emerge, has to do with the question as to the infallible certainty of the truths which the whole Church in common has received."

separately an infallible and universal Teacher. But they *ruled* the Church *collectively*, and not separately; ruled her in virtue of their union with S. Peter. On every matter of discipline where there was opening for difference of opinion, his deliberate decision determined that of the rest, and constituted the Church's Law. The command e.g. (Acts xv. 29) to abstain from idolothyta and from blood, derived its binding force from the fact, not that the Apostolic *majority*, but that *S. Peter* approved it. Of the Prerogatives exercised by individual Apostles, some had a divine, others an ecclesiastical origin: the former were known as such by each Apostle through his Inspiration; the latter were possessed by him in virtue of S. Peter's concurrence. When S. Peter died, his Successor in his Episcopate became the centre of Ecclesiastical Unity. All those, and only those, are Catholics, who are in his communion. The Catholic Episcopate teaches and rules the Catholic Church; but it does so only in union with S. Peter's Chair. Any doctrinal Decision of Catholic Bishops, which has his express or tacit concurrence *as* a doctrinal Decision, is the Church's Decision, and so infallible. On the other hand any doctrinal Decision which has *not* his express or tacit concurrence—however numerous a Body of Bishops may have united in promulgating it—is *not* the Church's Decision, and is *not* infallible. As to government, a parallel rule holds good. Any episcopal ordinance—be the Bishops concerned in it more or fewer—is *the Church's* ordinance, where it has his express or tacit sanction; otherwise not.

From this view it follows, that the Pope is infallible in teaching ex cathedrâ; and also that his authority over the Church is ecclesiastically absolute.* For if those Bishops who act in union with him, be they more or fewer, are privileged to teach the Church infallibly and to govern her supremely,—it is plain that such Infallibility and such Supremacy are ultimately vested, not in them, but in him. It does not however at all follow, that those in every age who have held the premisses, have held explicitly the undeniable conclusion thence deducible. To this we shall return in a later part of our article.

But many a Protestant controversialist ascribes to Ultramontanes a more extreme doctrine, than they really hold. He supposes them to consider the Episcopate as the Pope's mere creation and vicegerent; just, e.g., as the Roman Congregations are. But every Catholic would repudiate such a tenet as erroneous, or even heretical. True (according to Ultramontanes) that the Pope assigns to each Bishop his diocese, and confers on him jurisdiction. Still the difference is vital between a Roman Congregation on the one hand, and Bishops on the other. The former were called into existence by the Pope yesterday, and may be abolished by him to-morrow. But he has no

* As on former occasions, we use the qualification "ecclesiastically" to avoid possible misconception. Of course, in one sense the Pope's Supremacy is not absolute, because it is restrained by God's Law within certain limits. But it is "ecclesiastically" absolute; i. e., subject to no authority on earth, within the limits within which it exists at all.

more power of abolishing the Episcopacy, than of abolishing the Papacy itself.* Moreover every Catholic Bishop,—apart altogether from his diocesan duties,—has received from God the commission of co-operating on occasion with his Brethren and with the Holy See, whether in preserving purity of faith throughout the orbis terrarum, or in enacting measures of wholesome discipline for the Church Universal. And for this very reason, the Popes, while calling themselves and called by others "Bishops of the Catholic Church," have uniformly rejected the title of "Universal Bishops." Such a name would imply, that the Pope is the only divinely-appointed Bishop; and that other Bishops are not really successors of the Apostles, but only his mere delegates and representatives.†

* An eminent theologian, whose authority is peculiarly great on all doctrines concerning *the Church*, has kindly forwarded to us the following expansion of the statement in the text. Christ established, not Episcopal *order* merely, but Episcopal *jurisdiction*. That is He ordained that there should be for ever in the Church, besides the universal Pastor, Pastors having particular flocks, with power to teach, legislate, inflict censures, &c. &c. The jus divinum assigns no limits to this jurisdiction: but it gives the Pope power of assigning limits ob justam causam; of which he is supreme judge. Yet the Pope cannot so limit this jurisdiction, as to destroy totally or in substance the idea of Episcopal jurisdiction as instituted by Christ. He cannot, e. g., say that in future no Bishop shall have any power to make any law for his diocese, inflict any censure, &c. &c. He can do this ob justam causam in particular cases, so that the particular Bishop loses Episcopal jurisdiction; but he cannot do it in so many cases as would constitute the corpus Episcoporum. [The theologian here mentioned is my kind friend, Rev. Dr. Murray, of Maynooth.]

† On this name, "Universal Bishop," see Schrader, vol. ii. pp. 89-94.

V.

Such then are the Ultramontane principles of Ecclesiastical Unity. And if Dr. Pusey's reasoning against *these* principles is worth absolutely nothing,—à fortiori it is worthless, as directed against any less consistent expression of Roman Catholic doctrine. Anglicans in general maintain, that these principles are opposed to those of Scripture; and Dr. Pusey in particular argues that they are opposed to those of Antiquity. We will consider therefore in order (1) the sayings of our Blessed Lord recorded in Scripture; (2) the history of Apostolic times, as recorded chiefly in the Acts; and (3) the testimonies of Apostolic Tradition, derivable from the first six centuries. Under each of these heads it will be necessary of course to make a very brief selection, from a very large amount of matter. But on this particular controversy,—when once the point at issue has been fairly stated, a very few facts go a very long way indeed. Or rather it may be said, that the ordinary objections will be found crumbling to pieces, through their own mutual contradiction and intrinsic rottenness.

VI.

Firstly then, our Blessed Lord's words are so far from contradicting Ultramontane doctrine, that on

the contrary they most strongly and irresistibly confirm it. This is most clearly, laboriously, and powerfully drawn out by Dr. Murray; and we earnestly recommend to our readers the truly interesting and attractive task, of studying carefully his admirable exposition. (See vol. iii. from p. 373 to 421.) We can give but a few hints of the general argument; but those hints will be amply sufficient for our purpose.

When first Simon Barjona was brought into his Saviour's presence, the very first words uttered to him by that Saviour were these: "Thou art Simon son of Jona; thou shalt be called Cephas" (John i. 42). And this declaration was considered by the Evangelist so important, that even if our Lord uttered other words on that occasion, they have not been reported. The very first thing which happened to this Apostle at the outset of his Christian life, was to be designated as the Church's future Rock. At a later period, in reward for his divinely-inspired confession of his Lord's Eternal Sonship, the prediction of change of name was accomplished. Once more Jesus called him by his birth-name; and once more contrasted it with that which he was henceforth to bear (Matt. xvi. 17, 18). Now also for the first time the significance of that name was unfolded. We cannot better exhibit the obvious and unforced sense of our Lord's words, than by quoting Dean Stanley. Perhaps no other living Englishman is more imbued to the very core with detestation of the sacerdotal principle, than is that otherwise amiable and gentle writer. Where the Dean

of Westminster therefore supports Petrine doctrine, we may be very sure that by no possible ingenuity can Scripture be fairly interpreted otherwise. Thus runs his comment on our Lord's words. In them, he says,—

"The Church . . . is represented as a house; not a temple so much as a beleaguered fortress, according to the figure frequently used by the prophets immediately before the Captivity. . . . It is of this fortress . . . that Peter is to be the foundation-rock. *It was no longer to be reared on the literal rock of Zion, but on a living man.* . . . And against this new theocracy . . . *as so founded and supported* . . . it is declared that the gates of the grave shall not prevail. . . . The *promise is clear* that, vehement as may be the struggle for its very existence which the . . . Church will have to maintain, yet *such will be the strength of Peter* that, through Christ's blessing, it will survive the shock triumphantly."*

As to the rest of this most remarkable prophecy, we can but refer to Dr. Murray (pp. 383-396). We will here only add that it acquires peculiar force, from the circumstances under which it was uttered; from the close connection which it implies, between our Lord's own dignity and that of his future Vicegerent. This is excellently expressed in the Dean's paraphrase: "Thou hast told Christ what He is, and He

* "Essays on the Apostolic Age," pp. 121-3. The Dean preposterously prefaces the substantive "Church" here by the adjective "early," as his only means of avoiding the Roman Catholic conclusion. What syllable is there in our Lord's words, on which to found so amazing an interpolation?

tells thee what thou art" (p. 116). It would appear, moreover (p. 118) that this name Cephas or Peter was now borne for the first time. Even Jesus and Mary were already Jewish names. But Christ invented (so to speak) a new name, in order adequately to honour this great Apostle, and to express with due emphasis his office in the Church. Then consider how completely he became identified with this new name. S. Paul, e.g., never once calls him Simon, but invariably either Cephas or Peter; so as ever to be reminding those Christians whom he has himself converted, that it is another, and not himself, who is the Church's foundation-Rock.

It is with great reluctance that we pass over the rest of Dr. Murray's irrefragable argument. And in particular we should have been glad to ponder with due attention that most significant passage, Luke xxii. 23–32. We must pass over however this critical passage. We must content ourselves with a brief reference to that other illustrious occasion, on which our Lord at once fulfilled His prediction and performed His promise, by conferring on S. Peter his great dignity. In John xxi. 15-17, He expressly distinguishes S. Peter from the other Apostles—again, and for the third time, giving him his full birth-name, Simon Barjona—and endows him with the duty and the prerogative of being Shepherd to the whole flock.

Our conclusions far outstrip the necessities of our argument. Our argument, however, may be thus drawn out. We assume throughout, what we trust we established in [the preceding Essay]. We assume

that the Church is essentially one corporate Society. We next then proceed to inquire, what is her principle or centre of unity. If, as Roman Catholics maintain, S. Peter and his Successors constitute that centre, then the utterances of our blessed Lord are permitted to retain their one obvious and intelligible sense. Peter is that Rock, in whose strength the Church will be supported against the attacks of Satan; He is the one supreme Shepherd on earth of Christ's lambs and sheep. On the Roman Catholic hypothesis,—in proportion as our Lord's sayings are carefully and intently pondered,—in that proportion they will be found to contain an ever-increasing profoundness, richness, beauty, variousness of signification. But if God had appointed the principle of Unity to reside,—not in S. Peter and his Successors,—but in a majority of Apostles first and of Bishops afterwards,—then these sayings would be absolutely unintelligible, or rather plainly false. The Church's Rock would not be one Apostle, but a majority of Apostles; and the same majority would exercise a shepherd's office even over S. Peter himself.

We are next to inquire, whether Christ said anything in an opposite direction. No one, we reply, has ever so much as alleged one single text, in which He made the most distant allusion to any principle of Unity in the Church other than S. Peter. As regards His various mentions of the Apostolic office,—in the first place no candid person will allege, that they are expressed at all so emphatically, so prominently, so pointedly, as His mentions of S. Peter's Primacy.

This however is quite unimportant to our argument. What concerns us is, that all such pronouncements of our Lord refer without exception to the Apostles' *collective* authority over the Christian flock. They are vitally important, as solemnly proclaiming that absolute Supremacy over the Church which was to be possessed by the Apostolic College. True; but they have no bearing whatever on *the internal constitution and mutual relations* of the Apostolic College. In the Apostolic passages He declares, that the Apostles and their Successors to the end of time shall teach and govern the Church. And in the Petrine passages He further declares, that S. Peter and *his* Successors are to perform the same office in quite a special sense. There is nothing whatever therefore in the former class, which has the slightest tendency to clash with what is said in the latter.

Our historical refutation of Dr. Pusey would have remained so far complete, had we merely shown that our Lord's various utterances are fully reconcileable with the Roman theory. But we have established much more than this; we have established that they are *not* reconcileable with any other. We have not therefore contented ourselves with answering an objection; but have added a second and important argument for our thesis.

VII.

We are next to view the Church of the Apostles in practical action. And for that purpose we open

the Acts. It is admitted by Dr. Pusey and by all with whom we are here concerned, that each of the Apostles was individually infallible in *teaching*. We are now inquiring what was their principle of Unity, whenever they acted corporately in matters of *discipline*. And it follows from what has already been said, that there are three different alternatives which specially demand our consideration. (1) The Apostles may have imaginably received inspiration on matters of discipline, no less than of doctrine; so that harmony was at once secured for their action, without argument or deliberation. (2) Their collective decision may have been determined in each case by a *majority* of Apostles. (3) The Roman doctrine may be true: viz., that they acted corporately, precisely so far as they acted in union with S. Peter; and consequently that he possessed over them a real Primacy of authority. Now the second of these alternatives is negatived at once, by the most superficial appeal to facts. If God originally placed the Church under the government of a majority of Apostolic votes, it was implied by that very fact that the Apostles were to remain together throughout their lives; whereas in fact, after a few years of united government, they separated to preach the Gospel in distant lands. By far the most critical and important act of Apostolic discipline was that promulgated at the Council of Jerusalem; and yet at that Council only three of the original Apostles were present. This alternative then must be at once put out of account. It is plain that a central government, exercised in union by the

collective Apostolic Body, was but a temporary fact, a transient feature, in the Church's early history.

On the other hand there are the strongest indications, in the Acts, of S. Peter's Primacy.

"It was he who arranged the filling up of the Apostolic College, through Matthias's election. He fixed the form of election, confining it to those who had been companions of Christ, and witnesses of His teaching and acts. He takes up the word before the people and the Sanhedrim, and works the first miracle for confirming Christ's Resurrection. The punishment of Ananias and Sapphira,—the anathema on Simon Magus, the first heretic,—the first visiting and confirming the Churches suffering under persecution, were all his acts. If he was *sent* with John by the Apostolic College to the new converts at Samaria, he was himself member and president of that College. So the Jews *sent* their High Priest Ismael to Nero; and Ignatius says that the neighbouring Churches in Asia had *sent*, some their Bishops, some their Priests and Deacons." *

And a still stronger fact was that to which we have already referred; viz., his very name of Peter. While all the other Apostles were called by well-known Jewish names, he was called by one hitherto absolutely unheard of: a name which at once expressed the function, as quite peculiar to its bearer, of standing as the Church's one foundation-Rock.

At the same time, as was to be expected, there was

* Dr. Döllinger on "Christianity and Church," English translation, vol. i. pp. 101–2. See this brought out at length by Mr. Allies, "St. Peter, his Name and Office."

in general most profound and immediate Apostolic agreement, as to the measures which the Church's welfare demanded. And from this obvious fact it follows, that the general current of early history is hardly less consistent with the first, than with the last, of the three alternative theories which we mentioned above. By far the greater portion of the Acts, we say, would fully harmonize with a supposition, that there was no need for mutual conference and deliberation; but that the Holy Ghost on each occasion inspired severally all the Apostles with a clear view of what suited such occasion. There is one most critical period of history however, which places the general principles of the Apostolic government in a far clearer light than any other; and which at once decides the present question. We refer, of course, to the Judaizing controversy, on which we spoke at some length in January.* We will here refer to those particulars alone, which concern our present subject, and which we did not there expressly consider.

Now firstly (xv. 36), before the general Assembly of Christians came together at Jerusalem, the five Apostles and the local Presbyters met separately "to see concerning the matter";† and the Decisions pro-

* [See my "Essays on Devotional and Scriptural Subjects," pp. 277–303.]

† S. Luke's narrative includes two different meetings. For (1) the Apostles and Presbyters came together; and (2) after S. Peter's speech, *the whole multitude* was silent (ver. 12). Then the final assent was given (ver. 22) by the Apostles and Presbyters and *whole Church.*

mulgated at the larger meeting were the result of this previous deliberation. On what did such deliberation turn? Evidently not on the doctrinal question. For (putting aside all other objections to such a theory) S. Peter (ver. 10) at the larger meeting expressed amazement that, after the fact of Cornelius, any doctrinal doubt could remain even among private Christians. This previous deliberation then had been on the disciplinary measures needed for the crisis; and the Apostles decided on those, which S. James promulgated at the larger Assembly (ver. 20).

These commands were at once promulgated, as binding the conscience of every Christian whom they concerned, and as having the Holy Ghost's full authority (vv. 28–9). Here then you have facts which bear most importantly on the present inquiry. The law finally adopted was not miraculously suggested by the Holy Ghost to the mind of each separate Apostle; on the contrary, it resulted from the Apostles' concert and deliberation, not only with each other, but with the Jerusalem Presbyters. On the other hand, although only five out of the twelve Apostles concurred therein, it was accepted as obligatory by every one without question. The Apostles then were accounted to act corporately, even though no more were present or were summoned, than a minority of their number. But what reason can be alleged for this by a controversialist of any school, except only that they were acting in union with S. Peter?

There is no one portion however of Scripture history, from which Protestants have derived so many

objections to S. Peter's Primacy, as from the Judaizing controversy. These objections chiefly concern the relations between him and St. Paul; and we devoted an article in January to their detailed refutation.* One remains to be considered here, because it is founded on the position not of S. Paul, but of S. James. We will begin by stating it at the best advantage:—"If "S. Peter had possessed a Primacy of authority, it is "quite impossible that S. James, not he, should have "presided at the Council of Jerusalem, and promul-"gated the Apostolic decree. But S. James assuredly "did occupy this place. It was he who finally "summed up the proceedings, and pronounced the "'Ego judico' (ver. 19), which was carried into effect." The objection possesses on the surface much plausibility; but it is dissipated when you look closely at facts. Its fallacy consists in its ignoring the circumstance, that there were two Apostolic pronouncements; viz. (1) the Definition of faith, and (2) the disciplinary Decree. S. Peter very suitably uttered the former, and S. James very suitably uttered the latter. "Ego judico" undoubtedly means, as the objector alleges, "I judge in my own name and that of my brethren;" "I pronounce the Apostolic judgment." But then (as ver. 20 demonstratively proves) this judgment was not doctrinal but disciplinary. If one may indulge in conjecture, it would seem far more probable than not, that it was S. James who proposed

* [See the Sixth of my "Essays on Devotional and Scriptural Subjects."]

this measure at the preliminary meeting. At all events his position, as specially representing the Jewish element in the Church, made it obviously suitable that he should pronounce what had been decreed in protection of the Jewish Christians. But if you look carefully at his speech, you will find that, so far from professing to promulgate a Definition of faith, on the contrary he refers (ver. 14) to S. Peter as having already done so. While on the other hand, so soon as S. Peter had spoken, "tacuit omnis multitudo" (ver. 12), and the voice of controversy was no longer heard.

We thus then sum up our argument from Apostolic history. If the facts of that history were found fully consistent with the theory of S. Peter's Supremacy, the Anglican objection would be entirely refuted; and our demonstration of that Supremacy would remain untouched. But the case is much stronger. Not only the facts of that history are reconcileable with the Roman theory, but they are not reconcileable with any other which has been so much as suggested. Just then as, in considering our Lord's words, we obtained a second independent argument for the Roman conclusion,—so now, in considering Apostolic history, we have a *third* independent argument on the same side.

From Scripture we proceed to Antiquity; from Apostolic to post-Apostolic times. And it is on these times indeed, and not on Apostolic, that Dr. Pusey lays his principal stress. Before entering however on our direct argument, we must of necessity

touch briefly a matter, which in itself belongs to the discussion [contained in the preceding Essay], though it has a close bearing on the present question. Read those most impressive patristic passages on ecclesiastical Unity, which Mr. Allies has brought together in the work we name at the head of our article. He begins with S. Clement, who was Pope before S. John's death; and he carries the series down uninterrupted to the time of S. Augustine. No one Doctrine, it is manifest, more absolutely possessed the mind of the Fathers,—not even the Doctrine of our Lord's Incarnation and Resurrection,—than the Doctrine, that visible and indefectible Unity is an essential attribute of the Church. Catholic students of Church history open Dr. Pusey's pages with a kind of bewilderment, wondering what solution he can possibly attempt, where facts are so plain and unmistakeable. His principal replies are two. They are totally inconsistent indeed with each other; but are not the less welcome to a writer, whom his greatest admirers will hardly call logical or clear-headed, and who is in the unfortunate case of having literally no position. Sometimes then Dr. Pusey admits that God placed the Church, as one whole, under the supreme government of the Catholic Episcopate. But having made this admission he proceeds to imply, that God made no provision whatever for the permanent exercise of this government; and that in fact, during more than one-half of the Church's duration, her Supreme Government has been totally in abeyance. Then on a sudden, as though dimly perceiving the imbecility of such a theory

as this, he boldly resorts to the original Tractarian stronghold;* the (supposed) independent authority given by God to each individual Bishop. "Each Bishop," he says, wresting S. Cyprian's words to his own most anti-Cyprianic purpose, "orders and directs "his own proceedings; having hereafter to give ac- "count of his intentions," not to any superior authority on earth, but "only to the Lord." This latter view, we imagine,—as far as so strangely-constituted a mind can be considered to hold any view whatever—is the theory to which he himself spontaneously gravitates.

We will here then offer a comment on this latter theory. We say confidently, that there is no tenet whatever more absolutely and more obviously disproved than this, by every page of ecclesiastical history from first to last. We say confidently that it would have been as simply amazing to a Catholic of the Second Century, as to a Roman Catholic of the Nineteenth. From the very death of the Apostles, individual Bishops were controlled at every turn by Episcopal Synods, as Dr. Pusey himself expressly testifies. Turn to his work called "The Councils of the Church" (Parker, 1857). He tells us (page 51) that these Synods were held "throughout the Second Century;" i.e. from the time which immediately succeeded S. John's death. Moreover he had already said (p. 49), that they were "the Law of the Church;" and that an Emperor's prohibition of them forced Christians to break the laws either of the State or the

* See the preceding Essay, p. 333.

Church. Every Bishop who voted at these Synods, —every Bishop who considered his conscience bound by their Decrees,—testified a Doctrine directly opposed to Dr. Pusey's. Every such Bishop testified the Doctrine, that individual Bishops are *not* invested by God with an authority ecclesiastically supreme.

Now the connection of all this with our present subject is manifest enough. Whence did these Episcopal Synods derive *their own* commission? Had God given to *them* an ecclesiastically supreme authority? Dr. Pusey considers that no change took place in this respect down to the age of S. Augustine. He says of that period (Eirenicon, p. 67) that "the African Canons stood on *their own* authority, as did those of *all other Churches;* the Greek, the Spanish, the Gallican, and the British." Does he hold then, that God gave to each National Synod supreme authority over all the Christians of that nation? Does he hold that, by God's original appointment, the African Church was one corporate society; the Greek a second; the Spanish a third; the Gallican a fourth; and the British a fifth? If he do not mean this, his words are unintelligible. If he do mean it, he has here broached a third theory wilder than even his other two. One understands the *Tractarian* statement—amazing though it be—that S. Peter's full power has been transmitted to every individual Bishop. But who in the world ever dreamed that it was transmitted, not indeed to every individual Bishop, but to every National Primate? The Episcopate is at least of Divine institution. But Dr. Pusey will not himself maintain, that the office

of National Primate is immediately appointed by God.

At all events, every one with whom we are now in controversy—every one who admits indeed the Church's indefectible corporate Unity, but denies that Rome is the principle of that Unity,—must entirely agree with us as to these Episcopal Synods. He must say, just as we do, that they derived their commission from *the tacit assent of the Church's Supreme Authority.* If God had vested this authority in the majority of Bishops, it is plain that their votes could not be taken on each occasion, while persecutions distracted and convulsed the Church. If on the contrary (as Roman Catholics hold) the Supreme Pontiff possessed this authority, it is equally plain that he could not duly and fully exercise it, at a time when he was himself the most prominent object of those persecutions.* Nor again could he duly exercise that authority which Roman Catholics consider him to have possessed—however undeniable might be his possession of that authority—at a time when communication was always difficult, and often impossible, between him and distant portions of the Church. The Popes acted, precisely as it was their *duty* to act on the supposition of their possessing a Divinely-given Supremacy. They well knew that the Catholic Episcopate had received from Apostolic times the very same body of Doctrine,—the very same principles and rules of

* See some admirable remarks of Dr. Murray, vol. iii. pp. 615-618.

discipline,—which they had themselves inherited. So long therefore as no intolerable evil resulted to the Church from their forbearance, they gladly saw God's work done for them by local authorities, whether diocesan, provincial, or national. But when any serious emergency arose—especially when doctrinal purity was exposed to any peril—they at once peremptorily interfered. We need no other testimony for this fact, than that of the Protestant world itself. For its stock charge against the ante-Nicene Popes is their uniform exhibition of "an aggressive, usurping, domineering spirit." No candid reader of history can possibly doubt that the Popes did exhibit an aggressive, usurping, domineering spirit,—*unless* it be true that Christ had given them authority over His whole flock.

For various reasons,—which we have not space here to recount,—this comparative rarity of intervention, on the part of the Church's Supreme Authority, was by no means so calamitous in those early centuries, as it would have been at a later period. Still it was necessarily a serious evil. And our present opponents (whoever they are) must hold as strongly as we do, that as soon as peace was restored to the Church, a certain change of discipline became of great importance. All who hold that the whole Church is placed under any one Supreme Authority, must admit that the ante-Nicene method of government, though required by the time, was abnormal and irregular. Dr. Pusey says most truly (p. 73) that "what *was* not of divine right cannot *become* so." But he has failed to perceive,

that a power may have been most truly *given* by God, which nevertheless cannot be wisely *exercised* until the favourable moment shall arise.

This preliminary difficulty then being easily solved, we are brought to the point really at issue. Dr. Pusey considers those centuries which elapsed before the Photian Schism as a kind of golden age; and he fully admits that, during those centuries, the Church's corporate Unity was inviolate. We argued [in the preceding Essay]—we venture to think most conclusively—that this Unity is not the Church's "happiest condition," but her essential and unalterable constitution. We are now occupied in inquiring, what is the centre and principle of this Unity. We began our article by giving (what we account) irrefragable proof, that *the Holy See* is this divinely-established centre of Unity. But Dr. Pusey alleges that the facts of his golden age are irreconcileable with such a supposition. This allegation therefore we now proceed to consider. We will treat separately (1) the ante-Nicene and (2) the subsequent centuries; because of the signal difference between the circumstances of those two periods.

VIII.

But firstly, considerable light is thrown on our subject by the Apostolic history itself. If God originally entrusted the Church's government to a majority of voting Apostles, a strong presumption would arise,

that He entrusted it after their death to a majority of voting Bishops. On the contrary, if the Apostles were commissioned to exercise that government, not as represented by a majority, but as acting in union with S. Peter,—then there is every reason to expect that post-Apostolic Bishops are corporately united on a similar principle. And there is moreover one very remarkable fact, conspicuous on the surface of Church history from the very first, which strikingly confirms this antecedent presumption. To this fact (very characteristically) our prejudiced opponent nowhere makes the slightest reference; but none the less there it is. The later Bishops *in general* were regarded as Successors of the Apostles in general; but hardly ever was an *individual Bishop* spoken of as Successor of an individual Apostle, excepting only to S. Peter. The instances e.g. are most rare of the Bishop of Jerusalem being called Successor to S. James; whereas the whole Catholic world concurred from the very first in naming the Bishop of Rome as Successor to S. Peter. This fact alone suffices to establish, that his office is, in one respect or another, different *in kind* from that of any other Bishop.

Now as to ante-Nicene times in particular. We assume from [the preceding Essay] that in those times the Catholic Episcopate, acting corporately, had supreme power over the Church. But (as we have so often said) this proposition is simply unmeaning, until you have explained *how* the Episcopate acted corporately; what was its principle of Unity. Roman Catholics maintain that the Holy See was this prin-

ciple of Unity; and they point to various facts, which imply the existence of such a tradition in the earliest post-Apostolic times. There are very many facts, we say, which undeniably indicate the Roman doctrine, and not a few testimonies which distinctly affirm it. We shall not be expected to draw these out in detail. On this head we can refer to Catholic controversial works; but in truth, as will soon be seen, the scope of our argument in no way requires such detail. We will only mention, that every single Father, who speaks of Bishops at all, speaks also of the Roman Primacy. And we will cite the well-known passages of SS. Irenæus and Cyprian. S. Irenæus, as F. Schrader excellently draws out (vol. i. p. 81), expresses these four propositions: (1) the *fact* of the universal communion [in faith] of all Catholics with the Roman Church: (2) the *necessity* of this communion: (3) the *cause* both of the fact and of the obligation, derived from this circumstance; viz., that the Roman Church is at once a centre round which the faithful coalesce, and also a model in Doctrine to all other Churches: (4) the *reason* of these various Prerogatives; consisting in the peculiar "principalitas" which she possesses. See also Dr. Murray's admirable exposition of the passage from p. 558 to p. 563, of vol. iii. So much on S. Irenæus.* S. Cyprian, who (as we said in [the preceding Essay]) is so volu-

* [I may be allowed to remind my readers of two articles on S. Irenæus (January 1875, July 1876), which I think were among the greatest ornaments of the "Dublin Review" under my Editorship. They were by the Rev. W. E. Addis.]

minous and energetic in behalf of the Church's indivisible Unity,—expresses very distinctly the divinely-given *principle* of Unity. "It is from the Chair of Peter," he says, from that "*principal* Church" that "*hath issued the Unity of the Priesthood.*" "*Thy communion,*" O Cornelius of Rome, "is *the Unity and the Charity of the Catholic Church.*"

But it is really wasting time and space to pursue such testimonies; for our argument only requires us to express the safest of all imaginable propositions. Certain Christians, we say, in the three first centuries regarded the Roman Bishop as having quite a different position from other Bishops, in keeping together that corporate Society called the Church. Whereas the Church is one edifice built up by God,—certain Christians considered S. Peter (in himself and in his Successors) to be the Rock on which that one edifice was founded. Whereas the Church is by divine ordinance indefectibly and corporately one,—certain Christians considered communion with the Holy See to be the appointed principle of Unity.

On the other hand (as we have so often observed) if the divinely-appointed principle of Unity be *not* the Papacy, it must be some other which admits of being named. God, e.g., may have ordained that *the majority of Bishops* is infallible in teaching and supreme in governing. We are next therefore to inquire, what ante-Nicene testimonies or indications can be adduced, for some other principle of Unity *distinct* from the Papal. And to this inquiry the answer is most simple. Not one controversialist, however learned, has so much

as suggested *one* such testimony or indication. Our argument therefore is most direct. That the ante-Nicene Fathers ascribe to the Church corporate Unity as an essential attribute,—is not less certain on the very surface of history, than that modern Roman Catholics ascribe to her that attribute. But if God endowed the Church with indefectible corporate Unity, it follows by absolute necessity that He endowed her with some *principle* of Unity. Moreover if the Apostles taught the former, they taught also the latter. You approach the ante-Nicene writers, who lived nearest to the Apostles, that you may learn from them what *was* the Apostolic Doctrine on the principle of Unity. You find in these writers various concurrent testimonies, and a large number of concurrent facts, stating or implying the *Roman* principle of Unity; while as to any other, different from this, there is nowhere so much as the slightest hint of such a one having ever been heard of. The Roman therefore, and no other, must have been the Doctrine taught by the Apostles. Here also we must repeat what has been said on two earlier occasions in this article. If we merely showed that ante-Nicene facts are *reconcileable* with the Roman theory, we should have done absolutely all which our argument requires; for our direct proof of that theory rests (as has been seen) on grounds altogether different. But we have done a great deal more than was necessary for our argument. We have shown, not merely that ante-Nicene facts are *reconcileable* with the Roman theory, but also that (even considered exclusively in their own mutual light)

they suffice to establish it. They thus furnish a fourth independent argument for our conclusion.

We are next to investigate a period, which may be expected to determine most unmistakeably the point at issue: that of the early Œcumenical Councils. When Catholic Bishops assemble from every part of Christendom, to exercise in common their divinely-given office of teaching and governing the Church, —then it is that one may expect confidently to find some clear exhibition of the corporate principle, which unites them into one body. We will take the four first Councils as representing the rest; because they are those on which Dr. Pusey and all Anglicans lay their greatest stress.

For reasons which will presently appear, we begin with the Council of Ephesus. We would earnestly draw Dr. Pusey's attention to the facts of this Council, as brought out by Dr. Murray (vol. iii. pp. 577-586).* We will here most briefly insert a few relevant particulars. Pope S. Celestine thus charged his Legates, on their departure for Ephesus:—"If a discussion should arise, *you are to declare judgment on the sentiments of the Bishops;* not yourselves to undergo a trial." S. Cyril presided over the Council, avowedly as S. Celestine's vicegerent. The Ephesine Fathers pronounced Nestorius's condemnation, "*being compelled thereto* through the sacred Canons and *the Letter of our most holy father and fellow minister*

* F. Harper also treated this Council with especial vigour in a sermon which he published separately.

(συλλειτούργου) Celestine" (p. 580). The Roman Legates, who accidentally did not arrive till after this condemnation had been pronounced, produced a Letter from S. Celestine, stating that he sent them for the purpose of *carrying into effect what he had already determined:* nor did any one present dream of taking exception to this Letter (p. 581). Lastly Philip, one of them, declared—and all the assembled Bishops gave tacit assent to the declaration—that "S. Peter was chief or head of the Apostles, and *the foundation of the Catholic Church;* and that *to this time and always he lives and exercises judgment in the person of his Successors*" (p. 583). No one then can doubt, that the Ephesine Fathers considered the bond of their corporate action to be their union with S. Peter's Successor.

As to the Council of Chalcedon, there can be no need for more than extracting a few well-known passages, from the letter addressed to Pope S. Leo by the Bishops there assembled. "Thou didst preside over us," they say, "*as Head over the members.*" It is "thy Apostolic Sanctity" to whom "*the custody of the Vineyard was entrusted by the Saviour*" (p. 593).* Certainly the very last thing these Bishops could have imagined would be, that the Pope was subject to an Episcopal majority; or indeed to any other ecclesiastical authority whatever.

We now go back to the second Œcumenical Council,

* A most graphic picture of this Council is given, and its Papal spirit most clearly pointed out, by F. Newman in his Essay on Development. [New Edition: pp. 307-312.]

—that of Constantinople. Now this was not intrinsically an Œcumenical Council at all.* As Dr. Pusey points out (p. 90), it was in itself only an Eastern Council; and its commission therefore was derived (as Dr. Pusey will admit) from the express or tacit approval of the Church's Supreme Authority. Moreover, as Dr. Murray mentions (vol. ii. p. 505), no Acts whatever are extant of its history. Indeed there are very few remains of any kind: viz., a letter to the Emperor; seven Canons; its well-known Profession of Faith; and a Synodical Letter. Even had it left behind a far more copious record,—since it did not profess to be a general gathering of Catholic Bishops, there was no reason to expect from it any distinct testimony on the question before us. It has nothing whatever to say, that we can see, either for or against the Roman principle of Unity.

As to the Nicene Council, there is a similar scarcity of authentic information; though not quite to the same extent. Dr. Murray (vol. iii. pp. 675-679) has given, we think, a moral demonstration of the fact, that Hosius presided as Pope S. Silvester's vicegerent. But there is no reason at all for insisting on this. It is absolutely certain from documentary evidence, that Hosius signed first in order; then two Roman Presbyters as representing the Pope; and then (*after* these three) the Patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem. It is also documentarily certain, that no

* To use Dr. Murray's expression, it was Œcumenical "in exitu," but not "in convocatione" or "in celebratione" (vol. iii. pp. 173-177).

other Bishop *except* the Roman signed by representatives at all. To take all this then on the lowest ground, it points in some degree to a conclusion, that the Nicene Bishops regarded Papal co-operation as their principle of united action. The recorded fact, we say, of the Nicene Council point in *some* degree (greater or less) towards the *Roman* principle of Unity; while as to any *other* principle of Unity distinct from this, no such theory has ever been so much as ascribed to them.

And the same may be said of all this period, which we said of the preceding. Its writers speak indeed far more frequently and more emphatically on the Primacy than did their predecessors, as having come more clearly to see its vital importance. On the other hand, no controversialists have adduced from that period—any more than from the preceding—one single Father, whom they even allege as holding theoretically any principle of Unity *distinct* from the Papal. Nay, we may add that no anti-Roman controversialists have themselves so much as suggested or put into words any such imaginable theory. The conclusion then which follows, as to the *later* portion of Dr. Pusey's golden age, is precisely the same with that which followed as to the *earlier*.

IX.

We are next to consider broadly and generally the various historical objections to Papal Doctrine, which

may be found scattered confusedly and unmethodically up and down Dr. Pusey's book. And first of all we must protest emphatically against his constant implication, that if he adduces one single fact of the past which Roman Catholics are unable completely to elucidate, he has a right to intone the chant of victory. In one sense indeed our protest is superfluous; for certainly he has not adduced any fact, which is not capable of ready and complete explanation. But F. Harper showed, in his Essay on the Immaculate Conception, how far stronger are the apparent historical objections to that doctrine, than any which had occurred to Dr. Pusey's mind. And we cannot therefore feel any confidence, that far stronger apparent objections are not adducible against Papal Prerogatives, than any to be found in the Eirenicon. We protest therefore vehemently, at starting, against the above-mentioned implication. On what imaginable ground has Dr. Pusey a right to expect, that every fact of ecclesiastical history, which has come down to us at all, shall have come down to us in so accurate and complete a shape, as to be capable of full explanation? Is this the case then with secular history? Will Dr. Pusey tell his readers who wrote the letters of Junius? or who was the Man in the Iron Mask? or who built the Round Towers of Ireland? Are there not absolutely unanswerable objections to every theory on these subjects, which has hitherto been adduced? Yet Dr. Pusey will admit, we suppose, that there is some real solution of the difficulty, though he may not happen to know it. Considering indeed the vast

extent of ecclesiastical history and the singular definiteness of Roman Doctrine,—it is a matter for real amazement, that there are so few facts of the past which give difficulty to Roman Catholics.

Dr. Pusey, of all men, should shrink from so reckless a mode of reasoning. How admirable is his zeal for the doctrine of Scriptural Inspiration! Yet suppose he were treated by a rationalist as he treats the Roman Catholic Church. "Explain to me at once," such is his opponent's peremptory summons, "how this "text is consistent with that, or with the facts of "history. Harmonize the Evangelists as to the day "on which our Lord celebrated the Paschal Feast; as "to the exact hour at which He died on the Cross; as "to the exact order of His subsequent appearances. "Do all this, or else confess that your cherished doc-"trine is an empty pretension, excogitated by priestly "tyrants for the purpose of reducing men into intel-"lectual slavery." Yet such is Dr. Pusey's tone in dealing with Catholics. "Explain this very moment," he says peremptorily, "the case of Liberius; of "Apiarius; of Honorius. Do all this; or else confess "that the whole series of Popes pursued an unholy "project of encroachment and usurpation, with a view "to their own aggrandizement."

The second particular which we criticize, is his strange assumption, that everything ever said by any single Father proceeds necessarily from Apostolic Tradition. We will illustrate this habit of thought from the case on which he lays more stress perhaps than on any other: we mean the contest between

SS. Stephen and Cyprian. S. Stephen claimed, it appears, a certain right of authoritative interference, on the question of the Baptism conferred by heretics; and S. Cyprian repudiated such interference. "Behold," exclaims Dr. Pusey, "here is the Pope claiming an authority unknown to Tradition; as is evident from S. Cyprian's testimony." Why, by the same way of reasoning you could prove the exact contradictory. S. Stephen, we suppose, was not the less a Father, because he was also a Pope. On Dr. Pusey's principles then, Dr. Pusey is at once seen manifestly to be in the wrong. On these principles we might at once argue, from the very fact of S. Stephen *claiming* this authority, that Tradition sanctioned that claim. And indeed, even on the surface, there would be stronger ground for this argument than for Dr. Pusey's; because Dr. Pusey himself holds that S. Cyprian was completely wrong on the Baptismal question. On one most important matter of Doctrine, Dr. Pusey considers that S. Stephen interpreted Tradition rightly and S. Cyprian wrongly. Surely then this is some warrant for assuming, that on *other* matters also S. Stephen's acquaintance with Tradition was more accurate than S. Cyprian's.

Dr. Pusey will naturally ask us to suggest some method, for discriminating Apostolic Tradition from the private opinion of an individual Father. This is far too large a matter to be treated episodically; but we will venture to lay down one simple rule, which will serve for every single difficulty adduced in the Eirenicon. We would thus therefore address Dr.

Pusey: If you think that S. Cyprian testified to some Apostolic Tradition which S. Stephen opposed,—we have a right before all things to hear from you, *what* that Tradition *was*. You are confident, it seems, (1) that S. Cyprian's view of the Church's constitution differed essentially from S. Stephen's; and (2) that his, and not the other, is that which the Apostles taught. Please then to explain—surely it must be very easy for you to do so—what *was* S. Cyprian's view, thus received traditionally from the Apostles. Did he consider, as in many parts of your book you seem to think he did, that every Bishop is by God's Law ecclesiastically supreme over his own diocese? On the contrary, no one took a more prominent part than he in those Episcopal Synods, which were constantly controlling individual Bishops. Moreover, at one period of his life, when he was contemplating (not the question of Baptism, but) this very question of the Church's constitution,—he distinctly laid down a Doctrine entirely contradictory to that with which you credit him. He distinctly laid down, that all Bishops are placed by God under one Supreme Ecclesiastical Government.* You will reply at once, that he considered *the Catholic Episcopate* as the supreme government; and so *we* say also. But we proceed to ask you, what he held to be the *principle of Unity* in that Episcopate. Did he think, e.g., that a *majority* of voting Bishops governed the Church? that the Bishop of Rome was subject to that majority?

* See [the preceding Essay, pp. 346–349].

Or did S. Cyprian think that a majority of Patriarchs, or of Primates, or of Metropolitans, was endowed by God with supreme authority? Not one syllable can you quote from him, which would lead any one to dream that any such thought even once entered his mind. Most certainly therefore the principles, on which he acted in resisting S. Stephen, did not rest on any Apostolic Tradition concerning the Church's constitution. Why is this so certain? For this simple reason. You cannot so much as *name* any doctrine whatever on the Church's constitution,—of which you will even *allege* that it is Apostolic, and of which you will at the same time allege that it was held by S. Cyprian. You are driven yourself to explain that Saint's actions, not by ascribing to him any definite and traditional anti-Roman doctrine, but by some different method altogether.

The principle here indicated seems to us fundamentally important, in appreciating the various controversies which have been raised on the significance of this or that fact in Ecclesiastical History. We will make no apology therefore for pursuing the subject a little further, and expressing it with somewhat more generality. Objectors allege some given statement or act of some given Father, as showing that the present Roman Catholic doctrine on the Church's constitution differs from that held in the early centuries. Let us assume then that this particular statement or act *is* one, which no devout Roman Catholic of a later period would have uttered or done. Now this circumstance may *conceivably* arise from the fact, that the

Father in question held some doctrine on the Church's constitution, different from the Roman. But the circumstance *may* merely arise from the fact, that he made some practical mistake, as to the *bearing* of that Doctrine which in theory he held. Now if the latter alternative be the true one,—not only such Father bears no *adverse* testimony against Roman Doctrine, but he is one among that cloud of witnesses who positively support that Doctrine. Objectors therefore —if they are to make any way whatever—must allege the former alternative. They must allege that this Father held in *theory* some positive doctrine on the Church's constitution, different from the Roman. We prefer to them therefore the very humble request, that they will specify precisely *what* that doctrine is. If they fail in doing this, their objection ipso facto collapses. And yet we protest we cannot call to mind one single case, in which an Anglican controversialist has even attempted to do what we desiderate.

X.

And now for a general view of Dr. Pusey's own historical objections. These are divisible into two main classes. Firstly he adduces various instances, in which this or that Father seems (as Dr. Pusey thinks) by no means to have held the full Roman Catholic Doctrine on Papal Prerogatives. And secondly he adduces various instances, in which Roman Catholics themselves (he considers) must admit, that Popes have in

fact taught erroneously ex cathedrâ. These two classes of objections differ from each other essentially, as to the kind of answer that can be given them. On the first class it is very easy to lay down certain general principles, which apply in common to all, and which may readily be adapted to each individual case. But to the other class of objections—as is evident from its very nature—no other reply is abstractedly possible, except a consideration of them one by one. From the very nature of the case therefore, this *second* class of objections cannot be encountered, except by a series of successive papers.* But before concluding our present article, we will express most briefly those *general principles,* which will be found applicable in every case to the

* [Most of the objections, which Dr. Pusey urged under this head, were directed against that doctrine on Papal Infallibility, which he admitted to be held by all "Ultramontanes." Every one of these has been encountered in time past by grave Catholic theologians ; and (I think) with most satisfactory result. It so happened however under the influence of circumstances, that in subsequent articles I considered in detail the condemnation of Pope Honorius, and also the "Filioque" controversy.

But there were other objections pressed by Dr. Pusey, which it especially behoved me to meet. To meet them (I say) was a duty especially incumbent on myself : because they were directed against what he accounted exaggerations of the ordinary "Ultramontane" Doctrine ; introduced by Pope Pius IX. and emphasized in the "Dublin Review." I met all these, one by one, in our following number : that for October 1867. The Eirenicon however is now so forgotten, that I do not think it worth while to reprint this latter article.]

whole *first class* of objections. To this we at once proceed.

We maintain then that, during the whole of Dr. Pusey's golden age, all those writers whom he would himself account Catholic held explicitly and most undoubtingly the doctrines which follow. They held (1) that the Church's corporate and hierarchical Unity is essential and indefectible. They held (2) that the centre and principle of this Unity is S. Peter or his Successor. They held (3) that the Catholic Episcopate, acting in union with the Holy See, has been invested by God with the supreme power of governing the Church. They held (4) that the same Episcopate, acting in the same Union, has been endowed by God with the duty and with the privilege of infallibly preserving, in integrity and unsullied purity, a great body of Dogma handed down by the Apostles. They held (5) that this privilege, however, does not extend to coining what is new; to receiving and authenticating fresh revelations; but exclusively to enunciating and defending, whether against direct or indirect attack, that one Faith given once for all. There is no one passage, cited by Dr. Pusey from any one Father, which has so much as the superficial appearance of denying any one among these five propositions. Unless indeed you except one single expression of S. Cyprian's; which Dr. Pusey so curiously wrests into a support of that most anti-Cyprianic tenet, the independence of individual Bishops.

Now Dr. Pusey will not himself deny, that these five propositions lead by necessary consequence to the full Roman Catholic doctrine. At the same time we

on our side admit most readily, that not unfrequently, in the heat and hurry of action and as some particular case arose, this or that Father did not rightly *apply* those principles which he most firmly held. In particular when Popes, as in duty bound, laboured (as Mr. Allies expresses it) to "unify" the Church more and more closely; when with that view they put forth from time to time a greater power, not than they had hitherto *possessed*, but than they had hitherto *exercised;* now and then a very obvious result ensued. The Bishops, whose liberty of action was thus diminished, not unnaturally appealed to their former comparative independence, as though it had been sanctioned by Apostolic Tradition. Lastly, at any given period the Pope of the day—as was to be expected from one whom God had made "Guardian of the vineyard"—saw, far more clearly than others, the true extent and legitimate application of his own Prerogatives. We are perfectly confident, that there is no one objection of Dr. Pusey's former class, which these considerations will not amply solve. Mr. Allies applies them with singular power and success, to the whole case of S. Augustine and Apiarius.

Our successive comments on Dr. Pusey have sufficiently shown our general estimate of his controversial character; nor is there any necessity for our taking trouble, to exhibit a reasoned and formulated analysis of its demerits. Personally (as we have already said) we entertain towards him none but most kindly and respectful feelings; and we much regret the attitude of opposition towards him, which he compels us to assume.

English Church Defence Tracts. London : Rivingtons.

[October 1872.]

XI.

These Tracts purport to show, by an appeal to history, that the power now-claimed by the Holy See was not given her by God. And firstly, a word must be said on this appeal itself to history. Anglicans* have got hold of the notion, that a Catholic, in arguing against them, is more or less embarrassed by history; that he tries to avoid facing the historical argument, and to divert the controversy into other channels. Never was there a profounder mistake. Anglicans, we consider, are thoroughly beaten, on whichever side they assail the Church: but if there be one battle-field more than another on which their defeat is utterly ignominious, it is this ground of history. Never was there a calumny more absurd as well as shameless, than that which ascribes to Catholics in general, or to the Archbishop of Westminster in particular, an opinion, that the Definition of Papal Infallibility was a "triumph over history."

What can be—we will not say its foundation, for it *has* no foundation—but what can be its origin? We

* [In all which follows of this Essay, I use the term "Anglicans" to denote those members of the Established Church, who sympathize doctrinally with such writers as Dr. Pusey, Canon Liddon, Professor Bright.]

can think of no other, except that the Archbishop has more than once protested against the view, that history is the divinely appointed source, from which individual Christians are to learn Revealed Dogma. God has instituted an infallible Church, as the one authoritative teacher of Dogma. And the Church's authority is made known to the mass of men, not by their personal study of history, but by notes manifest and apparent to all. "Were the Church," says F. Humphrey,

"to be discoverable and known only in this way, by means of long, learned, and laborious investigation, salvation would be for the few, and not for all. All men have not brains, or learning, or leisure, for such an inquiry; nay, more than half the human race cannot even read. Faith, then is not to be got from books. 'Faith cometh by hearing.' Yes, it must be by signs and notes which are apparent to all; to the poor as to the rich; to the illiterate and the rude, as well as to the clever and the learned; to the apple-woman at the street-corner, guileless of culture and learning, as well as to the king in his palace, and to the philosopher in his study. She has a soul to be saved as well as they; for her, the Incarnate Word laid down His Life, and shed His Blood, as much as for them; and she has, equally with them, a right to know where is the Divine Teacher who will guide her into all truth."

But if ever there were in the world a theory preposterously unhistorical, — a theory which treats the records of past time as a mere almanack — a theory utterly revolting to every historically cultured mind — it is that of Anglicans. This is what has

been repeatedly pressed by Catholic controversialists; and it is as coolly ignored in these Tracts, as though (which however is impossible) their writers had never heard the allegation. Once more then we must endeavour to urge on their attention, what has been so persistently put forth against them in Catholic controversy for so many centuries. At the same time small is our hope, that they will fulfil the most rudimentary of controversial obligations, by giving some little heed to what is said by their opponents.

The historical controversy between Catholics and High-churchmen turns fundamentally on the Church's divinely given constitution. And the foundation of the Catholic historical argument is this: that whatever Doctrine on this subject was unanimously held by the Fathers as divinely revealed, beyond doubt was *really* so revealed.* To hear Anglicans talk, you would think that they hold this with fullest acceptance. Nay, with astounding infatuation, they sometimes persuade themselves, that Catholics hold it less rootedly than they do. Now it is manifest on the very surface of history, that a certain very definite Doctrine concerning the Church's constitution was held unanimously by the Fathers; and one would suppose accordingly that the controversy is at an end. The Church was universally regarded as being, by divine irrevocable appointment, one corporate Society governed by the united Episcopate. It was further

* We by no means say, of course, that every revealed Doctrine has been unanimously held as such by the Fathers; we only express the *converse* proposition.

universally held, that this united Episcopate has received from God the gift, of securely preserving Catholic Dogma against all heretical corruption; insomuch that the Church's Unity of Faith is ever as visible and unmistakable a fact, as her Unity of organization. All the Fathers held moreover, that a certain precedency was conferred by Christ on S. Peter's See before all others; whatever the exact *nature* of that precedency. Lastly the Doctrine was no less universal, that the Church, thus constituted, has received from Christ an irrevocable promise, of being preserved safely in all her essential attributes until His second coming. These verities no doubt lead necessarily to one or two further inquiries: as e.g. particularly, what is the true nature of the precedency accorded to St. Peter's See? and further, what is the principle of Episcopal Unity? what is that divinely appointed ordinance, which indefectibly secures the Unity of Episcopal action? It is not equally manifest on the surface of history, how these two questions would have been answered by the Fathers; or whether indeed all would have given the *same* answer. Let these points therefore for the moment be reserved; and let us look at those remaining features of the picture, on which no one can doubt that the Fathers were unanimous.

The controversy then, as we have said, would seem really to be at an end. The Anglican starts with professing, that whatever Doctrine on this subject was unanimously held by the Fathers as divinely revealed, was really so revealed. Catholics, actually

holding what Anglicans only *profess,* accept the preceding picture in all its minutest details. On the other hand Anglicans utterly reject it in every particular. They *deny* that the Church is, by divine irrevocable appointment, one corporate Society; and they *deny* that the Catholic Episcopate has received from God the irrevocable gift of securely preserving Catholic Dogma. They have themselves chosen their battle-field; and *on* that battle-field they are utterly routed and put to confusion.

There are two theses then—quite essential to the Anglican position—which are manifestly and flagrantly contradictory to the unanimous teaching of the Fathers. The first of these theses is, that the Church is not, by divine irrevocable appointment, one corporate Society. That Anglicans maintain this thesis, is a matter of eyesight and admits no denial. The second fundamental Anglican thesis is, that the Catholic Episcopate has not received from God the irrevocable privilege, of securely preserving Catholic Dogma. This thesis they commonly disclaim: but the utter hopelessness of their disclaimer does but put in clearer light the ignominiousness of their historical defeat.

The Anglican then does not *deny*—so he assures the world—that the Catholic Episcopate has received from God the irrevocable privilege, of securely preserving Catholic Dogma. On the contrary, he declares that those three societies, which he regards as jointly constituting the Catholic Church, agree in prominently testifying the fundamental truths of

Revelation. This or that branch, he admits, may have admitted subordinate errors; but he adds, that neither the Roman, nor Greek, nor Anglican Communion has ever been sullied by *heresy*. An amazing statement indeed! For consider. According to him, it is no matter of opinion but a revealed Truth, that the Pope possesses no Supremacy over the Episcopal Body; it is no matter of opinion but a revealed Truth, that the Pope is fallible when teaching ex cathedrâ. According to him then, the whole Roman Church—by far the largest "branch" of the three—imposes on her children, as of grave obligation, the denial of revealed Truth; or in other words, the belief and profession of heresy. She imposes the obligation moreover, on no subordinate matter, but on the very Rule of Faith.*

Such then is that theory of the Catholic Church, which an Anglican has the nerve to propose as patristic. A theory which affirms, that the large majority of Catholic Bishops, co-operating with S. Peter's See, can be permitted by Christ to enforce heresy, as of Catholic Faith and as a condition of communion.

Doubtless, — since the Anglican thinks that a true portion of the Catholic Church can be so degraded and apostate,—there is a certain unhappy consistency, in his accounting *his own* Communion also

* It may be worth mentioning that, with the vast majority of Anglicans, the Dogma of the Immaculate Conception must be a heresy: because they consider it a *revealed Truth*, that every person, born of human parents, has contracted original sin.

a portion of the Catholic Church. Still, with all his extraordinary power of making himself believe what he wishes, he cannot possibly acquiesce in such a conclusion, without resolutely blinding himself to those facts which most closely and unintermittingly surround him. Accordingly, Dr. Pusey, in the "Eirenicon" (p. 10), with characteristic undauntedness, asserted that, within the Church of England, "the great body of the Faith is infallibly fixed;" that she is "a continual unchanging teacher of the Truth which Christ revealed." And then—within a year of his making this assertion—he admitted that she tolerated within her bosom errors worse than the Mahometan.*

Whatever else may be in God's counsels, we may securely prophesy that Anglican High-churchism has no future to expect. At the same time it does not therefore follow, that no advantage is gained by such discussions as that with which we have been engaged. In proportion as they produce any effect, they will of course be personally serviceable to those directly addressed; for Anglicans, remaining such, incur the certainty of grievous spiritual loss, and the peril of eternal ruin. But further. There are two forms of misbelief, which at the present moment are far more threatening and dangerous than any others; viz. liberalism within the Christian pale and antitheism without it. Now (for various reasons which we cannot here enumerate) there is no possibility that these desolating errors can be combated with permanent

* [See p. 142 of this volume.]

and fully satisfactory effect, except by Catholics. It is most important therefore, that as many as possible of those who are otherwise qualified to engage in such conflicts—and Canon Liddon for one is *eminently* qualified—should be in submission to the full teaching of the Catholic Church.*

APPENDIX.

HISTORICAL OBJECTIONS TO CATHOLIC DOCTRINE.

[January 1880.]

I.

After I published the preceding article in July 1867, circumstances diverted me from prosecuting farther at that time my controversy against Anglicans and Dr. Pusey. But one subject still remained, which otherwise I should have treated on some subsequent occasion. I wrote on this subject at an earlier period, in three entirely forgotten pamphlets; and am not without hope of hereafter republishing the more salient portions of those pamphlets. Here I will only attempt to set forth most briefly the particular point

* [The article, from which these last paragraphs are taken, is on the whole too occupied with merely ephemeral matters to be worth republishing. But the extract given in the text seemed available, as pointedly summing up my preceding arguments against Dr. Pusey.]

to which I refer. It has been hinted at indeed in the preceding pages, but not distinctly exhibited.

I said in the Eighth Essay, that Anglicans have advanced indeed an interminable array of objections, against the *conclusion* to which Catholic controversialists have addressed their reasoning. But, I added, in regard to the *reasoning itself*—as adduced by those controversialists, and set forth under their guidance in my preceding Essays,—the said Anglicans have been profoundly silent. What I have done in those Essays, I say, has merely been to set forth after my own fashion the course of reasoning, universally adopted by Catholic controversialists. And I am really not aware of one single Anglican, who has so much as looked that course of reasoning in the face. On the other hand Anglican objections to the Catholic *conclusion* are of every imaginable kind. Now there is no reason for treating in this volume the *other* heterogeneous allegations to which I here refer. But it does seem called for—in connection with my own argument—that I say a word or two on the *historical* objections alleged. And what I say of them is briefly this; that, in the enormous majority of instances, there is no need whatever of historical examination and research, in order that they be peremptorily overruled and put out of court. In the enormous majority of instances, the Church's Anglican assailant is guilty of the grossest "ignoratio elenchi." His reasoning is sufficiently answered by the very easy process of showing, that the facts alleged by him—were they ever so true—are absolutely and entirely irrelevant.

For my present purpose, I divide these objections into two different classes. First I will consider those which are adduced against the Church's Dogma concerning her own constitution; and next I will consider those adduced against her other Dogmata of whatever kind. I begin then with the Church's Dogma, concerning her own constitution. And this Dogma is obviously subdivided into two constituent portions: her Dogma concerning Ecclesiastical Unity, and her Dogma concerning the Pope's Prerogatives.

II.

What is objected under the former head is this. "Certain Bishops," it is alleged "or certain local "Churches, or certain individuals commonly recog-"nized as Catholics, have on certain occasions acted "or spoken in some way or other, which disproves "the Catholic Doctrine. They have acted or spoken "in some way or other, in which they could not have "acted or spoken, had they accepted the Dogma now "held by Roman Catholics, concerning the Church's "indivisible Unity. And this fact," so proceeds the objector, "shows that the said Dogma was not handed "down by the Apostles as part of the Deposit."

Now one thing at all events is most certain. The Apostles either taught (1) that the Church is by divine law one Body Politic, which is what Roman Catholics hold; or (2) that she is by divine law made up of many bodies politic, each governed by a Bishop; or

(3) that she is by divine law constituted in some other conceivable way; or (4) that there is no Church existing by divine law at all. Now at starting let us suppose for argument's sake, that one or other of these alternative doctrines *had* once been held in some corner of the Church for some brief period. How could one reasonably infer from such a fact, that the present Roman Catholic Doctrine is a corruption? All which could reasonably be said is, that *one or other* of the two doctrines is a corruption. And accordingly it would be necessary further to inquire, *on which side* corruption of Apostolic Doctrine really existed. But there is here no space for carrying on this line of thought, which is in truth entirely inapplicable to the facts of the case.

What I say then directly is this. For not one of the three alternative theories above named, has so much as one syllable of even plausible historical argument ever been adduced. Let the Anglican controversialist say plainly, *which* of the three non-Catholic doctrines just now recited he alleges to have been divinely revealed. And then let him adduce some show at least of historical argument, in favour of that doctrine. This is where Anglican controversialists so ignominiously break down. Let them mention if they can one single historical fact, which even tends to show that any one accounted a Catholic, in any age of the Church, held any doctrine on the Church's Unity different from ours. Let them first *formulate* that doctrine, different from ours, which they allege the individual in question to have held. And then let

them adduce some historical proof for their assertion, that he did hold the doctrine which they shall have thus formulated. This is exactly what they never by any accident even attempt to do. They may point out very easily indeed, that this or that Catholic, in this or that emergency, grievously failed to grasp the *consequences* which legitimately ensue from some doctrine which he theoretically held. But a million such facts are, I need not say, simply barren of all controversial value.

Exactly the same reasoning applies, to the *second* constituent portion of the Church's Dogma concerning her own constitution. If she is by divine appointment one Body Politic—she must necessarily possess some divinely-appointed centre or principle of Unity. *What* is that centre or principle? On the Roman Catholic view, the Apostles proclaimed as part of God's law, that the Pope is ecclesiastically supreme over the Church. But *imaginably* they may have taught as divinely revealed some doctrine,—which differs indeed from this,—but which yet is consistent with their Dogma concerning Ecclesiastical Unity. They may imaginably have taught e.g. (1) that the Church is subject by God's law to the majority of Bishops; or (2) to the majority of Patriarchs; or (3) to some Patriarch other than the Roman; or (4) to some other authority which may be named. I call on any Anglican to name if he can any one fact in Ecclesiastical History, which gives so much as plausible or colourable countenance to any one of those imaginable theories. There is literally no rival theory producible. None from East, any more than from

West; none from earlier, any more than from later centuries; none from those who most energetically resisted particular exercises of Papal power, any more than from those who most consistently upheld them. If Ecclesiastical Unity were commanded by divine law—and if no other bond of Ecclesiastical Unity except the Papal were at any time even alleged as of divine appointment—then it must be this latter and no other which was inculcated by the Apostles.

There is in fact one most simple and axiomatic canon of historical interpretation, under which the whole body of such historical objections absolutely and irrecoverably collapses. I will state it thus: "No word or act of early Christians can be admitted as evidence of Divine Tradition, unless we can refer such word or act to some principle,—which admits of being stated,—and which we can suppose these Christians (consciously or unconsciously) to have held." This, I say, is axiomatic. Any words or acts, which we *cannot* so refer, must by the very necessity of the case be traced to one or other of the various causes, which tend to *obscure* and *corrupt* Tradition. Such facts cannot be taken as testifying any Doctrine handed down from Apostolic times; because (by hypothesis) there is no such Doctrine, which they can even be *alleged* as testifying. And I need hardly say how many are the different causes—quite distinct from Apostolic Tradition—which may have given rise to the language or action of a Catholic or body of Catholics, on some particular occasion. Such Catholics may have been moved by

unconscious jealousy or antipathy; by self-will and hatred of restraint; by slowness in discerning the legitimate consequences of acknowledged truth; by cherished prejudices; by individual or national peculiarities; by reasoning, good or bad; by imagination, conjecture, impulse. The question in any given case is, whether their language or conduct be due to one or other of these sinister causes; or whether it be due to some Apostolic Tradition which had reached them. And what I here urge is this. No controversialist can (without the grossest fallacy) ascribe any given conduct of any given ancient Catholics to their acceptance of some Apostolically-descended anti-Roman doctrine—unti he has performed a previous task. He must first of all set forth what *is* the doctrine—different from that now professed by Roman Catholics—in regard to which he will even *allege,* that on the one hand it was taught by the Apostles, and that on the other hand it was really held by those ancient Catholics whom he cites as witnesses. Now this is the feat which Anglican controversialists never attempt to accomplish. They seem never to think of the question whether *they* are *right,* so eager are they to show that *we* are *wrong.* They do not seem to care what Antiquity does prove; so impetuous is their resolve to show at all hazards, that there is one doctrinal system at all events which Antiquity does *not* prove.

There is one class (no doubt) of Anglican objections against the Church's Dogma concerning her own constitution—to which what I have said does not apply. The Church teaches that the Pope is infallible in his

ex cathedrâ pronouncements; and the Anglican rejoins, that this or that Pontifical ex cathedrâ utterance is certainly erroneous. *These* objections must of course be carefully examined, each on its own respective ground. But objections of this kind bear hardly more than an infinitesimal proportion to the innumerable miscellaneous facts, brought together by an Anglican from every corner of Church history, as telling against the Roman Catholic Creed. The constant and wearying reiteration of two names—Liberius and Honorius—shows how little that is even primâ facie plausible can be adduced on historical grounds, against the truth of Pontifical Infallibility.

III.

And now as regards the second class of Catholic Dogmata; those which do *not* concern the Church's constitution. A very few words will suffice on this head; and I may take at random *Transubstantiation*, as a pattern specimen of the class. Anglicans are for ever calling on us to prove such a Dogma, if we can, by the exclusive instrumentality of Scriptural and patristic statements. Never was there a more patent instance of "ignoratio elenchi." The historical argument for Transubstantiation is absolutely complete, as soon as we have given an historical proof of the Church's Infallibility. From that moment, the burden of argument is thrown entirely on opponents. No doubt it is *imaginable* that Anglicans might legitimately arrive, on

historical grounds, at an anti-Catholic conclusion on the subject. They might imaginably prove to demonstration, from Scriptural and patristic data, that there was no Dogma impressed on the mind of Christians under the magisterium of the Apostles, which admits of being reasonably developed into the defined Dogma of Transubstantiation. Nothing less than this indeed would be of the slightest service to them. But if (per impossibile) they did succeed in proving this, they would undoubtedly succeed in proving a *very* anti-Catholic conclusion: for they would succeed in proving, that Christianity is not from God. I have urged this point more than once in the preceding Essays. It is quite certain on historical grounds that, if Christianity came from God, the Church in communion with Rome is an infallible Teacher. The Anglican objector does not in any way set himself to confront this argument; but only purports to prove, on *further* historical grounds, that she is *not* an infallible Teacher. Take the premiss which he does not deny; combine it with the premiss which he strenuously affirms; and the logical conclusion is obvious.

I need hardly add however, that Catholic theologians do a very great deal more than is required by the necessities of their argument. They love to exhibit the Scriptural and patristic testimonies for Transubstantiation, or any other Catholic Dogma; and to trace the thread of Tradition thereon through every successive age. Only Anglicans should be reminded once for all, that this is entirely "ex abundanti." The historical argument for Transubstantiation or for any other

Roman Catholic Dogma is absolutely complete, just so soon as the historical argument is complete, which establishes that the Church in communion with Rome is infallible in her teaching.

I have been engaged, for many pages back, in drawing out a sample of the historical arguments available for the Church's Dogma on her own constitution. My readers however must not suppose me to have forgotten the great principle, which I expressed in F. Humphrey's words a few pages back. Revealed Truth must really be discoverable by the individual through means adapted to his capacity; in most cases, therefore, through means altogether distinct from that of argumentative historical investigation. I may be allowed to add, that there is no one truth which I am in less danger of forgetting than this.

EXTENT OF THE CHURCH'S INFALLIBILITY IN DEFINING.

INTRODUCTORY.

[January 1880.]

I HAVE mentioned, in my Preliminary Essay, the controversy which gave occasion to the short Latin treatise, published in 1869, of which a translation here follows. As I apprehend the matter, the main points of that controversy were as follows. First as regards its basis.

1. My opponent and myself were agreed in renouncing Gallicanism. We both held, that whatever definitional Infallibility is possessed by the Ecclesia Docens, is possessed by the Pope speaking ex cathedrâ.

2. We were also agreed, that whatever definitional Infallibility the Pope practically *claims*, such Infallibility he should be accounted by every Catholic to possess.

The chief questions at issue were these four; though there were some few others, incidental and subordinate.

1. Are Catholics, or are they not, under a grave obligation of accepting as infallibly just those "minor" doctrinal censures—censures distinct from the particular nota "heretical"—with which the Pope may

have officially stigmatized this or that proposition? Is it, or is it not true, that Catholics are required to regard the Pope as having power to issue such censures ex cathedrâ?

2. Does Infallibility, or does it not, extend beyond the limit of Truths either actually or at least virtually revealed? Does it extend to the definition of what I have called "protective" truths? By this term I understand "truths, in regard to which the Pope may judge that—though they are neither actually nor virtually revealed—still their firm and undoubting acceptance by the faithful is necessary or important, in order to the due conservation and protection of the Deposit." Has the Pope power, or has he not, of defining such protective truths ex cathedrâ? Are Catholics, or are they not, bound on each occasion to accept such Definitions as infallible?

3. Have Popes from time to time issued ex cathedrâ what may be called *expositional* pronouncements? Or on the other hand, can no Papal pronouncement be truly accounted ex cathedrâ, unless it be expressed in the shape of some logically and definitely expressed proposition or propositions?

4. Are there certain external notes, whereby a definition ex cathedrâ may be securely known? Or on the contrary is the question, whether any given Act be ex cathedrâ, to be determined by the circumstances (external and internal) of the particular case?

Three pamphlets passed on each side, without either party convincing the other; and I then published the short Latin treatise, of which a translation here

follows. In my original pamphlets I more than once dwelt on the circumstance, that theologians (in my humble opinion) had by no means given the subject that degree of methodical and scientific consideration, which was due to its importance. And I ended my first pamphlet by "taking for granted," "that I may have made various incidental and minor mistakes in treating so large a question." At a later period (July, 1874, p. 2, note) I said that, in my Latin treatise, "one or two subordinate but not altogether unimportant portions of what I had originally maintained are either retracted or expressed with some hesitation." "This was done," I added, "in deference to the judgment of one or two eminent theologians." One of these retractations is expressly mentioned in the treatise: see note to the Ninth Thesis. But indeed I have now no doubt that, in various parts of my pamphlets, I pressed one or two of my points much too far; though I do not now exactly remember what those points were. This was due in part, I take for granted, to the heat of polemics; but it is due still more (I think) to a certain hankering after premature logical completeness, which I quite recognise as prominent among my intellectual faults. On looking however (after an interval) at my Latin treatise, I find that I am still in entire accordance with the various Theses there expressed.

The title of this treatise* speaks indeed, not of "Theses" only, but of "Questions." These latter were

* "De Infallibilitatis extensione Theses quasdam et Quæstiones theologorum judicio subjicit Gulielmus Georgius Ward, D.Ph."

two in number, and I do not here translate them. The first* asked in effect, whether on certain occasions the Pope may in some shape propose to all the faithful some doctrine as certain, without imposing on them the obligation of its acceptance. I expressed myself as strongly disposed to answer this question in the negative; but I am now rather disposed to the other alternative. The matter however requires a much longer and more detailed treatment, than could here be given to it. The second question was, whether those Decisions of a Pontifical Congregation which expressly state the Pope's confirmation of them, are to be accounted Pontifical ex cathedrâ Acts. I defer to a future occasion any treatment of this, not very practically important, question.

The title of my Latin pamphlet was too large. The pamphlet does not treat "the extent of Infallibility," but only "the extent of *definitional* Infallibility." It was altogether silent e.g. on the Pope's extent of Infallibility in canonizing Saints; approving religious orders; devotions; disciplinary rules; &c., &c. I have now therefore corrected the title accordingly.

Otherwise I have thought it better, for more than one reason, to translate the treatise exactly as it stood. Once or twice I alter a few words to express more clearly what I meant; but even these I always include between brackets. What notes I now add, are also

* "An quoties Pontifex, in expositione quâdam doctrinali, fideles omnes quid ab eis pro certo tenendum sit edoceat, eo ipso ex cathedrâ loqui censeatur."

included within brackets. And I subjoin two Appendices: one on the authority of the Syllabus, the other on the comparative frequency of ex-cathedrâ Acts. I omit the original Preface, as under present circumstances superfluous.

CERTAIN THESES SUBMITTED TO THE JUDGMENT OF THEOLOGIANS.

[March 1869.]

PRINCIPLES ASSUMED IN THE ARGUMENT.

WITH a view to making the whole matter more clear, we will here mention a few principles, which in the following pages will be assumed as certain.

I. Whatever [definitional] Infallibility is possessed by the "Ecclesia Docens," that same Infallibility is possessed by the Pope [teaching ex cathedrâ]. So hold by far the most numerous and most grave theologians.

II. The words "Infallible," "Infallibly," or others precisely equivalent, are seldom, if indeed ever, found in Papal Decrees. Even the Canons of the Council of Trent—even the Definition of the Immaculate Conception—are not called by the Church in so many words *infallible*.

III. It appertains to the Pope's Infallibility, that he never claims for himself in practice any larger Infallibility than he in reality possesses. "By the mere fact," says Bouix ("De Papa," Vol. II., p. 236) that he defines something and commands belief in it,—by that

very fact he at the same time defines, and commands belief in, his own *competence* to define the same." If therefore we desire to know the extent of the Pope's Infallibility, we have only to inquire what extent of Infallibility the Pope claims for himself in practice.

IV. In whatever Decrees the Pope binds the faithful to yield interior and altogether absolute assent [to his teaching therein contained] of those Decrees, he practically teaches and proposes the Infallibility.

V. The Pope therefore is infallible in all those Definitions, in regard to which he manifests his intention of obliging all the faithful to their interior and entirely absolute acceptance.

VI. The Pope never speaks with Infallibility strictly so called, except when he speaks (as it is called) ex cathedrâ; that is, when he speaks as Universal Doctor, exercising his Apostolical authority of teaching. If it is manifest that he intends to impose on all the faithful entirely absolute assent,—by that very fact it is manifest that he speaks infallibly, and therefore ex cathedrâ. On the other hand if it is manifest that he speaks ex cathedrâ,—by that very fact it is manifest that he imposes on all the faithful an obligation of entirely absolute assent.

These principles will be readily admitted by all those with whom just now we are in controversy; if we except one or two words bearing on Gallicanism. Gallicans themselves however, I hope, will for the most part agree with the following Theses; if in every case they will suppose, that the voice of the Pope is supported by the consent of the Bishops.

And here it will be useful also to premise a certain Definition.

The "Deposit of Faith," as it is called, embraces all those and only those Truths, which were revealed immediately by God, and delivered immediately to the Church by the Apostles.

FIRST THESIS.

The Church is infallible, not only when she anathematizes certain propositions as heretical, but also when she stigmatizes them with some minor censure: when e.g. she proscribes them as erroneous, approaching to heresy, false, scandalous, temerarious, &c., &c.

There are not wanting authors grave and very grave who, when they have some altogether separate question directly under their consideration, [seem on the surface] to confine Infallibility within the sphere of Dogmata actually contained in the Deposit of Faith. But these same authors, when they explain their minds more at length, show most clearly that they hold no such view. Murray indeed does not hesitate to assert ("De Ecclesiâ," d. 17, n. 63), that the tenet, to which our Thesis is opposed, "down to this very day has not so much as one grave and approved theologian in its favour."

Now the primary and most direct proof of this Thesis is derived from the Doctrine, that the Church is infallible in her whole magisterium.

"The Church," says Perrone, "performs the office "... of magistra .... in her daily ministry, "wherein by verbal and practical inculcation she in-"structs the faithful in all those things which con-"duce to their training in pure doctrine and morality, "and leads them as it were by the hand along the "path of eternal salvation. Catholics contend that "Christ has endued the Church with Infallibility in "the performance of this office" ("De Locis," n. 347).

Now whenever the Church condemns propositions as erroneous, or approaching to heresy, or worthy of any other censure, what she does is precisely (using F. Perrone's words) to "instruct the faithful in those "things which conduce to their training in pure "doctrine and morality." These censures therefore, as being included in the Church's magisterium, are undoubtedly infallible.

Another and most irrefragable argument for this Thesis may be taken from those celebrated Bulls, the "Unigenitus" and "Auctorem Fidei." In these Bulls many doctrinal censures are pronounced on various propositions. And in each "perpetuo valiturâ Constitutione" the Pope explicitly and in so many words imposes a strict obligation on all Catholics, not to *think* otherwise, concerning the proscribed propositions, than as is set forth in the Bull. But "the "Pope is infallible in all those Definitions, in regard to "which he manifests his intention of obliging all "the faithful to their interior and entirely absolute "acceptance." (See principle V. page 435.) The

Pontiff therefore undoubtedly has the power of infallibly pronouncing such minor censures.*

* [The words in the "Auctorem Fidei," to which the text refers, run as follows. "Mandamus igitur omnibus utriusque sexûs Christi fidelibus, ne de dictis propositionibus et doctrinis *sentire*, docere, prædicare præsumant, contra quam in hâc nostrâ Constitutione declaratur." In the "Unigenitus" the expressions are entirely similar.

Some of these minor censures—such as "temerarious," "scandalous," "pernicious,"—do not by their very wording imply, that the condemned proposition is *false*. And some theologians in fact hold, that a *true* proposition may be censured ex cathedrâ, as being "temerarious" or the like under the circumstances of the moment. For my own part I follow those very far more numerous and grave theologians, who entirely dissent from this view; and I gave my reasons in October 1867, pp. 346–348. At the same time I have always admitted that the question is an open one.

But every Catholic—I humbly maintain—is bound to hold as most certain, that the Church is *infallible* in pronouncing these minor censures: that what she pronounces "temerarious" e. g. is infallibly "temerarious;" &c. &c. &c. "All Catholic theologians without exception that I know," declares Cardinal Manning, "teach that the Church is infallible in all such censures" ("Petri Privilegium," iii. p. 74). And the Cardinal proceeds most forcibly to argue for the general proposition which I have just stated. Nor is it only dogmatic theologians who have so spoken. In the controversy which occasioned the present treatise, I alleged that every moral theologian, who has touched the matter at all, speaks in accordance with what has been above said. I mentioned the names of Viva, S. Alphonsus, Bouvier, Scavini. My opponent candidly added on his own account, "that even such authors as Lacroix and Reuter,—who contemplate the holding that a condemned proposition may be true,—still condemn *of grave sin* such as hold *the injustice of its condemnation.*"

Another explanation should be added. A proposition is condemned "in sensu ab auctore intento." In order therefore to understand in what sense some proposition has been censured, it

SECOND THESIS.

The Infallibility of the Church is not confined to things which are actually or virtually contained in the Deposit, but extends further. It extends namely to all those truths, which the Church may judge to be so connected with the Deposit, that unless Catholics hold them firmly, the Deposit can either not at all, or at least not so well, be preserved and guarded in its entire fulness.

Truths "virtually revealed" are of more than one class. A truth is "virtually revealed," when it logically follows from two premisses which are revealed. A truth is also said to be "virtually revealed," when it is rightly inferred from the logical combination of a revealed Truth with one known by Reason. And there is perhaps also a third class of "virtually revealed"

is often necessary to investigate in what sense the condemned writer intended it.

Further there is a very important distinction between the practical results of a Pope's Act, when he condemns some tenet as *heretical*, and when he only stigmatizes it with a minor censure. I have said something on this in pp. 299, 300 of this volume; and recur to the matter at greater length, in the first Appendix to this Essay.

It has been suggested in England, that Mgr. Fessler speaks as though he were not certain of the Pope's Infallibility in minor censures. But nothing in the world is more certain—so I confidently maintain—than that this is a mistake. See the "Dublin Review," for July, 1875, pp. 87-89.]

truths: those namely which are deduced from truths of the two former classes by a still further process of logic.

There are some Catholics, who extend indeed the Church's Infallibility to these "virtually revealed" truths, but nevertheless extend it no further. Yet by every Catholic it ought to be considered most certain, that the Church is able to determine those truths also infallibly, which (before such Determination of the Church) were neither actually nor virtually revealed; but which are judged by the Church necessary or useful, in order to *protect* the Deposit. Truths of this kind we may call "protective"; and it is of them we are speaking in this Thesis.

We will now proceed to give some examples of these "protective" truths; by which it will be sufficiently evident, that this Second Thesis cannot permissibly be doubted by any Catholic.

1. Let us take for our first example such a Dogmatic Fact, as e.g. the sense of Jansenius objectively manifested in his book "Augustinus." The following proposition is most certainly infallible. "Certain five assertions are contained in Jansenius's book, according to the legitimate and objective sense of that book." It cannot be said that this proposition—before it was determined by the Church—could be logically deduced from any revealed premiss. No chain of syllogisms can be imagined, issuing in the proof of this proposition, which should contain any revealed Dogma, as even one premiss of one syllogism. The proposition is therefore "protective," and not "virtually

revealed." But that the Church was infallible in declaring it, no Catholic in these days will venture to deny.*

2. Then again consider the power which the Church in all ages has claimed for herself, of judging infallibly not only concerning the *doctrines*, but concerning the *persons* of heretics. She anathematized not merely Arianism, Nestorianism, Eutychianism; but also Arius, Nestorius, Eutyches. The Church indeed does not judge concerning inward acts. Nevertheless she has often commanded the faithful to hold, not only that certain *tenets* are heretical, but also that a particular *man* was objectively (so to speak) a heretic; that a certain man in his external manifestations showed himself to be a heretic. The following proposition—with many others similar—has been taught infallibly by the Church. "Arius really taught the doctrine which is called Arian." But this proposition is merely "protective;" nor could it, before the condemnation of Arius, have been deduced from any revealed premiss by any logical process.†

* [Since I wrote this treatise, I observe that one modern theologian, Bulsanus, does seem to deny that the Church was infallible on the Dogmatic Fact concerning Jansenius. He adds, however: "Those followers of Jansenius erred and *sinned most gravely* who, while they condemned the Five Propositions proscribed by the Roman Pontiffs, nevertheless refused to confess that the Five Propositions were truly contained in Jansenius's book; although the Roman Pontiffs, with full Episcopal assent, judged and declared this fact." "Theologia Generalis," section 240.]

† [So S. Leo II. anathematized his Predecessor Honorius, because the latter "did not labour to preserve in purity this

3. The third example shall be taken from what may be called Ecclesiastical terminology. "That the Church has the right of appointing and (as it were) consecrating certain words, as definitely and (among those which are proposed) alone fitting and most fitting for the signification of this or that Dogma—is evident from her practice. And that she is *infallible* in designating such terms, is evident from the fact, that otherwise she would be liable to error in the teaching and preserving of the Faith. For in designating such words, her very end is to teach the Faith, and in the most fitting manner to keep it pure and safe," (Murray, "De Ecclesiâ," d. 17, n. 102.) Let us then consider the following proposition. "The word 'homoousios' expresses most suitably that very Dogma concerning the Nature of the Son of God, which all Catholics recognize." This proposition —before the Church had sanctioned the use of the word in question—in no way followed from revealed premisses. Nevertheless in a "protective" proposition of this sort, the Church is to be considered infallible.

4. The same conclusion is arrived at from various propositions, which Popes have from time to time infallibly condemned. Pius VI., for example, teaches in the "Auctorem Fidei," that Clement IX. did not restore peace to the Church by approving the distinction between jus and factum (prop. 13); and again, that most holy men and doctors have studied

Apostolic Church by the teaching of Apostolic Tradition, but suffered the spotless to be polluted by the profane betrayal."]

Scholastic Theology with great advantage to the Catholic religion (prop. 76). And many Pontifical Declarations of this sort might easily be adduced.

Moreover this second Thesis is emphatically established by those words of Pius IX.—taken from the Constitution "Gravissimas inter"—which Murray serviceably quotes ("De Ecclesiâ," d. 17, n. 42). "The Church," so speaks the Pope, "by the power committed to her from God, has not only a right but still more duty . . . . to proscribe and condemn all errors, if the integrity of the Faith and the salvation of souls shall have required this." And he condemns the contrary opinion, as "erroneous, injurious to the Faith and to the Church's- authority." All errors therefore can be infallibly condemned by the Church, of which the condemnation "is required by the integrity of the Faith and the salvation of souls." This is the exact Thesis we are defending.

Lastly,—according to that Definition of a theological censure which (as F. Perrone tells us) "is commonly given" ("De Virt. Theol." part 1, n. 500),—any proposition can be censured, which is "*in any way* hurtful to the Faith." According, therefore, to the common opinion of theologians,—it is not only those propositions which are in some way *contrary* to the Faith that can be condemned, but also those which are in any way *hurtful* to it.

And here, for the sake of greater clearness, we may perhaps be allowed to append two remarks. One of these is merely verbal. Some persons (I think) give the name "virtually revealed" to these "protective"

truths, even before they are defined by the Church. Whatever may be [the propriety of this expression], at any rate it is manifest that truths of this description, before the Church's Definition of them, cannot be logically deduced from any revealed premiss.

Nevertheless, *after* the Declaration of the Church, these truths are beyond all doubt rightly called "virtually revealed." Take an obvious illustration. "The "Church is infallible in every proposition, of which she "commands the entirely absolute acceptance." Here we have a revealed premiss. "That those five assertions are really contained in Jansenius's book—this is a proposition, of which the Church commands the entirely absolute acceptance." Here is a premiss known by Reason: [i.e. by means of testimony]. And from these two premisses taken together, it follows directly that those five assertions were really contained in Jansenius's book. This latter truth therefore—from the time that the Church declared it—has been "virtually revealed."*

* [I cannot now remember, why I did not here refer to the defined Doctrine concerning the Holy Father's Civil Princedom. This Doctrine is most certainly neither a revealed verity, nor (before its Definition) logically deducible from such. Nevertheless (as I often pointed out in the "Dublin Review") the Syllabus expressly declares, that "all Catholics are bound (debent) most firmly to hold" the Doctrine in question. If any one reply that the Syllabus was not quite certainly issued ex cathedrâ,—I would submit to his attentive judgment what I urge on this matter in an Appendix which follows.

In regard to this Second Thesis, there is another fact to be carefully noted. Cardinal Antonelli, in his well-known letter to Count Daru of which I gave a translation in July 1870, pp. 225–

THIRD THESIS.

Many truths, which primarily and in their proximate materia are not theological, but philosophical, political, historical, physical,—are nevertheless so connected with things revealed, that their declaration is most useful and sometimes even necessary for the safe custody of the Deposit. Such truths the Church can declare infallibly.

This Thesis requires no further proof, than has been given for the preceding Theses.

Nevertheless, in order to understand the matter properly, it is necessary to keep clear of both Scylla and Charybdis. Now in the first place the Church teaches nothing, except for the sake of the Deposit. She is interested in theological matters for their own sake; but for other matters she has no regard, except so far as they are connected with theological. It can be conceived, for instance, that some philosophical

231, makes an important statement. Had the Council been able to sit another year, a proposed Canon would have been submitted to episcopal approbation, defining (under sanction of anathema) "that the Church's Infallibility extends, not only to the Deposit of Faith, but to everything necessary for the preservation of such Deposit." Cardinal Antonelli,—while making the obvious remark that this Canon may possibly receive some modification from the judgment and decision of the Episcopate,—nevertheless declares, that it is in itself no more than an "exposition of the maxims and fundamental principles of the Church; principles repeated over and over again in the Acts of former General Councils."]

system is opposed indeed to reason or experience; while nevertheless it is not injurious to the Deposit of Faith. A system of this kind the Church would not have the power of condemning. Or to express the same truth in other words,—if the Church condemn certain philosophical, political, physical tenets, from that very fact it may be inferred with certainty that those tenets are injurious to the Faith.

However, what is theologically false cannot be philosophically true. Therefore—if any philosophical opinion is stigmatized with some theological censure which declares it to be false,—then, even in teaching Philosophy, it is to be held as certain that such proposition is false. And thus, although the Church does not teach human sciences from their own principles, she can nevertheless very importantly advance and assist them.*

* [Cardinal Manning, in his "Petri Privilegium" (iii. 67–79), draws out a sample of the various non-revealed truths necessary for security of the Deposit, on which the Church can speak infallibly. In their number are (1) various truths of natural reason and natural science; as that substance exists, or that the soul is the form of the body. There are (2) various truths of human history; as that the Council of Trent issued certain Canons, or that Pius IX. defined the Immaculate Conception. There are (3) what may be called *dogmatic* historical facts; as that the Council of Trent was Œcumenical, or that Leo XIII. is true Pope, or that the Vulgate is authentic. There are (4) truths of interpretation; as that Jansenius's book, according to its legitimate objective sense, contains five certain theses. All this is over and above what I have mentioned under my Second Thesis: viz. the Church's Infallibility in her use of dogmatic *language;* and in condemning (what I may call) *the person* of heretics.]

FOURTH THESIS.

When the Church declares any truths to be thus connected with the Deposit, by that very fact she pronounces them to be contained in the materia of Faith and Morals.

Martin V. calls those Decrees which were published against Wickliff, "so many Determinations, Conclu-"sions, and Decrees in Materiâ Fidei." Now among Wickliff's condemned propositions the following are found:—"Universities, studies, colleges . . . and pro-"fessorships in the same were introduced in the vain "spirit of heathenism: they are of as much use to the "Church as the Devil is" (prop. 29). "The Epistolæ "Decretales are apocryphal, and lead one astray from "the Faith of Christ; and those clerics are foolish "who consider them" (prop. 38). But the contradictory of these propositions is neither immediately revealed, nor logically *deducible* from what is immediately revealed. And nevertheless we have it on the testimony of the Pope and the Council, that they are contained in Materiâ Fidei. Those truths therefore, which the Church declares for protection of the Deposit, by that very fact she accounts as contained in the materia of Faith and Morals.

Hence we arrive at an inference of some importance. When this or that theologian limits Infallibility to the materia of Faith and Morals,—we cannot thence infer that it even occurred to his mind to doubt

the Church's Infallibility in declaring "protective" truths.*

And here by the way we will say a few words about another manner of speaking. It is the custom of some theologians—possibly even the Popes have sometimes so spoken—to call those truths only "Dogmata," which are revealed by God; and all those truths which are merely *connected* with the Deposit of Faith, they name "Doctrines." We will ourselves adopt this distinction. Propositions of every sort—philosophical, historical, political, physical—we will call "doctrinal," in so far as they are referred, or capable of being referred, to the Deposit of Faith.

FIFTH THESIS.

The Church not unfrequently teaches infallibly, not only when she affirms or condemns some definite proposition; but also when

* [It will be seen at once how important is this argument, in regard to the Vatican Definition of Pontifical Infallibility. This Definition pronounces the Pope to be infallible, when he defines a doctrine *concerning Faith or Morals* to be held by the Universal Church.

Cardinal Manning ("Petri Privilegium," iii. pp. 60, 61) puts together various equivalent phrases, used by different theologians. Thus Gregory of Valentia says that the Pope is infallible "in controverted matters which have respect to piety;" Bellarmine, "in things which pertain to faith;" S. Antoninus "concerning whatever relates to faith, whether speculative or practical;" Suarez "in things which pertain to doctrine," such as the approval of religious orders; Melchior Canus "in deciding controversies on religion."]

(sometimes in a flowing and rhetorical way) she publishes an Exposition of Catholic doctrine.

From among the many Expositions which there are of this sort, I will mention a few.

1. That S. Leo's Epistle to S. Flavian is now an infallible Rule of Faith, not one theologian has ever doubted;* although the Gallicans indeed, according to their principles, would say that it was not infallible, until it had received the assent of the Bishops. But after this assent, to use Bossuet's words, this Epistle has been "proposed [to the Church] as an irrevocable Rule of Faith, most perfect, and most certain." Now in this Epistle the Holy Pontiff neither confirms nor condemns *definite propositions.* He is entirely occupied with fully and accurately working out an *Exposition* of Catholic Dogma.

2. Some Œcumenical Councils have put forth their Definitions, not in the way of *propositions,* such e.g. as were S. Cyril's anathematisms; but in the way of full and diffuse exposition. This was the case, for instance, with the Sixth and Seventh.

3. Again, the Council of Trent teaches, not only by "Canons"; but also by "Capitula," which are so many *Expositions* of Catholic Doctrine. That the Infallibility of these Capitula is not less than that of the Canons, is shown most clearly by the words of the Council. In the Sixth Session, for instance, the Fathers

* [I cannot now remember why I ventured to say quite so much as this; considering my opponent had mentioned Bellarmine, as the one exception to this otherwise universal fact.]

spoke as follows: "The Holy . . . Synod of Trent "... here intends to expound (exponere) to all the "faithful the true and sound Doctrine of Justification "... *strictly forbidding* anyone hereafter to *believe*, "preach, or teach otherwise, than as is determined and "*declared* by the present Decree." Then follows the first Capitulum. "In the first place the holy Synod *declares*," &c., &c. There are sixteen of the Capitula; and when they are finished, the Tridentine Fathers proceed thus: "After this Catholic doctrine on Justi-"fication, *which unless each man accepts faithfully and* "*firmly he cannot be justified*, it has pleased the Holy "Synod to add these Canons; so that all may know "*not only* what they ought *to hold and to follow*, but "*also* what they ought *to flee from and avoid*." The Capitula then teach what the Catholic is bound "to hold and follow"; the Canons, what he is bound to "flee from and avoid." But all Catholics are commanded to "accept faithfully and firmly" the Capitula not less than the Canons.* But, as we have so often said, the Church is infallible in all those Determinations, in regard to which she commands all the faithful to hold them with an interior and wholly absolute assent.

It does not however follow from all this (to make a remark in passing) that any one would [necessarily] be a *heretic*, who should deliberately dissent from the Doctrine put forth in the Tridentine Capitula; but only that he would sin mortally against the virtue of faith.

4. Next for the celebrated Bull "Unam Sanctam."

* See Murray, "De Ecclesiâ," d. 17, no. 277, 278.

Suarez calls this Bull a "Definition of the Pope, received and approved by the common consent of the Church" (De Fide, d. 20, s. 3, n. 22). But this Bull is nothing else than a comprehensive *Exposition* of Catholic doctrine, concerning the mutual relations of the Sacerdotium and the Imperium.*

A few other examples will be mentioned in the following pages; but what we have said is abundantly sufficient for our purpose.

It may easily happen therefore, and not unfrequently does happen, that some Pontifical *Exposition* of Catholic doctrine is issued ex cathedrâ. On the other hand it is undoubted that Popes often put forth various doctrinal Expositions, which are not issued ex cathedrâ, and are not strictly infallible. It is therefore of some moment that we should know, which of these Expositions are to be accounted infallible, and in what part infallible. This question, it seems to us, theologians have not sufficiently elucidated; or they have not duly given their mind to its consideration; or they have not thought it opportune to inquire deeply into the matter. On this subject, some things appear to us certain, some less certain.† We will begin with what is certain.

SIXTH THESIS.

It is not all doctrinal Expositions of the Pope, that are issued ex cathedrâ. Sometimes he

* [I am now disposed to *retract* my reference to the "Unam Sanctam," for more than one reason.]

† [The "less certain" points refer to the two "Questions"; which do not appear in this translation.]

speaks, not in order to teach the whole Church, but to give some private individual or some particular Church doctrinal admonition. Expositions of this sort, although they possess the very highest authority, are not to be accounted altogether infallible.

For the office is committed to the Pope, not only of teaching, but also of "ruling and guiding (gubernandi) the Church." Now it appertains especially to the "Gubernator Ecclesiæ," that he admonish private Catholics and particular Churches concerning their doctrinal errors, and lead them back to the full Truth. He discharges this same office of "Gubernator Doctrinalis" (so to speak,) when he instructs recent converts in Catholic doctrine, as it were catechetically: which function Eugenius IV. performed in his instruction to the Armenians. In like manner the Pope discharges the office of "Gubernator Doctrinalis," when he sends back answers to Bishops, or even to private Catholics, who have sought his doctrinal judgment. "For Popes often answer the private questions of this or that Bishop, by setting forth their own opinions on the questions proposed; without expressing any judgment by which they will the faithful to be obliged."* Of this description most probably was Nicolas I.'s answer to the Bulgarians. Acts of this sort are *Pontifical*, but not *ex cathedrâ*. They come from the Pope as Pope, but not as Universal Doctor. "All

* Canus, "De Locis," l. 6, c. 8—7.

these," says F. Perrone, "considering the Supreme Authority with which they issue, are always to be held as of great value; and to be received with humble submission and reverence of mind; but still they do not constitute a Definition ex cathedrâ."*

In the Monothelistic controversy, Honorius wrote his Epistles to Sergius as "Gubernator Doctrinalis" of the Church. In this capacity he acted so infelicitously, that after his death he was rightly anathematized by S. Leo II.—not as a heretic: God forbid!—but as a favourer of heretics, and a partaker in their offence. He put forth no Decree at all ex cathedrâ. Indeed that Honorius himself was wholly free from the Monothelistic heresy, is abundantly clear from his Epistles. Still he did not at all understand the significance and gravity of the question at issue. And he admonished the Eastern Patriarchs to abstain from using that term—the "gemina operatio,"—which nevertheless was the only fitting term to set forth and preserve the Catholic Truth. But it is quite certain that he taught nothing ex cathedrâ, concerning the unsuitableness of the term.

SEVENTH THESIS.

In those Expositions of doctrine which are issued ex cathedrâ, it is not everything that is infallible; but only those things which are an integral part of the Definition itself.

The preamble of a Pontifical Act, for instance; or

* "De Locis," n. 725, note (2).

the arguments brought forward for proof; are commonly not intended by the Pope to oblige the assent of the faithful as infallibly true. And in an Act of this sort there are often to be found other "obiter dicta," which are put forth by the Pope in the way of exhortation, advice, &c., &c., but not as expressing an integral part of the Truth defined therein.

In Œcumenical Councils themselves, it is the "Definition" alone which is "defined." The rest of what is contained in the Acts possesses commonly the highest authority; but the assistance of the Holy Ghost is not promised, that the statements therein contained be infallibly true. The same principle holds good entirely, as is evident, with Pontifical utterances ex cathedrâ.

A practical inference, which follows from this thesis, is drawn out excellently (as is his wont) by Tanner: "If the Pope puts forth any Decree in the materia of Faith as Pastor of the Church, we should carefully consider by the light of its circumstances—such as the occasion of its being written, the question proposed, the words of the Decree—what it is which the Pope intends to teach or determine directly. Things which are said only for a *proof* and *confirmation* of the defined Verity,—or which are said *incidentally* only and *by the way*,—are not included in the Definition: nor is it supposed that the Pope intends to oblige the Church to believe these things." ("De Fide," n. 261.)

EIGHTH THESIS.

It is beyond the possibility of doubt, that

Gregory XVI. promulgated the Encyclical "Mirari Vos" ex cathedrâ.

For in the Encyclical "Singulari nos," which that Pope afterwards addressed (June 23rd, 1834) to all the Bishops of the Church, he expressly testified this. "In our Encyclical Letter" — that is the "Mirari Vos" — "dated August 15th, 1832, we announced, according to the functions of our office, to the whole Catholic flock, sound Doctrine and *which alone it is lawful to follow* concerning the heads therein mentioned." Later, in the same Encyclical, Gregory XVI. spoke concerning that Doctrine "which in our said Letter we *defined,* according to *the authority* given to our unworthy selves [humilitati nostræ], both with regard to the subjection due to civil powers; and with regard to warding off from the people the deadly poison of indifferentism; and with regard to curbing the exorbitant laxity of thought and speech; and with regard to condemning unlimited liberty of conscience [omnimodâ conscientiæ libertate]," &c., &c.

Thus,—on the testimony of the Pope himself,—in the Encyclical "Mirari Vos," "according to the function of his office," "according to the authority" divinely "given to him," he "*defined* the *Catholic* doctrine," "which alone it is lawful to follow." It is really impossible that the obligation of absolute interior assent, by which all Catholics are bound, should be more clearly expressed. But in all those Determinations—as we have so often argued — the Pope is infallible, in which he wills to impose on the faithful

the obligation of holding them with an interior and wholly absolute assent.

Moreover the whole history of the promulgation of this Encyclical shows most clearly, that the Pope published it as an infallible Rule of Faith.

1. On February 3rd, 1832, Lamennais and his companions offered a humble memorial to Gregory XVI. In this memorial they speak thus*: "Deign, O Father, "to look upon some of thy most humble servants, "who are accused of rebellion against thy *infallible* "and at the same time most sweet authority. If so "much as one of their thoughts is out of accordance "with thine, that one they cast away and abjure." Moreover Cardinal Pacca, on August 16th, addressed a letter to Lamennais, which was written by command of the Pope himself. In this letter he expressly declares, that the Pope has at length done the exact thing which Lamennais had long desired. Then he proceeds in these words: "His Holiness was the less" able to abstain from promulgating his judgment, "because the Episcopate on all sides have entreated this Apostolic Chair, that they may obtain a solemn decision from the *infallible* mouth of Peter's Successor concerning" your "doctrines." The Pope therefore, speaking through Cardinal Pacca, openly avers that, in delivering judgment, he assented to the wishes both of the Episcopate and of Lamennais.

* All these citations are taken from Lamennais's work called "Affaires de Rome": Cailleux et Cie., Paris, 1866-7.

Now what were these wishes? Precisely that the Pope should put forth an *infallible* judgment.

2. Then on May 8th, 1833, Gregory XVI. wrote as follows to the Archbishop of Toulouse: "Your letter," he says, "was delivered to us when we had already for a long time been applying ourselves to that care and thought, which were necessary, in order that, according to the custom and precedent of this Holy See, . . . *we might teach opportunely all sons of the Church* what . . . should be preached concerning this most sad argument. Being mindful also, in accordance with the admonition of our Predecessor, Leo the Great, that our unworthy selves are placed over the Church in his name *whose faith repels all errors,*—we well understand it to be specially entrusted to us that we exert all our endeavours in those matters in which the well-being of the whole Church may possibly suffer. . . . This we have, by the help of God and the special protection of the Most Holy Virgin, faithfully performed, in an Encyclical Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic world, dated the Day of her solemn Assumption, in which (*according to the function of our office*) we have put forward *the sound Doctrine, and that which alone it is lawful to follow.*" The Pope then testifies that, in the "Mirari Vos," he spoke as the heir of Peter's Infallibility; that he published it to "*teach all* "*Catholics the sound Doctrine*"; and lastly, that that doctrine was "that which alone it is lawful to follow."

3. Gregory XVI. also wrote in quite the same sense

to [another] Bishop on October 5th in the same year. He regrets that Lamennais has not yet made it "manifest" to the Catholic world, "that *he holds firmly and strongly* and professes that sound Doctrine" which is put forth in the Encyclical. He regrets that that person "honours the supreme *authority*" of the Pope "indeed, but has not yet submitted to" the Pope's "*judgment* and the *Doctrines laid down* by him." Gregory XVI. sets forth lastly, what it is which he requires of Lamennais: namely, "that he should affirm that he follows *solely and absolutely* the Doctrine set forth in the Encyclical; and that he will not write or *approve of* anything out of harmony with it."

4. Lastly, Cardinal Pacca, by command of the Pope, wrote another letter to Lamennais on the 28th day of November in the same year. In this he regrets exceedingly, that Lamennais has not "submitted" himself to the "*infallible* pronouncements of the mouth of Peter."

It is most remarkable, in how many and how various ways the Infallibility of this Encyclical has been testified by its author Gregory XVI. himself. In all Ecclesiastical history I doubt if so much as one Pontifical Act could be found, concerning which there are more indubitable proofs, that the Pope published it with the intention of binding all the Faithful to a wholly absolute assent.

From this Thesis several inferences ensue, which will be mentioned in the following pages. Let us here notice one only; namely, that nowhere has

any Pope used more vehement and more rhetorical language than in this Encyclical. The proposition, —that "for every man liberty of conscience should be asserted and vindicated"—is condemned as a "most pestilential error" and an "insanity," rather than merely an "erroneous opinion." That "liberty of the press," which prevails at the present time, "is declared most foul" (teterrima) and "never to be sufficiently execrated and detested." It is evident therefore that an infallible pronouncement may proceed ex Petri Cathedrâ, although it be expressed by words exceedingly vehement and rhetorical.

Some have taken occasion from these vehement and rhetorical words, to deny the Infallibility of the Encyclical. They have protested that expressions of this kind would [press too cruelly on men's consciences] if the Encyclical were to be considered ex cathedrâ. [They have added] that, in the midst of such a cloud and mist of words, no Catholic could tell to what precise Determination interior assent is due. But I think this objection can be met very easily. All Catholics attribute to the Scriptures a much more (so to speak) *pervasive* Infallibility, than to any Doctrinal Exposition put forth by the Church: for in Holy Scripture there are no "obiter dicta;" and the very arguments are infallibly true. Now certain words of S. Peter and S. Jude (see 2 Peter ii. 19; Jude 10–16) are not less vehement than those of Gregory XVI. S. Paul also abounds in rhetorical passages. We ask our adversaries therefore, how we can sufficiently tell

exactly what it is, in these rhetorical passages, which the Holy Ghost teaches?*

NINTH THESIS.

In many Encyclical Letters, and Consistorial Allocutions, and other Apostolical Letters Pius IX. spoke ex cathedrâ.

That once at least in the course of his Pontificate Pius IX. has spoken ex cathedrâ, is recognized by all Catholics; nor can he who says otherwise be a Catholic at all. Such utterance was in the Dogmatic Bull "Ineffabilis."

This phrase "ex cathedrâ" indeed is not used precisely in the same sense, when we speak concerning Definitions of Faith and concerning other Definitions. However the Pope can be said with sufficient correctness to speak "ex cathedrâ,"—although he may put forth no Dogma to be believed de fide [immediatâ]—whenever he teaches Catholic Doctrine infallibly as Universal Doctor.† It is now therefore to be shown,

* [Even Dr. Döllinger, at the time, regarded the "Mirari Vos" as quite certainly ex cathedrâ. I found this statement on M. de Haulleville's letter; to which I refer in p. 27 of this volume, and which I reprinted from the "Month" in January, 1876. "Lacordaire went up to" Dr. Döllinger "and said: 'Is the Encyclical 'Mirari Vos' in your opinion a doctrinal document imposed on our faith?' The answer of the Bavarian Priest was point-blank (carrément) affirmative: and Lacordaire became silent."]

† [I need hardly remind my readers, that this sense of the term "ex cathedrâ" is now authoritatively fixed by the Vatican Definition.

See p. 193, note, in this volume.]

that Pius IX. did in reality so teach in many Apostolical Letters and Allocutions.

And this indeed he equivalently attests in the Encyclical "Quantâ curâ." In the first paragraph of that Encyclical he states, that the Roman Pontiffs his Predecessors have never omitted carefully to nourish the Lord's whole flock with words of faith and to imbue them with healthful doctrine: nay that "there is nothing on which they have been more anxious, than that they should unveil and condemn by their Letters and Constitutions all those heresies and errors which, being opposed to our Divine Faith . . . have often stirred up grievous tempests," &c., &c. But these Constitutions, as is plain, were those Doctrinal Definitions, by which in all former ages the Church was preserved scathless from aggressive heresies and errors. It is therefore quite certain that they were published by Pius IX.'s Predecessors, in their capacity as Pastors of the Church and Universal Teachers; [or (in other words) ex cathedrâ.]

"But now,"—so the Pope proceeds in the second paragraph—"*following in the illustrious footsteps of our Predecessors,* we have raised our voice, and by many published Encyclical Letters, and Consistorial Allocutions and other Apostolical Letters *we have condemned the chief errors of our most unhappy age.*" His Predecessors had condemned heresies and errors "by Letters and Constitutions" published ex cathedrâ: and Pius IX. professes "that he has followed in their footsteps," in condemning the "chief errors of our times." These condemnations therefore were issued

ex cathedrâ. But they were contained, as he himself says, in many Encyclicals, Allocutions, Apostolical Letters. Those Encyclicals, Allocutions, Apostolical Letters therefore were issued ex cathedrâ.

"And especially," says Pius IX., "in our first "Encyclical Letter written to you on November 9th, "1846, and in two Consistorial Allocutions delivered "by us on December 9th, 1854, and June 9th, 1862, "respectively, we condemned certain monstrous prodi-"gies of opinion, which prevail especially in this age, "to the grievous injury of souls and to the grievous "detriment of civil society itself," &c., &c. But when the Pope solemnly condemns certain prodigies of opinion predominant in a certain age, he speaks beyond all doubt ex cathedrâ. Consequently in that Encyclical, and in those two Allocutions, Pius IX. spoke ex cathedrâ.*

* I freely confess that when I set forth this thesis in some of my writings, I extended it too far. [The reference here is to my pamphlets and articles in the preceding controversy.] For I thought that all those Acts of Pius IX. were ex cathedrâ, in which those propositions are censured which were afterwards condemned in the Syllabus. This view I now retract. For grave theologians have instructed me, that from the mere fact of these Acts being quoted in the Syllabus, no *general* proof ensues that they were issued ex cathedrâ; but that each one must be separately examined.

[I never thought that all these Acts without exception were cognizable *at the time they were issued*, as doctrinally obligatory. My notion was, that the Syllabus threw back on them a reflected light; and constituted a sufficient manifestation of what the Pope had intended in their original publication.

In my second Appendix to this Essay I have set forth in greater

TENTH THESIS.

God has not obliged the Pope to any determinate form of speaking ex cathedrâ. All that is required is that the Pope should, either in the Papal Act itself, or else in any other way whatever, sufficiently manifest his intention of teaching the whole Church [obligatorily].

I do not think a single theologian can be found, who holds explicitly that the Pope is obliged by God to some distinct form in speaking ex cathedrâ. Nevertheless not unfrequently this or that theologian has (through carelessness, it seems to me) argued, as if he *implicitly* considered such obligation to exist. If there be question of Dogmatic Bulls, it will suffice to mention this one fact; viz., that they did not come into use until nearly the Mediæval period. All pronouncements for many centuries, which came from the Petri Cathedra, were clothed in other forms than that of Dogmatic Bulls.

There are some perhaps, who do not deny this Thesis, but who escape from its legitimate force in another way. "In the course of time it happened"—so it will perhaps be argued—"that Popes chose "Dogmatic Bulls as the exclusive media for teaching "the Universal Church. From the time that this "custom prevailed,—whenever the Pope speaks in a

detail the absolutely conclusive argument (as it seems to me) for the conclusion, that those pronouncements of Pius IX. were issued ex cathedrâ, to which he refers in the "Quantâ cura."]

"different way he sufficiently shows that he does not "intend to speak ex cathedrâ, or to oblige the assent "of the faithful."

To this in the first place it may be answered, that no custom ever prevailed in any age of not teaching ex cathedrâ except by Bulls. If such custom ever did flourish, it certainly was in force in the Seventeenth Century: and nevertheless in that very Century Innocent XII. condemned Fénélon, not by a Bull, but by a Brief. That this condemnation was ex cathedrâ, no one has ever doubted.

But let us grant if you please [for argument's sake], that during some centuries Popes spoke ex cathedrâ only by Bulls: no inference could thence be in any way derived for our adversaries' conclusion. No one will be bold enough to assert, that the Popes who reigned in those centuries intended to bind their successors to the same mode of utterance; or that they had the power of doing so, even if they had had the intention. And Pius IX., as we have just seen, testifies that he has several times spoken ex cathedrâ by Encyclicals, Allocutions, and other Apostolical Letters. Gregory XVI. published a declaration of the same kind (see Denzinger, n. 1486); and indeed most certainly issued the "Mirari vos" ex cathedrâ. Even therefore if a custom had once been in force among the Popes of not speaking ex cathedrâ except by Bulls, Gregory XVI. and Pius IX. have expressly stated that they no longer keep to that custom.

ELEVENTH THESIS.

A pronouncement may be ex cathedrâ, even though the obligation of giving assent be not expressly mentioned, either by the word "anathema" or in any other way soever.

Not to mention any other examples, the truth of this Thesis is shown by the Encyclical "Mirari Vos." For although, as we have seen, Gregory XVI. has made it extrinsically most manifest that all Catholics are under an obligation of accepting the Doctrine therein set forth,—nevertheless he did not explicitly affirm this in the Encyclical. The same may be said of St. Leo's Epistle to St. Flavian; and of many other pronouncements.

TWELFTH THESIS.

A pronouncement may be ex cathedrâ, which as regards its form is not addressed to the whole Church: which e.g. is addressed to some Bishop, or even to a layman.

An utterance ex cathedrâ is nothing else, than an utterance in which the Pope intends to teach [obligatorily] the whole Church in virtue of his Apostolical authority, and sufficiently manifests such intention. Some however have misinterpreted the theologians who express this truth; as though these theologians accounted it necessary—in order for an utterance

to be [cognizable as] ex cathedrâ—that it should be addressed to the whole Church, *even in its form.* This however is the merest hallucination. A Papal Act is addressed in form to the whole Church, when it is addressed to all the Bishops; and much more if (as the Bulls "Unigenitus" and "Auctorem Fidei") it be addressed to all the faithful. But even the Bull "Ineffabilis"* is not, as regards its form, addressed to the Universal Church. And (to pass over very many other instances) the truth of our Thesis is most unanswerably established by S. Leo's celebrated Epistle to S. Flavian.

And Benedict XIV. also, in writing to the Bishop of Domingo on December 5th, 1744, said: "We write "not with the authority of the Holy See . . . but "only in the character of a Private Doctor . . . . For "indeed it does not seem to us that the question re-"quires the 'oraculum' of a Pontifical Decision." The "'oraculum' of a Pontifical Decision" *could* therefore have been put forth, in merely replying to the question of one Bishop.

THIRTEENTH THESIS.

If in any Pontifical Letter it is declared that some proposition is false, erroneous, rash, &c.; or is revealed, certain, Catholic, &c.; such Letter is commonly to be accounted ex cathedrâ.

So, almost in so many words, says Murray, "De

* [The Bull which defined the Immaculate Conception.]

Ecclesiâ," d. 20, n. 115. And he adds the following reason:—"That the Faith should be kept pure, is a matter which appertains equally to the whole Universal Church, to all and each of the several Churches, and all and each of the faithful." Moreover, the Pope, by the very fact that he uses words of this description, sufficiently implies that he intends to express an obligation, by which all Catholics are bound, to embrace his declaration with entirely absolute assent.

Nevertheless this Thesis seems to us to require a certain qualification and explanation. For it might happen that some Catholic—e.g. some king or emperor—should hold some proposition through ignorance, which had been recognized by the whole Church as worthy of censure; or that he should reject some proposition, which is known throughout the whole Church to be Catholic and certain. Such a man the Pope may possibly instruct, not in his capacity as Universal Doctor, but as "Gubernator Doctrinalis."

However this exception is of very little importance. For the Pope's testification that some Doctrine is known as certain throughout the whole Church, will in practice have hardly less effect, than if he declared the Doctrine ex cathedrâ. Pius IX., for example, admonished Victor Emmanuel, that *"it is a Doctrine of the Catholic Church"* that the conjugal union cannot exist among Christians, without the Sacrament of Matrimony. If the Pope intended to attest the fact that practically all Catholics throughout the whole

world so think—a testimony of this kind is almost equivalent to a pronouncement ex cathedrâ. But if he were sufficiently aware that some who were not strictly non-Catholics doubted its truth,—and if nevertheless he pronounced that the Doctrine is Catholic and most certain,—then beyond all question he determined the matter as Universal Doctor.*

FOURTEENTH THESIS.

All the errors enumerated in the Syllabus promulgated on December 8th, 1854, were [in that Syllabus] censured by Pius IX. ex cathedrâ.

The truth of this Thesis—from the time when the Syllabus was published—has become clearer every day, from the course of action and speech pursued by Pius IX. and the Bishops.

1. Cardinal Antonelli, by order of Pius IX., forwarded this Syllabus to all the Bishops, as being a Document wherein were recited "the errors and pernicious doctrines which have been censured and proscribed by the Pontiff." By the very fact (as we have said) that the Pope calls these errors "censured and proscribed," he sufficiently implies that he is intending to express an obligation, by which all Catholics are bound absolutely to reject these errors.

* [Unless indeed this were one of the cases, in which a Pope proposes some verity as certainly Catholic, without intending to impose on all Catholics the strict obligation of interior assent. See my introductory remarks.]

2. If we desire to know in what way Pius IX. intended this Syllabus to be received by the faithful, let us see how in the City of Rome, under the direction of the Pope, it was *proposed* to the faithful. Cardinal Patrizi, Pius IX.'s Vicar in the City, when in the year 1865 he sent his "sacred invitation" for the Lenten observances, spoke at the same time concerning the Encyclical "Quantâ curâ" and the Syllabus. He pronounced that these two Acts ought to be received by the faithful "as the very word of God."

3. Similar language was held by the Bishops, to whom throughout the world, conjointly with the See of Peter, is committed by God the charge of teaching the Church. Let us take, as an example, the French Bishops. This Syllabus—together with the Encyclical "Quantâ curâ" to which it is annexed—is called by them "an infallible Rule of Faith,"—"binding on the conscience of Christians"—a "symbol" of faith, as it were a "Credo"—"an infallible oracle of truth"—to which "docility of mind and heart are due from the Bishops"—which demands from all Catholics "full and complete adhesion of heart and soul"—"equal in authority to the Bull Unigenitus," &c. &c.* No single Bishop throughout the world has ever openly contradicted these Declarations.

4. Lastly—which is the greatest proof of all—Pius IX. exhibited his mind most expressly vivâ voce. For on June 17th, 1867, he spoke to the Bishops as

* The exact words of the Bishops are to be found quoted in my work "On Doctrinal Decisions which are not Definitions of Faith," pp. 86-91.

follows:—"The Encyclical 'Quantâ curâ,' and also the 'Syllabus' in the presence of all of you," he said, "I now confirm and *put before you as a Rule of teaching.*" But that which is a Rule of teaching to the Bishops, is beyond all doubt a Rule of belief to the faithful.*

FIFTEENTH THESIS.

To all Papal Definitions promulgated ex cathedrâ, which are supported by the assent of the Bishops, is due (objectively at least) under pain of mortal sin a firm and absolute interior assent, as to pronouncements infallibly true.

We have added the parenthesis, "which is supported by the assent of the Bishops," so as to avoid any dispute with Gallicans.† We have also added the words "objectively at least"; because invincible ignorance of this obligation (as regards its whole extent) may easily exist.

Now the truth of this Thesis is manifest from its very words. When the Pope speaks ex cathedrâ, he intends to oblige all the faithful to yield interior and absolute assent to his Determination as infallibly true; for to speak ex cathedrâ means precisely this. And that

* [Since this was first published, there has been much additional controversy concerning the Syllabus; and I subjoin therefore to this Essay an Appendix on the subject.]

† [I need not say that, since 1870, there can be no such person as a Gallican Catholic.]

such obligation binds under pain of mortal sin and not only of venial sin, all will agree.

This Thesis will be reduced to practice differently by different persons, in accordance with that moral system which any given person may adopt. For our own part we follow probabilism; and we will now therefore consider what is to be said about this matter, according to the view of probabilists. We will suppose all through, that the Bishops have added their voice to that of the Pope speaking ex cathedrâ.

1. Some Papal Acts are of such sort, that no one is able to know with [entire] certainty whether or no they are issued ex cathedrâ. As regards the Doctrine laid down in such Acts, no one is formally bound to yield thereto absolute assent as being infallibly true; unless indeed some other obligation come into account, derived from some different source.

2. Some Pontifical Acts are of such sort, that this or that learned theologian may be convinced of their being ex cathedrâ; although a good many other grave authors think otherwise. Such learned theologian is formally bound to give absolute assent to them as infallibly true. But this obligation he cannot impose upon others, either in the Sacrament of Penance or in any other way.*

3. And lastly there are other Acts, in regard to which there is no solid probability whatever, intrinsic

* [Nevertheless it is abundantly permissible, and may probably enough be his duty, to do his best that other theologians may come round to his view; and that thus by degrees the doctrine opposed to his own may lose all extrinsic probability.]

or extrinsic, that they are not ex cathedrâ pronouncements. This (it seems to me) holds good—not to mention Dogmatic Bulls and other such like—concerning the Encyclicals "Mirari Vos" and "Quantâ curâ," and also concerning the Syllabus; and concerning other Encyclicals, Allocutions, and Apostolical Letters not so very few. The obligation then is certain, of assenting to the Doctrine laid down in such Acts, as being infallibly true. Nevertheless a Confessor is not always bound to admonish a penitent concerning an obligation (even though it be quite certain), of which that penitent may be invincibly ignorant. In any case therefore which may occur, the priest will consider the different attendant circumstances, and do what he may judge best for promoting the glory of God.*

SIXTEENTH THESIS.

When all the Pontiffs, who on any occasion treat of the same subject, are with one accord and with one mind mutually harmonious and accordant in perseveringly and absolutely inculcating some given selfsame proposition as a part of Catholic Doctrine—even if they do not teach such proposition explicitly ex cathedrâ—their agreement is to be held a sure sign, that [this

* [Here comes into account that broad distinction between Definitions *of faith* and *other* ex cathedrâ Definitions, on which I have already more than once touched, and which will be directly considered in the Appendix on the Syllabus.]

proposition expresses] a Doctrine permanent in the mind of the Holy See, and therefore infallibly true.

This is said almost in so many words by Father Martin, S.J., in his excellent work "De Matrimonio et potestate ipsum dirimendi" (vol ii., page 521).*

This Thesis is, I think, very useful for solving certain difficulties, which may otherwise result from what has been said above. For although indeed those Apostolical Acts may be not few, concerning which it is impossible to be certain whether or not they are ex cathedrâ; nevertheless there is hardly anywhere (if indeed anywhere) a Pontifical Act to be found, inculcating as certain any Doctrine of moment, which Doctrine cannot be otherwise known as the uniform teaching of the Holy See and therefore infallible.

But of what description are the utterances, of which we speak in this Thesis? F. Martin explains this admirably. They are "attestations which from time to time the Sovereign Pontiffs have put forward,—not indeed as teaching solemnly and ex cathedrâ, nor as defining Doctrine and imposing its belief on the faithful, — but nevertheless as Sovereign Pontiffs, exercising their most high charge of instructing and strengthening in the Faith whether the faithful or their Pastors; defending and protecting true Doctrine; and correcting errors. Thus in these testi-

* [If I remember rightly, F. Martin does not use the precise words "infallibly true"; though they evidently express his meaning.]

monies is expressed the mind, judgment, and Doctrine of the Sovereign Pontiffs, not as of private doctors, but as of Sovereign Pontiffs. That is to say—they are the utterances of Sovereign Pontiffs, engaged in teaching these or those Catholics some given truth, as fixed and determined, either by former Definition or by the Doctrine continuously handed down [in the Holy See]" (page 482). Or to put it in other words, they are utterances of the Pope, speaking Pontifically, but not ex cathedrâ; utterances which the Popes put forth, not as Universal Doctors, but as the Church's "Gubernatores Doctrinales."

Now what proof can be offered of this Thesis? Let us again turn to Father Martin. "Although," he says, "sometimes in some one Declaration of one Sovereign Pontiff one can see only his opinion as a private doctor, nevertheless, when many Popes" agree together, "it is certain that they do not merely express their private opinion. For otherwise there would issue that *diversity of speech and thought*, which is always found in private doctors who put forth their opinion on doubtful matters; because a private doctor does not instantly, on being made Pope, clothe himself as it were in the mere opinions of his Predecessor. But the mutual agreement of these several Pontiffs is to be held as a special sign of a Doctrine, either already defined, or at least fixed, consistent, abiding and established in [the mind of] the Holy See; for this unanimous and consistent agreement cannot in fact have any other cause" (page 521).

But now any Doctrine, "abiding and established in the mind of the Holy See," is without doubt infallibly true. "Ad hanc enim Ecclesiam propter potentiorem principalitatem necesse est omnem convenire Ecclesiam; hoc est, eos qui sunt undique fideles: in quâ semper ab his qui sunt undique conservata est ea quæ ab Apostolis est Traditio." And in this Nineteenth Century Pius IX. has taught this not less lucidly, than in the Third Century did S. Irenæus. "This Seat of Blessed Peter in Rome has always kept whole and inviolate the Faith handed down by Christ, and has taught it to the faithful; showing to all the path of salvation and the *Doctrine of uncorrupted truth*" ("Qui pluribus," November 9th, 1846). "In which [Roman Church] exists the infallible [irreformabile] magisterium of the same Faith: the magisterium founded by our Divine Redeemer" ("Noscitis et nobiscum," December 8th, 1848). The Roman Church is "the centre of Catholic Truth and Unity, in *which Church alone* religion has been guarded inviolably, and from which all the other churches must derive their Tradition of Faith" ("Ineffabilis," December 8th, 1854).

Moreover the things are not few or of small moment, concerning which some definite Doctrine has always been delivered by a sufficiently long series of Popes. Concerning various philosophical questions; concerning the Temporal Power of the Church; concerning the mutual relations of Church and State; concerning the Pope's Civil Princedom; concerning

liberty of conscience and of the press; concerning mixed education; Popes, entirely differing in temperament and circumstances, have never spoken differently. And this unanimity, as F. Martin argues, can be referred to no other cause, than a consistent Tradition abiding in [the mind of] the Holy See.

SEVENTEENTH THESIS.

Doctrinal Decisions, promulgated by the Roman Congregations, are of the highest authority. They demand an interior and firm assent from every Catholic; although that assent is not altogether (if I may so say) *irreformable.* The same may be said à fortiori concerning a Pope's Doctrinal Declarations (if such there are) teaching some Doctrine as one which should be held as certain by every Catholic, which Declarations may not be strictly infallible.

If this Thesis be admitted, there will remain in practice hardly any difficulty or obscurity on the whole subject. For if to all these Declarations a firm assent is due from every Catholic,—it will be a matter rather for speculation than practice to inquire which of them are strictly infallible; and to which therefore is prescribed an assent, not only firm, but wholly absolute and irreformable.

Now an unanswerable argument for this Thesis is derived from the Church's authority. The Church is infallible in those things which appertain to Faith and

Morals. But the Church always earnestly praises those who submit their intellect to the Decrees of the Roman Congregations, and censures those who refuse so to do. And this could not be so, if submission of the intellect were not really due to such Decrees.*

It is not unfrequently objected against this Thesis, that a firm assent cannot be due to any proposition, which is not either demonstrated by manifest arguments, or infallibly proposed. But that this is not really so, is evident from many examples.

1. Titius, for instance, in not a few acts, and those the only ones of which I am cognisant, exhibits himself as a good man, although he may be a very bad one. I am bound under mortal sin firmly to believe that he is really good.† 2. That a religious submit his intellect firmly to the judgment of his Superior is, according to S. Ignatius, not deserving of blame, but of the highest praise. 3. A peasant whom his parochus instructs in matters of Faith and Morals, is bound firmly to accept all those Doctrines which such parochus puts forward as certain. And a thousand other similar examples might be quoted.

Now in none of these examples is there so grave a reason for assenting, as in the case before us. In

* [The words of the Munich Brief also deserve most careful attention in their bearing on this matter. I have commented on them in my article "Galileo and the Pontifical Congregations," which appeared in July, 1871; and which I hope to republish in my next volume.]

† [I ought to explain that, when I wrote my Latin pamphlet, I had seen in lithograph a Scholion of Cardinal Franzelin's on Infallibility, which he afterwards expanded into its published shape.]

the Church of Rome—to quote again the words of Pius IX.—"there exists the infallible magisterium of Faith, founded by the Divine Redeemer;" in her "alone has religion been inviolably guarded;" from her "all the other churches must derive their Tradition of Faith." Now the Congregations of which we are speaking live in the full light of Roman Tradition. In matters therefore which concern the guardianship of the Depòsit—even had the Church put forth no precept or even counsel on the subject—a Catholic would appear almost insane, if he did not most confidently prefer the judgment of these Congregations to his own.

And these Congregations do not only promulgate their judgments as their own. The Pope, as "Gubernator Doctrinalis" of the Church, has given them authority to direct all the faithful along the road of sound doctrine. Any Catholic would sin therefore against due obedience, who did not give a firm assent to their Decisions.

And the same is to be said à fortiori (as is most clearly evident) concerning the doctrinal Declarations (if any there be) of the Pope himself,—teaching that some Doctrine is to be held as certain by every Catholic,—which Declarations may not be strictly infallible. Whether any such Declarations exist, is—as we have said—a doubtful matter.

CONCLUSION.

Let so much have been said briefly and most imperfectly. I need not add, that I most humbly submit

the whole to the infallible judgment of the Holy See. And I earnestly request of theologians, that they will deign to correct my errors, and make manifest what is true on the whole subject.

APPENDIX I.

DOCTRINAL AUTHORITY OF THE SYLLABUS.

[January 1880.]

I HAVE nothing now to say for the first time on the Syllabus.* But I here propose to put together and newly arrange various reasonings on the subject, which I have published since my Latin treatise appeared. I need hardly add perhaps, that my purpose is to show that the Syllabus was quite certainly issued ex cathedrâ.

The Syllabus is thus headed:—

"Syllabus embracing the chief errors of our time which are censured in Consistorial Allocutions, in Encyclicals, and in other Apostolic Letters of our most holy Lord Pope Pius IX."

This Syllabus, in company with the Encyclical "Quantâ curâ," was sent by Cardinal Antonelli to every Catholic Bishop. The Cardinal introduced the two with the following letter:—

"Our Holy Father Pius IX., being profoundly anxious for the salvation of souls and for sound doctrine, has never ceased, from the commencement of

* The "Quantâ curâ" and Syllabus are printed and translated in the "Dublin Review" of April 1865.

his Pontificate, to proscribe and condemn the chief errors and false doctrines, especially of this most unhappy age, by published Encyclicals and Consistorial Allocutions and other Apostolic Letters. But as it may perhaps have happened that all the Pontifical Acts do not reach each one of the Ordinaries, therefore the same Sovereign Pontiff has willed that a Syllabus of the same errors should be compiled, to be sent to all the Bishops of the Catholic world, in order that those Bishops may have before their eyes all the errors and pernicious doctrines, which have been reprobated and condemned by him.

"He has accordingly charged me to take care that this Syllabus, having been printed, should be sent to your [Eminence] on this occasion and at this time; when the same Pontiff, from his great solicitude for the security and welfare of the Catholic Church and the whole flock divinely entrusted to him, has judged it fit to write another Encyclical to all Catholic Bishops. Performing therefore, as is my duty, with all suitable zeal and submission, the commands of the said Pontiff, I send [your Eminence] the said Syllabus annexed to this letter.

"I seize with much pleasure," &c., &c.

I.

By the Pope's command then, the Syllabus was forwarded to every Bishop in company with the "Quantâ curâ." At the time, the general body of Catholics regarded the authority of the two as identical; or rather indeed regarded the two as jointly constituting one Pontifical pronouncement. Some accounted the pronouncement ex cathedrâ; others

were not sure that it should so be accounted: but no one thought of distinguishing between its two portions. Now the case is different. Some even of those who hold the Syllabus to be ex cathedrâ, consider nevertheless that its authority stands on a different ground from that of the "Quantâ curâ"; while others, admitting the latter to be ex cathedrâ, deny that attribute to the former. For my own part however, I am convinced that the earlier view was the correct one. And though this fact is by no means essential to my argument—still I shall make matters much clearer, if I begin by giving my grounds for this judgment.

It has been maintained indeed of late years in England, that there is no *intrinsic* connection between the Encyclical and Syllabus: no other connection than the extrinsic one, that both were sent to the Bishops at the same time and by the same channel. But F. Schrader ("De Theologiâ generatim," p. 138, note) argues that there is a close intrinsic connection between the two. Pius IX., towards the commencement of the Encyclical, says that since the beginning of his Pontificate he has been occupied with successively condemning "the chief errors of this our most unhappy age"; and he adds, that he is now going to condemn *other* errors, "which *spring forth* from the same errors as from a fountain." The errors hitherto condemned then have been the evil "fountain"; while the errors condemned in the "Quantâ curâ" are the evil streams thence issuing. In company with this express declaration, there comes to every Bishop

Cardinal Antonelli's letter. This letter begins by repeating the very words of the Encyclical; and saying that the Pope, from the commencement of his Pontificate, has not ceased to condemn the chief errors of our most unhappy age. The Cardinal then adds, that he is commanded by the Pope to send round to the Bishops a Syllabus of those errors, "*on this occasion and at this time*" in which he also sends them the "Quantâ curâ." The Pope then sends them a Syllabus of errors *already* condemned by him, as supplementary to his condemnation of those *further* errors which *issue* from the former. The Bishops were to have in their hands one integral Act; exhibiting the whole mass of anti-Catholic falsehood, which he had denounced from the beginning of his Pontificate. Surely this is the one obvious unforced inference from the above data.

And a fact mentioned by F. Schrader seems conclusive. A work of his, called "The Pope and Modern Ideas," appeared very shortly before the publication of the Encyclical and Syllabus. In less than a month after the publication of those Documents, the Pope's Latin secretary wrote to F. Schrader, by the Holy Father's command, a Letter of approbation. In this Letter, Mgr. Mercurelli spoke of "*the recent Encyclical*, in which, shortly after" the appearance of Schrader's work, "those errors, which had been otherwise and at other times separately condemned, have now again been condemned jointly." The Pope's Secretary then, in an Official Letter written by the Pope's command, included the Syllabus under the general title of "the recent Encyclical."

Then there is another fact, mentioned by F. Schrader, and also by F. Dumas in the "Etudes religieuses" of May, 1875. Pius IX.—after he had defined the Immaculate Conception—did not thereupon dissolve the Commission of theologians who had been engaged in preparing the Definition. On the contrary he kept them still together, for the purpose of assisting him in his teaching office, by a careful theological examination of contemporary errors. And their labours bore a very important part, not only in preparing the various Pontifical utterances on which the Syllabus is founded—not only in preparing the "Quantâ curâ" —but also in preparing the Syllabus itself. They therefore who—under delegation from the Holy Father—put together the Syllabus, are to a large extent the very persons, who had worded those previous utterances on which the Syllabus is founded, and who worded also the "Quantâ curâ." The relevance of this fact to our present inquiry is obvious without another word.

But the question is really not a matter of mere inference, however cogent. Pius IX. himself at a later period directly testified the accuracy of this view. I am acquainted indeed with comparatively few of those Pontifical Acts in which—as the "Civilta" mentions—Pius IX. assumed the ex cathedrâ character of the Syllabus.* But I have happened to fall in

* It will be better here to translate this passage of the "Civilta." The italics are mine.

Certain "exceptional Catholics" says the writer "in order to assail the Syllabus's authority, lay stress on we know not what sup-

with one, which is most express and direct on the particular question which I am now considering. I cited it in October, 1875, p. 280, note. On July 22nd, 1875, Pius IX. congratulated certain Catholics, that they had resolved "to avoid with care all errors and perilous opinions; especially those," he added, "which have been proscribed in the Apostolic Letter 'Quantâ curâ,' and *in the Syllabus annexed to it.*" After this most explicit statement, no further doubt is surely possible.

posed defects in its publication. But it suffices to observe (1), that the Syllabus is certainly and *notoriously* a Pontifical Act, *recognized as such by the Holy Father in other Acts of his:* (2), that it contains a Doctrinal Rule in the matter of Morals and Faith: (3), that by the Pope's order it was transmitted by his Cardinal Secretary of State to all Catholic Bishops, with a circular letter from the aforesaid Cardinal: (4), that the whole Episcopate received the Syllabus as a Doctrinal Act, emanating from the Pope as Head of the Church; and explained it to the faithful as such: (5), that all the true faithful accepted it with religious submission, considering it (after the example and teaching of Bishops and Priests) as an Act of the Holy See.

"These matters of fact being *incontestable*, we ask what more is wanted, that the Syllabus be recognized as in itself authoritative, and as *imposing on Catholics the obligation of submission?* Is it certain customary formalities, which the Holy Father Pius IX. did not account necessary for the promulgation of this particular Act? But these formalities could only be required, in so far as their absence might call into question the Act's authenticity. Now this is not so in the present case. The identical and official letter, addressed by the Cardinal Secretary to each and all the Bishops of the Church, ... suffices to prove its authentic origin. And *it is well known* that the Cardinal Secretary is one of the organs commonly employed by the Holy See, even for the transaction of *matters purely ecclesiastical.*" Oct. 2, 1875.

Moreover (let me note by the way) this authentically ascribed character of the Syllabus—its being an annex to the "Quantâ curâ"—sufficiently explains the fact, that the Pontiff did not formally append to it his signature with the usual formalities. In ordinary life, if a man subjoins to a letter ever so long a postscript, he does not commonly a second time subscribe himself "very sincerely yours," or the like.

II.

It is plain then, that the universal persuasion which in the first instance existed among Catholics, as to the solidarity of Encyclical and Syllabus, had its origin in the then fresh tradition on the facts of the case. The next question to be considered would naturally be, whether the Holy Father issued this composite Act ex cathedrâ, or as possessing some less obligatory authority. But before one can enter on this inquiry, we are met by one most unexpected preliminary objection. It has been maintained in England, not only that there is no proof of the Syllabus having been issued by Pius IX. *ex cathedrâ,* but that there is no proof of its having been issued by him *at all.* Now I shall presently point out that, on subsequent occasions, Pius IX. claimed for himself in so many words the authorship of the Syllabus. But even as regards the period *previous* to his having thus distinctly expressed himself, I dissent earnestly from the principle involved in this allegation. I submit that such a

principle, were it accepted, would overthrow all the certainty of human facts.

Let me explain what I mean by a homely illustration. It must be admitted of course that—as the "Civilta" states—the Cardinal Secretary of State is a recognized organ of the Holy See, even on matters purely ecclesiastical. This, I say, must of course be admitted; because it was he who at the same time forwarded to all Catholic Bishops—not the Syllabus only—but the Encyclical also. It must further of course be admitted, that Pius IX. speedily became acquainted—on the strange supposition of his not having been acquainted *from the first*—with the wording of the Syllabus, and of Cardinal Antonelli's letter. It must also be admitted, that he was well aware how universally the Syllabus was regarded throughout the Catholic world as emanating from him. Now then for my illustration. The proprietor of a large landed estate sends a circular letter to his tenants, through his recognized agent. This agent, in forwarding the circular, adds a letter of his own, reminding the tenants that their landlord had sent them several previous letters. He adds, that the landlord did not wish them to forget the substance of those letters; that he (the landlord) had therefore ordered a list of their chief points to be drawn up; and that he himself (the agent), by the landlord's order, forwarded them a catalogue of those points, in company with the new circular. This catalogue is constantly spoken of at the landlord's table and in the landlord's hearing; and is ascribed

as a matter of course to the landlord himself. Under these circumstances, the landlord makes no disavowal whatever. If in such a case we could not reasonably assume as absolutely certain that the landlord did personally authorize the catalogue,—I submit that the certainty of human facts would be at an end. I am confident that the common sense of mankind would be with me in this statement; nor will anyone (I am sure) deny that the two cases are parallel. Moreover what I have said omits one fact, which is more important than all the rest: I mean the office of trust held by the Pope from God, in regard to preserving purity of Christian doctrine. Surely such a view of things as I am criticising cannot possibly stand. It is probable enough, I fear, that many Catholics may continue to hold what seems to me wrong doctrine on the authority of the Syllabus. But I do not fancy that this particular *method* of minimizing such authority could under any circumstances have retained a permanent place in men's minds.

As a matter of fact however, the conditions are now at an end under which it could possibly have had existence. The "Civilta," writing in 1875, testifies that, in various Acts, Pius IX. recognized the Syllabus as his own utterance. I have observed one such Pontifical Letter myself, which I cited in July 1876, p. 195, note. I shall afterwards refer to this Letter in a different connection; but here it suffices to quote from it five words. The Holy Father refers to the "Syllabus errorum *a nobis editus*": "the Syllabus of errors, published by *us*." I may assume that it is

for him to enounce peremptorily and without appeal, whether it were or were not he—whether it were he or some subordinate authority — who issued the Syllabus.

III.

Assuming then as simply indubitable, that Pius IX. was author of the Syllabus—the question at once emerges, did he issue it ex cathedrâ or with some less peremptory intention? I consider that the proof of the former alternative is absolutely conclusive. But before I proceed to its exhibition, let me say a few words on the à priori probability of the case. And first I would insist on the intensely *doctrinal* character of the Syllabus. Many Pontifical Acts (as I have argued in the preceding Essay) are quite indubitably ex cathedrâ, which nevertheless refer to a large number of matters *not* immediately doctrinal; which are written flowingly and rhetorically; from which one has (if I may so express myself) to pick out the Doctrine by one's own effort. But here each condemned error is set forth after a distinct and orderly fashion; just as in the "Exurge Domine," or the "Unigenitus," or the "Auctorem fidei." No doubt—as I quite admitted in my preceding Essay—the Holy Father often enough writes officially on matters of doctrine, and yet not as actually defining ex cathedrâ. He writes on such occasions in his capacity as "Gubernator Doctrinalis." True: but surely on such occasions he always writes

expositionally; not in the form of cataloguing erroneous propositions.

Then again let my readers consider the extraordinary *reach* of the Syllabus: the number, heterogeneousness, systematic arrangement of the errors recited. The document is not less than an elaborate and all-sided protest, drawn out with very great care and elaboration, against the whole predominant spirit of contemporary thought and contemporary political action.* It is surely very improbable that the Pope should issue so vast (in some sense unprecedentedly vast) a teaching Act, in any other capacity than as Teacher of all Christians, putting forth his Supreme Apostolical Authority.

Let us pass however from à priori augury to direct proof. In this connection I shall quote, before I conclude, Pius IX.'s most express words on subsequent occasions, declaring that he had issued the Syllabus ex cathedrâ. But the very first question an inquirer asks will be, in what sense it was received by the Bishops of the Church at the time when it was issued? And the reply to this question is simply unmistakeable. The French Bishops in particular were obliged by circumstances to speak with especial distinctness; and I have put together an extract from their pronouncements, in my volume on "Doctrinal Decisions," pp. 86–92. They refer throughout—as I have already explained—to the Encyclical and Syllabus

* I have attempted to show the great scientific completeness of the Syllabus, in an article of April 1865, which I hope hereafter to republish.

as jointly constituting one Pontifical Act. One Bishop says of this Act, that it is "doctrinal and even dogmatic;" and that to reject any portion of its teaching "would be the sacrifice of eternal salvation." Another, that "its teaching is dogmatic and infallible" "binding every Christian conscience." A third, that no State "decisions" "can exempt Catholics from the obligation of submitting thereto." A fourth, that all "should hear the Church" herein pronouncing, "if they wish still to claim the name of Catholics." A fifth, that "all the propositions" therein censured "are to be rejected and condemned;" because "the word of Christ speaking through the Apostolic mouth is always worthy of acceptation." A sixth, that it is "a rule of belief to the faithful" "teaching them what they must believe and practise to be saved." A seventh, that—according to the doctrines which "the Catechism has taught them from their infancy"—the faithful must account the newly-issued utterance "the Rule of their belief as of their moral conduct." An eighth, that it is "a duty on all the faithful to adhere" to this utterance "in spirit and in heart; and to make thereof the Rule of their Faith." A ninth, that the authority which therein speaks is "infallible in doctrinal matters"; "to which we all owe obedience unless we would renounce our title of Catholics." A tenth, that "it should be received as a symbol, as a credo, with the most perfect submission." An eleventh, that "every Catholic is obliged in conscience to adhere to its doctrinal decisions." A twelfth, that it emanates from "the Oracle which must

be listened to and believed." A thirteenth, that it is "a doctrinal instruction on matters" whereof "the Vicar of Jesus is the first and only judge." A fourteenth, that "it is the duty of all orthodox Christians to submit" their "understanding" thereto "with humble and filial docility." A fifteenth, that it rightfully claims "full and perfect adhesion of spirit and of heart." A sixteenth, that it is "a Rule of Faith which every Catholic is bound to accept." A seventeenth, that it contains "the instructions of him whose faith cannot fail." An eighteenth, that it is "a dogmatic and moral Bull ex cathedrâ." A nineteenth, that he and his whole flock "adhere with their whole soul and without reserve" to its "great and salutary instructions." A twentieth, that "it is an imperative and sacred duty for all true Catholics" to receive it "with the most entire submission of mind and heart." A twenty-first, that he "adheres to it fully and without reserve," because the Supreme Pontiff "is appointed by God to direct the conscience." A twenty-second, that "he adheres emphatically with submission and love" to its "instructions." A twenty-third, that it is "a Rule of Faith from which no one can deviate without ceasing to be a Catholic."*

* In the first six of these extracts, the tenth, the thirteenth, and the sixteenth, the Bishop who is speaking expressly refers to the Syllabus. But no one who reads them will doubt, that all the Bishops whom I cite regard the Encyclical and Syllabus as together constituting one integral Act, which they often call the "Encyclical." The Bishop of Frejus exhibits a curious specimen of this; for he says that "the Encyclical does but renew the condemnation of propositions

Even Mgr. Dupanloup did not profess any different doctrine. I have a real veneration for the memory of that illustrious prelate, and would most gratefully commemorate his signal services to the Church. Nor was it the least of those services that, in the pamphlet to which I refer, he so powerfully exposed the shameful misrepresentations of the Syllabus, put forth by the French infidel press. Still, now when the heat of controversy has passed away, I think it will be generally admitted that—as regards the "modern liberties"—his own positive exposition of the Syllabus fell short of doing justice to its full doctrine.* Indeed it is most intelligible that he should have accounted it an actual obligation of charity towards M. de Montalembert and his friends, to lessen in every way he honestly could the difficulty they would necessarily experience,

already condemned." He actually forgets the "Quantâ curâ" itself, when he speaks of "The Encyclical." So again Mgr. Dupanloup called his pamphlet "La Convention du 15 Septembre et l'Encyclique du 8 Décembre": yet he wrote very far more prominently on the Syllabus, than on the "Quantâ curâ."

* The Holy Father—as my readers will remember—wrote to thank Mgr. Dupanloup for the great service done by his pamphlet. The Letter will be found entire in p. 571 of the "Dublin Review" for April 1865. I have always thought the last sentence of this Letter very significant. "We . . . take for granted that thou . . . wilt explain to thy people the true sense of our Letter the more studiously and accurately, in proportion as thou hast more vehemently exploded the calumnious interpretations given to the same." Surely this conveys a broad hint, that the Bishop's adequate *affirmative* exposition of the Pontifical Act is yet to come.

Here again—it will be observed—Pius IX. speaks of the Syllabus as comprised in his Encyclical "Letter."

as regards accepting some among the lessons of the Syllabus. But all this only makes it the more remarkable, that he does not attempt to dissociate himself from the voice of his episcopal brethren who account the Syllabus ex cathedrâ. In no other way could he so effectively have lessened the difficulty felt by "Liberal Catholics," as by laying down that the Syllabus imposes on them no obligation of interior assent to its teaching. Yet he does not attempt anything of the kind.

So much on the French Episcopate. But there is another fact, on which I have throughout laid still greater stress. The Cardinal Vicar of Rome—the Pope's direct representative, addressing the Pope's own diocese under the Pope's own eye—thus expressed himself concerning the Encyclical and Syllabus.* "The faithful," he said, "who show themselves such in word and act, recognise in the voice of the Church's Visible Head *the very word of God.*"

Now let us suppose for a moment, that Pius IX. had *not* intended to issue the Syllabus as an obligatory Rule of Faith. On such a supposition—what was his course of conduct under the circumstances I have set

* I do not know at the moment where to look for the words of Cardinal Patrizi's "Invito sacro," to which I refer in the text. But during the whole controversy of 1865–8—when I had the Cardinal's letter before me—I repeatedly said that the Cardinal's words referred to the Syllabus no less than to the Encyclical. Moreover my opponent—who otherwise criticized the argument I drew from this pronouncement—never threw doubt on this particular allegation. I have no doubt whatever therefore that the fact is so.

forth? He is well aware, that the French Episcopate —nay that his own Cardinal Vicar—inculcate on the faithful a certain very serious obligation as Pontifically imposed. He is also well aware, that he never imposed any such obligation at all. Yet (to say the very least) he preserves profound silence;* a silence which will inevitably be understood as one of approval and complacency. It would be an insult to the memory of Pius IX.—and to the office which he held—if I permitted myself to argue gravely against such a supposition.

And for how long a period did the Pontiff in any sense preserve silence? On June 17th, 1867—more than half the Bishops of the Catholic world being assembled at Rome to celebrate the eighteenth centenary of S. Peter's martyrdom—Pius IX. thus addressed them. "In the Encyclical of 1864," he said, "and in that which is called the Syllabus, I declared to the world the dangers which threatened Society, and I condemned the falsehoods which assail its life. That Act I now confirm again in your presence, and set it before you as *the Rule of your teaching.*"† He well knew, that so large a portion of the Episcopate had expressly declared these two documents to be ex cathedrâ and obligatory on the conscience of Catholics. And, knowing this, he deliberately used language which could have no other possible effect, except to confirm them in that persuasion.

* His Letter to Mgr. Dupanloup is at all events an exception to such silence.

† See Cardinal Manning's "Petri Privilegium," I. pp. 6, 7.

Here again it will be observed that the Holy Father —speaking distinctly of Encyclical and Syllabus— calls them jointly by the name "that Act." And this circumstance taken by itself would suffice to establish conclusively, that he issued the Syllabus as an annex to the "Quantâ curâ." He must have known what had been his own intention in issuing the two; and on this occasion (even had he not done so before) he manifested that intention.

This manifestation (no doubt) was oral, not written; though it is difficult to see how such a circumstance can lessen the force of what I have urged. At all events, as years went on, the Pontiff expressed himself in writing to the same effect. Before I proceed however to place before my reader these testifications, I must advert to a matter which occurred in the interval.

IV.

In the year 1871, Mgr. Fessler, Bishop of S. Polten, brought out a most valuable work, in reply to a certain Professor Schülte who had apostatized on occasion of the Vatican Definition. The latter writer, in accordance with the practice so prevalent in his new sect, had interpreted that Definition with the most reckless unscrupulousness. He had muddled together all Papal Decisions "on marriage questions; patronage questions; church-building questions;" even a statement of the *motives* leading to such Decisions; "every expression"

in Pontifical laws "even merely introductory," &c., &c. And he had assumed, that the Vatican Definition ascribed to the Holy See Infallibility throughout this vast range of subjects. Mgr. Fessler made the (to a Catholic) obvious reply, that this was the grossest possible misrepresentation. The Bishop pointed out, that—according to Vaticanly-defined Doctrine—"the Pope is not infallible as a man; as a theologian; as a Bishop; as a temporal prince; as a judge; as a legislator; or in his political views; or even in his government of the Church." A Pope never speaks ex cathedrâ, unless where the conditions are united which are mentioned in the Vatican Definition. Nay—adds Mgr. Fessler—even when the Pope does issue an ex cathedrâ Act—it is the Doctrine defined, and that alone, to which Catholics are under an obligation of assenting.* Preambles, arguments, obiter dicta, are external to the defining intention, and external therefore to the obligation of belief. Accordingly he calls his work "True and False Infallibility." The "False Infallibility" is that which *Schülte alleged* to have been defined at the Council; while the "True Infallibility" is that which was really there defined. The Bishop's volume did immense service in Germany; where the wildest notions had been before afloat, as to what the Council had done.

In one particular passage however, the Bishop expressed himself after a fashion which I venture to think paradoxical, concerning the doctrinal autho-

* See the Seventh Thesis of this Essay.

rity of the Syllabus. His purpose throughout is to show, how little *additional* obligation of belief had been imposed on Catholics by the Vatican Definition. As to the Syllabus—he admits indeed that interior assent is due to its whole teaching. But such assent, he adds, was due, as a matter of deference to the Pope, long before the Definition of 1870. And even to this day, he adds, "many theologians think it may be assumed as doubtful" whether the Syllabus were issued ex cathedrâ—and accordingly whether any *additional* obligation of assent to its teaching were imposed by the Vatican Council—"until some fresh Declaration is made on the subject by the Holy See."

Now a cock-and-bull story came somehow or other to be inserted in a Catholic journal—the "Germania"—as to the authority with which Mgr. Fessler's treatise had been invested. That journal stated as a matter of fact, that the treatise had been referred by the Pope to a theological Commission of different nationalities; and that these theologians, having carefully examined it, had given it unqualified approbation. To others, I suppose—certainly to me—the notion never occurred, that a story so definite and so circumstantial could be (as it turned out to be) a simple and absolute figment. I think indeed on reflection, that my reasonable course from the first would have been to doubt its correctness. So strong (I think) is the argument for the Syllabus's ex cathedrâ character, that I ought to have almost taken for granted, that no Decision sanctioned by the Pope could have been in a different sense. However in fact I did take the story

for granted. And accordingly in April 1875—while expressing my own continued conviction that the Syllabus is an ex cathedrâ pronouncement—I added that "no Catholic as such can as yet be under an *obligation* of accepting the Syllabus, in any more stringent way than as Mgr. Fessler accepts it." In April, 1876, however—having discovered the fabulousness of the whole story concerning the international Commission—I retracted my retractation. See p. 372, note.

It is true no doubt, that Pius IX. warmly congratulated Mgr. Fessler on the publication of his volume. An adverse critic pressed this point against me; and I replied to him in July, 1876. I will not here repeat what I then said; for the detail would be wearisome, and anyone who pleases can of course refer to the article. There is no ground whatever for supposing —such was my argument—that the Pope had any knowledge whatever concerning the treatise, beyond a knowledge of its general drift. Still less is there any ground for supposing, that the Pope had heard of that one incidental passage in which mention was made of the Syllabus.* The treatise was published in Germany in German in February, 1871. The Pope—who did not know German—wrote his letter of gratulation in the following April. Nor does anyone profess that the treatise had been in the

* In his Third Edition, Mgr. Fessler added one or two further remarks on the Syllabus. But this Edition was not published until some time after the Pope's Letter.

meantime (or indeed that it has ever been) translated into Italian or Latin.*

V.

At the same time I cannot be otherwise than confident, that had the Bishop lived a year or two longer, he would have changed his attitude towards the Syllabus. "Many theologians"—he had said—"think it may be assumed as doubtful" whether the Pope issued it ex cathedrâ, "until some fresh Declaration is made on the subject by the Holy See." Now the "Civilta"—in a passage quoted a few pages back—says that in various subsequent Acts Pius IX. did make exactly such a Declaration. I have myself

* Other (to my mind) very singular allegations have been made, concerning this treatise. Some Catholics have maintained that it was written—not only, nor perhaps even chiefly, against Schülte and his supporters—but also against certain "extreme" children of the Church. It was partly written—according to these commentators—to protest against a certain supposed "Ultramontane" view; which claims a larger extent as having been ascribed to Infallibility by the Vatican Fathers, than was in fact by them thereto ascribed. Further—according to the same commentators—Mgr. Fessler doubts the Church's Infallibility in her pronouncement of minor doctrinal censures; and doubts also her power of defining infallibly truths which were not actually revealed, however close may be their connection with the Deposit. I met expressly every one of these allegations, in my articles of April 1875, July 1875, and July 1876. According to my own view of the controversy, I showed irrefragably in those articles—by collating various parts of the treatise—not only that the Bishop's words *need* mean nothing of the kind, but that they *can* mean nothing of the kind.

fallen in with two such instances; and it is difficult to see how words can well be clearer. The former will be found in the original Latin, "Dublin Review" of July, 1876, p. 125, note. A priest had written a volume, purporting to treat one particular theme "according to the doctrine of the Syllabus." Pius IX. on April 20th, 1874, wrote him a congratulatory Letter, in which he mentioned the Syllabus among "the teachings of Peter's Chair." "Petri Cathedræ documentis." This (I say) was in 1874; long after the term "ex cathedrâ" had received its authentic explanation. To say that "the Syllabus is a teaching of the Petri Cathedra," is to say (hardly even in other words) that "the teaching of the Syllabus is ex cathedrâ."*

* It has before now been maintained, that such a "Declaration" as Mgr. Fessler desiderates, must be one accompanied by certain formalities, which (so it is alleged) are necessary for the authentication of an ex cathedrâ pronouncement as such. For my part, I have always confidently denied that there are any such formalities. See the Tenth Thesis of the preceding Essay. Consider e. g. the Encyclical "Mirari vos;" concerning which we know with absolute certainty (by its author's subsequent testification) that it was intended to impose obligatory Doctrine on all Catholics. Consider on the other hand any one among these numerous Encyclicals, concerning which no one ever maintained that they were intended to impose obligatory doctrine. What difference is there between the *formalities* which accompany these respective pronouncements? Of course none whatever.

The immediate question however concerns, not Doctrine, but Mgr. Fessler's *view* of Doctrine. Now a moment's attention will show, that he cannot possibly mean what these commentators suppose. If he considered that there are certain definite formalities which must be found in any ex cathedrâ Act—he could not have

The other testimony of Pius IX. was adduced by me in October, 1875, p. 280; and is dated July 22nd of that year. In this case I have not seen the Latin original; but I quoted a French translation, published in the "Etudes." Here again the Syllabus is expressly called "a teaching of this Chair of Truth:" doubtless in Latin "hujus Veritatis Cathedræ documentum."* Here, as before, a "documentum Cathedræ" must necessarily be a "documentum Pontificis ex cathedrâ."

VI.

It now only remains to consider objections. And I

considered it *doubtful* whether the Syllabus were ex cathedrâ. Either the Syllabus was accompanied by those formalities, and then it was certainly ex cathedrâ; or else it was *not* accompanied by them, and then it certainly was *not* ex cathedrâ. And on the latter supposition, no subsequent Pontifical Declaration could possibly effect, that the Syllabus should be known as having been issued ex cathedrâ; because on the contrary we knew with perfect certainty from the first, that it was *not* issued ex cathedrâ. Mgr. Fessler then had heard nothing whatever about these alleged formalities. In fact he has expressed his general doctrine very clearly; and I for one entirely concur with it, except as regards the particular instance of the Syllabus. "I find," he says, "that in this case, as in a hundred others, we can fully rely on the notes which have been given by" the Vatican Definition; . . . . "but yet, notwithstanding this, the application of the notes to particular cases may have its difficulties." (English translation, p. 5.) Of course there could be no possible "difficulties," if an ex cathedrâ Act were distinguishable from others, as being accompanied by certain formalities which admit of being described in black and white.

* Or rather "documenta"; as the Brief includes the Syllabus among other "teachings."

am convinced that the one which, more than all the rest put together, weighs with educated Catholics who have not specially given their mind to theology, is this. "The Vatican Definition"—they say—"was ex "cathedrâ: this is a plain matter of fact. The Syllabus "was not ex cathedrâ: this is another plain matter of "fact. A Catholic who should profess to repudiate the "Vatican Definition, is not a possibly existent person; "for the very profession excludes him from the Church. "But more than one excellent Catholic—layman or "priest—avowedly declines to accept the Syllabus-"censures as infallibly just; and even the 'extremest' "Catholics do not say that such avowal excludes him "from the Church." This objection however is refuted by a reply of the most simple and elementary character. No one ever alleged that the Syllabus is a Definition *of faith;* that it condemns the errors which it recites, precisely as *heretical.* Now there is a most important distinction between Definitions *of faith* and *other* ex cathedrâ Definitions; a distinction to which I have more than once referred in the preceding portion of this volume. I have expressed it in my Essay on the Council of Florence. "Suppose you disbelieve," I said, "the Doctrine of Transubstantiation, though you well know that it is taught as strictly of faith by the Church in communion with Rome. However invincible may be your ignorance of that Church's authority—and however convinced a priest may be of such invincibleness—he cannot admit you to the Sacraments. But suppose that, through invincible ignorance, you disbelieve some

doctrine which is infallibly taught by the Church—yet not as strictly *de fide*—the priest then is *not* bound to exclude you." In very many cases he may presume that your "ignorance" of the precept of interior assent is "invincible;" and that far more harm than good will probably ensue, from any attempt to press it on your attention.

Indeed I may mention a fact, which shows how universally recognised is this distinction. A distinguished Roman theologian, who was kind enough to revise my Latin treatise, told me that several theologians did not apply the term "ex cathedrâ," except to Definitions *of faith*. They held indeed that, in pronouncing a minor doctrinal censure, the Holy Father speaks as Universal Teacher, and imposes a strict obligation of interior assent; but they did not commonly apply the phrase "ex cathedrâ" to such Definition. Accordingly it was at the suggestion of this theologian, that I inserted the two first paragraphs in the exposition of my Ninth Thesis. The Vatican Fathers indeed subsequently fixed the phrase "ex cathedrâ" in its wider sense. But the fact still remains, that there is a broad and ineffaceable distinction between these two classes of ex cathedrâ Acts. The Definition of the Immaculate Conception or of Papal Infallibility belongs to one class; the "Mirari vos," "Quantâ curâ," or Syllabus to the other.

There is no other objection I ever heard against the ex cathedrâ character of the Syllabus, which impresses me as having even any superficial or colourable plausibility. Indeed there is only one other, which I think

it worth while even to mention. It has been pointed out that, in one or two instances, this or that censure contained in the Syllabus goes a good deal beyond anything contained in the original Pontifical Document; that the original Document e.g. was purely disciplinary, and contained no direct theological *teaching* whatever. But this fact presents no difficulty. The Pope may most intelligibly condemn ex cathedrâ some proposition: and at the same time remind Catholics, that on a former occasion he had implicitly condemned it, by some disciplinary Act or otherwise; though at that earlier time *not* ex cathedrâ. In fact such a circumstance surely gives still further reason for regarding the Syllabus as ex cathedrâ. It is improbable that he should act in what I may call so high-handed a way, unless he were exercising his office as Teacher to the full extent of its prerogatives.

And theologians (I believe) almost unanimously—though I admit of course that there is one most eminent exception—hold this view of the Syllabus. F. Dumas, in the "Etudes" of March, 1876, affirms that "no recent work on theology of any value has come into his hands, without his finding the Syllabus there invoked against many a thesis, just as the condemnation of Bains or Quesnel is invoked." Hergenröther takes for granted, in a tone which implies there can be no doubt on the matter, that the Syllabus-condemnations are ex cathedrâ ("Church and State" i. 206–8). Canon Neville says (on "Mr. Gladstone's Expostulation," p. 54) that "the teachings of

the Syllabus are the cordially-accepted creed of every son and daughter of the Church, in the sense in which they emanate from the Pope." Moreover—since such a Pontifical Declaration as Mgr. Fessler desiderated has most indubitably been given since his time—we may safely rank on the same side the Bishop himself, and the (unnamed) theologians whom he cites. Even were the case otherwise, he is express in mentioning that interior assent is due from every Catholic to the teaching of the Syllabus; and for practical purposes one does not see much difference between this and the ordinary view.

I conclude in the words of the distinguished German theologian, Molitor. The Syllabus is "a piece of Apostolic teaching" which "stands like a light-house in the stormy night of our times; so that poor sea-farers may steer their boats by it, and that stately vessels may not founder on the rocks" ("Burning Questions," English translation, p. 73.)

APPENDIX II.

ARE INFALLIBLE DEFINITIONS RARE?

[February 1880.]

I.

DE MORGAN has said, with apparent paradox but with great truth, that in grammar the comparative degree is much more positive than the positive. It is a much more positive and intelligible statement to

say that A is greater than B, than to say that A is great or that B is great. The latter statement indeed is not positive and intelligible at all, until one understands what is the assumed *standard* of greatness.

So when the question is asked (as of late it has not unfrequently been) whether infallible Definitions are rare events—no answer can be given to such a question, until one understands what is the assumed *standard* of rarity or frequency.* It is very certain indeed, that ex cathedrâ Definitions are far rarer in every period than are other Pontifical Acts. This "comparative" statement is positive, intelligible, and most indubitable. Moreover it is one on which it is of great importance to dwell prominently; because enemies of the Church are so constantly implying, that Catholics ascribe Infallibility to everything which a Pope officially says or does. But some Catholics seem to speak as though an infallible Definition were in such sense rare, that its pronouncement is almost an epoch in the Church's history. For my own part I cannot approach ever so distantly to the acceptance of such a statement. Indeed I can hardly think it would have ever been made, except for some such confusion as that of which I spoke in the preceding Appendix: a confusion between Definitions *of faith*, and *minor* infallible Definitions. I shall here then reproduce

* Sometimes indeed it has been asked, whether the Church's *exercise of Infallibility* be rare or frequent. But this must be a mere oversight. Of course the Church's exercise of Infallibility in her ordinary magisterium is unintermittent.

part of what I have from time to time said on this matter in the "Dublin Review."

It so happens that, as regards the Pontiff who has last closed his reign, we have one or two very definite data, on which to base a most certain judgment. I am very far from meaning to imply, that other Popes have spoken ex cathedrâ with as much comparative frequency as Pius IX. But still it will be useful to ascertain in the first instance, how the case has stood with *him*.

II.

The first evidence I shall adduce on this head is his own testimony in the "Quantâ curâ." He opens this Encyclical (Dec. 1864) by reminding the Bishops, "with how great care" his Predecessors had laboured "in their most wise Letters and Constitutions to expose and condemn all those heresies and errors" which in their time afflicted the Church. In like manner, he adds, "scarcely had we been elevated to the Chair of S. Peter when, *according to the duty of our Apostolic ministry*, and following the illustrious example of our Predecessors, we" began "raising our voice." "In *many* ["pluribus"] published Encyclical Letters, Consistorial Allocutions and other Apostolic Letters *we have condemned the chief errors of this our unhappy age*; and we have excited your admirable Episcopal vigilance; and we have *again and again* [etiam atque etiam] admonished and ex-

horted *all sons of the Catholic Church* to us most dear, that they should altogether abhor and flee from the contagion of so dire a pestilence." On these words a very sure argument may be founded. When a Pontiff "according to the duty of his Apostolic ministry"—pursuing the course of "those most wise Letters and Constitutions" wherein his Predecessors "exposed and condemned the heresies and errors of their time"—proceeds to "condemn the chief errors" of his "most unhappy age"—he is speaking ex cathedrâ. Again there is another argument. Those "most wise Letters and Constitutions," whereby earlier Popes had condemned the "heresies and errors" of their times, were assuredly issued ex cathedrâ. But Pius IX. expressly says that, in the various pronouncements to which he refers, he has been following the example of those Predecessors. In such pronouncements therefore, he was himself also speaking ex cathedrâ. Now he says that those pronouncements have been "*many*"; that he has "*again and again*" put them forth. The conclusion is obvious.

If further argument could be needed for the conclusion, that Pius IX. spoke ex cathedrâ in those pronouncements to which the "Quantâ curâ" refers—such argument would be found in the wording of the Vatican Definition. Mgr. Fessler has most serviceably reminded us, that in this Definition, and nowhere else, are to be found the authentic notes of an ex cathedrâ Act. Now, according to its words, the Pope speaks ex cathedrâ and infallibly, whenever "in discharge of his office as Pastor and Teacher of all Christians he

defines, according to his Supreme Apostolic Authority, a Doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the Universal Church." Take then any given error, which Pius IX. condemned in some one of the pronouncements mentioned by the "Quantâ curâ." Let me apply successively to such condemnation the Vatican tests of an ex cathedrâ Act.

Did he condemn that error "in discharge of his office as Pastor and Teacher of all Christians, according to his Supreme Apostolic Authority?" He tells us in the "Quantâ curâ," that he issued his utterance "according to the duty of his Apostolic ministry." He further tells us, that in the said utterance he was "treading in the footsteps of his illustrious Predecessors;" who had been in the habit of putting forth "most wise Letters and Constitutions," for the purpose of "exposing and condemning all heresies and errors" which were noxious to faith and morals.

Did he define a "Doctrine concerning faith or morals?" He declares (1) that his Predecessors had been in the habit of condemning "heresies and errors adverse to our divine Faith; to the doctrine of the Catholic Church; to purity of morals; to the eternal salvation of souls." And he declares (2) that in this particular utterance he was following their example.

Did he define "a Doctrine to be held by the Universal Church?" He expressly testifies that, when "condemning the chief errors of their own most unhappy age" he had "admonished and exhorted all sons of the Catholic Church" to abhor the contagion."

It really seems to me, that if the Vatican Fathers

had had the "Quantâ curâ" expressly in their mind, they could hardly have declared, more distinctly than they did, the ex cathedrâ character of the condemnations mentioned in that Encyclical. Word seems to tally with word, and clause with clause.

III.

My second testimony shall be taken from the Preface to the First Dogmatic Constitution of the Vatican Council. In that Preface, Pius IX., having referred to the deplorable intellectual evils of the time, goes on to say that "the Church's deepest compassion is stirred by these errors;" and that "*at no time can she rest* from testifying and proclaiming God's Truth." "We *therefore,*" he continues, "*treading in the footsteps of our Predecessors,* have *never ceased,* in accordance with our *Supreme Apostolic Office,* from teaching and defending Catholic Truth, and reprobating perverse doctrines." The Pontiff declares then that he has been speaking ex cathedrâ with such frequency, that in a figurative sense he may be said "never to have ceased" from one continuous ex cathedrâ pronouncement.

IV.

I proceed to a third testification of the same fact; not now proceeding from the Pope himself, but proceeding responsively from the Bishops. At the

Centenary of 1867 the Catholic Episcopate assembled at Rome* thus addressed Pius IX. Here, as before, I italicise a few clauses:—

"*Never has your voice been silent.* You have accounted it to *belong to your Supreme Office* to proclaim eternal verities; to smite with the sword of your Apostolic utterance the errors of the times . . . to dispel the darkness which perverse and novel teachings have shed over men's souls . . . so that at length all may attain to know what it is which *every Catholic should hold retain and profess.* For that exceeding great care we render to your Holiness the deepest thanks . . . and believing that *Peter has spoken by the mouth of Pius*—therefore, whatever you have spoken, confirmed, and pronounced *for the safe custody of the Deposit,* we likewise speak, confirm, and pronounce . . . *For* that is firmly and deeply established in our conviction which the Fathers at Florence defined . . . that the Roman Pontiff is 'the Vicar of Christ, Head of the whole Church, and Father and Teacher of all Christians.'"†

On this most pregnant passage, I have three remarks to be made.

Firstly, there can be no possible doubt that the Address itself describes Pius IX.'s ex cathedrâ Acts as having been very frequent. Let some given Pontifical Act be supposed to exist, in regard to which certain

* The majority of Catholic Bishops were actually assembled at Rome; and it is well known, that almost all who were not present afterwards gave in their adhesion to the address from which this extract is taken.

† Quoted by Cardinal Manning in his "Petri Privilegium,' I. p. 32.

Bishops declare that, in this utterance, the Pope, exercising his "Supreme Office," has "proclaimed" some "eternal verity;" has "smitten with his Apostolic utterance" some "error of the time;" that in this Act the Pope has tended to "dispel the darkness, which perverse and evil teachings have shed over men's souls;" that this Act has enabled Catholics, on one point at least, to know "what they are bound to hold, retain, and profess." Let these Bishops be further supposed to add that, in this utterance, "Peter has spoken by the mouth of Pius," "for the safe custody of the Deposit"; and let them proclaim to him that they feel themselves bound to confirm this same utterance, because they are deeply convinced that he is, by divine appointment, "Teacher of all Christians." The last thing certainly which any one would dream of doubting is, that they contemplate this Act as having been issued ex cathedrâ. Now in the Address the Bishops say that Pius IX.'s "voice has never been silent" (to speak figuratively), so frequent has he been in promulgating utterances of this very kind.

Secondly, the Pontiff warmly approved what the Bishops had said to him. He declares at the very beginning of his reply* how acceptable to him is the fact, that the Bishops assert the Doctrines which he has himself taught, and condemn the errors which he has himself condemned. By their presence and by their joint address—he then adds—they have shown that the same power as of old is exercised by "this

* "Petri Privilegium," I. p. 139.

Chair of Truth" (Cathedra Veritatis). In other words he says, that they have shown how great still is the Roman Pontiff's power, when he speaks from the "Cathedra Veritatis."

Thirdly, my readers will remember that in 1870 some five hundred Bishops signed a Postulatum for the definition of Pontifical Infallibility. This Postulatum will be found at length in Card. Manning's "Petri Privilegium," iii. 167-171. In their Appendix to it they accumulated various testimonies for the Dogma; and among them they cited the particular passage, which I have quoted from the Episcopal Address of 1867. One can hardly imagine a more authentic testimony to the fact, that the signataries of this Address were referring in the said passage to *infallible* utterances and to no other. Yet they spoke of those utterances as having been so numerous, that Pius IX.'s "mouth" might truly be said "never to have been silent."

V.

I am by no means intending to assume that, in other Pontificates, ex cathedrâ utterances have been nearly so frequent as under Pius IX. Indeed the fact, mentioned by FF. Schrader and Damas, and cited by me in the preceding Appendix, might lead one to expect exceptional frequency in the latter case. The Holy Father—it appears—kept together for ten more years the theologians who had drawn up the Definition of

1854, in order that they might give him counsel on other matters of doctrine. To such a permanent theological commission, a very frequent succession of ex cathedrâ utterances would seem the natural correlative.

At the same time, let the following passage be considered, from the present Holy Father's inaugural Encyclical, "Inscrutabili." We italicise a word or two.

"We exhort you, Venerable Brethren . . . to kindle in the hearts of the faithful committed to you the love of religion: that so with closer union they may cling to this Chair of truth and justice; that they may accept all its Doctrines with inmost assent of mind and will; that they may entirely reject even *the most widely-spread opinions*, which they recognise as opposed *to the teachings of the Church.* In which matter the Roman Pontiffs our Predecessors,—last of all Pius IX. of sacred memory, especially in the Œcumenical Vatican Council— . . . have not failed, *as often as was necessary*, to reprobate prevailing errors and *smite them with Apostolical censure.* We, following the footsteps of our Predecessors, *confirm and renew all these condemnations;* and at the same time earnestly beseech the Father of Lights, that all the faithful, being made perfect in the same sense and the same judgment, may be one with ourselves in thought and in speech."

That Leo XIII. here speaks of ex cathedrâ Acts, is at once seen by his language about "smiting errors with Apostolical censure." And certainly the very last thing which any one would surmise from his words is, that those Pontifical Acts, in which prevalent errors

are condemned ex cathedrâ, have been but few and far between.

I will cite one further fact. The Preamble to the Definition of 1870 singles out three in particular, from all the ecclesiastical testimonies which might have been adduced for the Dogma in hand. The first of these is the well-known formula, prescribed by Pope Hormisdas to the Eastern Bishops.* "In the Apostolic See," say these Bishops, "religion has always been preserved *without spot.*" "*Wherefore*" —they presently proceed—"we receive and approve *all the Letters of Pope Leo* and *all that he wrote concerning the Christian religion.* Therefore, as we have said, following in all things the Apostolic See and *professing all its Decrees,* I hope," &c., &c. It is not then only S. Leo's Letter to S. Flavian which ranks among the "Decrees of the Apostolic See," and its "spotless" teaching: but *all* his "Letters"; *all* "which he wrote concerning the Christian religion." S. Leo's ex cathedrâ utterances then were certainly numerous.

On the whole therefore, so much as this may be very safely affirmed. One cannot lay it down as a kind of acknowledged fact or habit in the Church, that infallible Definitions are rare; unless the word "rare" be used in some signification, extremely different from that in which the common sense of mankind would understand it. The question whether any given Pontifical utterance be ex cathedrâ, must be decided

* This may be seen in the "Petri Privilegium," II. p. 86.

by the special circumstances (intrinsic and extrinsic) of that utterance. But no argument against its being ex cathedrâ can be derived from any such general principle, as that ex cathedrâ utterances are rare: because on the contrary it would rather appear, that such utterances are frequent.

AUTHORITY OF THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY.

La Filosofia antica esposta e difesa dal P. GIUSEPPE KLEUTGEN, D.C., D.G. Versione dal Tedesco. Roma.

De l'Unité dans l'Enseignment de la Philosophie au sein des Eccles Catholiques. Par le P. H. RAMIÈRE. Paris.

Essay on First Principles. By the Very Rev. JOHN CANON WALKER. London: Longmans.

[July 1869.]

I.

THE foundation by Descartes of what is called "the modern philosophy," may fairly be accounted the severest *intellectual* calamity which ever befell the Church. However much she suffered in other ways from the various heresies of successive centuries, *intellectually* she gained by them. For she was led in each case to investigate more profoundly, to analyze more carefully, to express more precisely, the Dogma assailed; while its assailants were expelled from her territory, and had no power therefore to taint her atmosphere. But Descartes was no heretic. And the result of his career is, that for a considerable period there has been mutual internecine war among Catholics, as to the very fundamentals of Philo-

sophy.* From the fact of living in the midst of this phenomenon, there is a tendency in contemporary Catholics† greatly to underrate its disastrousness; and it may be worth while therefore, before going further, to point out one or two particulars under which it is especially deplorable.

II.

Dogmatic Theology more properly so called—the exposition and analysis of Dogmata in themselves and in their mutual relation—has its very life in the combination of truths known by Revelation with truths known by Reason. If the latter data therefore be wrongly supplied, the whole science is vitiated and worthless.‡ The disciples then of an unsound philo-

* "This great undeniable fact must never be lost sight of, that *up to the beginning of the last Century* the Scholastic Philosophy kept itself in possession throughout the whole extent of the Catholic Church" (Kleutgen, vol. i. p. 100). F. Kleutgen then would give some 150 years, as the period during which the calamity mentioned in the text has oppressed the Church. "Our domestic contentions . . . . turn on the *most fundamental questions:* those on which depends *the certainty of all our rational convictions;* on the principles which should be opposed to sceptics and pantheists; on the legitimacy of the idea of God and of all absolute ideas; on the very value of Reason; in one word on *the whole of Philosophy.*" (Ramière, pp. 4, 5).

† [I was writing in 1869.]

‡ "What is Theology? The Philosophy of Revelation: in other words it is the result of applying to revealed Dogmata the methods and principles of Philosophy. Evidently therefore all hope o theological union must be abandoned, so long as disputes continue

sophy are ipso facto excluded from all full or trustworthy scientific knowledge of Dogma. Since therefore nowadays all speculatively-given Catholics regard a large number of their fellow-Catholics as being in this very category—as being disciples of an unsound philosophy—the natural result is, that Dogmatic Theology goes very much to the wall. And indeed one very curious indication of this result may be observed; viz., that the very meaning of the phrase "Dogmatic Theology" has imperceptibly changed. Catholics do not like to admit that they neglect Dogmatic Theology; and so they give that name to other studies, which, however valuable in themselves, are of quite a different character: such as Dogmatic *History*, and anti-Protestant *Controversy*. Both these studies, it need not be said, have very great value; and the latter indeed has been for the last three centuries absolutely indispensable. But surely it is quite a misnomer to speak of either as "Dogmatic Theology."*

on philosophical principles and on the intrinsic trustworthiness of Reason. . . . . If one of our students opens S. Thomas, Suarez, or some other of those great Doctors whom the Church has proclaimed the luminaries of Theology,—instead of light he finds therein but obscurity. Their terms, their axioms, their formulæ, which used to be perfectly clear to those who had been philosophically educated, have now become even to teachers mere hieroglyphics." (Ramière, pp. 21, 22).

* [F. Harper, S.J., expresses with great vigour the same view of things. "Positive Theology," he says, "apart from its scholastic guardian, can hardly be called a theology at all; but a compost, more or less erudite, of Scriptural and patristic exegesis, leavened with the history of Dogma." The "Month," November 1879, p. 364.]

Now we should have to occupy a long article with the subject, if we attempted to set forth the deplorable disadvantage under which all Catholic speculation labours, from the comparative neglect into which dogmatical science has lately fallen in many parts of Christendom. Here we will but express briefly our own strong opinion, (1) that this is the one central science, which gives unity and due proportionate significance to all other sacred studies; (2) that where this is neglected, even those which are zealously cultivated produce far less good fruit than would otherwise be the case; and (3) that the one predominant cause of its neglect—the cause which has had much more influence than all the rest put together—has been the mutual divergence of Catholics in the field of Philosophy. Canon Walker has spoken excellently on this; though in language studiously moderate:—

"In this point of view the Church has suffered loss, when her writers and teachers turned more to the historic and authoritative foundations of Truth, than to its intrinsic reasons, analogies, and aims; although she has undoubtedly gained in other and important respects. At first the younger methods, as with Petavius, inherited a rich stock of principles and Dogmatic Truth to support and vivify their elaborate and critical illustrations. But by degrees the substance began to subside, and the most meagre groundwork of reason served the purposes of varied erudition. Nay, what has been very prejudicial to Truth, a dangerous eclecticism of different principles of philosophy has been adopted for the uses of Dogma; as if Philosophy were an alien without any definite character, intended only to meet the accidental wants of

the theological disputant. Till at last new and foreign principles and processes of reasoning have on all sides forced an entrance into the domain of Dogma; and the Church seemed, as some of late have too crudely and absolutely stated, to be left without a philosophy" (pp. vi. vii.).

III.

A second evil has arisen from Catholic philosophical differences, almost as serious as that which we have just mentioned, but entirely distinct. Many thinkers have of late pointed out, that the higher and more gifted non-Catholic intellects have in general entirely abandoned the old Protestant ruck; that they are either in some sense on their road to the Church, or else are rationalists, pantheists, atheists. As against this latter class (which among men of great intellectual power is very far larger than the former,) the old controversial formulæ—the old "probatur ex Scripturâ," "probatur ex Patribus,"—have become simply antiquated and obsolete. It is no paradox to say, that the controversial Theology now most peremptorily required is controversial *Philosophy*. If then we would estimate the seriousness of our present calamity, let us make a very intelligible supposition. Let us suppose that in the palmy days of Protestantism—in the period of Bellarmine or Bossuet—Catholic controversialists had been as much at issue with each other on first principles, as Catholic *philosophers* are now. What would have been the certain result? Catholics

would have wasted their intellectual energies in disputing with each other, and would moreover have been incapacitated from combining against the common enemy; while Protestants would have been under little danger, from an army divided against itself. Such alas! is the attitude now forced upon the Church's children, in confronting those portents of unbelief which are the great intellectual peril of our time. Catholics are simply impotent to contest *collectively* against the evil. Some doubtless do individually gird themselves for the conflict. But many more are simply cowed and dispirited; they fold their hands and gaze on the monster with alarm and disgust; or they compel themselves to forget his existence.*

IV.

A third evil result, more or less closely connected with each of the two former, is exhibited in Catholic higher lay education. The "Pall Mall Gazette," in a very interesting and significant article issued last April 12th, alleges one characteristic and widely-extended calamity, as having befallen the present age. It complains that Christians in general, and Catholics in particular, "have persuaded themselves to doubt whether it is necessary, or even desirable, that their religious belief should be true, in the plain

* [Matters in this respect have very greatly improved since 1869.]

common sense of that word. They have got into the way of thinking," it adds, "that there is an inferior article different from ordinary truth, which may perhaps be called spiritual truth, and which will for all religious purposes do quite as well, or rather much better. Their creed is . . . less a *doctrine* than a *resolution*, or . . . an *attempt* to believe. They are believers *in a general sense*." Now of course there is here enormous exaggeration; but we wish we could be sure that it does not rest on a certain small basis of truth. Various Catholic thinkers have seen the coming danger. They have constantly pointed out that there has long ceased to be a Christian atmosphere diffused throughout society, imbuing the mind unconsciously with Catholic doctrine and principle; nay, that the prevalent atmosphere has long been in character most opposite. And they have added that, for this reason, it has become far more necessary than it was in earlier times, to inculcate Dogma in one or other shape, as an express study for the educated class. In proportion as this is not done, the phenomenon described in the "Pall Mall Gazette" will be ever of less and less rare occurrence. But Dogma cannot possibly be taught in a shape which shall find access to highly-cultivated intellects, unless in most intimate connection with Philosophy. And thus two most lamentable results at once follow in Catholic higher education, whenever some philosophy is not carefully inculcated as the one fundamentally true and certain system. (1) A Catholic youth cannot be duly protected against that poisonous habit of

speculative thought, which infects the whole air he breathes. Nor (2) can he be trained in a due apprehension of those Dogmata, which are given him by God for the very purpose, that he may direct his life by their constant contemplation.

V.

Here then is the one pressing intellectual need of our time; that Catholics be philosophically united: here is the first, second, and third thing intellectually necessary. In fact, this has been among our principal reasons for dwelling so unintermittently, in this "Review," on the Church's Infallibility and authority within ground not strictly dogmatical. We have dwelt so much on this, because it is in the most complete interior submission to the Church's various Decrees concerning Philosophy, that the earliest remedy must be sought for so deplorable an evil. Other things will have to be added afterwards, no doubt; but this must come first, and without this the others are futile.

But now, if philosophical unity can be obtained at all,—among the various philosophies which have a footing within the Church, is there one in particular to which all eyes would turn as to the nucleus of such unity? Of course there is. The connection is most intimate, as we have seen, between Theology and Philosophy; and yet there is no philosophy with which the Church has ever had official relations, except only

the Scholastic. No Catholic who fairly gives his mind to the matter will be able to doubt, that in its essential and fundamental principles Scholasticism must be infallibly a true philosophy. We have already pointed out, that Dogmatic Theology is based throughout on Philosophy; and that a dogmatic theology, which should take a false philosophy for its basis, must by necessity be preponderatingly false. If then it be admitted—as Catholics are under an obligation of admitting—that the Church's Dogmatic Theology has been in every age substantially and predominantly trustworthy;—it must be no less infallibly certain, that those philosophical doctrines, which everywhere pervade it and are its animating principles, are fundamentally true.

VI.

But there is another and counterbalancing statement of the case, which it is no less important to bear in mind. We say that those philosophical principles, which pervade and animate the Scholastic Theology, are fundamentally true. But this is quite a different thing from saying that—even as exhibited by its best exponents, by S. Thomas or Suarez,—the Scholastic is a perfect and fully-satisfying Philosophy. As the connection of *Theology* with Philosophy was the ground of our general proposition in favour of that system;—so the *degree* of such connection must limit the *extent* to which the proposition itself may reason-

ably be carried. Take one instance of what we mean. The number is by no means inconsiderable of vital philosophical questions, which now profoundly agitate the mind of thinkers, but which three centuries ago had never been raised. It is not to a scholastic philosopher of the past, that a Catholic of this day would reasonably look for their explicit solution; though he *should* reject any proposed solution of them, which is at variance with the *fundamental principles* of Scholastic Philosophy. Again, even very eminent Scholastics may have fallen into various philosophical errors, not fundamental indeed, but very far from unimportant; and yet these errors may so little have worked their way into the fabric of *Theology*, that the Church may have had no call to interfere. We are not here saying that the fact *is* so; but only that the fact *may* be so for anything which Theology declares to the contrary. We would allege also with some confidence, that numerous and emphatic as have been the Church's testimonies to the value of Scholastic Philosophy, they have always stopped very far short of stamping with her authority each several portion of its doctrine.*

* Take, for example, the well-known Decree against Traditionalism. "Methodus, quâ usi sunt D. Thomas, D. Bonaventura, et alii post ipsos Scholastici, non ad rationalismum ducit; neque causa fuit, cur apud scholas hodiernas Philosophia in naturalismum et pantheismum impingeret. Proinde non licet in crimen Doctoribus et Magistris illis vertere, quòd methodum hanc, præsertim approbante vel saltem tacente Ecclesiâ, usurpaverint."

VII.

We speak on this whole subject with unfeigned diffidence, and with deep submission to better judgments than our own. But there is such pressing necessity for speech, that we felt it could not be right much longer to forbear, however keenly we might feel our own incompetence. And we speak now with far greater comfort than would be otherwise possible, because we are able to follow in the wake of so admirable a treatise as F. Kleutgen's which we have named at the head of our article. Indeed this great work appears to us by far the most valuable acquisition to Catholic philosophical literature (so far as we are acquainted with that literature), which has been made since the time of Suarez. Its two main theses are just those two on which we have been insisting. (1) The Scholastic Philosophy is infallibly true, in its essential and fundamental principles. But (2), to be made fully available for our time, it needs large additions and no inconsiderable corrections. In illustrating these theses, F. Kleutgen exhibits, not only the widest, the profoundest, apprehension of Scholasticism; but also a surprisingly fair and large-minded appreciation of other philosophical schools. Moreover he treats his whole theme with an accuracy of thought and expression, which cannot be surpassed. We may add, that not unfrequently he warms with his subject, and rises into real eloquence.

As regards the former of the two theses we have ascribed to him—viz., that the Scholastic Philosophy is true in its essential and fundamental principles—this is the one staple, the one pervading argument of his whole work. We will quote one passage in particular. We quote it for two reasons: (1) because (to our mind) it places the matter on precisely its true ground; and (2) because it dwells on that doctrine concerning the Church's unintermitting infallible magisterium, which we have ever so prominently advocated in this "Review." We italicise a few sentences.

"That the Church's Infallibility . . . . extends also to those sciences which, without being theological, are nevertheless closely bound up with Theology,—this is not questioned (so far as I know) even by our opponents.* Now the Ecclesia Docens maintains in the path of truth the Ecclesia Discens, not only by means of that extraordinary magisterium in virtue of which she pronounces from time to time her judgment on particular errors; but also by means of *her ordinary and always active magisterium,* in virtue of which she manifests true Doctrines over the whole earth. And therefore, if she has the Holy Ghost's assistance when promulgating her decisions against new dogmatical errors—*she is not deprived of the same assistance when she adopts measures which are of decisive influence over her abiding magisterium.* This magisterium consists in the manifestation and exposition of Revealed Truth, made by the Church's Ministers under the guidance and supervision of their

* We wish we could confirm this statement, so far as regards *English* Catholics [1869].

legitimate Pastors. Now since we [the mass of the faithful] are to be led into all the Truth through [the supervision of] these Pastors,—*is it possible that in their office of guidance and superintendence they should be abandoned by the Holy Ghost?* Again, who can possibly deny, that this manifestation and exposition of the doctrines of the Faith, uttered by the Church's Ministers, is greatly influenced by the theology which they study? And on the other hand who will deny, that this theology in its turn is notably affected by the philosophy which it uses for its purpose? The Church's Pastors therefore principally accomplish this their work of guardianship, by means of watchfulness over schools and over their direction; and on this is principally founded the Church's inalienable right of ordering the studies of schools. If then, in the exercise of this right, the Church is not without *infallible light from on high,* what inference may be drawn from her practice in the case we are treating? Here we are speaking of a certain Philosophy, which for many centuries was taught in all the higher schools of Christendom; and those precisely the centuries, in which the Church exercised, incomparably more than in any other period, her right of directing education. And in spite of repeated allegations to the contrary, [I affirm that] she not only *tolerated* the use of this Philosophy, but *promoted* it; and indeed *prescribed* it to the most illustrious Universities of the period, such as Paris, Rome, Bologna. This Philosophy is bound up most unvaryingly and most intimately with the whole of Scholastic Theology. And Scholastic Theology in general—particularly that of S. Thomas,—has been most solemnly approved by the Church; which urgently recommends it to us 'in order to make us secure against all errors, and well-equipped to contend against them.' [In this sense spoke the Pontiffs Sixtus V., Pius V., Alexander VII.,

Innocent XV., and others whom the author has elsewhere cited.]* Now is not this her practice a noteworthy exercise of her abiding magisterium, and one decisive [of the question before us]? Certainly this cannot be denied" (vol. i., pp. 93–95).

This argument seems to us as irrefragable in its substance, as it is admirably expressed by the author. The Church is infallible in her abiding magisterium; and she cannot therefore sanction a theology, which is wrong in principle. But her theology *would* be wrong in principle, if the Scholastic Philosophy, whereon it is based throughout, were fundamentally mistaken. Some readers indeed might doubt from the wording of the above extract, whether F. Kleutgen does not go even farther than this. They might doubt whether he can hold the *second* thesis which we have ascribed to him; viz., that this Philosophy needs, for present purposes, large additions and no inconsiderable corrections. But the very words which next follow, importantly explain and qualify what has preceded.

"We grant willingly that one may have quite just views concerning the Holy Ghost's assistance promised to the Church, and nevertheless hold that *certain particular doctrines of this Philosophy are not correct:* even though the doctrines be *in some way connected with questions of Theology.* One may hold that the Scholastic Philosophy, as a whole, is susceptible of *noteworthy improvements,* nay, and that from circumstances of the time it *needs them:* insomuch that, in this sense, it may with advantage be *superseded by a better*

* Note of the Italian translator.

Philosophy. But can one possibly grant that *a large part of its most characteristic doctrines is false?* that the *foundation and direction* of this Philosophy is perverse?" (p. 95.)

Such accusations are energetically alleged against Scholastic Philosophy by its assailants; and against such accusations our author persistently and emphatically defends it. In like manner he says elsewhere:—

"We have never asserted that all the questions now raised were solved in times past; nor have we ever expressed a doubt that for their solution the Ancient Philosophy *might derive advantage from the modern.* That which we do deny is, that, in order to perfect philosophical sciences, it is necessary to deny the *fundamental principles* of Antiquity and *abandon the road* which Antiquity has constructed" (vol. ii., p. 256).

Again:—

"Considering the intimate connection between Philosophy and Theology, [Descartes and his followers] ought to have inferred that the speculative system, which had been received within the Church for centuries and indeed from the very origin of Christianity, could not be destitute of a *solid and true foundation:* that this system might well be *incomplete;* but not erroneous, *at least on the principal questions*" (vol. i., pp. 114–5).

In vol. ii., p. 145, F. Kleutgen maintains that "a *foundation*" has been laid down by the Scholastics "for the *beginning* of philosophical speculation; or at least that such foundation certainly *may* be laid down,

without abandoning their principles." But he thinks their structure incomplete. Thus (vol. ii., p. 171), he regards "the principle of causality" or "of sufficient reason" as a principle indispensably necessary to be taken into account, for any adequate theory on the laws of thought. Yet he admits that "it is a merit of the modern philosophy" to have first "considered" this principle. As to *some* of the Scholastics, our author is prepared to go much farther; and is of opinion (vol. i., pp. 312–3) that by their mode of exposition they may have given a handle to the fearful error of Lockian empiricism itself. Descartes indeed, according to F. Kleutgen, would have been quite warranted in assailing *this or that particular scholastic doctrine.* His fault was that

"He did not *content* himself with assailing this or that particular doctrine of the Scholastics. He began with the persuasion, that down to his time neither was the fixed point understood from which Philosophy could start, nor the path along which it could proceed in security; and that consequently the Scholastics not only could not really prove the truths which they taught, but besides taught a large number of errors" (vol. i., p. 102).

It was from being inoculated with this preposterous contempt of the past, our author presently adds (p. 112), that Lamennais, Bautain, Gioberti, Hermes, Gunther, fell into the deplorable errors for which they have been condemned. And he proceeds to draw an important illustration, from the great theological work of Melchior Canus. When that theologian began to

teach, no one had methodically treated, as a distinct theme, the various sources of theological science; the relation of those sources to the first principle of that science, God's infallible word; and the comparative weight which should accordingly be assigned to each. Canus then had to treat a new subject; but he refused to treat it in a revolutionary spirit. He searched the old approved writers, to discover what views upon this new subject were most consistent with ancient dicta; and he firmly resolved that his addition to the time-honoured edifice should be in completest harmony with the ancient fabric itself. Such, adds F. Kleutgen, is the course now incumbent on a true Catholic philosopher. A criticism, e.g., of the cognitive faculties is simply essential, he considers, for the philosophical needs of our time; and yet will in vain be sought among the Scholastic Writers. It is the business of a true Catholic philosopher, to consider first of all what views on this matter are *implied* in the Schools; or (if *none* are implied) what views are in greatest harmony with their general system. It is infallibly certain that this system is true in its main essentials; and any view therefore must be unsound, which is incompatible with those essentials.

VIII.

Against F. Kleutgen's whole argument—and indeed against the Church's whole claim of authority within the region of Philosophy—an objection has repeatedly

been made, both by Protestants and by rebellious Catholics. "Philosophy," say these thinkers, "rests "exclusively on Reason; and ecclesiastical authority in "such a matter is simply an impertinent intrusion. "If Reason establishes some truth, anyone commits "intellectual suicide, who doubts that truth in defer-"ence to an external monitor. If on the other hand "there be any truth which *cannot* be established by "Reason, it has no right to be called a *philosophical* "truth at all."

Now we have no space in this number for enlarging duly, on the relations which should be preserved between Reason and Faith in philosophical investigation.* But we must, at all events, give a brief answer to this plausible objection. Firstly then we will reply to its *latter* clause; and we will point out, that there is no cause whatever why a truth may not be of extreme philosophical moment, which cannot nevertheless be established by human Reason. Take e.g. such an assertion as this: that Theology teaches nothing *intrinsically repugnant,* in declaring the One Divine Essence to be terminated by Three Divine Persons; or again, in declaring the accidents of bread and wine to remain, after consecration of the Eucharist, without any substance in which they inhere. Human Reason can neither prove nor disprove these truths; yet no one will doubt that they are philosophically most important. It is a mere question of words,

* We may perhaps refer, without impropriety, to Dr. Ward's "Philosophical Introduction," pp. xxi–xxvii.

whether you do or do not call them *philosophical* truths. But at all events, they throw very great light on various philosophical questions. Moreover there is every probability that some reason higher than the human—some angelic reason—can cognise some or all of them with certainty by its own light.

Next, as to the *former* part of the above-recited objection. One thing is plain at starting. To maintain that the dictates of any theology can conflict with the dictates of Reason, is simply to maintain that such theology is so far false. He therefore who knows that the dictates of Catholic Theology are infallibly true,—will assume as a first principle, that they can never impose on him an obligation of abandoning what his reason has established. It may well happen indeed, that you *think* you have established some tenet by Reason, and that the Church may presently condemn that tenet. Just so, schoolboys often think they have correctly performed a sum in addition or multiplication; yet they find their answer plucked.* Still they do not immediately cry out that their instructor is violating the sacred rights of Reason; but rather take for granted, that they have themselves made a mistake. In like manner the Catholic philosopher, if he finds some one of his conclusions condemned by the Church, is at once perfectly certain, that either his premisses have been unsound or insufficient, or his inferences too hasty. He reviews therefore his past

* This admirable illustration was used some years back in the "Tablet," on occasion (we think) of the Munich Brief.

course of argument, fully expecting that he will make one or other of these discoveries. In most instances his assurance is speedily justified by the event. It may happen however, that he is a long time in finding the flaw; nay, in some comparatively rare cases, he may not be able to find it at all. Yet, even under such circumstances as these, a good Catholic remains confident that there *is* a flaw somewhere, and that his conclusion is really false and mischievous.

It is only in this last case, that any theoretical difficulty can be even alleged. If a Catholic philosopher however felt a moment's hesitation in submitting his judgment on the supposed hypothesis, we would thus argue with him in reply: You have long studied Philosophy. It is quite a familiar fact to you therefore, that some of the world's greatest thinkers have held, as undeniably established by Reason, various opinions, of which you see the utter baselessness and falsehood. Anyhow therefore it is *possible*, that this or that of your own philosophical opinions is similarly baseless; but that, from a certain narrowness or self-partiality, you are blind to the fact. Well, that which, under *any* circumstances, is abundantly *possible*,—you are called on under *present* circumstances to accept as certainly *true*. Why are you called on so to accept it? Because your divinely-given Teacher has so decided. What can be more reasonable than this?

In fact we are confident it will be found, not only that the principle of authority is not adverse to the true interests of Philosophy; but, on the contrary, that it is the only *conservator* of those interests. The

one bane both of Metaphysics and Psychology has ever been, that philosophers have been so deplorably hasty in their philosophical processes; so deplorably careless, as to the sufficiency of their premisses and the correctness of their deductions. The Catholic philosopher enjoys a protection, to which externs are altogether strangers, against these fundamental and capital dangers. Nor in truth do we see how there is any hope of sufficient battle being given to the various forms of philosophical misbelief now prevalent, by any effort which can be put forth by individual philosophers following each his own light. The Church, and the Church alone, can secure that philosophical unity, which is so paramountly needed. A large number of her faithful children, through obedience to her voice, will themselves have learned to see under the light of Reason the falsehood of this or that view, with which they may have originally started. Others, who have not yet come themselves to *see* this, will nevertheless firmly believe it, and will abstain from pressing their idiosyncrasies. And thus the army of Truth, united in one compact phalanx, will have its due advantage against the disorganized and mutually divergent hosts of error.

IX.

There can be no more intensely practical question then, just now, than a consideration of the proper method for ascertaining the Church's voice, on this

or that philosophical question. We will therefore conclude, by expressing our own humble suggestions on the subject. Even though our statements were found to be substantially incorrect, we should have done an important work if we induced more competent thinkers to express themselves clearly on the matter. Our own impression however is, that every loyal Catholic will agree with our principles as far as they go; though it is probable that there may be others of almost equal importance, which have not occurred to our mind. We will not indeed here speak of the intellectual submission due to explicit ecclesiastical pronouncements, because we have so repeatedly enlarged on this. We will speak merely of the *other* means which exist, for knowing the Church's judgment on those things philosophical which are within her sphere.

1. Every philosophical proposition is infallibly true, which is implied in the Church's Dogmatic Definitions. One example will sufficiently illustrate our meaning. It is infallibly true, that the word "Transubstantiation" aptly and correctly expresses that Dogma to which the Church applies it. But the word would *not* truly and aptly express such Dogma, unless certain philosophical propositions were correct concerning "substance," "accident," &c., &c. Such propositions therefore must be regarded as infallibly certain.*

* [Very much to the purpose here is a note of Cardinal Franzelin's, to the Thirteenth Thesis of his work on "Tradition and Scripture":—

"It is easily seen (says the Cardinal) that many truths, in them-

2. All philosophical principles are infallibly true, which pervade and animate the Church's one recognized Dogmatic Theology, the Scholastic.

selves philosophical and metaphysical, are in the strictest relation with the Verities of Faith : insomuch that without them the latter cannot be rightly understood and explicated. When this happens, those truths—not indeed regarded universally but in their formal relation to the Verities of Faith with which they are bound up—should be accounted truly theological. Of this kind are the notions of 'nature' and 'hypostasis' in relation to the [Mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation]. Of this kind again is the Doctrine concerning the accidents of bodies, in reference to . . . . the Holy Eucharist. . . . . Again the Doctrine concerning inherent habits and qualities, in reference to the Dogmata on Grace and the Sacramental Character ; or concerning the 'substantial form' in reference to the true unity of human nature ; &c. &c."

F. Harper again, in the article from which I have already quoted, expresses himself most strongly in the same direction.

If certain philosophical terms, he says, "which are the key to the Church's Definition" on the Eucharist "are interpreted in accordance with some new philosophical theory, and in consequence have a meaning fathered upon them of which the Fathers who drew up, and the Pope who confirmed, the Canons, never even dreamed—it is plain to see . . . . how Declarations of the Faith . . . . might be so dissevered of their native meaning, as to become capable of sanctioning *any amount of heresy and error.* Take e.g. the monads of Leibnitz—or the occasionalism of Mallebranche—or the forces of Boscovich—as a guide in interpreting the Church's Definitions concerning the Holy Eucharist. Is there a known *heresy connected with this Dogma,* that could not by logical sequence parade itself under shadow of the interpretation ?" (p. 370).

There cannot be a better illustration than this, of the principle urged in my text. I have no such knowledge myself indeed on the subject, as to have any opinion of my own on the particular question raised by F. Harper. But let us assume, that his view of facts is correct. Let us assume, that either of the three philosophical theories he mentions would, if accepted as true, de-

3. As to other scholastic philosophical propositions, —the degree of ecclesiastical authority which they possess is proportioned to the degree of intimacy and pervasiveness with which they have inflowed into the Scholastic Theology.

4. Those scholastic philosophical propositions which have not so inflowed at all—however prominent and important they may be in a purely philosophical point of view—are to be judged exclusively by their own merits, and to be weighed impartially in the scale of reason. Yet there is strong reason for an à priori anticipation that, for the most part, they will be found far weightier in that scale, than the parallel propositions of conflicting philosophies.

Our readers will have seen, from the preceding remarks, that we are strongly disposed to one opinion, which we have not yet expressly mentioned. Undoubtedly the strictures on Scholastic Philosophy, uttered by a certain class of Catholics, are not only very superficial, but very disloyal to the Church; betraying indeed a most inadequate appreciation of her Infallibility and her authority in teaching. But (speaking with great deference) we do think that some Catholics fall into an opposite extreme. Take e.g. Canon Walker's valuable and thoughtful pamphlet. Certainly we have not observed in it any direct expression on the subject, to which we can take exception.

naturalize the Church's Declarations concerning the Blessed Eucharist. If this be so, then I think it should be regarded as infallibly certain on theological grounds, that all those three philosophical theories are false.]

Still its general *tone* almost seems to imply, that any one philosophical proposition, current among the Scholastics, has pretty well as much authority as any other; and that the most intellectually dutiful sons of the Church are those, who accept every such proposition simply as a matter of course, without question or delay. Now it is abundantly possible, that there may be reasons for such a view of which we know nothing. We only say that we *do* know nothing of them; that we are not ourselves aware of any ground, on which such an unquestioning and absolute acceptance of every scholastic philosophical detail can be defended. And the quotations, which we gave a few pages back, show at all events that in this we are following no less grave an authority than that of F. Kleutgen.

X.

The sum of our whole argument may be thus stated:—(1) It is the normal condition of Catholics, that they be absolutely united on philosophical *essentials;* while there shall be a large amount among them of free discussion, on questions which are secondary indeed, but very far from unimportant. (2) For the last 150 years this normal condition has been suspended, and Catholics have been at mutual variance on the very foundations of Philosophy. (3) From this calamity there has arisen, in many parts of the Church, a deplorable neglect of Dogmatic Theology

properly so called; and also a very serious difficulty in the higher education of laymen. (4) From the same cause, it has become impossible to defend successfully on a large scale those fundamental truths of Natural Religion, which are now the main points of attack among many of the ablest and most cultivated non-Catholic thinkers. No successful war can be waged against the enemies of Natural Religion, unless there is a large and united phalanx of its upholders. (5) This unspeakably needed philosophical unity might without difficulty be obtained by Catholics (though not by other religionists), if Catholic thinkers would be but duly loyal to the Church's voice. (6) Lastly, such loyalty would be sufficiently secured, by the acceptance of certain practical principles, which we have ventured (under correction) to indicate.

We submit these various opinions to the better judgment of Catholic philosophical inquirers. We have long been anxious to urge a Catholic crusade in behalf of Natural Religion, against the Mills and Bains and other its enemies, who in England are now so active and stirring. But no such crusade is possible, except in proportion as Catholics shall be philosophically united among themselves. We hope then that we may hereafter from time to time apply (as best we are able) the principles suggested in this article, to a treatment of the various vital questions now at issue between Religion and its opponents.

Meanwhile we cannot better conclude our present paper, than by extracting a strong testimony to the Scholastic Philosophy from a very impartial quarter,

the "Saturday Review." The passage terminates an able notice of Mr. Lecky's new work, in the issue for May 1st. And this, be it remembered, is the testimony of a Protestant journalist; of one therefore, who is in all probability altogether unacquainted with what Scholasticism has done, in the way of building up that unparalleled intellectual fabric, the Church's Dogmatic Theology.

"Mind is employed either in tracking out the knowledge of things outside it, or in examining its own thoughts and history. Its activity ought to take both directions: in the Middle Ages it long shrank, not without intelligible reasons, from the first; but surely the mind cannot be said to be idle when it puts forth its strength on the second. Now, though there was a vast deficiency in that hunting out and ascertaining the facts of nature and history which is so great a work in our days, there was no deficiency in that *which is more properly thought*—profound and patient and exact consideration of what goes on in the mind, of its efforts to know, of its materials and processes. The schoolmen have become a commonplace for sneers. But no one who ever studied any of the great ones among them could possibly say that mind in them was dormant. No one could ever say that men like Anselm or Aquinas did not treat the most difficult questions with a freedom and originality, which are ordinarily supposed incompatible with their religion. *In all that is of most essential consequence,* not only in the exhibition of what we know, but in grasping it firmly, clearly, comprehensively, in taking in all the sides of a question, in mapping out all its ramifications, in the sheer hard work of purely intellectual action on ideas and words, *they are still our unequalled masters.* Most surely, if they led, in their keen and

subtle speculations, into many false and useless roads, they paved the way as nothing else did,—*as certainly neither ancient speculation nor Mahommedan science did*—for modern philosophy. They laid out the ground and prepared a language for Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Kant. Those ancient and unwearied pioneers of real thinking deserve more respect than they always meet, from all who know that real thinking is as necessary as the actual discovery of facts, for the true and solid advancement of knowledge."*

* [Since the preceding article was written, three important Declarations have issued from Rome on the theme to which it refers: not to mention others, with which I may be unacquainted.

1. There is the pronouncement on Rosmini's works, which I published in our number for July 1876, pp. 277-280. The Master of the Sacred Palace lays down,—as established after a "most rigorous examination"—that "the accusations brought against Rosmini's works were false; that nothing was found therein contrary to Faith or Morals; that their publication and perusal are not dangerous to the faithful." "By this it is not meant," the Master of the Sacred Palace presently adds, "that it is unlawful to dissent from Rosmini's philosophical system . . . . and even to offer a confutation thereof in the schools." But "it is not lawful to inflict any theological censure on the doctrines maintained by him in those works, which the Sacred Congregation has examined and dismissed, and which the Holy Father has intended to protect from further accusations in the future."

2. There is the authoritative Letter of Mgr. Czacki, written in Pius IX.'s name, as to what Catholics are permitted to hold concerning the constitution of *matter*. F. Bottalla, S.J., made this Letter the theme of a pamphlet, which a contributor noticed in the "Dublin Review" for April 1878, pp. 511-513.

3. Last—and of all very far the most important—is the present Holy Father's Encyclical, "Æterni Patris."

I am not aware of anything in these three pronouncements, which would affect any part of the preceding Essay; though there is of course much in them, which would suggest theme for additional

THE CHURCH'S DOCTRINAL UNITY.

[February 1880.]

IN p. 108, note, I spoke of an Essay on "Catholic Controversies," as to be contained in this volume. I had intended to reprint an article, which appeared under that title in April 1869, with considerable additions. I find however that I have no room for this, and must defer it to another occasion. Yet it is really necessary (I may say) to put forth at least a few words, before I conclude, on the theme treated in that article; because the objection therein encountered is so sure to be suggested, by many things contained in the preceding Essays. What I have room to say indeed is necessarily brief and sketchy; yet quite sufficient (I trust) to exhibit a distinct outline of the position I would venture to assume. I speak throughout as in my own personal defence; but everyone will admit, that the personal question involves a most important and practical matter of principle.

remark. All such remark however I postpone for a future occasion. If God permits me to complete the philosophical series with which I am now engaged, and republish the whole in a connected shape—that will be the obvious occasion for a further treatment of the whole question, which concerns the Church's authority in matters primarily philosophical.]

I.

The discussion originates thus. There is no single attribute of the Church on which Catholics lay greater and more reasonable stress—whether in controversy or in theological exposition—than her Doctrinal Unity. But what is the exact *significance* of this attribute? There is a notion, not very uncommonly held among Catholics, which may be thus expressed. According to this view of the Church's Doctrinal Unity—all religious questions whatever, which can be contemplated by a Catholic, are either in the strictest sense closed, or else in the fullest sense open. They are either in the strictest sense closed, so that no one can remain a Catholic without answering them in the one prescribed way; or else they are in the fullest sense open, so that every Catholic is permitted (and even exhorted) by the Church to consider them by his own private judgment. This indeed is that very view of the Church's Doctrinal Unity, which these Catholics account so especially attractive to a Protestant. "If you become a Catholic" they say to him "you will only have to accept certain definite "dogmatic statements, which will be placed before "you in definite intelligible shape; while, externally "to these statements, your intellect will be as free "and unfettered as that of any Protestant in the "world." And (arriving at the point which to me is so practical) such Catholics have censured me severely, for the course which I consistently and promi-

nently pursued in the "Dublin Review." They have censured me severely, for earnestly protesting against this that and the other tenet as anti-Catholic and perilous to the Faith; while at the same time I admit, that an upholder of such tenet does not by that fact actually cease to be a Catholic: "'In necessariis "unitas,'" they say, "'in dubiis libertas.' Nothing "can be 'necessary,' which a Catholic may deny "without actual forfeiture of the Catholic name; "and all things which are not 'necessary' are "doubtful.'" I have been attempting therefore, they consider, to overthrow the Catholic's divinely-given "liberty in things doubtful." I have tyrannized —such is their charge against me—in a high-handed way over the conscience of my co-religionists; and, in my pretended zeal for Dogma, I have assailed what is among the Church's most prominent Dogmata—her teaching on her own Doctrinal Unity.

I entertain profound respect for several of these critics; insomuch that I should feel most uncomfortable, if I failed frankly to encounter their objection. I must submit to them however, with great and sincere deference, that they importantly misunderstand what is *meant* by the Church's Doctrinal Unity.

II.

But first I must beg them at all events to put the saddle on the right horse. Certain Catholics no doubt have been accused, in the "Dublin Review," of

grievous anti-Catholic error; and every effort has been made, that English Catholics in general may regard the doctrine of such Catholics with extreme aversion. Now let me suppose for argument's sake, that so to accuse and condemn the doctrine of those whom I admit to be my fellow-Catholics—is grossly derogatory and insulting to the Church's attribute of Doctrinal Unity. Can any fair-minded person nevertheless accuse *the "Dublin Review"* as responsible for this calamity? You might as well express severe censure on some unlucky medical practitioner, because—when first he settles in some neighbourhood—he finds scarlatina there largely prevalent. Before I began my Editorship, the Cardinal Primate of England had denounced certain English Catholics, as having for years past been destitute "of all reverence in their treatment of persons and things deemed sacred;" as having "grazed over the very edge of the most perilous abysses of error;" as having "habitually preferred un-Catholic to Catholic instincts, tendencies and motives." Cardinal Wiseman added that—in warning his flock against "such dangerous leadership"—he was but obeying the instructions of the Holy See. See p. 3 of this volume. If we are to accept the principles which I am opposing in this Essay—how unseemly and un-Catholic was such a denunciation as this! Unseemly and un-Catholic in Cardinal Wiseman. But much more unseemly and un-Catholic in the Holy Father himself; seeing that the ultimate origination and responsibility of the procedure rested with him. And now on the other hand let it be supposed for a moment, that no Catholic organ

had responded to the Cardinal's denunciation; that no words of censure against the writers thus stigmatized had been heard from the English flock. Is *this* the method which my critics would have preferred, for exhibiting in its full lustre the Church's attribute of Doctrinal Unity? The Pope and English Episcopate denounce as anti-Catholic a certain school of thought, existing in Catholic England; and the whole body of English Catholics tacitly support this school of thought, by refusing to join in the denunciation! I will ask my critics to tell me even on *their* principles—which is the more flagrant violation of the Church's Doctrinal Unity? On one side we have to imagine a passive resistance set forth on principle,—against the united teaching of the Holy See and English Episcopate,—by the united body of English Catholic priests and laymen. On the other side we have to imagine a large number of the latter class sympathizing with and supporting the former, in their struggle against these anti-Catholic Catholics. My critics will no doubt say, that *either* spectacle is deplorable. But I ask them, which is the *more* so? And one or other of the two was under circumstances simply inevitable.

But phenomena of a similar kind have existed, not in England only, but throughout the Church. Pius IX. accounted the duty most urgent of impressing on his spiritual children the fact, that various Catholics have been advocating this or that tenet directly opposed to the Church's teaching. So urgent did he account this duty, that he indulgenced a certain prayer, and wished it to be recited on the same day

by every Catholic throughout the world. I printed this prayer, in July 1875, pp. 37, 8. It contains the following clause:—

"WOULD THAT I COULD OBTAIN ALSO FOR THOSE CATHOLICS WHO STILL PROVE THEMSELVES TO BE SUCH BY MANY OUTWARD ACTS OF CHARITY, BUT WHO THROUGH OBSTINACY IN THEIR OWN OPINIONS REFUSE TO SUBMIT TO THE DECISIONS OF THE HOLY SEE, OR CHERISH SENTIMENTS AT VARIANCE WITH HER TEACHING, THAT THEY SHOULD SEE THEIR ERRORS AND BECOME PERSUADED THAT HE WHO HEARETH NOT THE CHURCH IN ALL THINGS HEARETH NOT GOD WHO IS WITH HER."

Pius IX. then laboured to impress on each one of his subjects a conviction, that one chief danger of the time—for the removal of which special prayer should be offered to Almighty God—is the existence of Catholics, who will not receive the full infallible teaching of the Holy See and the Church. On reading the prayer as a whole, we shall find that three principal things were (in his judgment) especially needed at that particular time. These were, (1) that sinners (including of course formal heretics) be converted; (2) that Catholics be roused to zeal for God's glory and the Church's interests; (3) that a certain body of Catholics,—who in some sense indeed are zealous, but who are doctrinally unsound—may at last submit themselves to the full teaching of God and the Church.

I may mention two erroneous tenets in particular, which no doubt he had specially in his mind, when he counselled such a prayer. One of

these is that, which denies the necessity of his Civil Princedom in order to the Church's well-being; and the other is that commonly called "Liberal Catholicism." I will here speak only of the latter; but what is said concerning it may most easily be applied to the former also. A fair sample of Pius IX.'s habitual language in reference to this tenet, may be seen in a collection which I published (April 1876) of certain Letters, issued by him within the space of hardly more than one year. In these Letters he pronounces (1) that his various censures of liberalism have been directed—not against non-Catholic liberals—but against certain Catholics (p. 490); (2) that "Liberal Catholicism" is a "culpable doctrine," which "endeavours to conciliate light with darkness, truth with error" (p. 493); (3) that "Liberal Catholics are more dangerous and injurious than declared enemies"; (4) that they "esteem themselves wiser than the Church, to which has been promised specially and eternally divine assistance" (p. 488).*

* I speak exclusively of Pius IX., because all which I wrote on such matters was under his reign. But on these two themes—The Pope's Civil Princedom and "Liberal Catholicism"—our present Holy Father has spoken no less decidedly and unmistakeably. I begin with the former.

Here is an extract from his address last year to the Catholic journalists; recorded in the "Tablet," of March 1, 1879. I italicize a phrase or two. "Above all things," said the Pontiff, "you should be perfect in the same sense and in the same mind, adhering with a firm assent to *the Doctrines and Decisions of the Catholic Church.* And the necessity of this concord appears the

Now let us suppose for a moment, that no Catholic writer had been found to express his acceptance of the

greater when we consider that, even *among those who are numbered among Catholics*, there are some who take it upon themselves to decide and define *on their private judgment* public controversies of the gravest moment, which concern even the condition of the Apostolic See; and appear to entertain opinions" concerning the Pope's Civil Princedom, "which cannot be reconciled with the liberty and dignity of the Roman Pontiff, &c. &c. &c." Now the Doctrine which Leo XIII. proceeds to lay down on his Civil Princedom, neither is de fide immediatâ, nor can by possibility be so defined. In other words—the contradictory of that Doctrine neither is now a heresy, nor can by possibility *ever* be a heresy. Yet he claims from his spiritual children "assent to the Decisions of the Catholic Church" on the subject; and proceeds to set forth the calamities which would ensue, if Catholics held thereon an erroneous notion.

Next let me give some extracts from the Encyclical "Quod Apostoloci," issued by the Holy Father on December 28, 1878, which may be seen in the "Dublin Review" of April 1879. My references are to the two paragraphs in pp. 507, 508; as showing what is the Holy Father's language, in regard to those "principles of 1789" which are (as it were) the rallying flag of "Liberal Catholicism." At a certain period, he says, the detestable doctrines of the Reformation came to issue in the fact, that "by a new impiety *unheard of among the very heathens*, States were constituted on the method of paying no regard to God, nor to the institutions appointed by Him [ordinis ab Eo præstituti]." The seed of this error had been cherished in various secret societies; and from the first moment when these societies came into existence, they were denounced by the contemporary Popes, Clement XII. and Benedict XIV. At a later period—so Leo XIII. continues—these tenets were openly professed by the French philosophers; "a certain unbridled liberty was ascribed to man; and *a new principle of political right was invented and began to be publicly sanctioned*, which is opposed both to the natural and the divine law. [Jus novum, ut aiunt, contra naturalem divinamque

Pope's ex cathedrâ teaching, or to aim at inculcating and defending it. Let us suppose for a moment, that the accents of the Apostolic Voice had been followed by no echo from the Church's children. Well—various comments might have been made on such a fact, by various

legem confingi et sanciri cæptum est.]" At once Pius VI. of happy memory, who then was Pope, "set forth *in his public teachings* the evil nature and the falsehood of those doctrines." "But when nevertheless" these notions "daily obtained greater hold on the conviction of peoples, nay and became the recognized maxims of kingdoms—Pius VII. and Leo XII. anathematized those secret societies" which especially cherished them. "Lastly," concludes the Pontiff, "it is manifest to all, with what most weighty words, and with how great firmness and persistency of spirit, our glorious predecessor Pius IX. of happy memory—by Allocutions and Encyclical Letters—contended, whether [generally] against those evil endeavours of the sects, or [particularly] against the plague of socialism thence bursting forth." And Leo XIII. had said just before, that the warnings to which he refers were put forth by his Predecessors, in order that "they might protect the Lord's flock from hostile snares" and "provide for the salvation (saluti) of the faithful."

When did Pius IX. ever use more emphatic language than this? That a state should be constituted on the method of paying no regard to God and the institutions appointed by Him—is pronounced to be "a new impiety unknown to the very heathens." The new principle of "political right," inaugurated in 1789, is denounced as being "in opposition both to the natural and the divine law."

As regards the intensely pernicious and anti-Catholic tendency of "Liberal Catholicism"—I would refer my readers to two admirable articles by F. Ramière, S.J., of which I published a translation in the "Dublin Review" of July 1875 and January 1876. Perhaps also I may, without impertinence, draw attention to Cardinal Manning's article in the "North American Review" of February 1880.

spectators, from various points of view. But surely the very strangest and drollest of all possible comments would be, that this startling doctrinal chasm, between the general body of the Church and her divinely-appointed Teacher, exhibited with signal emphasis her attribute of *Doctrinal Unity*.*

Let me sum up my argument as far as I have gone. There are certain tenets, of which I admit that a man may profess them without thereby actually ceasing to be a Catholic; but in regard to which nevertheless I have maintained, that they have been infallibly pronounced false, and that they are grievously injurious to the spiritual interests of mankind. It is objected, that such language as this is grossly disparaging to the Church's attribute of Doctrinal Unity. I reply, that it is not an individual writer, but the divinely-appointed "Teacher of Christians," who has set the example of such language. I reply again, that the Ecclesia Docens has repeatedly confirmed, in this respect, the utterances of her visible Head. No individual Catholic has any further responsibility in the matter, except for following the doctrinal guidance of that authority, which Christ has *given* him to be his doctrinal guide.

* I am not of course implying, that the Pontiff was actually speaking ex cathedrâ in the particular Letters from which I have quoted. But in those Letters—as on so many other occasions—he testified that he *had* condemned "Liberal Catholicism" ex cathedrâ.

III.

Now however I come to the merits of the question itself. The objector implies such a thesis as the following: "It is inconsistent with the Church's "attribute of Doctrinal Unity"—such is his notion—"that any tenet, which a man may profess without "thereby ceasing to be a Catholic, can be grievously "injurious to the spiritual interests of mankind; or "again can be such, that every Catholic is under the "obligation of repudiating it as infallibly false." I reply, that were this thesis true—the Church's Doctrinal Unity (if it ever existed at all) would have long since ceased to exist. I reply that—were this thesis true—the Church herself (in opposition to Christ's promises) would have long since been brought to an end, if indeed she ever had had a beginning.

Firstly then. If this thesis were true, the Church's Doctrinal Unity could not co-exist with her habit of pronouncing *minor doctrinal censures*. Yet this habit (as every one knows) has prevailed for many centuries. Here let us fix our ideas by one instance. Fénélon's quietistic doctrine was stigmatized ex cathedrâ with various minor censures, but was not condemned as heretical. Let me suppose that a number of his adherents had avowedly continued to maintain his doctrine, as expressed in the very words of his condemned propositions. No one could possibly say that they would thereby cease to be Catholics; because no part of Fénélon's doctrine was condemned as heretical. And yet every Catholic would have been under the strict obligation, of regarding the doctrine,

held by these his brethren in the Faith, with profound aversion. He would have been under the strict obligation of accounting it "temerarious, scandalous, ill-sounding, offensive to pious ears, pernicious in practice, and even erroneous." The upholders of this doctrine would not as such actually cease to be Catholics. But they would nevertheless be grievously unsound, disloyal, Catholics; and would reasonably rank among the most dangerous enemies of the Church and the Truth. In one respect (as Pius IX. said of the "Liberal Catholics") they would be greater enemies to the Faith than heretics are. Because it is the Church alone which can successfully combat for the Truth; and these men would so grievously clog her wheels and hamper her action.

What I have said here, applies (as is evident) to every one of those innumerable instances, in which (during so many centuries) the Church has stigmatized this or that tenet with some minor doctrinal censure. But I submit to learned men whether, from her very cradle, her position have not been practically the same; whether she have not habitually regarded incipient heresy, or constructive heresy, as very far more nearly akin to heresy than to orthodoxy. Space does not permit me to set forth those instances, which have at once occurred to my own mind; and (still less) to search for more. But I will go back to the beginning. I suppose no one will maintain, that the whole number of Judaizers were simply heretical and external to the Church. Yet S. Paul habitually assails them with a severity of invective, with which no language of

Pius IX.'s concerning the "Liberal Catholics" can bear a moment's comparison.*

The whole objection then—so I must maintain—proceeds on a totally mistaken notion of what is *meant* by the Church's Doctrinal Unity. And I will now therefore proceed to set forth—though I must do so in the merest and most naked skeleton outline—what I apprehend that Doctrine to be. I most earnestly submit what I shall say to the judgment of more competent theologians. Of course I believe that it will be found in entire accordance with their principles, because otherwise I should not maintain it. But I have not been able to find in them an express treatment of the question, under that precise aspect in which I am here obliged to consider it.

IV.

I begin with premising what I have so often pressed in my earlier Essays. The method appointed by God, in order to the instruction of individuals in Christian doctrine, is not that they learn by rote certain doctrinal formulæ, but something immeasurably more living and efficacious. God's method is, that they surrender themselves in a spirit of humility and docility to the Church's authoritative system; that is, to the various influences which have her encouragement and sanction.† In fact Cardinal Newman teaches

* See what I have said in my "Essays on Devotional and Scriptural Subjects," p. 278.

† I may quote in illustration some remarks I made in April 1876, pp. 285, 286.

us that, in the early centuries, the Church was very unwilling to put Dogmata into words at all; and only

"The whole course of our remarks will have shown the fundamental mistake involved in a certain impression, which no one (we suppose) would quite deliberately and consciously entertain, but which seems in some sense to possess the mind of not so very few. Several Catholics, we fancy, think vaguely about Revelation, as though Dogma had sprung up at once full-grown, nay, like Minerva, clothed in full armour; as though in the very First Century Catholics had been taught the phrases 'Three Persons in One Nature,' 'One Person in Two Natures'; as though the distinction between actual and habitual grace had from the first eo nomine been distinctly placed before them; as though the Dogma of Original Sin, and the effect of Baptism in remitting such sin, had been explicitly announced in terms to the whole flock. When persons were more or less possessed with such a notion as this, we cannot be surprised that the Definition of the Immaculate Conception or of Papal Infallibility should have plunged them into some perplexity. In the same spirit the Döllingerites used to say in 1869–70, that the whole office of Bishops assembled in Council is to testify each the Tradition of his own diocese; and that an Œcumenical Council has no other authority, than is involved in such testification. This from persons, who boasted forsooth of their 'scientific history'! As though Catholic Tradition could be reported, textually as it were, to Nicæa or Chalcedon from the orbis terrarum; in the way in which statistical facts are reported: the population, e.g., of some city; or the number of Catholics included in that population.

"And such persons, by another kindred mistake, attach an unreal and untenable sense to the Church's attribute of Doctrinal Unity. They picture to themselves Christian faith, as having always consisted in the acceptance of a certain fixed phraseology; though of course they do not forget that the said phraseology receives additions as time advances. He who accepts this authorized phraseology—such is their unconscious thought—is a Catholic: he who does not accept it, is not a Catholic: and every question, external to this phraseology, is simply an open one; on

did so, "in proportion as the cogency of Apostolic Tradition was weakened by the lapse of time." See his most instructive Section on "the principle of the formation and imposition of Creeds," in "The Arians," Third Edition, pp. 137-154.

I submit then, that the Church's Doctrinal Unity consists essentially in this. She is so guarded by divine laws, and guided by divine superintendence, that whoever surrenders himself to her entire magisterium is infallibly instructed—not in divergent and mutually inconsistent tenets—but on the contrary, in the one body of Divine Truth. This Doctrinal Unity may exist with greater vigour in this time or place than in that. But God has bound Himself by irre-

which every Catholic may think just as he pleases. But Catholic faith has never consisted in this passive and otiose acceptance of a phraseology; and during the very earliest centuries in fact, there was extremely little fixed Catholic phraseology for any one to accept. In *those* centuries at all events, in order to apprehend Christian Dogma, it was necessary to study the Church's mind; and such study would be of course much more effectively performed by one Catholic than by another. In *the earliest* centuries at all events, to say that A was a more docile Catholic than B,—might or might not be a *true* affirmation; but it was as simply *intelligible*, as to say that he was more charitable to the poor, or more veracious, or more austere in life. It meant that he was more earnest than B, in giving due weight to the Church's authoritative intimations. In S. Paul's own time some Christians were more 'spiritual' in their apprehension of Dogma, and others more 'carnal'; some were content with the elements of Christian knowledge, while others went on to perfection. Nor can anyone say with the least appearance of plausibility, that this distinction between Catholic and Catholic ceased, merely because Definitions increased and multiplied."

vocable promise, to prevent doctrinal imperfection or divergency from proceeding beyond certain comparatively narrow limits.

This is that attribute of Doctrinal Unity, which is so attractive to externs, in proportion as they may have been trained by the Holy Ghost in habits of humility and docility. Here is the broad contrast—which words can hardly exaggerate — between the Establishment or any other Protestant sect and the Catholic Church. In Protestant sects, to each man is left the impossible task of discriminating for himself between religious truth and error. But in the Catholic Church, what is claimed at his hands is his joyous and unreserved surrender to authoritative guidance.

Next for the means by which God *secures* Doctrinal Unity in the Church. They are (I think) principally these. Firstly He has enacted a law—which no merely ecclesiastical authority therefore can transgress—that no one is a member of the Visible Church, who shall deny any Dogma taught by the Ecclesia Docens as an integral part of the Deposit. Correlatively with this —He has endowed the Holy See with Infallibility in defining any such Dogma ; and He secures by unintermittent superintendence, that no Pope ever admits to his communion any persons known to him as denying what the Church has taught as revealed Truth.

This whole provision however—if it stood alone—would be greatly and conspicuously inadequate for the proposed end. He has supplemented it therefore in various ways. Thus He has endowed the Holy

See with Infallibility, in declaring various non-revealed truths; in regard to which she may judge, that her infallible declaration of them is necessary or important for preserving the Church in that Doctrinal Unity, which I just now explained. The Pope of the day is not bound by God's law to *exclude from his communion* those who repudiate any truths so declared; though (I conceive) he has full power of thus excluding them, if to him it seem good. Each successive Pontiff is entrusted by God with the sacred duty, of labouring towards the preservation and increase of Doctrinal Unity, by the free *use* both of infallible Definitions and of disciplinary enactments. One Pope may perform this duty more energetically or judiciously than another; though it is absurd to suppose that his contemporaries can confidently judge, how far this may be the fact. But God infallibly secures by His Providence, that no series of Popes be so neglectful of their duty, as to impair the Church's Doctrinal Unity in more than a comparatively small degree.

If this view of doctrine be accepted—an important result obviously follows. When S. Paul denounced the Judaizers,* or Pius IX. the "Liberal Catholics,"—either Teacher was so far from injuring the Church's attribute of Doctrinal Unity, that on the contrary he was promoting it in the very way approved by God. On the other hand when unorthodox and ill-advised (however excellently intentioned) Catholics deny the necessity of the Pope's Civil Princedom, or again

* Each Apostle of course was a Universal Teacher.

defend the modern liberties as a social blessing,—they are so far from vindicating Christian Liberty and Doctrinal Unity, that they are fighting in the very opposite camp. They are (most unintentionally) labouring to substitute disunion for Unity, and the slavery of private opinion for the liberty of divinely-authenticated Truth. No other Catholic is so grievous an enemy to the Church's Doctrinal Unity, as he who professes his intention of believing no more, than what he is *obliged* to believe under pain of forfeiting the Catholic name.

V.

It only remains to consider how these principles affect the question, what conditions of belief must be fulfilled by externs, in order to their reception into the Catholic Church. And one conclusion is at once evident from what has been said. No person can become a member of the Church, who is not prepared to accept with divine faith every Dogma, which the Church may propose as part of the Deposit. He must be prepared at this moment to accept all the Dogmata so proposed at this moment, whether by Definition or by the Church's ordinary magisterium. He must be prepared to accept them, whether they are known to him individually or unknown to him. Further he must be prepared at this moment to accept with divine faith—not only those Dogmata which the Church now proposes as immediately

revealed,—but those which she may *hereafter* so propose. All this — I conceive — is fixed by God's irrevocable law. Those who are *not* so disposed as I describe, cannot possibly become members of the body of the Catholic Church; even though some priest unwittingly went through the external form of their reception.

On the other hand a priest is *not* obliged by the divine law to place distinctly before the mind of postulants their obligation of assent to those many infallible judgments, which are not Definitions *of faith*. The priest may leave such persons in their (presumably) invincible ignorance of such obligation —or on the contrary may dispel it—according to his view of what in the particular case may be spiritually expedient.

On this question of spiritual expediency—though it is but indirectly connected with my theme—I may make one suggestion. In regard to certain ritualists, F. Hutton says ("The Anglican Ministry," p. 13) that "no priest who understood their temper would be willing formally to receive them into the Church, without some considerable period of probation." Nothing is more conceivable, than that this or that candidate for admission may be willing to accept (as far as words go) certain authoritative formulæ; and may nevertheless be grievously destitute of loyalty to the Church's magisterium. It might be a very useful precautionary medicine, to impress on such a man the very large amount of intellectual captivity, which is the lot of a good Catholic. I may refer to what I

have said in pp. 319-326. On the other hand there may be many—full of loyal intentions towards the Church—in whose mind grave and very injurious misconception might arise from such a course. After they become Catholics—in proportion as they learn that this or that belief is required at their hands,—in that proportion they will also see the reasonableness of such belief, and its harmony with truths already known to them. On this I have touched in pp. 192-196.

Nevertheless I would again submit to my readers' consideration what I urged in April 1869, p. 376. "Individualism" I said "or private judgment was involved indeed as a principle in Protestantism from the first; yet only by slow degrees has it been carried into practical effect. For some two centuries and more, the religion of Protestants, with certain rare exceptions, was a corporate religion. Lutheran, Calvinistic, Zuinglian, Socinian societies differed from the Catholic Church in certain prominent tenets; and the recognized office of private judgment was to examine the foundation of those respective tenets. This task once performed, the inquirer united himself to one or other of these societies as the case might be; and proceeded to adopt 'en masse,' as a matter of course, the whole remaining assemblage of its doctrines and practices. It is very evident how fundamentally different is the present attitude of educated and thinking Protestants; and what vast strides have been made in the habit of individualism." The cases then may well be very far more numerous now than

they were even fifty years ago, in which true spiritual policy will prompt rather to most fully stating, than to in any way understating, the amount of profound intellectual submission required from a Catholic.

Such then is that view on the Church's attribute of Doctrinal Unity—expressed in naked skeleton outline—which I submit to the judgment of theologians. If I am favoured by their comments, I hope on a future occasion to set it forth, with due corrections, and with adequate fulness of exposition.

FINIS.

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